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Dovzhenko, Stalin, and the (Re)creation of Shchors
GEORGE O. LIBER
In his 1939 autobiography, the Soviet Ukrainian filmmaker Oleksander
Dovzhenko claimed that the just-released film Shchors (on Mykola Shchors, a
Red Army commander during the Bolshevik Revolution) was his best. He wrote:
Working on the script for Shchors and shooting the film was the most satisfy-
ing experience of my life. It took eleven months to write the script and twenty
months to film it. That was a whole lifetime. I put to full use in Shchors all the
knowledge and experience acquired in twelve years of hard labor. I made it
with all my love and strength as a memorial to the people, a token of my love
. and deep respect for the hero of the great Ukrainian October. I felt that my
creative urges were being expressed not in flimsy celluloid, but in durable
stone or metal fated to survive the centuries. I wanted to be worthy of the
people and of the trust placed in me by the great man [Stalin]. When I fell ill
during the work I could not bear the thought that I might not be able to finish
it.1
But Dovzhenko's filming of Shchors had been more complex and more
frustrating than this account intimates. In a letter to a close friend written on 8
December 1939, only several days after writing his autobiography, he admit-
ted: "I completed Shchors. It was a very difficult film to make and took a good
five years of health from me. And I still have not gotten over it."2
Dovzhenko did not leave a complete summary of his experiences filming
Shchors? What descriptions do exist are fragmentary, if not hagiographie,
accounts written by others. It becomes obvious when reading between the lines
of these narratives that the creation of Shchors presented Dovzhenko with his
greatest challenge. Stalin's personal involvement in the film's production re-
stricted the full expression of Dovzhenko's creativity. In response, the film-
maker became very frustrated, very angry, depressed, and ill, and even contem-
plated suicide. Despite official delays and emotional outbursts which paralyzed
his work, Dovzhenko completed his project and created a socialist realist film
with double meanings.
The film portrays Ukrainian Bolshevik resistance to the intervention forces
of the Central Powers in 1918 and to the army of the Ukrainian National
Republic (UNR) commanded by Symon Petliura during the Civil War. Young
Mykola Shchors leads the Bohun Brigade and the salty old peasant, Vasyl'
Bozhenko, heads the Tarashchansk regiment. Both forces amalgamate under
Shchors' command.
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After Kaiser William IFs abdication in November 1918, the hopes of Ger-
man soldiers stationed in Ukraine of returning home are raised, but their
officers oppose any such moves. Shchors initiates a policy of fraternization
between the Ukrainian and the German enlisted men, which undermines the
authority of the German officers; subsequently, the way is cleared for the
Germans to leave Ukraine.
The film then centers on Shchor's defeat of Petliura at Chernihiv. The
Bolshevik hero soon follows this victory up by capturing Kyiv. A
UNR counteroffensive forces Shchors to retreat; he is injured in a battle at
Berdychiv. Recuperating with other wounded partisans, Shchors discusses his
dreams of the future. The scene then shifts to a distraught Bozhenko who has
learned that counterrevolutionary agents murdered his wife; Shchors consoles
him. The two leaders regroup and rout an invading Polish army. This victory,
however, becomes short-lived. In the summer of 1919, Petliura's troops sweep
across Ukraine. Mortally wounded during one of Petliura's attacks, Bozhenko
dies. His men carry him to his grave, where Shchors delivers the eulogy. The
film ends with Shchors reviewing the troops at his newly established school for
Red Army officers.4
Although it comprised an unevenly developed plot, Shchors conformed to
the guidelines set by the official Soviet policy of socialist realism. The film
depicts a dedicated, selfless, and zealous revolutionary hero who overcame
great odds by his faith in Lenin and by the force of his will. As a politically and
militarily infallible protagonist, Shchors dominates the film. When Shchors
appeared in 1939, it joined a group of films, such as the Vasiliev Brothers'
Chapaev (1934) and Sergei Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky (1938), that dealt
with, as one scholar put it, "powerful individuals from Russian and Soviet
history, all of which were designed to provide precedent and legitimation for
Stalin's authority."5
Dovzhenko completed Shchors, his first reinterpretation of the Revolution
and Civil War since Arsenal in 1929, during the peak of Stalin's power. In
creating this film, he skillfully negotiated between the conflicting demands of
his own creative muse and Stalin's interpretation of the Revolution and Civil
War. In doing so, he took great risks and managed to square the circle, but at
great emotional cost to himself.
Stalin's Initiative
As he edited Aerograd at the end of 1934, Dovzhenko hoped to start shooting
two new films in 1935: Tsar (described as "a social satire based on the Imperi-
alist War of 1914-1918") and Paradise Lost and Found ("about a new ice
age").6 But Stalin had other plans for the filmmaker.
During the fifteenth-anniversary celebrations of Soviet cinematography in
early 1935, the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the Supreme Soviet
honored Dovzhenko, together with the film director Vsevolod Pudovkin and
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Boris Shumiatskii, the head of the Main Administration of the Soviet Cinema
Industry. As M. I. Kalinin, TsIK's chairman and the nominal president of the
USSR, awarded Dovzhenko the Order of Lenin on 27 February 1935, Stalin,
who stood close to the podium, allegedly remarked of the filmmaker, "he has
an obligation—to create a Ukrainian Chapaev."7
Chapaev appeared in 1934 and became extremely popular, selling over 50
million tickets in five years.8 The film celebrates a newly resurrected hero of
the Civil War, V. I. Chapaev, who commands a rifle division against various
anti-Bolshevik armies. Chapaev, an uneducated peasant who fights coura-
geously, possesses good political instincts and understands that the Bolsheviks
represent the future. But without the guidance of their representative, the
commissar, Chapaev would have been defeated. Under the commissar's watch-
ful eye, Chapaev's class consciousness grows and he wins on the battlefield.
Although he ultimately dies a heroic death in battle at the end of the film, his
Red Army division triumphs. Thus, the hero might die, but the cause is invin-
cible.9 In suggesting that Dovzhenko make a film about a Ukrainian Chapaev,
Stalin was, in effect, proposing that Dovzhenko cinematographically flesh out
a highly sensitive topic—the Revolution and Civil War—which the Commu-
nist Party had begun to reinterpret along revisionist (Stalinist) lines by the early
1930s.
Following the presentation of the awards, Stalin asked Dovzhenko if he
knew of Mykola Oleksandrovych Shchors and his significance. When
Dovzhenko affirmed that he did, the Soviet ruler then advised him to "think
about him."10
Dovzhenko had little choice but to agree to Stalin's proposal of producing a
film on the Bolshevik military leader. On 12 March 1935, Dovzhenko publicly
revealed for the first time that his next film would deal with Shchors, who
hitherto had not been among the best known of Bolshevik figures in
Ukraine.11 Indeed, before 27 February 1935, most Soviet journalists and schol-
ars could not identify Shchors. But after Pravda published (on 5 March)
Stalin's remarks from the aforementioned fifteenth-anniversary conclave,
which raised Shchors to cult hero status, they instantly "discovered" Shchors
and reevaluated his contributions to the Bolshevik cause. Shchors now became
"one of the organizers and commanders of the first units of the Red Army in
Ukraine." Together with the help of the "fraternal Russian people and the
heroic units of the Red Army," this Ukrainian Bolshevik liberated Ukraine
"from counterrevolution."12
These hyperbolic declarations, however, contradicted historical reality.
Shchors was born on 25 May 1895 in the village of SnovsTce (now Shchors) in
the Horodnia county of the province of Chernihiv. The son of a railway
mechanic, he completed his education at a school ran by the Russian railway
administration. He then received training as a military medic, serving in this
capacity at the beginning of the First World War. After completing officer
training school in 1915, he became a junior officer in the tsarist army.13
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It is unclear when Shchors developed his Bolshevik sympathies, but he
certainly identified with the Communist cause by September 1918, when he
formed the pro-Soviet Bohun Brigade. In February 1919 his unit helped to
capture Kyiv, and in March 1919 he became the commander of the First Soviet
Ukrainian Division.14
Although Shchors clearly did participate in the Revolution and the Civil
War, he did not play the central role the Party claimed of him after February
1935. Shchors was, in fact, a rather problematic hero. In August 1919, one
month short of his death, Red Army military inspectors complained that
Shchors, who had earlier objected to former tsarist officers giving him orders,
had an inflated ego and was not qualified to be a division commander.15 These
same inspectors further argued that Shchors should be held responsible for his
unit's defeat and face trial before a revolutionary court.16
Despite such evidence against him, Stalin's Party machine insisted on repre-
senting Shchors as a selfless Bolshevik revolutionary hero. Reviving a second-
ary figure from the Civil War's memory hole, Stalin exaggerated Shchors'
accomplishments, not unlike the way the Party leader magnified his own feats.
Now Dovzhenko had to apply Stalin's interpretation to film.
In order to coherently portray this myth, Dovzhenko had to gather details
about the new Bolshevik hero. His research became extensive. Already in mid-
March 1935, Dovzhenko met with several groups of veterans from Shchors'
division then living in Moscow and listened "attentively" to their stories. He
also heard the reminiscences of Mykola Shchors' brother, Hryhorii. In addi-
tion, Dovzhenko received over 13,000 letters and brief memoirs from all across
the USSR from veterans who had served under Shchors.17
On 28 April 1935, Dovzhenko traveled to Kyiv in order to examine the
materials that the Ukrainfilm's Historico-Literary Bureau had gathered on
Shchors after Stalin proclaimed him the "Ukrainian Chapaev."18Dovzhenko's
trip of April 1935, his first to Ukraine since his departure from there in late
1932, went well. He arrived triumphantly, having become Stalin's client in the
spring of 1933 and having his mission to produce a film about Shchors publi-
cized extensively in the spring of 1935.19 For nearly a year, until March 1936,
Dovzhenko traveled back and forth between Moscow and Kyiv in order to
work on Shchors. As he proceeded to research Shchors, Dovzhenko continued
to edit Aerograd (until November 1935).20 Working on these two projects
simultaneously, Dovzhenko likely pushed himself to the brink of exhaustion.
The combination of meetings, letters, and research trips generated an enor-
mous volume of "facts" concerning Shchors. According to one newspaper
correspondent who observed him, Dovzhenko often selected only a phrase or
an allusion from these mountains of paper in order to create the Bolshevik
commander's personal and professional characteristics.21 After receiving 38
thick files on Shchors from Ukrainfilm's Historico-Literary Bureau, the film-
maker claimed that they described "the same things six, eight, and ten times,
but in different ways . . . I am beginning slowly to become aware that those
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who remember, 'remember' for a certain reason . . . I must admit that there is
not one exact episode. I created everything."22
Written shortly after Stalin constructed the cult of Shchors, the reminis-
cences and memoirs appeared inconsistent to Dovzhenko. In light of the public
campaign, the memoirs most likely delivered positive .versions of the past,
providing "facts" and vignettes which Shchors' former comrades-in-arms an-
ticipated would please those collecting the memoirs. But the "facts" were
insufficient: Dovzhenko needed to establish a coherent vision.
Building on the memoirs' fictions, Dovzhenko established a framework for
Shchors' revolutionary activities. In doing so, he created an even greater fiction
than Stalin's. For personal and professional reasons, he hoped that Stalin would
be pleased.
Dovzhenko had good reason to be concerned. Between 27 February 1935,
when Stalin first presented his idea to Dovzhenko, and March 1939, when the
film finally appeared, the Soviet leader met with Dovzhenko several times. The
first meeting took place in Stalin's Kremlin office on 22 May 1935. Initially,
the Soviet leader asked the filmmaker questions about Aerograd. He then
focused on Shchors.23 Stalin, according to Dovzhenko's account, repeated that
he only suggested that the filmmaker consider making a film about Shchors.
Dovzhenko was not obliged to do so, Stalin claimed. If he had other plans, then
he should work on them.
Dovzhenko thanked Stalin for his concern, but replied that the idea of
making a film about Shchors excited him. At this meeting Stalin spoke much
about Shchors, about the differences between Shchors and Chapaev, and about
the challenges in creating a film about this Civil War hero.24
Stalin proposed that the film portray the struggle of the Ukrainian people
with the "Ukrainian counterrevolution and with the German and Polish occupi-
ers for their social and national liberation." At the same time, it was necessary
"to show the Ukrainian people, especially their national character, their humor,
their beautiful songs and dances."25 The Soviet leader wanted to remind the
director that Shchors, Dovzhenko's first film dealing with a Ukrainian topic in
three years, should reflect the new Soviet interpretations of the Ukrainian past.
Ukrainian songs and dances would provide the national form; the message,
however, had to possess a socialist content.
Most importantly, the film would present a revisionist message: that the
Ukrainians were an integral part of the Bolshevik Revolution and that they,
assisted by the "fraternal Russian people" and the "heroic units of the Red
Army," won the struggle against Ukrainian, Polish, and German counterrevolu-
tionaries. Shchors would commemorate a Ukrainian Bolshevik leader and
suggest that the efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, not a reliance on Bolshe-
vik intervention from Russia, constituted the primary source of the Communist
victory in Ukraine.
At the end of the meeting, Stalin mentioned a recently released record of
Ukrainian folk songs. "Have you heard this record?" he asked the filmmaker.
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"No, I haven't," Dovzhenko replied. "I don't have a record player."
An hour after Dovzhenko returned home from the Kremlin, the filmmaker
received a record player, a gift from the Soviet leader. In an interview pub-
lished shortly after this meeting, Dovzhenko claimed that he would keep the
record player to the end of his life. "In what other country would workers and
artists, scholars and authors," he asked rhetorically, "feel such a direct intimacy
with their beloved leader and feel our glorious Party's and Comrade Stalin's
daily concerns?"26
But in the company of his closest friends, Dovzhenko asserted that Stalin
gave him the record player and the Ukrainian record to remind the filmmaker
of his nationalist past.27 Stalin most likely knew of Dovzhenko's service in
Petliura's army and of his arrest and conviction in 1919.28 His gift represented
a warning shot: if Dovzhenko did not produce a film that conformed to the
Party leader's standards (according to the filmmaker's interpretation of Stalin's
motivations behind the gift), then trouble would follow.
Searching for an Interpretation
Not surprisingly, the filmmaker experienced problems in the making of
Shchors,. During the course of its production, Dovzhenko's loyalty and political
reliability came into serious question. His emotional stability deteriorated;
fears, anxieties, and feelings of insecurity weakened him.
He often became ill for long periods. On 22 April 1937, Dovzhenko wrote a
letter to his friend, Vsevolod Vyshnevskii, in which he mentioned his poor
health: "I have a sclerosis of my blood vessels, especially in my head and aorta.
I do not feel well. I quickly get tired and do not always think clearly."29 In
order to take advantage of the winter weather necessary for critical scenes in
the film, Dovzhenko had begun to film Shchors before the authorities had
completely approved his screenplay. He hoped to save an entire year; the
winter scenes were close to completion when Shumiatskii ordered Dovzhenko
to stop.30
After a four-month illness (from September 1937 until January 1938),
Dovzhenko started to film the now officially approved scenes.31 Coronary
disease then confined Dovzhenko to bed for three months in 1938.32 Following
the production of Shchors in March 1939, he again became sick and did not
recover until September 1939.33 The conflict between Dovzhenko's wish to
conform and his desire to preserve his own creative integrity may have caused
his illnesses.
In seeking to implement Stalin's suggestion, Dovzhenko feared that the
actors he had selected, especially those in the primary roles, might not please
the Soviet leader. After completing half the film with one actor in the title role,
Dovzhenko started anew with another.34 Finally, in the fall of 1937, the
filmmaker chose a third actor, Ievgenii Samoilov, to play Shchors.35 A
Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (NKVD) intelligence officer provided a
THE (RE)CREATION OF SHCHORS 277
very perceptive report of the director's inability to find a good actor to play the
main hero: "I think that Dovzhenko's dissatisfaction with the actors who
played Shchors has a more complex reason than the incompatibility of this or
that actor. Dovzhenko's creative dissatisfaction with the image of Shchors
caused this hypercriticism."36
Perhaps. But Dovzhenko experienced a much greater frustration in the late
1930s. The historical context behind Shchors' image constantly changed. Be-
tween 1935 and 1939 Soviet historians rewrote the official history of the
Revolution and Civil War, erasing the contributions of recent purge victims
and replacing them with the newly expanded roles played by Lenin and Stalin.
Dovzhenko's project became an integral part of this revisionist process. Cen-
sors, for example, arbitrarily altered sequences to conform to the latest changes
in the official record.37 Most importantly, Dovzhenko had to second-guess the
contours of what was politically acceptable.
This had been Dovzhenko's problem with Earth (1930) and Ivan (1932).
Over the course of their long-term production the Party changed course and left
Dovzhenko, who could not transform his films as quickly as the Politburo
could issue decrees, open to attack.
The Stalinist regime in the 1930s forced the filmmaker to submit every
decision and every episode to groups of people "who knew what Stalin
wanted." These critics, for example, asserted that Stalin wished Dovzhenko to
show that Shchors' staff was better than Chapaev's; averred that the Soviet
leader wanted Dovzhenko to depict a peasant insurrection in the film; ex-
pressed the hope that Dovzhenko would use Stalin's remarks concerning the
national question; and strongly suggested that Dovzhenko make Shchors the
leading political representative of the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy in
Ukraine.38
D. V. Petrovslcyi, a writer and a veteran of the First Soviet Ukrainian
Division who knew Shchors personally, reviewed the screenplay and excerpts
from scenes Dovzhenko had shot. He claimed that Dovzhenko fleshed out
Bozhenko more than he did Shchors. PetrovsTcyi asserted that Arkadii
Kisliakov, the second of the three actors who portrayed Shchors, did not fit the
role and needed to be replaced. Most importantly, Petrovsicyi professed that the
portrayal of Shchors dying in the arms of Ivan Dubovyi—his second-in-com-
mand—the climactic moment in one of the earlier versions of the film, proved
highly unsatisfactory. It "does not uplift the viewer." In order to arouse the
viewer's enthusiasm, PetrovsTcyi suggested that Dovzhenko add a revolution-
ary call to arms, such as "Let's recapture Kyiv!" to this scene. In the film's
final frames, according to Petrovsliyi, the First Soviet Ukrainian Division,
inspired by Shchors' death, should retake Kyiv. This, PetrovsTcyi concluded,
would be the proper cinematic response.39
In addition to these critics, Dovzhenko experienced more late-night meet-
ings with Stalin, some of which were not as pleasant as the first few. The
filmmaker later told friends about one frightening incident in Stalin's office,
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when the Soviet leader refused to speak to Dovzhenko and when Beria accused
him of joining a nationalist conspiracy.40
It is unclear why Stalin and Beria were angry with the filmmaker. But
perhaps it had to do with the portrayal—or lack thereof—of Stalin's role. At
the height of Stalin's "cult of personality," it was difficult to portray a hero of
the Ukrainian people who did not mention Stalin.41 Or perhaps Dovzhenko
received orders to include Stalin in his film, but did not comply.42 Most likely,
however, the cultural commissars imagined Stalin's inclusion to be an unspo-
ken assumption and realized that the filmmaker did not understand this new
political custom. Whatever the reason for the official displeasure, the expecta-
tion of subscription to Stalin's personality cult remained as ever before;
Dovzhenko, however, did not conform.
In his own defense, the filmmaker claimed that he could not introduce a
scene of Stalin or characters discussing him without violating the historical or
artistic truth of the film's material.43 During the Civil War Shchors did not
report to Stalin. Few rank and file soldiers even knew of Stalin at the time. In
the scenes portraying Shchors' talks with his own troops (who would not have
been able to identify Stalin, a member of the Party's inner circle since 1912),
Dovzhenko could not show his hero equating Stalin with Lenin.
The filmmaker also did not include a scene where Shchors allegedly met
Lenin. If he had captured this scene on film, he would have had to conform to
the custom established by Soviet filmmakers in the 1930s of assigning Stalin to
Lenin's side. Instead, according to one of Dovzhenko's colleagues, the film-
maker chose to do otherwise. "I did not want to show this," Dovzhenko told
this colleague. "I therefore only limited myself to Shchors' mentioning his
conversation with Lenin."44 Stalin's absence from Shchors raised the issue of
Dovzhenko's true feelings for the Party leader.
Dovzhenko's situation became more precarious after the arrest of Ivan
Dubovyi, Shchors' former deputy, in early 1938 and his subsequent execution
on 29 July 1938. An important Red Army officer, Dubovyi commanded the
First Soviet Ukrainian Division, which he handed over to Shchors in the spring
of 1919. After Shchors' death, he again commanded this division. From 1924
he commanded the Kyiv Rifle Corps, then in 1929 became deputy commander
of the Ukrainian Military District (under lona Iakir) and, after a reorganization
in 1935, the commander of the Kharkiv Military District.45 Dubovyi be-
friended Dovzhenko and became a military consultant for Shchors and also a
character in the film.
Dubovyi's relationship with Iakir marked him. After the arrest, trial, and
hasty execution of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (the deputy commissar of
defense), of Iakir, and other important military commanders on 11 June 1937,
Stalin called for the extermination of "enemies of the people" in the army.46
Stalin's subordinates suspected that Dubovyi had made unauthorized contacts
with Germans and Ukrainian nationalists abroad.47 Arrested in early 1938,
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Dubovyi confessed that he killed Shchors in battle "in order to take his place as
commander of the division."48
We can only imagine Dovzhenko's vulnerability following Dubovyi's ar-
rest, confession, and execution, especially since the arrest took place in
Dovzhenko's presence at the Kyiv Film Studios.49 In essence, the NKVD
arrested Dovzhenko's own military advisor in the middle of production and
"unmasked" him as the murderer of the film's title character.
This Kafkaesque turn of events not only complicated the conclusion of the
film, but also put Dovzhenko in grave danger. Before Dubovyi's arrest, the
director envisioned Shchors to be dying on the battlefield and passing his
command over to Dubovyi. Now, in order to save his own skin, Dovzhenko
had to rewrite and to refilm Shchors.50
Dubovyi now became Dovzhenko's central problem. Shchors' deputy could
not appear in the film, unless Dovzhenko presented him as "an enemy of the
people"; Dovzhenko, however, felt that Dubovyi had been unjustly treated and
executed.51
Dovzhenko did not want to portray Dubovyi killing Shchors in his film. But
if the filmmaker did not want to follow the official interpretation, he had to edit
Dubovyi out of the film. Once he excluded Dubovyi, then the cinematic
Shchors could live beyond 30 August 1919, the date Shchors died. In a para-
doxical manner, the only way that Dovzhenko could deal honestly with
Shchors' death was to deny that it happened.
Although the filmmaker did not have much room to maneuver, he sought to
deal honestly with other issues beyond Stalin's representation on the screen and
Dubovyi's relationship with Shchors. Despite the fiction of the film's overall
interpretation, that nationally conscious Ukrainians constituted the core sup-
porters of the Bolshevik victory in Ukraine, Dovzhenko's use of Ukrainian
folklore ukrainianized the film. Although the film met the guidelines, "national
in form, socialist in content," the Ukrainian songs and dances overshadowed
the revolutionary content in this "revolutionary film."
At the end of the screenplay and the film, Dovzhenko had Shchors observe a
parade of future Red Army officers at the military academy he headed. In the
screenplay, Shchors asserted before a group of visiting inspector-generals who
wanted to send his students into a hopeless battle: "I will not send my school of
Red commanders into battle. I will lose a division, but will save my command-
ers, and I'll have a division! A corps! An army!"52 In one of the versions of the
film, a narrator's voice concluded: "If Red commanders exist, then there is a
Red Army." In and of itself, the statement reflected reality. But in the late
1930s, when the security organs arrested and executed tens of thousands of
Soviet military leaders, might not this statement be an attack against Stalin?53
Two years after Dovzhenko released Shchors, when German armies swept
across the Soviet Union, it was obvious that a Red Army capable of effectively
defending the USSR did not exist.
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Although Dovzhenko did not have much creative flexibility under Stalin's
shadow, his art, personal charisma, and his stubborn persistence allowed him to
present his own covert interpretation of Soviet history on the screen. He
adhered to the overall Stalinist interpretation, but undermined it by including
scenes with double meanings. Dovzhenko succeeded in completing the film,
but at the cost of his own physical health and of his own emotional equilibrium.
Emotional Breakdown
By the summer of 1938 Dovzhenko, especially when inebriated, could not
disguise his rage against the restrictions Stalin had imposed on him. In a
conversation recorded by the Kharkiv Oblast NKVD and relayed to Beria,
Dovzhenko expressed his fury against the Soviet authorities, Ukrainians, and
the Party. In light of the purges, he claimed that he could not distinguish
between the legitimate Soviet authorities and the "enemies of the people," who
hid everywhere. He cursed Dubovyi, whose arrest had caused Dovzhenko to
reshoot his nearly completed film. He damned Ukrainians, whom he claimed
were all "traitors." Further, he asserted that Ukrainians did not possess a native
culture because the authorities feared the emergence of an independent Ukrai-
nian culture. The authorities stereotyped the creators of an indigenous Ukrai-
nian culture as "potential enemies." As a result of these prejudices, Ukrainian
cultural workers became "martyrs at Golgotha."
Dovzhenko then condemned the Party: "What kind of party is this? Why
does it contain so many traitors? All of its leaders are traitors." Dovzhenko then
maintained that it was easier for Shchors to get rid of the Germans in 1918 than
it was for him to make a film about the Bolshevik hero. "Let them allow me to
work!" he cried out.54During a meeting of Party members at the Kyiv Film
Studio on 19 October 1938, Dovzhenko's colleagues criticized the filmmaker
for his lack of self-criticism, his slow pace, his waste of film, and his cost
overruns. Dovzhenko snapped and retorted that it was better "to die than to
listen to such criticism."55 Responding hysterically to his critics, he yelled, "I
hate you!"56 Inasmuch as a director no longer had the right to change the
screenplay during the actual shooting of the film, Dovzhenko complained that
this restricted his "creative possibilities." Upset by these constraints,
Dovzhenko threatened to change careers. After regaining his composure, he
admitted that directors needed to follow this rule, but he did not have the
strength to do so. He then said that he would finish the picture when he could.
No one had the right to rush him, he protested. He then abraptly walked out of
the meeting.57
Not surprisingly, Dovzhenko remarked that life was "very difficult" for him
during this period. He often declared that he did not want to live58 and often
threatened suicide, before and after Dubovyi's arrest.59
In the course of creating Shchors, Dovzhenko had many discussions with
leading Party and government officials other than Stalin. They included Panas
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Liubchenko (who committed suicide in 1937, after being accused of heading a
counterrevolutionary nationalist organization in Ukraine), Stanislav Kosior
(executed in 1938), Pavel Postyshev (executed in 1938), Boris Shumiatskii
(purged in 1938), Nikolai Yezhov (arrested in 1939 and shot in 1940), Hryhorii
Petrovsiiyi, and Nikita Khrushchev, who served as the first secretary of the
Communist Party of Ukraine from 1938 until March 1947.
These meetings at the height of the purges must have heightened
Dovzhenko's sense of insecurity and fears for his future. As he read the
morning newspapers with their denunciations of those purged, he may have
been pleased with the demise of his tormentors. But he also must have come to
the realization that if the security organs arrested, tried, and executed his
supervisors, then he could not be far behind on the blacklist. Once on a list,
always on a list.
Success
Dovzhenko terminated the filming of Shchors in the fall of 1938 and immedi-
ately started editing the raw footage. On 4 March 1939, he brought his final
version to the Committee of Cinematography in Moscow for approval.60 When
the first official viewing of the film took place, he lay on the sofa in an
adjoining room and cried.61 Semen Dukel'skii, the man who replaced
Shumiatskii, saw the film with his assistant, but abruptly left the screening
room when it ended, not sparing a moment to discuss the film with Dovzhenko.
He immediately took the film "to the higher-ups"; only after they praised
Dovzhenko's final version did Dukel'skii admit that he enjoyed the picture.62
Two weeks later, on 19 March 1939, delegates to the Eighteenth Congress
of the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow saw Shchors for the first time.63
The film officially premiered on 2-3 April 1939 at the Cinema Building in
Moscow. The audience, which included Sergei Eisenstein and other famous
Soviet directors, responded enthusiastically.64 On 1 May 1939, Shchors pre-
miered in Kyiv and became a popular film throughout the USSR, selling 31
million tickets.65 Dovzhenko took great pride in his accomplishment and con-
sidered it his best film.66 Stalin agreed.
Dovzhenko's completion of Shchors resuscitated Stalin's faith in the film-
maker and brought him many rewards: in the spring of 1939 Dovzhenko
became a member of the Union of Soviet Writers; in November he received the
title of Honored Artist of the Arts of the Ukrainian SSR; in December he won
election to the Kyiv City Council; in the fall of 1940 the All-Union Committee
on Cinematography appointed him the artistic director of the Kyiv Film Stu-
dios; and, finally, in March 1941 he received the Stalin Prize, First Class
category, for his film.67 But most importantly, the authorities allowed the
filmmaker to live and work in Ukraine. Only one prize eluded Dovzhenko—
reinstatement in the Communist Party.68
Shchors became Dovzhenko's political triumph, but at a heavy psychologi-
cal cost to the great artist.
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Ukraine and Germany:
Toward a New Partnership?
ANGELA STENT
The results of Ukraine's second postcommunist presidential election in No-
vember 1999 may be interpreted as a popular vote of endorsement for continu-
ing a policy of integration with the West.1 President Leonid Kuchma, serving
his second term, described the election as "a second referendum on Ukrainian
independence" and stressed the importance of Ukraine's European choice. He
pledged to seek membership in the European Union (EU) while strengthening
Ukraine's relationship with both Russia and the United States. "The European
future of Ukraine," he explained, "is inseparable from its strategic partnership
with Russia."2 As the West endeavors to ensure that the new Ukrainian gov-
ernment abides by promises to pursue reform, Germany will play a pivotal role
in nurturing Ukraine's relations with Europe. The Schroeder-Fischer govern-
ment has said it would conduct a more active policy toward Ukraine than
previously. The decade ahead may see the realization of improved Ukrainian-
German relations, closer to the initial vision of the early 1990s. Earlier aspira-
tions have so far been unfulfilled because of domestic pressures both in Ger-
many and in Ukraine, and because of Europe's difficulties in dealing with
problems that followed the collapse of communism.
Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has sought to forge a viable role for
itself in European security and economic structures. That process has been
complicated both by Ukraine's domestic challenges and by the fragmentation
of Europe since the end of the Cold War. Conflicts in the former Yugoslav
states, varying rates of progress in the postcommunist transitions of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, and uncertainty in the West over
how far and how fast to integrate the new states into Western security struc-
tures, have all delayed the process of creating a new European security order
after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. With the exception of Poland, Hun-
gary, and the Czech Republic, which are North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members, all other European postcommunist states have developed a
variety of links both with NATO and the EU that fall short of full membership
in these organizations. The anticipated enlargement of the EU will only include
a limited number of postcommunist states. Thus, Ukraine's prospects for fuller
integration into European and transatlantic structures remain uncertain.
As Europe's principal central power and the one most concerned with
developments to its east, Germany has played a key role in engaging Ukraine
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and in seeking its integration into European structures. This is partly because of
historical ties, but also because a united Germany became acutely aware that,
after the collapse of the USSR, instability to its east could have major detri-
mental effects on its own stability as it integrated the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) into the German Federal Republic. Germany was concerned
not only about the potential repercussions of mass migration or ethnic conflict
close to its borders, but, with respect to Ukraine, also was worried about the
potential environmental disasters that could engulf the continent in the event of
another Chornobyl-like accident. Although its focus for much of the 1990s was
Poland, Germany became increasingly committed to forging a partnership with
Ukraine. Germany realized that it must construct a workable relationship with
Ukraine, a country strategically positioned between Russia and Germany and
vitally important in terms of the issues that most concerned Bonn.
Ukraine's geopolitical position on the border of what Bonn considered a
new zone of insecurity, coupled with its complicated ties with Germany, en-
sured that a bilateral relationship would develop. The country's economic
potential, its nuclear power status, and its population, which includes ethnic
Germans, were factors that reinforced Germany's inclination to build ties with
Kyiv. Ukraine, for its part, stressed from the beginning that it is a European
state and, in seeking ties with the West, began to cultivate a relationship with
Germany.
The Ukrainian-German relationship has, in this past decade, been hostage to
domestic exigencies in both countries. Germany has been preoccupied with the
enormous material and psychological costs of unification and with its transfer
of the seat of government from Bonn to Berlin. Ukraine has faced the unprec-
edented challenge of simultaneously becoming a viable postcolonial nation-
state and moving toward a democratic market society. Despite Germany's
domestic preoccupations, it has realized that Ukraine will be a significant
player in Europe in the twenty-first century. Germany has therefore considered
it essential to build a strong bilateral relationship with Kyiv and to strengthen
Ukraine's role in multilateral organizations.
Both Germany and Ukraine face foreign policy challenges. For Germany,
the issue is to define a role for a united Germany in Europe, one that reflects the
reality of Germany's resources and power, but that does not evoke too many
ghosts from the twentieth-century past in Central and Eastern Europe. For
Ukraine, the issue is of a different order of magnitude: how to articulate an
independent foreign policy reflecting Ukrainian national interests—a foreign
policy that balances the need for continuing ties with Russia against the desire
to become a full participant in European structures while integrating both the
economic and military aspects of security.
Given the complexities of these challenges, it is not surprising that the
German-Ukrainian partnership is, thus far, an incomplete one, and that its
future evolution will, in part, depend on domestic developments in both coun-
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tries but also on their relationship with their respective neighbors. Neverthe-
less, the German-Ukrainian relationship has matured over this past decade and
the elements of a partnership have begun to crystallize.
This article analyzes the Ukrainian-German relationship from the perspec-
tives of mutual historical ties, the more recent bilateral relations over the last
decade, and the multilateral dimensions of contemporary German-Ukrainian
interaction.
Ukrainian-German Historical Ties
The history of Ukrainian-German relations is a long one. German merchants
and travelers began to visit Ukrainian lands in the tenth century, but settlement
did not begin until Catherine ΙΓ s manifesto that invited German colonists to the
Russian Empire. In 1764 Catherine II issued a decree aimed at attracting
Germans to colonize parts of Southern Russia. The decree offered extensive
privileges—including free transportation to the Russian Empire, freedom to
practice any trade, interest-free loans, and exemption from military service.
After the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775, German settlers arrived
in the former Cossack territory of southern Ukraine. They subsequently came
in larger numbers during the first half of the nineteenth century, settling across
the Ukrainian steppe and in the Crimea. Almost all of the colonists, who came
to be known as Black Sea Germans (Schwarzmeerdeutsche), settled in rural
communities with distinct and separate religious affiliations: Lutheran, Catho-
lic, or Mennonite. By 1897, the Black Sea Germans numbered some 345,000
individuals. There were another 200,000 more Germans in Volhynia, where
they had purchased land from the Polish nobility.3 The Germans lived in closed
settlements where they received tax exemptions and other benefits while con-
tributing to the local economy. In their compact communities they could prac-
tice beliefs (especially true of the Mennonites) which in their countries of
origin were persecuted. Thus, for more than two centuries, Germans and Ukrai-
nians lived alongside each other.
The First World War brought Germany and Ukraine together in their first
major encounter of the twentieth century. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of
3 March 1918 between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers led to the
division of Ukraine into German and Austrian spheres of occupation. By that
time, there were 700,000 Germans living in southern Ukraine who together had
represented the second largest concentration of German colonists in the tsarist
empire; Germany had plans to supplement that number with more colonists
after the war was over.4 The main goal, however, was to collect food from
Ukraine to feed the Central Powers' starving populations. Attempts to requisi-
tion food supplies were resisted by the peasants, and the Germans responded by
disbanding the Ukrainian government of the Central Rada and ruling through
the more cooperative regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadslcyi. As attacks on
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Ukrainian peasants persisted, the Bolsheviks were able to present themselves
as defenders of Ukrainians against the Germans. Conflict between Germans
and Ukrainians continued until the German capitulation of November 1918.5
Whatever negative memories of German subjection of Ukrainians remained
after 1918 were rapidly eclipsed during the 1920s and 1930s by the atrocities
committed against Ukrainians under Stalin. Ukraine, the granary of the USSR,
suffered disproportionately during collectivization and during the famine of
1932-1933. Thus, by the time of the Nazi attack on the USSR, there was little
support for (russification-oriented) Soviet communism.
The next major encounter between Ukrainians and the German state came
after 1939. As a result of the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, most of western
Ukraine was occupied by Soviet troops. In June 1940, the USSR forced Roma-
nia to cede Bessarabia and Bukovyna. Thus, a total of seven million inhabitants
formerly in Poland and Romania were added to the Ukrainian SSR, giving
Ukrainians from these regions their first taste of Stalinism. Another half-
million Ukrainians lived in those parts of Poland that were occupied by the
Nazis after September 1939. The most dramatic change, however, came with
the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, after which most
Ukrainians came under German rule.
The history of German-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War is
mixed. Some Ukrainians, for whom Stalin was a greater evil than Hitler and
who were thus eager to fight the Russians, welcomed the German invaders as
liberators from communist oppression. Inasmuch as there were Ukrainians who
equated Soviet communists with Jews, Hitler's antisemitic propaganda fell on
fertile soil. There is no consensus on the degree to which Ukrainians partici-
pated in the atrocities against Jews, the worst committed in Ukraine being the
massacre of 33,000 Jews at Babyn Yar on the outskirts of Kyiv in September
1941.6
Of course, Nazi ideology blinded the Germans to the pragmatic advantages
of treating Ukrainians in a more civilized fashion. The Nazi ruler of Ukraine,
Erich Koch, was notorious for his personal contempt for Slavs: "Gentlemen,"
he announced on his arrival in Reichkommissariat Ukraine in September 1941,
"I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed
Reichskommissar of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods we
can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or the property of the
Ukrainians." And on another occasion he asserted: "If I find a Ukrainian who is
worthy of sitting at the same table with me, I must have him shot."7 During the
course of the war, over 2.3 million Ukrainians were deported to work as slave
laborers in different parts of the Reich. Nazi rule in Ukraine was brutal, and a
Ukrainian resistance movement arose in response. Recruits for anti-German
partisan warfare came from a variety of groups: disillusioned nationalists,
communists, Jews, and escapees from forced labor camps. The partisan recruits
who fought the Germans were partly autonomous and partly controlled by the
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Soviets. As late as July 1941, Hitler had declared that "only Germans should
carry weapons, not Slavs, Czechs, Cossacks, or Ukrainians." However, after
the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Nazi Propaganda Minister
Josef Goebbels began to adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward Slavs. Some
Ukrainians were already fighting with the Germans, and now Ukrainians were
encouraged to join the retreating German armies. The SS offered Ukrainians
something of unique value—military training—and some Ukrainian units, in
the vain hope that the Russian communists could still be defeated, fought with
the Nazis until the end of the war.8
The history of German-Ukrainian relations during World War II is, there-
fore, a rather mixed one, particularly when compared with Ukrainian experi-
ences under Soviet rule. During the postwar Soviet era, the Nazi occupation of
Ukraine was never fully discussed out of fear that Ukrainians might consider it
more favorably than the Soviet occupation. Although the USSR could always
invoke the image of Nazi atrocities as a means of rallying its population behind
Soviet policies, in Ukraine the image of Germans was more ambivalent be-
cause the Germans have historically been viewed as a nation that could liberate
Ukrainians from Russian domination.
During the postwar Soviet period, the most significant contacts between
Germans and Ukrainians came via GDR-Ukrainian relations, which were quite
extensive. The Ukrainian SSR had a myriad of economic, cultural and political
ties with East Germany. Moreover, when West Germany began to pursue its
new Ostpolitik in 1969, East German and Ukrainian opponents of détente made
common cause. The opposition of the first secretary of the Communist Party of
Ukraine, Petro Shelest, to Brezhnev's rapprochement with Willy Brandt's
West Germany gave a boost to GDR leader Walter Ulbricht's attempts to fight
Ostpolitik. Ultimately, however, both Ulbricht and Shelest lost their positions.9
West Germany also developed economic, cultural, and political ties with the
Ukrainian SSR, but always within the context of its central relationship with
Moscow. Nevertheless, contacts between elites and the population of Ukraine
and the two German states grew as the Communist era ended. By 1991,
therefore, the Ukrainian SSR had established a pattern of contacts with both
East and West Germany.
The Evolution of German-Ukrainian Relations, 1992-1999
Ukrainian Expectations
When Ukraine achieved independence at the end of 1991, its initial expecta-
tions of German economic and political support were considerable, which
were, as it soon transpired, unrealistic. Ukrainians approached Germany in
1992 with inordinately more enthusiasm than vice versa. Prior to the breakup
of the Soviet Union, Germany, like other Western countries, had done little to
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recognize Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty of July 1990, although it had
opened a consulate in Kyiv earlier in 1989. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's July
1991 summit with Mikhail Gorbachev in Kyiv, ostensibly to commemorate the
fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the USSR, was a last-minute
attempt to shore up the Soviet leader's weak internal position.10 Only after the
Belovezhsk agreement founding the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) in December 1991 did Ukraine's foreign minister, Anatolii Zlenko, visit
Bonn to discuss bilateral relations. He returned to Ukraine with promises of
future German diplomatic recognition and for the establishment of a German-
Ukrainian Economic Cooperation Council, and with an invitation for President
Leonid Kravchuk to visit Bonn. In this early stage of official Ukrainian-
German relations, the Ukrainian press highlighted the ignorance of most Ger-
mans about Ukraine.11
Before his February 1992 visit to Bonn, President Leonid Kravchuk gave an
optimistic assessment of the prospects for German-Ukrainian ties. The new
Ukrainian leadership hoped that Germany would be more forthcoming with
assistance and contacts than the other Western states, partly because of history
and geography, but partly because the GDR had been closely tied to Ukraine
economically. The importance of economic links with Germany and of
Ukraine's willingness to resettle deported ethnic Germans were stressed. At the
time, both Russia and Ukraine felt that they were competing against each other
for German largesse. The Russian daily Izvestiia reported, for example, that
"[i]n the rivalry between Moscow and Kyiv in seeking Germany's favor, Kyiv
is currently in the lead: [the Germans] paid Kravchuk the compliment of
holding him up as an example to other CIS heads on how to tackle the problems
of national minorities."12
A few months later, however, Kravchuk and his colleagues would deny any
such suggestion that they were winning the battle for German attention and
money. Ukrainian officials complained about "Bonn's fixation on Moscow."13
As the economic situation in Ukraine deteriorated, Prime Minister Leonid
Kuchma made a renewed appeal for German and EU assistance. Just before
Kohl's visit to Kyiv, an opinion poll of Ukrainian politicians and officials
found that the majority of them believed that Germany was the only G-7 state
that was pursuing a supportive policy toward Ukraine and the only country that
could save Ukraine from its unhealthy dependence on Russia. They also as-
sumed that Germany had an interest in the outcome of Russo-Ukrainian ten-
sions: Germany would be more directly affected by a Russo-Ukrainian conflict,
after all, than would the United States.14
The German government, however, remained cautious. It continued to view
its relationship with Ukraine largely through a Russian lens and was moreover
concerned about the large number of unresolved issues in Russo-Ukrainian
relations. In the fall of 1993, Germany reiterated that it would only become
more involved in Ukraine once Kyiv committed itself to renouncing nuclear
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weapons, thereby making explicit the link between economic assistance and
political concessions. Although it welcomed the January 1994 Trilateral Agree-
ment in which Ukraine renounced its nuclear arsenal, it was wary of Ukraine's
economic difficulties. Germany had not yet defined its interests in Ukraine.
After Leonid Kuchma was elected president in the summer of 1994, he
realized that in order to change German attitudes, Ukraine would have to
convince Germany that it had modified its policies on two major issues: eco-
nomic reform and relations with Russia. Kyiv would also have to persuade
Bonn that Germany had vital interests in Ukraine. About a month after the
elections, President Kuchma granted an interview to a reporter of Der Spiegel
in which he recalled the German occupation of Ukraine, his prior experience
with West Germany in his capacity as general director of Yuzhmash/
Pivdenmash (the world's largest rocket construction firm, based in
Dnipropetrovsk), and as a participant in a four-week management course in
Germany. He stressed that he favored "a partnership with Russia, just as
Germany wants it," and reiterated his commitment to economic reform, par-
ticularly privatization, and greater partnership with Germany.15 Since the early
years of independence, Ukraine has gradually become more realistic about
what it needs to do in order to attract more German attention and investment.
German Expectations
Germany's initial attitude toward Ukraine was ambivalent. Like its allies,
Germany greeted the breakup of the Soviet Union with a great deal of appre-
hension. In place of the predictable Gorbachev came fifteen new states with
largely unknown leaders—former apparatchiki presiding over multiethnic
states, the borders of which were delineated by Stalin for his own purposes, and
whose major raison d'être was nationalism. These developments made Ger-
mans uncomfortable in view of their own twentieth-century experiences, and
because their ongoing challenge of unification could be undermined by poten-
tial disruptions from the east. Since the West was accustomed to interacting
with Russia, it continued to deal with Russia, aware that it was still a major
nuclear power.
Germany's main interests in Ukraine centered on the resettlement of Soviet
soldiers in their homelands and the containment of tensions between Kyiv and
Moscow. The most pressing problem to September 1994 involved the with-
drawal of the 380,000 Soviet troops and their dependents from the former East
Germany. One-third of the former Soviet officers, along with many of the
enlisted men, were Ukrainian. These soldiers needed housing and employment;
therefore much of the initial German aid to the Newly Independent States after
1992 was earmarked for the construction of dwellings and for job retraining.
Ukraine was a significant recipient of the aid that was apportioned for realiza-
tion of these projects. Beyond these immediate issues—and given the burden of
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history and the uncertainties about Ukraine's future—Bonn was wary of em-
barking on too assertive a relationship with Ukraine. Yet, if one contrasts its
active and extensive ties with postcommunist Poland, another country with
which it shares a heavy historical burden, it is clear that concern about Russia's
reactions also influenced Germany's policy.
German policies were also influenced by the unexpected problems of adjust-
ing to a new role in Europe. For forty years West Germany's sovereignty had
been limited and it had deliberately eschewed a major international role. In-
deed, the German Federal Republic had settled comfortably into its constrained
position. Now, however, Germany came under increasing pressure from its
allies and neighbors to assume a much larger role in Europe and to take the lead
in rebuilding the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. It was particularly
difficult for Germany to balance the demands of fostering stability and the
development of viable market economies in Central Europe, on the one hand,
and in Russia, Ukraine, and other successor states, on the other. Given
Germany's uneasiness about summoning ghosts from the past, it sought to
diversify these ties as much as possible and to shift the burden of assisting the
postcommunist states to the EU and other multilateral bodies.16 The impera-
tives for involvement in Ukraine were both positive and negative—the desire to
help construct a viable market society and the fear of the consequences of
instability and crisis in Ukraine for German stability and security.
It should not be overlooked, however, that Germany is a federal country,
and that its constituent Länder (states) have their own identities. Perhaps none
more so than the "Free State of Bavaria," traditionally the home of a good
portion of Germany's Ukrainian émigré community. From the outset, Bavaria
took a proactive policy toward Ukraine. As early as 1990, for example, the
prime minister of Bavaria, Max Streibl, signed a partnership agreement with
Ukraine. Also significantly, the following year in May 1991 Leonid Kravchuk,
who was then chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, led a delegation to
Bavaria, before being received in Bonn. During a meeting with the president of
the Bavarian Landtag (legislature), both sides talked about their respective
sovereignties and pledged closer economic and political ties.17 Then in 1992,
German Interior Minister Edmund Stoiber (a Bavarian) led a Bavarian delega-
tion to Ukraine, and spoke of a Südschiene ("southern link"). Ukraine, he said,
greatly admired both Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Franz-Josef Strauss, the
longtime prime minister of Bavaria, for transforming Bavaria from a primarily
agrarian to a modern industrial state. It also admired, he continued, Bavaria's
long struggle to assert its federal rights and achieve autonomy from Bonn.18 In
fact, Bonn continued to use Bavaria as an intermediary as it formulated its
policy toward Ukraine. By mid-1993, the 1990 Bavarian-Ukrainian partnership
agreement had expanded to include sister-city projects, cultural exchanges, and
greater bilateral trade. Bavaria utilized its relationship with Ukraine to assert its
own independence from Bonn and to raise its international profile. However,
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Ukraine also profited from this burgeoning relationship, although Munich
could not provide the recognition that Kyiv sought from Bonn.19
Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of debt repayments also
came to the fore. Germany had been the USSR's largest creditor and, after
1991, it became concerned that Ukraine might not be willing to assume its part
of the Soviet debt. Already before the breakup of the USSR, a German delega-
tion had gone to Kyiv to persuade its future leaders to accept their full share of
the Soviet debt.20 By the time Foreign Minister Zlenko visited Bonn in Decem-
ber 1991, Germany was willing to talk about a German-Ukrainian treaty based
on Kyiv's commitment not only to debt repayment, but to the renunciation of
nuclear weapons as well. Ukraine then became the first post-Soviet state to be
recognized by Germany, and the German consul general, Count Hennecke von
Bassewitz (whose ancestor had been a diplomat at Peter Γ s court), was ap-
pointed ambassador. At this stage, Germany's concern, apart from nuclear
questions, also extended to the issue of Ukraine's future adherence to conven-
tional arms limitation treaties that had already been signed by the Soviet Union.
Despite these early German attempts to support Ukraine, Bonn soon became
disenchanted because of the lack of progress on what it defined as priority
issues: debt repayment, the situation of ethnic Germans, nuclear weapons, and
economic reform. But because of Ukraine's geostrategic importance, by Febru-
ary 1993 Germany's foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, decided that it was time to
reinvigorate the relationship.21 He discovered during his visit to Kyiv, however,
that the reception from his hosts was less than cordial. The Ukrainians com-
plained that Bonn was making demands without offering them much in return.
Bonn, for its part, began to view Ukraine as a "spoiler" in the NIS region, with
its government unwilling to make good on its promises on nuclear weapons to
the international community or on economic reform to its own people.
Chancellor Kohl went to Ukraine in June 1993 (the first visit by a major
West European leader) still hoping to persuade Kravchuk to fulfill his prom-
ises, precisely because Germany realized how important Ukraine's potential
European role might be. He emphasized that Germany "needs Moscow and
Kyiv" and offered economic incentives for increased Ukrainian cooperation on
political and strategic matters.22 Ukraine and Germany also signed a joint
statement on the basis of relations between the two states. This included an
agreement to endorse the principles of sovereignty and the inviolability of
borders, to renounce force, and to respect human rights. The two parties also
committed themselves "to democracy as the only legitimate form of govern-
ment." But Germany remained skeptical about Ukraine's domestic and interna-
tional intentions until Kuchma's election. Although the German private sector
was more forthcoming than Western counterparts, its government seemed
wary. After Kuchma's election of 1994, however, the bilateral relationship
acquired more dynamism.
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Bilateral Issues Since 1992: Ethnic Germans
Before German unification, the West German government offered the USSR
material incentives to encourage local ethnic Germans to emigrate to Germany.
After 1990, however, the situation changed dramatically. The costs of unifica-
tion, East German resentment of immigrants, and the economic burdens of
absorbing 16 million people of the former GDR, all combined to change the
German government's attitude. Policy shifted to enticing ethnic Germans to
remain in the successor states to the USSR—mainly Russia, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan. Although Stalin had deported most of Ukraine's ethnic Germans
in 1941, by 1989 nearly 38,000 of the original 400,000 deportees had returned
to Ukraine.23 On the eve of his first presidential visit to Bonn, Kravchuk
pledged to resettle 400,000 ethnic Germans in Ukraine and to offer them the
best farmland in the southern regions of Ukraine and in the Crimea.24 In Bonn
Kravchuk secured a guarantee from Kohl that State Secretary Horst
Waffenschmidt would discuss in Kyiv the matter of material support for reset-
tling Germans in Ukraine.25 The first German delegation, optimistic about
Kravchuk's commitments, arrived a few weeks later. Local authorities in the
Odesa region told a subsequent delegation that they would resettle up to 6,000
families in the next two years.26 Grounds for optimism were also provided by
Ukraine s liberal law on national minorities, which promised Germans, like
other minorities, full rights, including citizenship.27 However, the law did not
explain how it could be proved that a person was indeed a deportee. In retro-
spect, it appears that Kravchuk and his colleagues had not fully considered all
dimensions of the issue.
By June 1992 Kravchuk had gone back on his original promise and now
asserted that Ukraine would only accept Germans (and their direct descen-
dants) who had actually been deported from Ukraine. It would not take ethnic
Germans who had not lived in Ukraine prior to 1941. Nevertheless, the German
government continued to push ahead with its resettlement program. In Septem-
ber 1992, Wiedergeburt (Rebirth), the organization of ethnic Germans that
originated in Russia, founded a chapter in Kyiv and sought to link ethnic
Germans in Ukraine with those in Russia. A Ukrainian-German Fund was
established with money from both countries, and Waffenschmidt, as
Germany's official responsible for German resettlement, announced that
DM52 million would be made available for relocation to the Odesa, Mykolaív,
Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions of southern Ukraine.28 But
by 15 March 1993 Kravchuk had declared the plans to resettle Germans in
Ukraine a failure because, in his opinion, "most Germans are still hoping to go
directly to Germany."29
The issue of ethnic Germans returning to Ukraine has been raised in every
high-level bilateral meeting and continues even now to be a delicate matter.
Since 1992 the German government has disbursed DM55 million to assist
ethnic Germans, the bulk of those funds directed to housing, social, and cul-
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tural programs. For its part, Weidergeburt became more active in Ukraine, but,
in the process, also came into conflict with the Ukrainian authorities.
The program failed for several reasons: the costs were too high for the
Ukrainian government and German assistance came mainly in the form of
grants-in-aid, which the Ukrainians did not want. Moreover, while much of the
funds were for cultural centers, economic assistance would have been far more
important in persuading Germans to remain and not to emigrate. But there were
also political reasons for the lack of success of the program. Up to 8 million
Ukrainians lived outside Ukraine in the CIS,30 and it was not popular domesti-
cally to invite German immigrants to settle in Ukraine when ethnic Ukrainians
themselves found it difficult to return. Since it took at least two years for ethnic
Germans in Ukraine to obtain visas for Germany, the German embassy in Kyiv
endeavored to assist emigrants while they were waiting to leave. But many of
the emigrants spent their time in difficult conditions in makeshift camps. So
far, it has been extremely difficult for Germany to realize its goal of persuading
ethnic Germans that they are better off in Ukraine or Russia than in Germany.
Economic Ties
The Public Sector
For the first few years of its existence, Ukraine received its largest amount of
foreign aid from Germany. Germany's first—and largest—tranche of aid to
Ukraine came while the USSR still existed, when, as noted, it provided funds
for the construction of housing for soldiers returning from East Germany. After
independence, the first stumbling block to new aid was the debt situation.
Germany, as mentioned above, had been the USSR's largest creditor. Initially,
Ukraine and Germany sparred over how much of the Soviet debt was Kyiv's
responsibility. Eventually, Ukraine agreed to accept joint responsibility for the
Soviet debt and consolidated its relationship with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). After eight months of negotiations, Russia and Ukraine were able
to agree on how to divide the German money intended for housing construction
for returning soldiers. Germany was then more forthcoming with aid after these
Ukrainian moves. It guaranteed, for example, a total of DM1.5 billion in export
credits in 1992-1993 and also gave assistance for additional housing construc-
tion and for the retooling of returning soldiers.
Despite this aid and various humanitarian and technical assistance projects,
the German government remained cautious about giving money to Kyiv be-
cause of the lack of economic reform. Bonn realized, however, that withhold-
ing assistance could become self-defeating and so it began to revise its policies
after Ukraine signed the Trilateral Agreement of January 1994. A high-level
Ukrainian delegation visited Bonn early in 1994, seeking not only more eco-
nomic support, but also German assistance in persuading the EU to sign a
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partnership agreement with Ukraine. Germany came to be instrumental in the
development of the ensuing EU-Ukrainian relationship.
After Kuchma's election, the German government was more forthcoming,
particularly in regard to Ukraine's integration into international economic
structures. Kinkel and other delegates argued Ukraine's case at the 1994
Naples G-7 meeting and Ukraine was promised more assistance, especially
after reassurances by Kuchma that financial stabilization and privatization
policies would now be vigorously pursued. The IMF's first loan to Ukraine was
$730 million, which came in two $365 million installments. A second loan for
the sum of $2.2 billion was approved in 1998. By 2000, Ukraine owed a total of
$3.1 billion in debt payments, half of which was owed to the IMF.
Political developments were, of course, closely tied to the changing German
attitude. Immediately after Kuchma urged the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian
parliament) to endorse the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Kohl offered increased
German aid and support and closer Ukrainian ties with the World Bank and
IMF.31 Germany wanted to ensure multilateral cooperation for Ukraine's devel-
opment. As Ukraine's largest aid donor, Germany's assistance came to total
$1.7 billion in export credits, technical assistance and in other forms,32 and was
increasingly targeted at environmental projects which focused particularly on
the Chornobyl nuclear power station. Germany's experience of radiation fall-
out from the nuclear explosion in 1986 had a major bearing on German-
Ukrainian relations and provided a theme of continuity between the Kohl and
Schroeder governments. In 1997 Germany allocated over $52 million for the
reconstruction of the fourth nuclear reactor in Chornobyl.
When Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited Ukraine in July 1999, there
was considerable controversy surrounding the question of the future of nuclear
power. The Green Party, whose Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was instru-
mental in committing Germany to phase out nuclear power both domestically
and in Europe, was initially encouraging Ukraine to renounce nuclear power
altogether. Moreover, given the straggle within the Green Party between the
more radical advocates of a total ban on nuclear power and those willing to
compromise, the Ukrainian case was introduced as part of domestic politics.
Given Ukraine's difficult economic situation and its dependence on imported
Russian energy, Kuchma made it clear that Ukraine could not commit itself to
phasing out nuclear power. Schroeder offered an alternative—construction of
two nonnuclear generators, fired by coal or gas. It was a proposal that was
supported by the majority of the Ukrainian population, but Kuchma rejected it.
He instead secured a German agreement to consider financing the construction
of alternative nuclear power plants in Rivne and Khmelnytskyi, and Ukraine
eventually agreed to shut down the last Chornobyl reactor.33 The Schroeder-
Fischer government, like that of its predecessor, stressed the need for continu-
ing economic reforms and the construction of a viable civil society in Ukraine.
But it also emphasized that it will be less willing and able to give money to the
NIS than was the Kohl Government.
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The Private Sector
German-Ukrainian economic relations have experienced a number of cycles
since 1991 and have been greatly affected by the difficult progress of economic
reform in Ukraine and by the growth of corruption in the economy. The
German private sector was, from the beginning, of two minds about Ukraine.
On the one hand, there were those who were enthusiastic about promoting
business in Ukraine. This group did not want to lose a potentially valuable
foothold and be outbid by other Western firms. On the other hand, there was
the voice of caution, expressed by the Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft,
the major lobbying group for trade with the east, which argued that Ukraine
had not taken the necessary economic, political, or legal steps to assure the
German private sector that its efforts would be rewarded in any predictable
way. Prior to the breakup of the USSR, the private sector tried to build on the
close economic links between Ukraine and the former GDR, if only in part
because of united Germany's obligations to take over the GDR economic ties
with the former Soviet states that were part of the agreements on German
unification.34
Despite the overall reticence of private firms, entrepreneurs found some
areas of the economy to be promising. Telecommunications was one such
sector, German firms being prominent in a deal to construct a modern telecom-
munications system for Ukraine. Some Länder, primarily from the east, entered
into cooperation agreements, such as the one between Brandenburg and the
Dnipropetrovsk region. Germany emerged to become Ukraine's second largest
trading partner (after Russia) with a turnover in 1998 of $2.8 billion, although
total private German investment in Ukraine was only $185 million;35 there
were also joint agricultural projects and joint mining projects. One feature of
the Ukrainian market was that it was attractive for medium-sized German
firms, which, for instance, found it difficult to operate in the Russian market
which favored larger firms.
However, major disincentives to German private economic activity in
Ukraine remained. There was, for instance, no enforceable legal system ensur-
ing commercial rights and protection for investors. In 1997 a group of 600
German investors in Ukraine drew up a list of complaints, which included
arbitrariness on the part of revenue officers and customs authorities; interfer-
ence by authorizing bodies in investment projects; laws that were constantly
changing; regulations that made any medium-term planning impossible; and
demands for bribes. In addition, it was stated that German government funds
designed to compensate Ukrainian victims of Nazism and slave laborers had
disappeared into the pockets of corrupt officials.
President Kuchma had his own source of dissatisfaction with the economic
relationship between Germany and Ukraine: "We are not satisfied with the
development of relations," he said. "Our trade balance is negative. We buy
more than we sell. There is hardly any German investment in Ukraine. For
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Germany, Russia is a priority. I consider this a mistake."36 Nevertheless, the
German message throughout the 1990s was consistent: the private sector
wanted to increase its activities in Ukraine, but the lack of an enforceable legal
code, the slow pace of economic reform, and the prevalence of corruption were
major obstacles to greater German-Ukrainian economic ties.
Military Cooperation
Initial German-Ukrainian military contacts were largely a product of German
involvement in the resettlement of ex-Soviet troops from the GDR. Since
Germany oversaw the construction of housing for soldiers in Ukraine and also
supervised officers' retraining, it was constantly engaged in resolving disputes
and trying to ensure adherence to the withdrawal schedule. Bonn realized that it
had to become more involved militarily with Ukraine because of its potential
strategic importance. In August 1993, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe
visited Ukraine and inaugurated a program of bilateral military cooperation. He
and his counterpart, Kostiantyn Morozov, signed an Agreement on Coopera-
tion in the military sphere that provided for twenty-four official and working
visits between delegations of both parties' armed forces over the duration of the
next two years. This was Ukraine's second military agreement with a Western
country, the first having been signed with the United States in July 1993. Since
1994, 74 Ukrainian soldiers have trained in Germany. There is currently a
provision for 20 more to go to Germany annually.37 Rühe also promised Ger-
man financial assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons located in Ukraine,
provided that Ukraine ratified START I and acceded to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. The German side had more than one motivation for this offer to
Ukraine. On the one hand, Germany, like the United States, wanted to encour-
age Ukraine to fulfill its commitments to become a nonnuclear state and,
realizing that arms reductions entailed large expenses, was thus willing to
assist. On the other hand, Germany wanted to reward Kyiv's active contribu-
tion to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia,
which had resulted in Ukrainian casualties.38 The Rühe-Morozov agreement
inaugurated a series of bilateral military meetings, which have continued under
the Schroeder government and is a key aspect of Germany's attempts to inte-
grate Ukraine into European structures.
The bilateral German-Ukrainian relationship is, therefore, multifaceted, and
entails a variety of political, economic, military, cultural and societal contacts.
However, it has been limited by domestic political and economic pressures in
both countries and by Germany's concerns about the pace of change in
Ukraine. Nevertheless, the combined factors of history, geography, and com-
mon environmental concerns will ensure a continuing relationship. Both
Ukraine and Germany realize that the multilateral dimensions of their relations
are equally important, and will become more so in this new century as Ukraine
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seeks to be more fully integrated into Europe and Germany is wary of being
perceived to act unilaterally in Central and Eastern Europe.
Multilateral Ties
Ukraine and NATO
After gaining independence, Ukraine announced that it would pursue a policy
of nonalignment, and its 1996 Constitution reaffirmed this. However, accord-
ing to former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk (1998-2000): "Our Constitu-
tion does not rule out the accession of our country to one bloc or another."39
Given its central and somewhat precarious geographical position, Ukraine's
general commitment to nonalignment was a correct one; nevertheless, it re-
mains strategically vulnerable and has sought to enhance its security by estab-
lishing ties with Europe's major security organization, NATO. Germany has
supported Ukraine in these endeavors. But as the issue of further NATO
enlargement develops, Germany's views of Ukraine's ultimate place in NATO
may differ from those of the United States.
In 1992, Ukraine joined the first postcommunist NATO group—the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council. It was the first post-Soviet state to join the
Partnership for Peace (PfP), in 1994. This program focuses on defense and
military cooperation and on the democratization of postcommunist armed
forces. Unlike Russia, Ukraine was, from the outset, an enthusiastic and coop-
erative member of PfP. It has participated in a variety of multinational military
and naval exercises both on Ukrainian territory and outside it, including one in
Romania in 1996, another in Central Asia in 1997, and various exercises in the
Crimea. PfP provided Ukraine with additional security guarantees to those
obtained in the January 1994 Trilateral Agreement. It has enabled Ukraine to
diversify its security policies to work with the United States and Europe in a
variety of ways. Ukrainian infantry, helicopter forces, and law enforcement
officials, have been an essential element of the NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. Indeed, Ukrainian soldiers' participation in the
NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia has reinforced Ukraine's role as
a factor guaranteeing a peaceful outcome in the Balkans.40
Nevertheless, when the debate about enlarging NATO began, Ukraine found
itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, having Poland as a NATO
member brings to Ukraine the benefit of having NATO structures closer to its
border. On the other hand, as many Ukrainian officials and politicians realized,
NATO enlargement could also mean the redivision of Europe with the fault
line now on the Polish-Ukrainian border.41 Together with the United States,
Germany was a prime mover urging NATO enlargement, primarily because of
the historical obligations it felt toward Poland.42 Although the United States
said from the beginning that any European state was in principle eligible for
302 STENT
NATO membership, Germany was much more cautious—no German official
has so far been willing to discuss the possible candidacy of Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials and politicians have also disagreed on NATO enlarge-
ment. Former Foreign Ministers Hennadii Udovenko and Tarasyuk both
stressed that Ukraine had no objections to the admission of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to NATO while noting that Ukraine had no plans in the
foreseeable future to join it.43 Kravchuk, Ukraine's former president, urged that
Ukraine apply for admission to NATO,44 to the chagrin of local communists,
who have sharply criticized NATO expansion. Ukraine, like Russia, signed its
own agreement with NATO in 1997—the Charter on a Distinctive Partner-
ship—through which NATO intended to demonstrate that it wants to enhance
Ukraine's role in the organization, even though it was not a candidate for
membership. When the Charter was signed in July, Chancellor Kohl heralded it
as representing a "new era for European security."45 The Charter names several
spheres of Ukrainian-NATO cooperation: arms trade and research; civilian
planning for emergencies; joint efforts against the proliferation of nuclear
technologies; terrorism; organized crime and drug trafficking; and also col-
laborative work on standardization, computer technologies, environmental pro-
tection, air traffic controlling and the uses of space.46 In other words, the
Ukrainian-NATO Charter covers security in a very broadly defined manner.
Ukraine now has a permanent representative at NATO, and NATO has opened
an information center in Kyiv. Both sides, thus, continue to work toward a
more viable partnership.
Ukraine has been an active and constructive participant in the NATO-
Ukraine Council. In January 2000, NATO Secretary General Lord George
Robertson visited Kyiv and praised Ukraine for its progress. He assured that
NATO would assist Ukraine in modernizing its armed forces, although he
admitted that the reform would be painful. Robertson and Tarasyuk discussed
the evolving NATO-Ukraine partnership, which included the retraining of
servicemen and cooperation in science and environmental protection.
Robertson also commended Ukraine for its participation in the multinational,
NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR).47
Indeed, the war in Kosovo presented both Ukraine and Germany with
difficult choices. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who had opposed
NATO policies before he came into office, was confronted with the problem of
how to deal with the process of ethnic cleansing. To the surprise of both the
Green Party he led and to the larger public, he became a strong advocate of
NATO's intervention to stop President Slobodan Milosevic's widely con-
demned campaign in Kosovo. Germany played a prominent role in the war and
in bringing about a ceasefire. To Ukraine, the war presented a different set of
issues. The war exposed, for example, its delicate position of being sandwiched
between Russia and NATO. While the Ukrainian communists, echoing the
Russians, denounced NATO's bombing of Serbia, President Kuchma tried at
the outset to serve the role of mediator, neither criticizing NATO's bombing
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nor endorsing it. In mid-April 1999, the German, Finnish, and Austrian foreign
ministers traveled to Kyiv to discuss Kuchma's proposals. Meanwhile,
Tarasyuk journeyed to Belgrade to try to persuade President Milosevic to
compromise. Kuchma emphasized the need for UN approval of the bombing
campaign and the need for all sides to negotiate in good faith.48 At the height of
the airstrikes, Kuchma attended the Washington NATO summit in which the
three Central European countries were admitted as full members. This was an
important gesture at a time when the majority of Ukrainians did not support
NATO airstrikes against Serbia.
Ultimately, the Ukrainian efforts were unsuccessful, and Ukraine suffered
significant financial losses from the war because of the interruption of Ukrai-
nian-Yugoslav trade and disruptions to Ukrainian Danube ship transport. After
the conflict was over, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping lauded
Ukraine's efforts and stressed its role in Balkan peacekeeping.49 Ukraine is an
active participant in KFOR, but is handicapped by the question of financing:
while Ukraine pays the salaries of its soldiers, the United States assumes much
of the running costs. Such problems as these form part of wider Ukrainian
dilemmas in reforming the military. Thus, the potential for greater Ukrainian
integration into NATO, with the support of Germany, certainly exists. Both
NATO and Ukraine, however, realize that the question of eventual membership
is still premature. Russia's negative attitude toward Ukrainian NATO member-
ship has also influenced this debate. NATO will make decisions on the next
group of potential members in 2002, but Ukraine will not be among those
considered. For the time being, Ukraine is focusing on close partnership with
NATO and has instead set its sights on accelerating the timetable for eventually
joining the European Union.
Ukraine and the European Union
Whereas Ukraine's attitude toward NATO membership has of necessity been
very cautious, the Ukrainian leadership's views on eventual EU membership
are not ambivalent: Ukraine has for some time argued that it wants to join the
European Union and would like to move quickly toward this goal. As Tarasyuk
has said, "The desire to restore to Ukraine its identity as a full-fledged Euro-
pean state has preordained European integration as the only acceptable devel-
opment path for Ukraine. This is exactly why one of Ukraine's foreign policy
priorities is integration with the EU."50 Thus far, Russia has paid little attention
to the implications of EU enlargement, focusing most of its ire on NATO
expansion. Inferring from this, the Ukrainian government has calculated that it
would encounter little opposition from Russia to any efforts to gain EU mem-
bership. The EU, on the other hand, has made it clear that any timetable for
Ukrainian membership will be quite protracted. Instead, largely under German
pressure, the EU has focused on Ukraine's environmental and nuclear power
problems.
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As a result of EU concerns, in June 1994 the EU-Ukraine Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement was signed after Germany intervened on Ukraine's
behalf. This represented the first international agreement in which Ukraine felt
that it had been recognized as a sovereign European state.51 Kravchuk hailed it
as a "breakthrough," proving that Ukraine was oriented toward the West. As
then Foreign Minister Zlenko stressed, "In one fell swoop Ukraine has ceased
to be a subject of international relations in spite of its own will. This is why the
joining of European economic and political structures is a logical and necessary
direction in Ukraine's foreign policy at the current stage."52 France and Ger-
many, speaking for the rest of the EU, stressed that a major item on their
agenda was the overhaul of Ukraine's energy sector and the earliest possible
shutdown of the Chornobyl reactor. Safety and environmental concerns were at
the heart of German espousal of the EU-Ukraine accord. As Kinkel put it,
saving the environment on the territory of the former Soviet Union was a key
concern in German foreign policy.53
It took almost four years for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to
come into effect. Even before it was officially ratified in Ukraine, some offi-
cials were asking the EU to consider an Association Agreement for Ukraine,
similar to those signed with countries such as Poland and Hungary, which are
candidates for EU membership in the first round of enlargement. The EU has
stressed, however, that any upgrading of Ukraine's relationship with the fif-
teen-member organization will take time, although it has not ruled out eventual
Ukrainian membership. German officials have reiterated that full membership
in the EU is open to Ukraine when it has met the necessary conditions for
association and, then, membership. Meanwhile, in order to comply with the
Schengen Agreements of March 1995—in which EU countries agreed to abol-
ish border controls along their joint frontiers but restrict freedom of movement
from non-EU members—those of Ukraine's neighbors that are candidates for
the first round of EU membership, such as Poland and Hungary, have placed
restrictions on the freedom of movement of their citizens and those of Ukraine
in traveling across their common boundaries, much to the consternation of the
Ukrainian government. The EU continues to focus on nuclear power issues and
has given Ukraine assistance for a number of projects, including nuclear safety
and research and the decommissioning of nuclear devices. EU countries were
the major donors in the July 2000 Chornobyl pledging conference hosted by
Germany.
From Ukraine's point of view, the EU has moved too slowly in offering
Kyiv the chance for greater integration. For the EU, relations with Ukraine
remain constrained by the same factors that have restricted German-Ukrainian
relations, namely, the slow pace of economic reform, domestic corruption, and
the opaqueness of the political situation. But the framework for closer ties is in
place and that framework could become more active if the Ukrainian economy
improves its performance. In the fall of 1999, the EU published its Common
Strategy on Ukraine, in which it committed itself to accelerate the pace of
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interaction with the new Ukrainian government, and to do more to promote
economic reform. However, the timetable for Ukrainian EU membership is still
quite distant in the future.
The Future of German-Ukrainian Relations
As Germany reoriented its Ostpolitik in postcommunist Europe, Ukraine be-
came part of the new equation, yet its place in Europe and in German foreign
policy was unclear. Germany regarded the Visegrád countries, the transitions
of which were proceeding more successfully than those of the countries to their
east, as worthy of special assistance and membership in European institutions.
Russia deserved special attention because of Germany's recognition of its
potential to disrupt European security and because of its economic and nuclear
assets. But where did Ukraine fit into German calculations? Its development
was not sufficiently advanced to qualify as a Central European state, but it was
also not to be feared or rewarded to the same degree as Russia.
Initially, Ukraine was in a "no-man's land" in the new European configura-
tion. Germany's initial reluctance to get too involved made it more difficult for
Ukraine to secure assistance from other countries. Germany largely set the
agenda in their mutual relationship, which was initially, in many ways, deter-
mined by the Soviet legacy of debts, nuclear weapons, and environmental
pollution. There were few "usable" historical ties from the pre-Soviet or Soviet
period that could place the bilateral relationship in a familiar context. But
Russia was also an important determinant of German-Ukrainian ties, and when
the political situation in Russia became more uncertain, Kyiv benefited.
Ukraine was potentially a major partner of Germany, but it would have to move
further along in nationbuilding and state-building and in economic reform in
order to realize that potential.
German policy toward Ukraine has remained consistent since Kuchma's
1999 election and since the Social Democratic Party-Green victory in 1998.
Germany recognized Ukraine's strategic importance in Europe and its potential
to become a significant European player, but a more active German engage-
ment awaits greater economic and political change in Ukraine. The continuing
uncertainties in Russia have intensified German attempts to promote Ukrainian
stability; they have also reinforced Germany's desire to ensure that the "border
of instability" in Europe, as Chancellor Kohl put it, remains on the Polish-
Ukrainian boundary for the time being.
Ukraine's continuing desire for further integration into Europe will increase,
particularly if its relationship with Russia—which has improved since the
signing of the 1997 treaty of mutual recognition—becomes normalized under
President Vladimir Putin. It is playing an increasingly important role in re-
gional blocs—the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group and the GUUAM
complex (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), for example—
and as a mediator in the Moldova-Transdnistria dispute. Kyiv is showing by its
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actions that it can pursue a constructive relationship with its neighbors. Newly-
appointed Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko has reiterated this commitment.
Unless there is a major domestic upheaval in Ukraine, the drive westwards will
remain and will be a significant factor motivating reform. Indeed, if Ukraine
were able to surmount its present economic and political difficulties, it would
be poised to become more closely integrated into both Central European and
broader European structures. Germany remains interested in promoting these
developments, realizing that in the best of all scenarios, Kyiv could once again
become a center of European commerce and culture.
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The Christianization and Ecclesiastical Structure
of Kyivan Rus'to 1300
ANDRZEJ POPPE
The Christianization of Rus'—the state of the East Slavs created with the
participation of Scandinavian war bands in the course of the ninth century-
was a pivotal event in the history of Eastern Europe. The reception of Eastern
Christianity and the articulation of the faith in the Slavic language set the
course for much of the religious, intellectual, and cultural development of the
three East Slavic peoples—Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians—over the
succeeding millennium.
Despite the obvious significance of the act of conversion itself, one should
not confuse the conversion of Rus' with its Christianization. Rather, the year
988, as the most important turning point in the process, marked but the opening
of the Christian era for Rus', providing new dimensions and a new quality to its
contacts with the world of Christian culture. Christianization itself lasted for
several centuries, with the most important portion, in terms of events and
results, falling in the second half of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh
centuries: that hundred-year period opened with the crucial, though individual
act of baptism of the hegemon and archontissa RhOsias, Princess Ol'ga, at
Constantinople in the 950s. It closed with a major development: the first
formulation of a theosophical vision of the converted land of Rus', which
placed its baptism into the context of a human history guided by the hand of
Providence—the history of universal Salvation. That vision was pronounced by
the monk-presbyter Hilarión (Ilarion), who was preparing in 1050 to assume
the throne of the metropolitan of Kyiv.
Despite the visible progress of Christianity, it is clear from the events of the
eleventh century that the common people were not as accommodating and
quick in their reception of the new religion. Indeed, the tenth century merely
demonstrated the possibility of, and the eleventh century created the conditions
for, the extension of the Christian faith to the broader ranks of society, provid-
ing but a beginning to the Church's efforts to overcome the traditional mental-
ity and ways of thinking of the common people. While the upper strata of
society and the inhabitants of the chief urban centers can be considered com-
pletely Christianized in the eleventh century, the conversion of the majority of
fortress-town centers in peripheral or recently colonized regions, particularly in
the north and northeast, would continue throughout the twelfth century. The
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penetration of Christianity into rural areas, along with the rise of a parish
network, comes only with the thirteenth century. Indeed, the disasters that
befell Rus' in that latter century expedited the conversion of its entire territory
and deepened the religious allegiance of its inhabitants. Consequently, by the
end of the thirteenth century, despite many survivals of the old beliefs and the
existence of syncretistic tendencies, not only the state, with its elite and towns,
but the whole populace of the lands of Rus' had become a substantially Chris-
tian society.
Foredawn of Christianity on the Dnipro
The centuries-long influence of the Byzantine possessions of the northern
Black Sea coast on the peoples of the southern tier of the East European plain
began, in the ninth century, to extend as well to the East Slavic tribes, who now
formed, together with bands of Scandinavian warriors and merchants, a new
sociopolitical entity—Rus'. The cumulative effects of raids on the cities of the
Black Sea coast and of the establishment of commercial contacts and diplo-
matic missions, had helped to acquaint the Rus' people with Christianity. For its
part, Byzantium was made quite aware of the danger posed by Rus' in July 860,
when the RhOs (as they were recorded in Greek) laid siege to Constantinople.
The empire reacted quickly, outlining two objectives to be achieved with the
help of Christianization. In 861 a mission was sent to Khazaria, headed by
Constantine, future apostle to the Slavs. His Vita allows us to conclude that the
best means of preventing further Rus' raids on Byzantine possessions was
considered to be the winning over of the Khazar ruler to Christianity and, as a
result, the baptism of the peoples under his rule, who included some of the
Slavs on the Dnipro. A second Byzantine undertaking was aimed specifically at
Rus': negotiations were begun, the successful outcome of which, according to
Byzantine accounts, was crowned by the arrival in Constantinople (ca. 865) of
a Rus' embassy requesting baptism. In connection with this event, Patriarch
Photius reported in an 867 encyclical to the patriarchs of the East that "the wild
people known as Rhös, who not long ago dared to attack the empire of the
Romans, have received the pure and uncorrupted Christian faith" and have
"found a place among those obedient and friendly to us," and "been given a
bishop and shepherd."1 That bishopric, if in fact it was actually established,
had an extremely short life, for it does not figure on any of the lists of dioceses
from the period. This first attempt at Christianization, which was assumed on
Byzantine initiative, was unsuccessful because Rus' itself was not yet ready for
conversion.
The absence of a bishop in Kyiv during Princess Ol'ga's period of rule is
indicated by her efforts to obtain one from Otto I in 959. Nonetheless, Chris-
tianity continued to gain adherents on the Dnipro. We must consider credible,
for example, the testimony of the Arab writer, Ibn Khurdädhbeh (d. 912),
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which dates to around 885 and concerns the аг-Rus merchants of the aş-
Saqäliba people who represented themselves as Christians to the Byzantine
customs authorities.2 To be sure, they would have had good reason to do so, as
Christians paid only half of the customs duty, but even if we assume, to be on
the safe side, that these merchants merely wanted to be seen as Christians, this
in itself indicates that Christianity was well known in Kyiv at the end of the
ninth century. A few merchants no doubt really were Christians, for the interna-
tional character of Kyiv, quite apparent in the tenth century, allowed for the
existence of a Christian community. Still, there were no Christians in the Rus'
embassy that concluded the Rus'-Byzantine treaty of 911. The turning point
must have come sometime after that year, for in 944 Christians do figure
among the Rus' envoys, who represented the social elite. There was already at
least one church in Kyiv by 944, as indicated by the text of a treaty from that
year and by an accompanying Primary Chronicle commentary, written at the
beginning of the twelfth century. As the chronicler relates: "the Christian Rus'
took oath in the church of St. Elijah, which is by the stream . . . [and] since it
was a parish church, for many of the Varangians were Christians."3 Likewise,
the fact that visitors from Kyiv to Constantinople prior to 944 regularly resided
in the suburbs near the Monastery of St. Mammas suggests that part of the Rus'
were already Christianized. This is also indicated by the Christian names of a
number of Dnipro islands (St. Gregory [Khortytsia] and St. Aitherios
[Berezan]) on the road "from the Varangians to the Greeks" (attested by
Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos in the mid-tenth century), as well as by the
presence of "baptized Rus"' in the imperial guard.
The disappearance of the practice of cremation of the dead and its replace-
ment by inhumation in the Kyiv region prior to the actual Christianization of
Rus' may possibly be linked with the influence of Christian traditions of burial.
Archaeological data do not permit a definitive conclusion, since the chronology
of cremation and burial practices among the Eastern Slavs is too heteroge-
neous. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the transition along the middle
Dnipro, from a prevalence of cremation in the sixth to tenth centuries to a
predominance of skeletal burials in the second half of the tenth century, coin-
cides chronologically with the opening up of Rus' to Christianity.4 Elsewhere
among the Eastern Slavs, cremation continues to be in evidence throughout the
eleventh century. The absence of cult objects (such as crosses or icons) of stone
or metal among the items found in the graves of this period is as characteristic,
with a few exceptions, as it was for the eleventh to thirteenth centuries as well.
We do not know whether the wearing of crosses was widely practiced at that
time. Nor is it clear whether those crosses, undoubtedly treated at first as
phylacteries, would have accompanied the deceased to the grave. Still, such a
syncretic treatment of this Christian symbol is suggested by bronze and silver
crosses of the eleventh century used as female jewelry or amulets and found
among cremated remains as well.5
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Baptism of Ol'ga—Regent of Rus'
After the death of the Kyivan prince Igor" (c. 945), the regency of his widow
Princess Ol'ga (until ca. 960) supported the further Christianization of Rus'. The
most salient expression of this policy was the baptism of Ol'ga herself. Accord-
ing to eleventh-century tradition, that ceremony took place in Constantinople.
The fact that Ol'ga's baptismal name, Helena, matched that of the wife of
Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos implies the participation of the
imperial couple as godparents. The Primary Chronicle's account of these
events has been embellished with many folkloristic elements clearly originat-
ing in an already Christian society. Nonetheless, the Primary Chronicle's date
for the baptism—6463 (according to the Byzantine anno mundi; i.e., between
1 September 954 and 31 August 955 A.D.)—finds support in the eulogy of
Princess Ol'ga included in the triptych Memorial and Encomium for Prince
Volodimer. That work, compiled at the end of the thirteenth century, contains
annalistic notes dating back to the eleventh century, and a few of them display
an independence from the chronology of these events presented in the
chronicle. The work's alternative, indirect way of indicating the date of Ol'ga's
baptism, for example, suggests it is using a different source: "after holy bap-
tism, Ol'ga lived fifteen years . . . she died on 11 July 6477 [969]."6 However,
it is the completely independent account in the Synopsis historiarum of John
Skylitzes that really demonstrates the likely accuracy of the Primary
Chronicle's date of 6463. Writing in the middle of the eleventh century,
Skylitzes makes use of tenth-century sources. He notes that Ol'ga, after the
death of her husband, came to Constantinople and returned home a baptized
Christian. All the events preceding and following this note relate to the period
of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos' reign between the dethronement of
Romanos I Lekapenos in December 944 and the death of Patriarch
Theophylaktos on 27 February 956. Skylitzes precedes his reference to the
baptism of Ol'ga with information about relations with Hungary between 948
and 955, and follows it with a discussion of the marriage of Constantine's son
Romanos II to Theophano, which probably took place in 955 and certainly no
later than 956. The chronological order of these events permits us to conclude
that Ol'ga was baptized in Constantinople in 954 or 955.7 The agreement
between the Skylitzes data and the two accounts from Rus' makes this dating of
Ol'ga's baptism most likely.
The description of the visit to the imperial palace of Ol'ga, archontissa and
hegemon of Rus', in De Ceremoniis, does not explicitly indicate whether the
Rus' princess was already a Christian. Thus, the current debate concerning the
date of that autumn visit—whether it occurred in 946 or in 957—is not of
essential significance for determining the place and time of her baptism.8
Certain inferences are possible, however. The fact that Ol'ga appears here under
her previous name (Elga) rather than her Christian one (Helena) proves noth-
ing, for many Christian South Slavic rulers and rulers of Rus' (including
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Volodimer, for that matter) are likewise known to Byzantine authors only by
their princely names. The presence of a priest in the suite of Princess Ol'ga is
likewise not of special significance: he could have been present to assist a
baptized or catechumen princess, but he could also have been there simply
because some of those accompanying Ol'ga were Christians (just as some of the
emissaries concluding the treaty of 944 had been).
More significant, on the other hand, is the indication of De Ceremoniis that,
during the ceremonial banquet, Ol'ga sat, in accordance with her dignity,
among the zöstai at the imperial table.9 She was thus treated as the equal of a
"girded" patrikia, the highest female rank at the imperial court. The title of
zöste was used in that period by the first ladies of the court, who would
accompany both empresses, the wives of the two emperors and Constantine
and his son, Romanos. In addition, the ninth and tenth centuries saw the use of
the term as an honorary title bestowed upon wives of neighboring rulers,
including those of Bulgaria.10 Only the zöstai had the right to sit at the table of
the imperial family. The "appropriate honor" that according to Skylitzes was
shown to Ol'ga after her baptism would have been nothing unusual, if it is
understood to have been an award of the title of zöste patrikia ("Girdled
Lady"), particularly since the Hungarian princes had received the title of
patrikios following their baptism. The Byzantine custom of granting court titles
to foreign rulers who were baptized with the participation of the emperor was
continued in the tenth century, and the omission of this award in Ol'ga's case is
unlikely and would be difficult to explain. It should also be noted that there are
no known instances in which the title of zöste was bestowed upon a non-
Christian.
Thus, on the basis of De Ceremoniis and the Synopsis of Skylitzes, we can
basically conclude that the archontissa of Rus' received the title of zöste
patrikia after her baptism, as a result of the participation of the imperial pair as
godparents. Likewise, the seating of the princess in the midst of the imperial
family for dessert and informal conversation on various subjects with the
emperor indicates an exceptional degree of intimacy for the imperial court,
with its concern for strict ceremonial decorum. The bestowing of such honor to
a zöste and goddaughter of the emperor would have been natural enough, but it
would have been completely unheard of for a pagan ruler to be accorded
similar treatment. Since spiritual kinship with the imperial family can now be
taken as a given here, the visit of the Christian Ol'ga must be dated to the
autumn of 957, and her baptism to an earlier visit to Constantinople in 954 or
955.
The Ottoman Mission
This date appears to be contradicted by the Continuation of the Chronicle of the
Abbot Regino of Priim (Reginonis abbatis Prumiensis chronicon, cum
continuatione Treverensi), probably written by Adalbert, monk of Trier and
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then missionary bishop to Rus', who later, in 968, went on to become the first
archbishop of Magdeburg. We read there, under the year 959, that "ambassa-
dors of Helena, queen of the Rus', who was baptized in Constantinople under
Romanos, emperor of Constantinople, came to King Otto I asking—insin-
cerely, it later turned out—for the appointment of a bishop and priests for that
people."11 A literal reading of this account would suggest that the baptism of
Ol'ga must to be dated to the reign of Romanos II, that is, between 9 November
959 and 15 March 963, but such a conclusion merely serves to deepen the
impression that the account itself is unreliable: were it true, then it would have
been a pagan Ol'ga, and not a Christian Helena, who would have sent an
embassy to Otto I in 959.12 Given the later provenance of this note (written
after 962, but no later than 967), we should probably see this as a typical error
resulting from faulty memory (naming Romanos instead of Constantine). Other
inaccuracies and inexactitudes in the Continuation would tend to support such
a view.
The very fact of the appearance of a Rus' embassy in 959 does not seem
open to doubt, for already in Christmas 959 in Frankfurt, the monk Libutius
was consecrated bishop genti Rusorum in the presence of Otto I. In light of this,
the arrival of the Rus' embassy should be dated to the autumn of 959, when
Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos was still alive. The news of his death on
9 November and of the assumption of power by Romanos could barely have
reached the royal court by Christmas.
There would be no question about the reliability of the account if, instead of
"sub Romano imperatore Constantinopolitano, " we were to find "sub Con-
stantino et Romano imperatoribus Constantinopolitanis. " There are, however,
circumstances permitting us to understand the appearance of such imprecision
at the time of the writing of the work. Romanos II became basileus autokrator
only after the death of his father Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos on 9
November 959, but he had been emperor in name from the moment of his
coronation on 6 April 945. At the courts of Europe it was well known who the
real ruler was, but this did not free one from the obligation to observe estab-
lished procedure. It is well known that "years of rule" were numbered from the
date of coronation (and hence, for Romanos, from 945) and that the titulature in
correspondence issued by the Byzantine imperial chancellery included the
names of both emperors, Constantine as well as Romanos. The co-emperor was
likewise named on a par with the real emperor in the address of letters sent to
them.13
The author of the Continuation, Adalbert, served in the chancellery of Otto I
from 953 to 956 and again, after his return from Kyiv, from 962 to 966, and
was thus perfectly acquainted with the formulae of Byzantine correspondence.
Since 945, Romanos had been named alongside Constantine in the address of
letters originating from the royal chancellery. When, after his stay in Kyiv,
Adalbert returned to his duties in the Ottonian chancellery, Romanos then
KYIVAN RUS' 317
figured first in the address as the emperor autokrator. Hence, Adalbert could
easily have named him alone when he wrote the further installment of his
chronicle.14
We thus have the right to consider Adalbert's information reliable, though
inexact (since it was incomplete), for, according to the chancellery's view of
the surrounding world, Ol'ga-Helena did receive her baptism under the reign of
Constantine as well as that of Romanos.
We owe the information about the Rus' princess included in the Continua-
tion solely to the need felt by Adalbert to comment on the Rus' episode of his
biography and to justify its unsuccessful outcome. Fate had it that the dispatch
of bishop Libutius was delayed, and his death on 15 February 961 suggests that
the delay must have been due to illness. The ordination of Adalbert in his place
must have been carried out quickly, although not earlier than Easter (7 April)
961, so that in the summer of that year Adalbert could already have been in
Kyiv, only to return home after less than twelve months.
Emphasizing the difficulties and dangers of his journey, Adalbert re-
proached the man responsible for his promotion, Archbishop Wilhelm of
Mainz, "from whom better treatment should have been expected, since I had
never done him any wrong."15 From this comment alone it is clear that
Adalbert belonged to that category of ecclesiastical dignitaries who had neither
desire for nor understanding of the apostolicity ad maiorem gloriam of Chris-
tianity. He was the polar opposite of a zealous man, a pillar of the church like
Bruno of Querfurt, who considered the mission to the pagans, even if it meant a
martyr's crown, to be of the highest honor. The failure of the mission to Rus'
thus had its internal reasons: the appointment of Adalbert as helmsman was not
the happiest of choices. Undertaking his task without enthusiasm, the mission-
ary bishop did not, however, simply dream up all the difficulties he encoun-
tered along the Dnipro. Two full years had passed since Ol'ga's invitation. Her
son Sviatoslav, who had reached adulthood and assumed power in the mean-
time, was, at best, indifferent to the goals of the mission. For him, the opinion
of his soldiers, with their scorn for Christianity, mattered more.
Under these new conditions, the pro-Christian Ol'ga was unable to offer
effective support to the missionary efforts. The authorities were not quick
competiere intrare (Luke 14:23), and so the missionaries, disappointed by such
double-dealing, did not delay in returning to their homelands. The generally
held view that the failure of the mission was a result of rivalries between Rome
and Constantinople lacks any real foundation. Regardless of certain differences
in rite, which could not have mattered to Ol'ga in any case, there was still one
Church at this time, and the activity of Greek or Latin missionaries, therefore,
did not have to be mutually exclusive, even though a signal success by one or
other mission would have placed the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the
order of the day. Ol'ga clearly understood that the conversion of the realm
would be difficult to carry out without dynastic, political and ecclesiastical
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contacts and sufficient aid from outside, and could have felt justified in turning
to any Christian ruler for this purpose. Her appeal, moreover, did meet with a
moderately favorable but short-lived response from the Ottoman court. Otto I
ultimately viewed the missionary action from the perspective of his own politi-
cal interests, and these did not extend much farther east than the river Elbe.16
Likewise, the practical recommendations on foreign policy toward northern
neighbors offered by Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos in De administrando
imperio indicate that, in the mid-tenth century, the political horizon of the
empire in that region was dominated by the Khazars and Pechenegs. To be
sure, political and commercial contacts with Rus' were valued, as was the
supply of mercenaries from that country, but the opportunity of opening Rus'
up to Christianity through the conversion of its ruler had not yet been recog-
nized. No doubt, influenced by earlier failures, Byzantine politics lacked a
genuine missionary impulse in this period. Indeed, in both Constantinople and
Rome in the tenth century, there was an absence of the imagination that had
earlier fuelled their competition over Bulgaria. The limitless East European
plain was only faintly outlined on the horizon of the Christian world in that
period.
Why, though, would a princess-regent of Rus' have appealed to the Western
Emperor Otto I in 959, given the traditional ties between Kyiv and the Eastern
Empire?
It is quite likely that Ol'ga, on her visit to Constantinople in 954-955,
sought, in addition to her own baptism, the dispatch to Rus' of a mission led by
a bishop.17 The fulfillment of this wish would have depended upon the em-
peror and the patriarch. Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos, a scholar and
literatus with an engaging lifestyle, was no statesman, living more in the past
than the present. Generous in his promises, he was parsimonious in his deeds.
The patriarch in that period, Theophylaktos, for his part, was a man found
"more often in the stables than in the church." When Emperor Romanos I
Lekapenos had forced the elevation of his sixteen-year-old son to the patriar-
chal throne in 933, the opposition of the local bishops was so great that the
consecration of the young man had to be performed by papal legates. This
lamentable situation continued until the death of Theophylaktos on 27 Febru-
ary 956. Moreover, as a result of a fall from his horse, he was in poor health
during the last two years of his life, and was thus at the very least limited in his
activities, which would have included the consecration of bishops. Finally,
finding a willing and worthy candidate who would not have considered this
mission a sentence of exile could well have compounded the difficulties.
When Ol'ga visited Constantinople as a Christian in 957, her presence there
was perhaps connected, in addition to political and commercial matters, with
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renewed efforts to obtain a bishop and mission for Kyiv. The patriarchate was
from 3 April 956 occupied by the more worthy Polyeuktos, who, in standing up
for the principles and canons of the church, quickly came into conflict with
some of the bishops and with the emperor himself. Constantine began by
fearing him and then went on to hate him with a passion that continued to his
last breath.18 No doubt, both the emperor and the patriarch, individually, would
have favored Ol'ga's request, but when it came to agreeing on a candidate,
intrigues and quarrels between the palace and Hagia Sophia would surely have
led to a postponement of the decision. Thus, when the awaited pastor failed to
appear in Kyiv in 958 or in the summer of 959, Ol'ga, sincere in her devotion to
the faith, sent her embassy to Otto I in early autumn 959. The fact that she
addressed her appeal directly to the German ruler attests to her good grasp of
the prevailing ecclesiastical situation.
It was not rivalry between Constantinople and Rome over Rus', but local
squabbles in both centers of the Christian world that had led to an ignoring of
the great mission of the church in this period. John XII, elevated to the papal
throne as an immature youth of seventeen, much as Theophylaktos, led a life of
scandal and even crime. In both churches there was no lack of striving toward
renewal, but the presence of unworthy individuals at the helm undermined the
missionary efforts that had been undertaken. Under the circumstances, Otto Γ s
efforts to regenerate the church in symbiosis with the state could not have
escaped the attention of the regent of Rus'.
* *
*
Various factors doomed the Rus' mission to failure, Adalbert's faintheartedness
being but the least among them. The attempts undertaken in Kyiv to draw
closer to the Christian world, strong with the power of a newly discovered
faith, but weak in social support, exposed the lack of any genuine interest in the
Christianization of Rus' in Constantinople. In the Byzantine capital, political
skepticism and ecclesiastical inertia were reinforced by popular fears of the
Rus', who aroused a sense of apocalyptic doom.
Even though it did not lead to an immediate breakthrough, the conversion of
Ol'ga, whom the chronicler hails as the herald and dawning light of Christianity
in Rus', had far-reaching consequences. The number of Christians continued to
grow—at the Kyivan court, among the nobles, and among the townspeople.
Ol'ga's efforts to win her son Sviatoslav over to the new faith were unsuccess-
ful, however. Even though the need for a change in the ideology and structure
of the young state of Rus' was already strongly felt locally, there were still
insufficient forces to break with the traditional worldview. Sviatoslav, the
barbarous warrior and chieftain, taking the helm of rule from his mother after
960, became the guardian of this archaic order. In fact, however, his own
activities ultimately served to destroy that system: his friendly contacts and
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military straggles with Byzantium, as well as his efforts to establish his rule in
Bulgaria, opened Rus' to a greater extent than ever before to the influence of
Christianity. Ol'ga herself was left with the possibility of influencing her grand-
children. One of these was Volodimer, who was raised at his grandmother's
court. Even if he was brought up as a pagan at the wish of his father, Ol'ga
doubtless did much to ensure that he came to know the new faith.19 More than
two decades were to pass, though, before that faith became the official religion
in Kyiv.
Civil War in Byzantium and the Conversion of Rus'
The year 988 opened the Christian era for all of Rus'. It unfolded against an
exceptionally colorful political background, one that has tended to obscure
some of the essential details of the events of 986-989. Let us thus examine the
tangle of events of that period which determined the entry of Rus' into the
Christian fold.20
The significant role ascribed to the city of Kherson (Gk. Chersoń; Korsun' to
the Rus' chroniclers) in the baptism of Rus' since the days of the Rus' Primary
Chronicle is in need of revision. The Primary Chronicle account of 988 should
not be seen as the basic source of our knowledge about the events relating to
the conversion of Rus'.2) An investigation of all the sources enables us to see
the Primary Chronicle's tale of the baptism as a myth clad in historical robes, a
literary compilation patched together more than a hundred years after the
events it purports to describe. Its author sought to portray the baptism of Rus' as
a great religious event, and so arranged his assembled materials in an order
calculated to emphasize the ordinances of Providence, even if that order contra-
dicted the logical flow of events.
A significant place in this compilation is occupied by a text known as the
"Korsun' Legend." That legend, originally Greek in language and, more impor-
tantly, Khersonian in spirit, came to Kyiv in the 1070s or 1080s as a result of
the broad contacts of the Kyivan Caves Monastery and its branch in
Tmutorokan. Passing in silence over the reasons for the campaign of the prince
of Rus' against Kherson, the legend has him capture the Greek city and demand
the hand of the sister of Emperor Basil II on the threat of further war. In the
finalization of the mutually successful negotiations, a significant role is played
by Kherson itself as the site of Volodimer's baptism and of his marriage to the
imperial princess Anna. The desire of the text to emphasize the role of this city
in the Byzantine-Rus' rapprochement is quite obvious.22
Historians assessing the marriage of Volodimer to the porphyrogennëta
Anna, daughter of Romanos II and granddaughter of Constantine, in the light of
an imperial doctrine categorically forbidding the marriage of members of the
imperial famly to foreigners, have viewed Volodimer's campaign against
Kherson as an effort of that prince to win, by force of arms, the hand of an
KYIVAN RUS' 321
imperial princess earlier promised to him in exchange for military aid.23 This
interpretative approach grows out of the conviction, as unshakeable as if it
could be demonstrated from the sources, that a barbarian—and a pagan at
that—could not have achieved such a great honor without exerting consider-
able pressure. The capture of Kherson supposedly played just such a role.
However, these historians have failed to recognize that the matrimonial prac-
tice of the imperial court was not as rigid as its declared principles, and they
have forgotten that political decisions are influenced first of all by political
realities, and only then by doctrinal considerations.24
In fact, there is no support in the sources for the universally held view that
Volodimer captured a Byzantine city loyal to Emperor Basil II and the
Macedonian dynasty. Indeed, the chronology of events as well as facts from the
history of Kherson itself lead one to quite the opposite conclusion. From the
mutually supplementary accounts of contemporary historians (Leo the Deacon,
Yahyä of Antioch, and Stephen [Step'anos] of Tarön) about celestial phenom-
ena it can be concluded that Kherson was captured probably by the end of 988
and surely before October 989.25 During this same period, Basil II, with Rus'
aid, won an enormous victory over the usurper, and the armies of Rus' contin-
ued to be involved until the late autumn in the crushing of still unextinguished
centers of revolt in Asia Minor. It is inconceivable that at the same time as a
Rus' force of several thousand was fighting victoriously under the command of
the emperor, other Rus' troops sent by the same Volodimer would be capturing
the city of Kherson, had it been loyal to the emperor. In fact, data from the tenth
century permit us to conclude that in the civil war of 986-989, Kherson must
have been in the camp of Basil IPs opponents.
In the middle of the tenth century, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos,
referring to earlier attempts of Kherson to cast off imperial authority, had
recommended measures to be taken in case of another revolt by this city.
Among the most effective, in his view, would be an economic blockade,
cutting off commercial contacts between Kherson and the Black Sea provinces
of the empire: deprived of the possibility of selling hides and wax or importing
grain and wine, the inhabitants of Kherson "will not be able to live."26 The
Byzantine emperor thus pointed to the circumstances that would dictate the
choice of one political orientation or another by this city, so slow to surrender
its traditional autonomy: it would have to submit to whoever controlled the
southern coast of the Black Sea. Beginning in September 987, that coast was
controlled by the pretender to the imperial crown, Bardas Phokas, who, as Leo
the Deacon reports, "took all of the ports and coastal regions of Asia Minor
with the exception of Abydos."27 There must have been tensions in 970-971,
when patrikios Kalokyros, one of the leading figures in Kherson and a trusted
supporter of Emperor Nikëphoros Phokas, refused to recognize the new em-
peror, John Tzimiskes, after the palace coup of December 969, thereby tying
his hopes for the future to the plans of the Phokas family and the bellicose
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Sviatoslav.28 At the beginning of the eleventh century, the revolt that broke out
in Kherson was ultimately suppressed in 1016 by the joint actions of the
imperial navy and a Rus' force.
These facts suggest that in 988 and 989 Rus' units were operating in the
Crimea on the basis of the same understanding and to the same end as their
comrades who had been sent to the Bosphorus by the Rus' prince. The imperial
possessions in the Crimea, with Kherson in the lead, had come out against the
Macedonian dynasty, and so Rus' troops besieged and captured the rebel city,
returning it to the rule of Emperor Basil II—ally and brother-in-law of the ruler
of Rus'.
This fundamentally different assessment of the place of Kherson in the
developments of the years 986-989 thus leads us to a new interpretation of the
sequence of events, showing how, on the one hand, they freed the Byzantine
Empire from the confusion of civil war and, on the other, then placed Rus'
inside the orbit of Christian civilization.
* *
A painful military defeat, and an even more painful loss of face in a battle with
the Bulgarians on 17 August 986, had forced Basil II to reassess the empire's
Bulgarian policy laid down by John Tzimiskes. Fresh memories of Sviatoslav's
conquest of Bulgaria encouraged thoughts about reviving those articles of the
treaties of 944 and 971 that had provided for Rus' military action against the
enemies of Byzantium. It is quite probable that contacts were initiated with
Kyiv for this reason soon after the retreat in Bulgaria. In any case, when the
Byzantine aristocracy, emboldened by the misfortunes of the emperor, came
out openly against the Macedonian dynasty a few months later, Basil, deter-
mined to break its political aspirations, no longer had any other way out. On
news of the destruction of Basil's armies by the Bulgarians, Bardas Skleros
mounted a new rebellion in December 986. Basil was forced to call back
Bardas Phokas to his aid, a talented general and ambitious politician whose
aspirations peaked in 970 and was suspected of participating in the conspiracy
of 985. Phokas, though forced to swear an oath of loyalty to the emperor on
everything holy, did not keep his word for long. Wasting no time, he already
began negotiations with Bardas Skleros in May 987. Basil had already learned
of Phokas' treason in June. After the pair of usurpers had agreed to a division of
the empire, Phokas treacherously imprisoned Skleros at their second meeting in
August, and on the day of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, Wednesday, 14
September 987, proclaimed himself emperor.
Elite units of the Byzantine army were in the hands of Basil IPs foes, with
the Armenians casting their lot with Skleros and the Iberians backing Phokas.
The emperor, faced with the hostility of the military and the landed aristocracy,
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with opposition in the bosom of the church, and an unfavorable attitude on the
part of the populace of the empire in general, could have little doubt that the
alliances against him spelled the beginning of the end of his reign. He did what
he could to hinder the common action of these threatening forces, but in order
to save his throne he had to be able to counter the armies of the enemy with an
equally respectable force. The contacts already established with Kyiv follow-
ing news of the agreement between the two usurpers in June now assumed a
character of the highest priority: the embassy was instructed not only to ensure
that military reinforcements were sent, but also to win Volodimer over entirely
to the cause of the Macedonian dynasty. The embassy must have set off in June
or the beginning of July 987—the period most favorable for navigation on the
Black Sea—and then arrived in Kyiv in July or August of that year. If earlier
attempts to obtain Rus' military support had focused on action against Bulgaria,
much more was hoped for and much more offered by the summer of 987. The
rank of the embassy must have been appropriate to the gravity of the matters it
was to discuss and the goals it was to achieve. It included, and was perhaps led
by, Theophylaktos, the metropolitan of Sebastea. Entangled in violent conflicts
with the Armenian clergy of that city, he had taken refuge in the capital in the
spring of 987 after the outbreak of the revolt of the Armenians' supporter
Skleros, thus linking his own fate with that of the Macedonian dynasty. The
events of 986 and 987, the fact of the erection of the metropolitanate of Rus'
sometime between 976 and 997, and the transfer of Theophylaktos from
Sebastea to the see of Rus' during the reign of Basil II Porphyrogennëtos, all
show that the ecclesiastical dignitary, loyal to the emperor, was suited as no
one else for a combined diplomatic and missionary undertaking of this kind.
His success in this endeavor resulted in Theophylaktos becoming the first head
of the church in Rus'.
* *
*
Three central issues were the subject of the discussions and mutually binding
agreements in Kyiv: 1) the acceptance of Christianity by the ruler of Rus' and
his land, 2) his marriage to the porphyrogenneta Anna, and 3) his provision of
effective military aid to the empire. Let us examine each issue individually.
1. Volodimer declared his readiness to accept baptism in his own name and
in that of his subjects: "the boyars and all the people of the land of Rus'." It was
decided, for the purposes of the propagation and strengthening of the Christian
faith there, to found a separate Rus' ecclesiastical province—a metropoli-
tanate—jurisdictionally joined to the patriarchate of Constantinople, with the
Byzantine side taking responsibility for its organization and the ruler of Rus'
providing his protection and the necessary means of support.
2. Through their emissaries, the Emperors Basil and (his brother)
Constantine expressed their desire to become kinsmen of the prince of Rus' and
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their readiness to give their sister Anna to him in marriage as soon as he
became a Christian.
3. Volodimer obligated himself to offer military aid against all the enemies
of the empire by sending a contingent of several thousand to the Bosphorus to
fight against the army of the usurpers as soon as possible. Probably then, or
before long, an armed action against the Crimean city of Kherson, which had
come out on the side of Bardas Phokas, was settled.29
Curiously, the most important stipulation of this now vanished treaty is
nowhere reflected in Byzantine writings of the tenth and eleventh century.30
The explanation should probably be sought in the fact that while Byzantine
public opinion, alarmed by the threatening presence of the contingents from the
north, doubted the sincerity of the conversion, court circles, for their part,
sought just as resolutely to emphasize that the baptism of Rus' was a long-
accomplished fact. Justification of such a point of view could be found both in
the 867 encyclical of Patriarch Photios and in the views expressed by
Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos in his Life of Basil I, written around 950.31
Doubtless, too, more than real weight was ascribed to the Christian community
that already existed in Kyiv. Such an explanation was opportune, as it would
not have been fitting to admit that at the battle of Abydos, "on the day that"—to
quote the Byzantine philosopher and theologian, Michael Psellos— "decided
the future of the Empire," the most Christian of rulers had been forced to rely
on the aid of pagan Rus' against his own subjects and fellow believers. For this
reason, in order to maintain appearances in Constantinople, Rus' was treated as
if it were already a Christian country, and the terms of the agreement concluded
were represented as simply involving the personal baptism of Volodimer and
those of his subjects who were not yet baptized, as well as the establishment of
jurisdictional and organizational bases for the church in Rus'.
For the Byzantine side, the most important issue was the arrival of a strong
Rus' force in Constantinople as soon as possible. If the alliance was concluded
in August and September, there would still have been a possibility of sending a
contingent of several hundred in the fall, before navigation became impossible,
but months would have been needed to prepare and then dispatch an armada of
several thousand warriors.32 Volodimer must have provided additional troops,
drawing them from various parts of his realm, as well as hired Varangians,
perhaps from Scandinavia. Considerable time would have been needed to
suitably equip an expeditionary corps of this kind and to prepare the 120 to 140
ships capable of carrying 40 to 60 warriors apiece down the river and across the
sea. Volodimer must have ordered the assembled force to move southward no
later than September of 987, as soon as circumstances were favorable for
navigation, which would have meant April or May 988, when the high level of
spring water would ease the passage of heavy war boats over the Dnipro
cataracts. The route down the Dnipro was easier and faster at that time of year,
taking about 20 to 23 days, and cabotage on the Black Sea—6 days. A fast-
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moving military fleet could thus complete the Kyiv-to-Constantinople journey
in about 26 to 30 days. Even in the case of a slightly slower pace, it could have
been expected on the Bosphorus sometime in June of 988.33
It was no problem to set a date for the baptism of Volodimer and his subjects
(meaning, for all practical purposes, the lords and military servitors and the
inhabitants of Kyiv). Part of the social elite and its clientele and part of the
merchant class were already Christian. The fact that a portion of the Byzantine
embassy remained in Kyiv for missionary work permitted the preparation of
catechumens and the performance of the baptismal rite at a leisurely pace, just
as long as it was completed before the agreed-upon date for the arrival of the
porphyrogennëta Anna in Rus'.34 The earliest possible date would have been
sometime in the summer of 988.
The giving away of a porphyrogennëta in marriage within less than a year
from the conclusion of the agreement seems quite startling, considering the
earlier experience of the Ottonians. Otto I had negotiated for three years with
Emperor Nikëphoros Phokas to obtain the hand of a porphyrogennëta for his
son Otto II, and unsuccessfully at that. Moreover, his emissary, Bishop
Liutprand of Cremona, was told, during an audience at the imperial palace in
968, that "It is an unheard-of thing for a porphyrogenita born of a
porphyrogenitus, that is, a daughter of one born in the (imperial) purple, who
was then herself born in the purple, to be given away in marriage to a for-
eigner."35 Subsequent efforts to win a porphyrogennëta for Otto III lasted for
more than six years (995-1001).
When the initiative was taken by the emperor himself, however, the matter
could be settled much more quickly: in the course of one-and-a-half years, for
example, a marriage was concluded between Otto II and Theophanô, who was,
it is true, not a porphyrogennëta, but only a relative of Emperor John
Tzimiskes. Even the temporary difficulties of Tzimiskes that had forced him to
revise his predecessor's policy toward the Ottonians were hardly comparable to
the plight of Basil II. The events of 986-987 had made Basil an emperor
without an empire. The Asiatic provinces were dominated by the rebellious
Bardas Phokas, while the Bulgarians held sway in a significant part of the
European half of the empire. The Armenian and Iberian units had thrown their
support to the usurpers. Nor could Basil count upon the Greeks. According to
Psellos, an overwhelming part of the army had declared itself for Bardas
Phokas, who had also won the support of the most influential aristocratic clans.
Basil was aware of the disloyalty among the Romaioi.36 In his efforts to save
his throne he could not afford to pay heed to any tradition, nor be held back by
the warnings of his grandfather, who had called down anathema upon anyone
who, in violation of tradition and imperial law, might be receptive to a request
from "the unbelieving and contemptible inhabitants of the North" to become
kinsmen of the emperor of the Romaioi?1 Aware of the danger to him and to
the Macedonian dynasty itself, he decided to break with the hitherto binding
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principle of denying marriage of foreigners to daughters of the emperor born in
the porphyrous chamber of the palace. Having concluded the agreement for the
marriage of Anna to Volodimer, Basil was profoundly interested in carrying it
to conclusion without delay. By having a sister in Kyiv, he could be certain of
effective support from his brother-in-law and count on the arrival of Rus' units
to deploy against the rebellion. To be sure, the emperor and his entourage
remembered well the lesson that Sviatoslav Igor'evich had taught the
Byzantines almost twenty years before. And some close to Basil were aware
that the Rus' prince stayed true toward Nikëphoros Phokas and that Byzantine-
Rus' relations came to a volte-face and hostility only after this emperor's
murder (11 December 969).38 The thought of a new appeal for aid from Rus'
must have aroused some anxiety. Nonetheless, there was no alternative. All
Basil could do was to take every possible step to avoid surprises from that
quarter while assuring himself of continued military aid. The most reliable
means of realizing this was the establishment of ties of kinship between the two
dynasties. It was thus not the prince who forced this union, but it was the
emperor himself, compelled by circumstances, who was the true initiator of the
marriage of Volodimer and Anna. The "Korsun' Legend" of the Primary
Chronicle, which is oblivious to the civil war in Byzantium and the matter of
Volodimer saving the throne for Basil II, betrays better knowledge of imperial
matrimonial doctrine than of historical reality.
For Volodimer, an early wedding date was likewise most desirable. An
honor that other Christian rulers had failed to attain had become the portion of
the ambitious builder of a large and energetic state that was, after all, barbarian
in the eyes of the heirs of the Roman Empire. The efforts of the Ottomans and
their merely trifling success with the non-porphyrogennëta Theophanö, so
poorly received, according to Thietmar, by many of the lords of the Heiliges
Römisches Reich, was no secret to the court in Kyiv. Moreover, reports of the
baptism of more and more Slavic and Scandinavian dynasts could well have
encouraged a growing sense of isolation and a desire to open up Rus' to the
Christian world, an attitude no doubt encouraged by those members of the
Kyivan ruler's entourage who had already converted to Christianity. The deci-
sion to accept baptism, already under consideration in Kyiv for some time and
now coming to fruition, became particularly attractive in light of the opportu-
nity to become a brother to the emperor of the Romaioi. The Kyivan ruler,
making Rus' part of the Christian oikoumenë, thus did not merely enter the
European family of rulers, but, thanks to his marriage to a porphyrogennëta,
immediately attained a leading position in that hierarchy.39 The union between
the two dynasties—Macedonian and Rurikid—significantly eased the difficult
and historically important breakthrough that opened the road to the
Christianization of Rus'. Hence the force of the political and ideological state-
ment of the marriage of Volodimer I.
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Since both sides were vitally interested in a hasty realization of their agree-
ment, a Rus' betrothal embassy must have arrived in Constantinople that same
autumn of 987. In its presence the treaty was to be ratified by the emperor
himself. The procedure must have been similar to that known from the agree-
ment between John Tzimiskes and Otto I in 971.40 Part of the Byzantine
delegation, consisting chiefly of clerics, remained in Kyiv to prepare and carry
out the baptism of the prince of Rus' and his pagan entourage, but the rest, with
the Rus' embassy and perhaps, as noted above, a military contingent of several
hundred, made its way by sea to Constantinople while that route was still open
to navigation. The assumption that this matchmaking embassy must have
reached Constantinople by October, or at the latest early November, is given
greater credence by the news that Volodimer's betrothal reached the European
courts by January 988. Light is shed on the timing of the agreement by the
thwarted plans of King Hugh Capet of France to obtain a porphyrogennëta for
his son Robert.41 All of this endorses the dating of the Byzantine-Rus' agree-
ment to being concluded no later than September 987.
* *
*
An appeal to outside force in the course of a civil war could not have failed to
have an impact on public opinion in the empire. Anxiety was fanned by circles
opposed to the Macedonian dynasty, but even among neutral and loyal groups,
the ruler's decision to bring in Rus' troops aroused serious misgivings, even
after the victory—no doubt out of fear about the long-range consequences of
such an action. These misgivings are expressed in a clear though indirect
manner by Leo the Deacon in his history, written at the beginning of the 990s.
Leo belonged to court circles, but was not an apologist for Basil Π. The
historian's silence about the presence of the Rus' at Chrysopolis and Abydos
and about the marriage of the porphyrogennëta Anna should be understood as
an expression of his disapproval of the means the emperor had employed to
save his throne. Leo's treatment of the capture of Kherson by the
"Tauroscythians" as yet another misfortune is witness to the fact that he was
shocked by the turning over of what was, after all, a Greek city to pillaging by
barbarians, whose excesses and cruelties in the wars with Sviatoslav were
recalled and exaggerated, not by chance, just at the time of rapprochement.
Leo, unsparing in his praise for Emperor Nikëphoros Phokas, and writing after
the civil war had already ended in victory for Basil, paints a dark picture of the
situation, so drastically different from the more fortunate reigns of Nikëphoros
Phokas (963-969) and John Tzimiskes (969-976). He portrays the Rus' as a
sinister and dangerous foe and a genuine menace to their neighbors, supporting
his warnings with the prophesies of Ezekiel (Historiae lib. IX, б).42
Leo the Deacon was not alone in deriving a pessimistic vision of the
empire's future from the years of civil war. In poetic works written between
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986 and 990, John Géomètres contrasts an idealized portrait of Nikëphoros
Phokas and his times with an image of the empire of the present, one encom-
passed with ruin and oppressed by a fratricidal war in which "brother aims his
ax at the breast of brother" and "noble cities are humiliatingly trampled by the
feet of foreigners."43
Aversion to the Rus' visitors is sharply expressed as well in a poetic epitaph
for Nikëphoros Phokas. The poet appeals to the murdered emperor to rise up
from his grave to defend his city against the Rus'. Particularly telling is the
following five-line stanza:
The armed forces of the Rus' come out against us.
The tribe of Scythians is thirsty for slaughter.
The lowest of foreigners plunder our city,
They, whom once your statue alone,
Before the gates of Byzantion, struck full of terror.44
This verse refers to the presence of the Rus' expeditionary corps in
Constantinople in 988-989. The Rus', despite their thirst for slaughter, limited
themselves to pillage. The behavior of foreign troops, even allied ones, was
always a heavy burden for the inhabitants of the host country, and the warriors
from Rus' were no exception, although the poet (whether under the influence of
his own prejudices or of reports purposely spread by forces hostile to Basil or
opposed to his policy) probably overstates the case. Evidence of misgivings
and fears about Rus' during the time of Basil II is offered by the Patria
Constantinopoleos, which is a guide to the landmarks of the capital. Referring
to a monument on the Forum of Taurus (Forum Tauri), it describes how one of
the reliefs on its side portrayed "the last days of the city, when the Rus' will
destroy it."45 The genesis of this legend about the future destruction of the city
by the Rus' dates back to their unexpected attack on Constantinople in 860. It is
noteworthy that the prophesy was still alive a few years after Abydos, in the
early 990s, when the guide was compiled. Despite the new state of relations
with Kyiv since 988, in the years that immediately followed, while elite Rus'
units fought on the Bulgarian and Syrian fronts to restore the empire to its
earlier strength and glory, a traveler guided across the Forum of Taurus was
still treated to the same, unaltered commentary. The fact remains that the
obsessive expectation of "the end of the city and the end of the world," a
reflection of the growth of millennarian beliefs, singled out the Rus' as the ones
who would execute the sentence.46 The divisions from the years of civil war
had not yet been overcome, and the opposition of broad sections of society had
not yet died down. The events that long since have enabled us to credit Basil II
with rebuilding the empire's strength appeared in much more somber hues to
his contemporaries. The new policy of Basil toward Kyiv aroused distrust and
anxiety about the future of the empire among the Byzantines, and this was
translated into the language of eschatological prophecy by the common people.
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Alongside his chief diplomatic initiative to ensure Kyivan aid, the emperor
negotiated an understanding with the Fätimid caliph of Egypt between Septem-
ber 987 and April 988. It was no coincidence that at a time when the eastern
regions of the empire were under the domination of Phokas, Basil sent an
embassy to Cairo and agreed, as Arab historians confirm, to heavy t e r m s -
inclusive of prayers for the Fätimid Caliph al-cAzîz recited in the mosque of
Constantinopole. At the cost of territorial concessions, he could count on Arab
military action to tie down part of Phokas' forces on the Syrian border.47 He
did not hesitate to choose such means of assuring his victory, and likewise did
not hesitate to sacrifice his own imperial sister to that goal. When his own
existence was at stake, there was no time to follow the dictates of imperial
doctrine.48
The Baptism of Rus' Viewed from Kyiv
At a time when the empire was wracked by civil war, three significant events
were taking place: the baptism of Rus', the marriage of Volodimer to Anna, and
the siege and capture of Kherson by Rus' armies. Our doubts about the reliabil-
ity of the Primary Chronicle account also have to do with the sequence and
location of events of which it writes. Not only the considerations outlined
above, but an analysis of other Rus' accounts as well, militate against the
contention that the baptism of Volodimer and his marriage to the
porphyrogennëta took place in captured Kherson. The Primary Chronicle's
"Korsun' legend" managed to forget the real reason for Rus' action against
Kherson and instead invested the city with splendor as the site of historical
ceremonies. Nonetheless, in composing anew the history of those years, it
conveyed details—still present in the eleventh century—connected with the
siege and capture of the city, as well as with its real role in the Christianization
of Rus'. Along with the trophies—relics of the saints, church vessels, and icons,
urgently needed for the newly established churches of Kyiv—many clerics of
Kherson also journeyed northward, though not of their own free will. Adapting
themselves to life in Rus', they came in time to be the propagators of this
legend, one so flattering to their native city.
The date of Kherson's capture can be deduced from Leo the Deacon's
reference to a comet that heralded the earthquake in Constantinople on 25-26
October 989. That comet appeared in July.49 In accordance with the sequence
of the Byzantine historian's account, the comet had appeared sometime after
the battle at Abydos and the fall of Kherson, justifying the traditional view that
Kherson was captured prior to July 989. In any case, the city fell before the
earthquake of October 989. The breaking of the resistance of this Crimean
fortress may have been linked with the arrival of news about the defeat and
death of Bardas Phokas at Abydos on 13 April 989. The Rus' action against
Kherson grew out of the agreement of 987 and fits in well with the overall
330 POPPE
outlines of the imperial policy toward the rebellious city. This new act of
treason brought the issue to life again. Basil II decided to break the political
ambitions of Kherson, and in order to provide exemplary punishment for the
city, he consciously handed the city over for plunder. As further retribution,
Kherson was also deprived of the right to mint its own coins.50 The extent of
the destruction remains under discussion, but it seems certain that Kherson
never regained its earlier political brilliance nor its economic significance.51
* *
*
In reconstructing the sequence of events associated with the baptism of Rus', it
is impossible not to notice the coincidence between certain of our conclusions
and the account of the Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodimer which
notes that: "after holy baptism the blessed prince lived twenty-eight years. In
the second [i.e., following] year after his baptism, he went to the cataracts, and
in the third he captured Kherson."52 The differences in the order and chronol-
ogy of events here from those in the Primary Chronicle permit us to conclude
that the concise annalistic notes used by the Memorial and Encomium, which
itself was compiled in the thirteenth century, originate from a different tradi-
tion. That tradition was still alive in Kyiv in the second half of the eleventh
century, as shown by the vitae of Boris and Glëb. If we subtract those twenty-
eight years from the death of Volodimer in 6523 (1015), the date of his baptism
falls in 6495 (March 987-February 988). The same conclusion is supported by
the reference to the capture of Kherson in the third year after the baptism.
Counting from 6495, that year turns out to be 6497 (March 989-February 990),
corresponding closely to Byzantine information about the date of that city's
fall.53
Thus, the dating of Volodimer's baptism to the year 6495 has all the
earmarks of a reliable tradition. The mission, which remained in Kyiv after the
conclusion of the understanding in September 6495 (987), would have had
sufficient time to convert the Rus' ruler before the end of the year (February
988). The sacraments of baptism and confirmation could only have been per-
formed by a bishop, and so it must be concluded that at least one hierarch of
episcopal rank headed the mission. Because there was no need for excessive
haste, the missionaries no doubt sought to endow the ceremonies with the most
spectacular character possible. Most likely, the feast of the Epiphany, one of
the nearest canonically established days suitable for the baptism of a ruler, was
chosen as the day of the ceremony.54
On the basis of the ritual requirements of the Constantinopolitan
euchologion, the preparation for baptism would have taken about two months.
The first stage of the catechumenate had probably already begun in October,
and certainly no later than the first half of November 987: after receiving
instruction in prayer and being conducted into the church, the prince became an
KYIVANRUS' 331
"unbaptized Christian." Following forty days of prayer, fasting, catechism, and
talks about the faith with his spiritual father, the bishop, Volodimer would have
reached the second stage of the catechumenate, which had to last at least ten
days, given the requirement of daily exorcistic prayers. The Christmas of 987
would have marked the beginning of the most significant period of this second
stage: the renunciations required for the confession of faith. As one newly born
into the faith, Volodimer received a new name at baptism: Basil (Vasilii). Since
the rituals of baptism and confirmation contained formulae using the new
baptismal name, the selection of the latter must have taken place beforehand.
The name chosen was the same as that of the "Emperor of the Romaioi,"
thereby revealing Basil II as the patron of the Rus' ruler's baptism and, as it
were, per procurant, his godfather.55 The feast day of the patron saint of both
rulers, St. Basil the Great, was 1 January, coinciding with the feast of the
Circumcision, and in 988 it fell on a Sunday. It could well have been the day
for the catechumen Volodimer to decide on his new Christian name. Receiving
the sacrament of baptism in the font and the sacrament of confirmation on 6
January 988, Volodimer thus became a Christian. The remaining heathen mem-
bers of his court probably were baptized at the same time.
* *
*
The em'gmatic reference in the Memorial and Encomium to Volodimer's trip to
the Dnipro cataracts in the year 6496 (March 988-February 989) comes be-
tween two major events—his baptism in 6495 and the capture of Kherson in
6497. If the note was based on an original annalistic record, then its terseness
would speak for it having been written at a time when the reason for the
prince's trip to the cataracts would still have been obvious.
What could have led Volodimer to do this in the following year, shortly after
his baptism—6496 or, to be more precise, during its first half (i.e., between the
spring and the fall of 988)—the period favorable for navigation on the Dnipro?
The prince of Rus' undoubtedly went down to the cataracts to greet his be-
trothed and to ensure a safe journey for her entourage. The documented in-
stances of later Rus' princes' travel to the cataracts or even the mouth of the
Dnipro to meet an entourage bringing a betrothed princess, support such an
interpretation of this laconic "reference."56 While Volodimer awaited the ar-
rival of Anna at the cataracts, guarded by his warriors, a flotilla of Rus' boats
must have moved still further down the Dnipro nearer to the mouth to take the
suite of the porphyrogennëta on board from their sea-going vessels. An under-
standing of these words of the Memorial and Encomium to be a reference to
Anna's arrival in Rus' in the calendar year (6496) after Volodimer's baptism,
or, more precisely, in the summer of 988, is reinforced by the fact that both
rulers had a genuine interest in carrying out their mutual obligations as soon as
possible. A delay in cementing the alliance would not have been in the interests
of the Macedonian dynasty.57
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* *
*
If everything points to 988 as the year of Volodimer's baptism, then 6 January
seems the most likely day for administering the sacrament, given its symbolism
by twinning the baptism of the ruler with the feast of the Epiphany. Likewise,
the day of the Descent of the Holy Spirit (Pentecost), which in 988 fell on 27
May, may well be linked with the mass baptism of the assembled Kyivans in
the waters of the Dnipro as described in the Primary Chronicle: "Then
Volodimer sent heralds throughout the city, proclaiming that if any inhabitant,
rich or poor, did not betake himself to the river, he would risk the prince's
displeasure. When the people heard these words, they wept for joy, and ex-
claimed in their enthusiasm: 'If this were not good, the prince and boyars
would not have accepted it.'"58 The equally zealous believer, Metropolitan
Hilarión, provided a somewhat more sober assessment of the event: "No one
dared to oppose Volodimer's pious command. And even if one did not come to
baptism out of love, he did so out of fear of the one who had ordered it, for his
piety was linked with authority."59
The "Korsun' Legend" events surrounding the baptism of Rus' are all related
in the Primary Chronicle under the year 6496 (March 988-February 989). For
the chronicler-compiler, the Kherson version seemed the most reliable, since it
offered the most providential vision of the conversion of Rus'. But as he
himself admitted, other versions were known to him, no doubt as laconic and
mundane as the above mentioned notes from the Memorial and Encomium. He
thus could have had the date of at least one of those events, and on that basis
assigned a place to the "Korsun' Legend" in the chronological structure of the
chronicle. This could have been the date of Anna's arrival or of the departure of
the expedition against Kherson, but most likely it was the year of the mass
baptism of the Kyivans. In Kyiv, the memory of that Pentecostal day, that last
Sunday in May of 988, when, along the Dnipro "a countless multitude as-
sembled, [who] all went into the water [and] stood, some up to their necks,
others up to their chests, the younger nearer the banks, the adults holding
children in their arms waded while the priests stood by and offered prayers,"60
must have lived on in the minds of several generations.
* * •
*
This turning point in the religious, social, and political life of Rus' is insepara-
bly linked with the personality of its ruler, Volodimer. Already in the eleventh
century a variety of commentators proclaimed the significance of his achieve-
ment, marking, as it did, the beginning of the spiritual transformation of the
East Slavs, and the accuracy of their assessment was confirmed by the millen-
nium that followed. Volodimer and his decision were soon compared to
Constantine the Great and his achievement. The baptizer of Rus' was styled
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"equal of the apostles," and "apostle among rulers." But his spiritual side, his
personality, was treated in a purely stylized manner. Thus, the monastic chroni-
cler sharply contrasts the dark figure of yesterday's pagan with the shining
visage of the Christian prince. From the oral—knightly and folk—bylina tradi-
tion, written down centuries later, there emerges a more colorful but equally
idealized figure of the Christian prince.61 The historian of today, wrenching the
account of Volodimer's "choice of a faith" out of its chronicle context and
thereby overlooking the role assigned to Providence in that account, uninten-
tionally endows the proceedings with a grotesque character: Volodimer is
portrayed as an able and effective ruler, who, when his reform of paganism has
failed, pragmatically considers various propositions and reaches out to Chris-
tian teaching as the best means of consolidating the structure of the state and
elevating its position by joining it to the family of Christian countries.
There exists almost nothing about the actual personality and religious con-
victions of the ruler, who, after all, himself became a Christian. Hilarión,
sketching his unambiguously positive portrait of a believer more than thirty
years after Volodimer's death, placed his emphasis, above all, on the cultiva-
tion of those values on Rus' soil of which he himself and his hero were zealous
propagators.
The "baptism of Rus"' had been prepared by two preceding generations, and
Volodimer's decision itself must have taken time to ripen. Hagiographie and
bookish tradition notwithstanding, the transformation of Volodimer from pa-
gan to Christian actually was not and could not have been a sudden one.
Volodimer, the third son of Sviatoslav, was born between 955 and 960 to
Malusha, housekeeper of Princess Ol'ga and of an unfree court attendant's
family. Her brother, Dobrynia, likewise made a career for himself at court.
Majlusha belonged to the inner circle of the regent's entourage, and as one of
Ol'ga's closest servants must have been baptized along with her mistress. As a
concubine of Sviatoslav and soon the mother of Volodimer, she continued to
Ιίνφ at court, and thus Ol'ga, up until her death in 969, could easily have
exercised an influence on the education of her grandson. Even if he was
brought up as a pagan in accordance with the wishes of his father, his grand-
mother and mother would surely have imparted many of the ideas and values of
the Christian faith to him. Shortly after Ol'ga's death, the young Volodimer,
along with his tutor and uncle Dobrynia, was sent by Sviatoslav to Novgorod.
The fact that it was Dobrynia whom Volodimer, after his own baptism in 988,
entrusted with overseeing the introduction of Christianity in Novgorod, allows
us to speculate that the brother of Malusha may already have been a Christian.
One can thus confidently presume that Volodimer, from childhood, grew up in
a Christian atmosphere and surely could not have been the convinced heathen
as some insinuate. The baptism of the thirty-year-old Volodimer on 6 January
98i8, preceded by a period of catechumenate, had grown out of well-prepared
soil. An emotional tie with Christianity, reaching back to childhood years,
imbued with the religious zeal of his grandmother and mother, intertwined with
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another, rational path to a knowledge of God: "reason illuminated his heart as
to how to find . . . the one God." Belief in the unseen, in that which the senses
cannot comprehend, was viewed in the young Christian society as a higher
stage of intellectual initiation, an attitude expressed well in Hilarion's charac-
terization of Volodimer's decision to be baptized as an act of wisdom. An act of
faith and an act of reason have at least one thing in common: both demand a
conscious concentration, an internal tension, a new sense of responsibility
toward oneself and one's surroundings. This was forcefully expressed by the
chronicler's metaphor of Volodimer as the plowman "who plowed and har-
rowed the soil when he enlightened Rus' with baptism," and Iaroslav the Wise
as the sower, "who sowed the hearts of the faithful with the written word."62
Some sense of the natural, human dimension of the faith of the ruler and
baptizer of Rus' can be derived from a few laconic but substantive remarks by
the missionary bishop, Bruno of Querfurt, in a letter to King Henry II at the
very beginning of 1009. The zealous missionary, aiming to convert the
Pechenegs, spent no less than two months in Kyiv in 1008. Out of their
conversations, characterized by a common concern for the extension of the
terra Christiana, and out of joint participation in worship and prayer, a bond of
spiritual friendship was forged between Bruno and Volodimer. The relation-
ship culminated in a dramatic farewell at the edge of the steppe: the missionary
and prince, and those accompanying them, joined together in the mystery of the
liturgy, united in prayer by a common language of faith and doubt, fear and
hope.63
* *
*
The Senior Ruzorum must have made a strong impression on Brano, in light of
how the latter undertook to present him to his own senior, King Henry, as a
model Christian and a model Christian ruler. In Brano's view, Volodimer
belonged to that rare category of princes who, like Constantine the Great and
Charlemagne, had earned from God the title of apostle by their work for the
conversion of the heathen and the enlargement of the church. In the course of
his visit to Kyiv, Bruno must have encouraged the baptizer of Rus' and his lay
and ecclesiastical entourage in their sense of the apostolic character of their
mission. That conviction continued to live on in Kyiv after the death of
Volodimer as well. Not only was it expressed by Hilarión and the chronicler, it
was made part of the legacy of the ruling house by Iaroslav the Wise, who
wrote it into the decorative program of the metropolitan cathedral of Kyiv in
the 1040s. The foundation scene in the western portion of the chief nave of St.
Sophia, a fresco of substantial dimensions (about 25 sq m) portraying Iaroslav
the Wise and members of his family, clearly corresponds to the mosaic frieze
depicting the Eucharist on the curving wall of the apse at the opposite end of
the nave. Looking at the two compositions, one cannot help being strack by the
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way the twelve-figure princely procession approaching the enthroned Christ
from either side echoes the procession of the apostles in the scene of the
Eucharist opposite. This striking parallel, clearly comprehensible in the context
of thé overall Christological theme of the compositions in the main nave and
transept (the central crossing of the church), is a visible symbol of the apostolic
mission of the ruling dynasty toward its subjects and toward its domain—the
land Of Rus'.64
Tfyis charismatic apotheosis of the ruling house was reinforced—beginning
in the mid-eleventh century—by the growing cult of saintly kinsmen: the
princes Boris and Glëb, treacherously slain in the fratricidal struggle for the
Kyi van throne that followed the death of Volodimer on 15 July 1015.65
By their very character, the two sons of Volodimer bore witness to their
adherence to the highest Christian values. In this young Christian society, their
voluntary sacrifice assumed the sense of martyrdom for the faith—a faith
confessed in deed as well as word. The martyred deaths of Boris and Glëb,
innocent and unresisting (as portrayed by both hagiographer and chronicler),
began to be interpreted in due course as a readiness to lay down one's own life
in sacrifice for the gospel of Christ. The chronicler, while drawing at the turn of
the eleventh century on the hagiographie text, emphasized even more strongly
the notion that the baptism of Rus', undertaken by Volodimer, had been brought
to fruition by the blessing of the land of Rus' with the blood of the princely
martyrs.66 Such a voluntary sacrifice attested to a turning point of Rus' on a
new path: Volodimer's two sons, bringing the gospel to life by their example of
humility, nonresistance, and participation in the sacrifice of Christ, demon-
strated how that gospel could transform a human life.
Such reflections on the act of baptism in 988, combined with a deepening
awareness of the history of the Christian community, also led to speculation
aboyt the original source and earliest beginnings of the conversion—specula-
tion that was not content to stop with the deeds of Volodimer, "equal of the
aposjtles," and those of his forerunner Ol'ga. The search was sparked by a
sincère, albeit naive, desire to embellish the searchers' own prehistory, to trace
their own path to salvation back to apostolic times. At the end of the eleventh
century, the legend of the wanderings of the Apostle Andrew, who was also
said to have established the episcopal see in Byzantion (the future
Constantinople), had a Rus' motif grafted onto it. The chronicle likewise
adopted a South Slavic tradition that portrayed the Apostle Paul as teacher of
all the Slavs.
The Apostle Andrew's setting foot on the land of Rus', and his raising of the
cross on the hills that would be become the site of future Kyiv, served, as it
were, as a baptism of the land itself, a foreshadowing of the Christian realm
that would one day arise there. The introduction of the Apostle Paul as a
missionary among the Slavs in their prehistoric cradle, and the characterization
of him as "the teacher of we Rus', since he preached to the Slavic race,"
supplemented the mission of Andrew. From the very presence of the Apostle
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Paul, blessing flowed down upon the Slavs in their ancient Danubian home-
land. Those who migrated to the Dnipro, moreover, settled on a land already
blessed by the Apostle Andrew. Thus, according to the chronicler's conception,
Christ, by the agency of the apostles, had already written the Slavs and the land
of Rus' into the history of salvation. Both legends were an expression of a
yearning, so typical of the newly converted, to find a place in the genealogy of
the church and the traditions of ancient ties to Christianity. The Rus' legend
about the wanderings of Andrew, originally an apocryphal work and then in the
thirteenth century an officially recognized Byzantine tradition, endowed the
ties between Kyiv and Constantinople, moreover, with a character of apostolic
predestination.67
* *
*
The integrative potential of the Slavic language was already recognized in Rus'
in the tenth century. The Slavicization of the social elite, led by the dynasty,
had begun even earlier. Igor's son Sviatoslav, born in the 930s, already bore a
Slavic name (Igor' itself is the Slavic version of Norse Ingvarr). The process
was also reflected in the contemporary Slavic translation of the treaties of 911
and 944. A role in the recognition of Slavic as the state language of Rus',
despite the Scandinavian origin (judging from their names) of the majority of
the Rus' emissaries concluding the treaties, was undoubtedly played by the
linguistically related Bulgarian culture, which penetrated the Dnipro region in
the course of the tenth century. The latter development also made it easier for
Volodimer, when receiving Christianity directly from Byzantium, to don a
linguistic garb of his own choosing. The choice bears witness to the self-
consciousness of the ruling circles of Kyivan Rus', who understood and valued
the social and political benefit of offering praise to the "newly known Christian
God" in the Slavic language. It also enjoyed the support of the church, con-
scious, thanks to the Cyrillo-Methodian experience, of the importance of the
language of ecclesiastical books and liturgy for the Christianization of a large
realm.68 Only with Christianization did Rus' become capable of full political
and social self-consciousness, finding a place for itself in the universal history
of humanity and its salvation. The right of the ruling elite to power was now
based not only on birth, valor, and wealth, but also on membership in a
particularly high religious and intellectual culture as well as on its distinctive-
ness from the unconverted and unenlightened. The Slavic neveglasb meant "a
heathen," but, as is clear from translations from Greek and Latin, it also meant
"an uneducated, ignorant man, one not belonging to the sphere of thought."
Christianity meant access to knowledge and became a source of intellectual
experience. The spiritual union of faith and reason rather than the dichotomy
between them, characterized a young Christian society. The newly converted
elite must have been particularly susceptible to the charm of the well-conceived
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orde(r linking church and written word with political authority and the fortress-
town. In the era of the Merovingians and perhaps even more in the era of the
Carolingians, Western Europe had lived through such a period, marked by the
nai'Ve absence of any distinction between religious ideals on the one hand and
political and civilizational ones on the other—an era when Christianity was
turn|ed more toward rulers, their courts, their magnates and courtly and armed
rethjiue, and appeared in harmony with earthly strivings toward legal order,
building in stone, and education. Now it was the turn of the Eastern Slavs. For
Emperor Basil and his entourage, preoccupied with immediate military and
political goals, the conversion of the ruler of Kyiv and his subjects was of
intejrest, above all else, from the point of view of an effective alliance. And so,
for ithe moment, an assurance of its constancy was sought, with mercenary
practicality, more in ties of kinship, though in the long run the imperial court
was sensible to institute the foundations of a religious community.69
Although clerics and the means necessary to support the Christianization of
Ruş' were dispatched from the imperial city on the order of the emperor, the
conversion of that land was not decided on the Bosphorus. For all the impor-
tance of the theological, intellectual, and cultural achievement of the Byzantine
and early Christian heritage in the transformation of the Eastern Slavs into a
Christian society, there is no basis for ascribing the conversion of Rus' to the
initiative and activity of Byzantium. What we are accustomed to characterizing
as ''Byzantine influence" was in fact the work of the interested party itself,
reaphing out in search of new spiritual values. Nonetheless, the Byzantines who
supported the measures and steps taken up by Anna and Basil II could consider
thej conversion of Rus' a significant achievement on their part, even though
majny notables in fact failed to grasp the significance of the event in time.70
tí, from the outside, it was the political aspect that was most clearly recog-
nizjed, in Rus' itself the newly converted elite had already managed in the
coijirse of the first century following the baptism to rise to a more complex
appreciation of the event. The change itself and the new participation in the
wcjrld of Christian values were understood, felt, and profoundly experienced.
Moreover, this elite had succeeded in arriving at a considered understanding of
its own conversion.71
The acceptance of Christianity was not dictated by chance. While the spe-
cific date and conditions of the baptism of the Rus' ruler and his entourage grew
out of a specific political situation, the entry of the Kyivan realm into the
Christian community had been preceded by more than a century of infiltration
of Christianity into the middle Dnipro region and of the growing stature ofthat
faith among the Rus' nobility and at the court in Kyiv (cf. the treaty of 944),
particularly since the time of the baptism of Volodimer's grandmother, the
regent of Rus' Ol'ga-Helena, from 954, the imperial zôstëpatrikia.
If the idea of the conversion of Rus' had been born in Constantinople, a
reversion to paganism would have been unavoidable—just as it had been
shjortly after the premature initiative of Photios in 867, or even after the attempt
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under Ol'ga and her son Sviatoslav (when the need for change was already felt,
but the fear of breaking with traditional values was still strong).72 This fear had
weakened in the course of the succeeding decades, and the conditions proposed
by Basil II, born in an international context that reflected the constellation of
real political forces, greatly eased Volodimer's decision. The permanence of
the reception was decided, however, by the political readiness of the Rus' ruling
strata to be baptized. The baptism of Rus' was a great religious act, but, at the
same time, it was a significant political event.
The Metropolitanate ofKyiv and All Rus': The Propagation of Christianity.
The Building of an Ecclesiastical Framework
The most important stipulation of the treaty concluded in September 987
between Byzantine Emperor Basil and Volodimer was the latter's agreement to
make Christianity the official religion of Rus'. The Byzantine side expressed its
readiness to participate actively in the realization of this task.
In the Notitia episcopatuum of the patriarchate of Constantinople, prepared
and promulgated around 1087 under Alexios I Komnenos, the metropolitanate
of Rus' is listed as number 60 among 80 metropolitanates. The metropolitanates
are listed in the Nötitiae in the order of their establishment. Immediately before
the see of Rus', in positions 58 among 59 are the metropolitanates of Serres
(Serrai) and Pompeiupolis, both of which were still only titular archbishoprics
in the time of John Tzimiskes, but figure as metropolitanates in a synod
document of 21 February 997. They thus had advanced in rank sometime
between 969 and 996. The metropolitanate of Alania, following Rus' in position
61, and thus established after it, was set up before 6506 (997-998), as indicated,
by a grant of privilege to its metropolitan in that year. The simple conclusion,
then, is that the metropolitanate of Rus' was created sometime after 969 and
certainly before 997. From one of the versions of the treatise "Peri
metatheseon" [De translationibus], it is known that Theophylaktos was trans-
ferred from the cathedra of Sebastea to the see of Rus' during the reign of Basil
II Porphyrogennëtos (976-1025). It is likewise known that Theodore, the
chronicler and metropolitan of Sebastea who was confirmed in his see in 997,
must have become pastor of that city prior to that year. Moreover, the informa-
tion about the translation was probably taken from Theodore's no longer extant
chronicle of Sebastea. It would appear, then, that Theophylaktos was
Theodore's predecessor in Sebastea and hence the very same metropolitan who
had fallen into a violent conflict with the clergy and people of that Armenian
city and region, and was forced, as a result, to leave Sebastea at the very
beginning of 987.73
Thus, everything would seem to indicate that the metropolitanate of Rus',
sixtieth in rank in the ecclesiastical province of the patriarchate of
Constantinople, had already been established in the princely capital of Kyiv by
the time the porphyrogennëta Anna and her suite of lay and ecclesiastical
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digftitaries arrived there in 988. At the head of the clergy who had come to Rus'
wasi the former metropolitan of Sebastea, a trusted supporter of Basil II. The
factj that he had already been consecrated a bishop made it easier for the
emperor to nominate him to this new post, avoiding difficult and time-consum-
ing ¡ecclesiastical procedure.
ІЬе. Byzantine genealogy of the Rus' church was indicated ca. 1050 by
Hilarión, himself soon to become metropolitan of Rus', in his Sermon on Divine
¿αψ and Grace. There he praised the deed of Volodimer and described the
ruler's path to a knowledge of the one God—"Most of all, moreover, he heard
of jhe ever Orthodox Greek land, loving Christ and strong in faith"—and later
compared the Rus' prince to Constantine the Great—"That man, together with
hisj mother Helena, brought the Cross from Jerusalem and established it, bring-
ing glory to the faith throughout his world. You and your grandmother Ol'ga
brought the Cross from the new Jerusalem, from the city of Constantine, and,
establishing it on your land, affirmed the faith." The Cross serves here as a
metaphor, expressing not only the triumph of Christianity in Rus', but also its
genealogy and institutional ties. Iaroslav continued the work of his father: "he
doles not alter your acts, but affirms them," while the whole princely family
"guards Orthodoxy in accordance with your will."74 Hilarión's express empha-
sis! o n *°е continuity between the ecclesiastical policy of Volodimer and that of
Iaroslav the Wise confirms that the status of the Church of Rus' had already
be)en defined in the era of its baptizer.
| The creation of an ecclesiastical province headed by a metropolitan (arch-
bishop) meant the establishment of a number of bishoprics with suffragans
subordinated to him within its structure. According to reliable data, several
bijshops came to Rus' with the metropolitan. The Arab historian Yahyä of
Ahtioch reports that Emperor Basil sent "metropolitans and bishops" to the
leader of Rus', and that they "baptized the king and all who inhabited his
land."75 This reference to "metropolitans" in the plural has led some to ques-
tion the reliability of the account of Yahyä, who was a Christian historian.
However, the circumstances under which Yahyä's report of the baptism came
into being enable us to explain the remark. Yahyä wrote his history of events in
Byzantium after moving in 1015 from Cairo to Antioch, where he was able to
make use of local Greek sources. One of those sources, recounting the uprising
of Bardas Phokas and the arrival of a Rus' force in Byzantium, could well have
used the Greek collective term for bishops of varying rank: archiereis. In
translating this term into Arabic, Yahyä must then have sought to convey its
meaning by using two words borrowed from the Greek and known to Arabic
Christians: mamrinat wa asâqifat (metropolitans and bishops). Because he
knew nothing more about the ecclesiastical organization in Rus' than his source
provided, his translation could have been influenced by the situation in the
patriarchate of Antioch, where many bishops used the title of metropolitan.
From a letter of the missionary bishop Bruno of Querfurt to the German
King Henry II in 1008, we know that one of his missionary comrades was
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consecrated (consecravimusque nos) bishop to the Pechenegs during Bruno's
visit to Kyiv in that year.76 According to the decrees of the Council of Nicaea, a
new bishop had to be consecrated by at least three bishops, and hence, other
bishops must have participated alongside Bruno in the ceremony, which took
place in Kyiv after the return of the mission from the steppe. This is likewise
indicated by Bruno's use of the plural in his letter. There were at least two of
them, probably the metropolitan of Kyiv and one of his suffragans. The Pri-
mary Chronicle, written a hundred years later, confirms the arrival of bishops
in Kyiv along with the porphyrogennëta Anna and their presence in Rus' during
the time of Volodimer.77 Also decisive here is the statement of Hilarión, who
praised Volodimer, saying, "and you often gathered together with our new
fathers—the bishops—and took counsel with them in humility, about how to
establish law among the people, who had just come to know God."78 Hilarión
must have met some of those who had taken part in the mass baptism in the
waters of the Dnipro in 988. In the 1060s, "another brother by the name of
Jeremy, who remembered the conversion of Rus'," was still living in the
Monastery of the Caves. Hilarion's own memory would have reached back at
least to the final years of Volodimer's rule, for he was a contemporary of that
prince's sons.
In 1018, Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg had no doubt that the cathedral
complex of St. Sophia in Kyiv had been occupied for years by "archiepiscopus
civitatis illius, " i.e., the head of an ecclesiastical province. In other words, the
church in Rus' already had its own ecclesiastical provincial structure. An
archbishop with the title of metropolitan, administering his own diocese, stood
at the head of a group of suffragans, each of them administering a diocese of his
own.
Thus, from the outset, the church in Rus' was a metropolitanate, an ecclesi-
astical province of the patriarchate of Constantinople. From this it follows that
the patriarch enjoyed certain defined rights here in administrative, judicial, and
legislative matters, as well as in the interpretation of canon law. The most
important of these was the right of filling the metropolitanate. In the tenth
through thirteenth centuries the exercise of that right lay within the competence
of the endemousa synodos, i.e., the permanent, standing patriarchal synod of
bishops residing or visiting in Constantinople, who presented to the patriarch
three candidates satisfying the canonical requirements. The one selected then
received his episcopal consecration from the hands of the patriarch. Even if
there was a candidate in mind from the outset, and frequently the will of the
emperor came into play here, an attempt was nonetheless made to preserve the
appearance of proper procedure. This was also the path to the see of Kyiv, and
the metropolitans of Rus' also took part in the work of the endemousa when
they were in the imperial capital. The difference from other metropolitanates of
the empire lay in the fact that the act of enthronement in Kyiv was one not only
of ecclesiastical, but of political accreditation as well. That enthronement
would take place in Kyiv's cathedral of St. Sophia on a Sunday shortly after the
К Yi VAN RUS' 341
arrival of the newly consecrated metropolitan. With the exception of three men
of Rus' (Hilarión, Clement [Klym], and Cyril [Kirili] II), all of them were
Greeks. Reception of a new arrival, permission to proceed with the enthrone-
ment ceremony, and the participation of the princely court in that rite served as
a defacto confirmation of the act that had been performed in Hagia Sophia in
Constantinople.
This method of filling the metropolitanate meant that every vacancy in the
see of Kyiv lasted at least a year or, not infrequently, longer. Likewise, the
periodic visits to Constantinople, made less frequently than at the prescribed
interval of every two years because of the difficulty of the journey, lasted
several months and sometimes a whole year. In the nearly 300-year period
under discussion here, the metropolitanate of Kyiv was vacant for at least 60
years, a fact that points, on the one hand, to the relative weakness of its
incumbent, who came to what was for him a foreign land partly without a
knowledge of the Slavic language or the realities of ecclesiastical life, and, on
the other, bears witness to the internal strength of the Rus' church.79
* *
With the establishment of a metropolitan see in Kyiv in 988 and, soon thereaf-
ter, episcopal sees in Bilhorod (Belgorod), Chernihiv (Chernigov), Novgorod,
and Polatsk (Polotsk), the framework of an ecclesiastical organization for Rus'
came into being. In this way, the organizational preconditions for the
Christianization of the Eastern Slavs were created. The seats of bishops were
situated in politically distinctive centers, which already possessed, by the sec-
ond half of the tenth century, an urban character. They lay on the north-south
river route known as the "road from the Varangians to the Greeks," the axis of
the political dominion of the Rurikids.80
From the beginning, a special place was held by the bishop in the town of
Bilhorod, a powerful fortress some 23 kilometers from Kyiv, which served as
Volodimer's second residence. As a kind of palatial bishop and above all else
as protöthronos (i.e., the first bishop of the province after the metropolitan), he
enjoyed precedence over the remaining suffragan bishops and took the place of
an absent metropolitan in certain functions. The position of the Bilhorod see
was emphasized by the choice of the Holy Apostles as its patrons, a choice
clearly linked with the title of the metropolitan cathedral, named for the Wis-
dom of God, which was identified with Christ as the second person of the Holy
Trinity. This symbolic expression was supplemented by the title of Transfigu-
ration of the Lord bestowed on the third cathedral created on the lands of Rus'
proper—that of Chernihiv, the second most significant center on the middle
Dnipro, about 150 kilometers from Kyiv.
The other centers chosen as the seats of bishops, the two most notable towns
of the realm after Kyiv, lay far to the north: Polatsk, more than 700 kilometers
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from the capital of Rus', and Novgorod, located more than 1,000 kilometers
from Kyiv. In both, the cathedral churches were dedicated to the Wisdom of
God—Sophia—and it was no coincidence. Traditionally, this has been seen as
an expression of the rivalry of both cities with Kyiv, but the political conditions
in the eleventh century, when Novgorod opposed itself to Kyiv on several
occasions and the princes of Polatsk had to defend their rights against Iaroslav
the Wise and his sons, cannot be projected back into the period of baptism and
the building of the framework of ecclesiastical organization. In those days,
Volodimer's oldest son, Iziaslav, was sitting in Polatsk, while in Novgorod
paganism was being uprooted by Volodimer's governor, his uncle Dobrynia.
The title of Sophia was consciously chosen by the bishops from Byzantium and
approved by the newly baptized ruler. Since mostly metropolitan cathedral
churches were dedicated to Sophia in the Byzantine domain, it cannot be
excluded that the choice was made with intended long-range perspectives.
Three cathedrals in the three most important centers of Kyivan Rus', each
bearing the same name, were thus linked to Hagia Sophia on the Bosphorus and
embodied the complex and rich theological content of such dedication. To the
newly converted, they proclaimed: "God is in the land of Rus', and with God's
help it shall not be moved." This is the sense of the mosaic inscription of Psalm
45:6 in the conch of the Kyivan metropolitan cathedral, the thirteen copulas of
which proclaimed the mission of Christ and his Apostles to the capital and all
of Rus'. The Wisdom of God portrayed—and was, in and of itself—the victory
of Christianity over paganism and the victory of Orthodoxy over heresy.81 The
latter victory had, since the reform of Byzantine Christianity in the eighth and
ninth centuries, been understood above all as the triumph over the iconoclasts
and found special expression in the iconographie programs of sacred edifices.
It thus is no coincidence that, at the dawn of Christianity, the triumph of
Orthodoxy among the Eastern Slavs manifested itself in the name of the three
chief cathedrals of Rus', and occupied a central place in the religious life of the
newly converted, expressed externally in a profound cult of the holy icon. The
introduction, adoration, and contemplation of the icon in Rus' thus have their
roots in the Christianization of that land, and we cannot accept those views that
see the source of these practices in local and especially pagan and syncretistic
traditions.82 Only with the passage of time did a host of superstitions grow up
around the cult of images. The Church in Rus' opposed itself, ultimately unsuc-
cessfully, to the influences of sculpted figures, not because of their supposedly
pagan origin, but because of the rejection of sculpted figures in the sacred art of
Byzantium, with its cult of the icon, that resulted from the victory of Ortho-
doxy.
The divergence between this most modest diocesan structure and the enor-
mous task of Christianizing a realm measuring an area of more than one million
square kilometers and inhabited by approximately five million people, forces
us to conclude that the Byzantine Church was totally unprepared and not fully
aware of the extraordinary significance of the changes taking place. So the
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Christianization process and ecclesiastical structures could not spread over the
whole land through decades. Undoubtedly, it was also a matter of routine: a
Byzantine metropolitan ecclesiastical province usually consisted of three to six
dioceses.
In Hilarión's conception of the conversion of Rus', the crucial turning point
was the decision of Volodimer. It is immediately emphasized, however, that
the baptism merely opened the door to a genuine Christianization of the land:
"Then the darkness of idolatry began to depart from us, and the dawn of a new
faith appeared."83 The Rus' side was thus aware that Christianity would be
accepted by the various strata of society primarily in those places where
political authority had been firmly established. Hence, Christianization could
not immediately embrace the whole expanse of territory under the rule of Rus'.
For example, the populace of those broad sections of the country whose subor-
dination to the state consisted primarily of an obligation to pay tribute at first
remained outside the new faith for the simple reason that the tributaries met
with the princely administration but once or, at most, twice a year. That is why
Christianization was concentrated first of all in the region of the middle
Dnipro.
Apart, however, from any question of the level of consciousness or limita-
tions on or unevenness of activity, a basic obstacle limited the progress of
Christianization. What was decisive was not the number of bishops but the
number of clergy and, more importantly, the number of those who knew the
Slavic language. The priests who carried out evangelization prior to 988 had
been but a drop in an ocean of enormous need. Related to this was the problem
of equipping the churches, particularly with ecclesiastical books, especially
those necessary for the celebration of the divine service. To satisfy the sud-
denly pressing need, recourse was had to a standard practice of those times.
The equipment of any churches of Kherson, the city punished by the Byzantine
emperor and his Rus' brother-in-law, went as booty to the north: undoubtedly,
part of Kherson's clergy were also sent against their will to Rus'. However, the
real, ongoing supply of church apparatus, and Slavic books in particular,
flowed from Bulgaria, which was being conquered step by step during those
years by Byzantine armies, half of which consisted of Rus' units; in 1016, a
third of the trophies fell to the Rus'.84
Rus' troops participated in the Byzantine conquest with only short interrup-
tions over the course of nearly twenty years, and the size of the spoils of war
obtained must have been correspondingly large. It has long been known that
many texts written in Bulgarian found their way to Rus'. The fate of the oldest
manuscripts is an integral part of the history of Bulgarian-Rus' linguistic and
literary contacts.85 The only thing remaining unclear has been the path by
which those manuscripts made their way to the banks of the Dnipro and
Volkhov. Such manuscripts as the Codex of Tsar Symeon—the prototype of
the Izbornik of Sviatoslav of 1073 or the Macedonian Gospel of Tsar Samuel
(d. 1014) from which the Ostromir Gospel was copied—were evidently from
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the palace church and library of the Bulgarian rulers. Their appearance in Rus'
can be explained convincingly only by jus spolii.se The ever growing number
of churches constructed in the newly converted state had to be supplied with
ecclesiastical books, and the choice of the Slavic language as the language of
liturgy and evangelization encouraged recourse to this cheapest and fastest
means of acquiring the needed materials. Plundering houses of worship in an
enemy land with an eye to supplying one's own churches was quite customary
in Christian Europe at the time, and, in this case, it provided the Byzantine ruler
with a most convenient way of fulfilling the obligations he had assumed. It also
helped to satisfy the wishes of his sister Anna and brother-in-law Volodimer,
who were actively involved in the Christianization of Rus'. Probably, many
literate Bulgarian clerics were also forced to journey to that region. The institu-
tion of an unfree clergy, known later in Rus', undoubtedly had its origins in
these early circumstances. Although it sounds paradoxical, the undeniable
Bulgarian influence on Rus' literature and more broadly, on its culture, was the
result not of supposed ecclesiastical ties with Ochrid, but of the participation of
Rus' troops in the Byzantine conquest of Bulgaria. Ironically, the stripping of
Bulgaria of Slavic books and clerics to meet the needs of the newly converted
East Slavs had to facilitate the Hellenization of the church and religious life in
Bulgaria itself after its conquest by the empire.
* *
*
The Christianization of Rus', much as that of other regions, could not be carried
out without the use of some coercion, both in the initial introduction of the new
religion and in defense against various attempts at apostasy, especially on the
part of the common people. The well-known uprisings of rural inhabitants
under the leadership of soothsayers in the eleventh century and the apostasy of
the people of Novgorod eighty years after the baptism of that city, forcibly
suppressed by princely authority in collaboration with the clergy, were as much
an expression of protest against the new order infusing the sociopolitical and
economic fabric of the land as against the new religious order that supported it,
imposed from above by the state.87 The Church, in the words of its representa-
tives, viewed compulsory baptism as a completely justifiable measure and
pointed, with the sincerity characteristic of a proselyte, to fear of the ruler as
the deciding reason for the recognition of the new religion by the majority.88 A
strong influence on the members of the simple urban mob was exercised by the
example of the courts of the prince and the aristocracy, with whom they were
linked by various ties. Religious instruction at the time of conversion to the
new faith was something of an exception during the earliest period following
the baptism of Rus', a privilege reserved for the social elite. But the effective-
ness of that instruction was also great. One hundred years after baptism, in the
upper strata of society, the ecclesiastical sacrament of marriage had became a
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common practice, and the church could turn to the task of winning over "the
simple people," who continued to avoid its blessing when contracting their
marriages, although the threat to impose ecclesiastical penances on the latter
suggests that they, too, were already within its reach.89
The Christian custom of commemoration of the deceased-—including me-
morial services, about which there are written references in relation to the
ruling dynasty as early as the eleventh century—found particularly fertile
ground, and was facilitated by the existing tradition of an ancestral worship. It
is in this sense that we should view the baptism of the exhumed remains of
Volodimer's brothers, the pagan princes Oleg (d. 977) and Iaropolk (d. 980)
and their burial in the princely church. Such acts, which were at variance with
church canons, may be explained by a desire to include in Christian commemo-
rations those members of the dynasty who perished in fratricidal struggles.
Christian piety as expressed in commemorations of the dead was being quickly
incorporated into family life.
A striking indication of the permanence of the ideological and religious
transformation of the ruling circles of Rus' is the fact that none of the compet-
ing parties in the interprincely straggles of the eleventh century sought to raise
paganism as a banner to rally in support of its own political interests. The deep
dynastic political crisis that exploded on the death of Volodimer in 1015,
expressed in a fratricidal struggle for the throne of Kyiv and lasting with
varying intensity until 1026, did not undermine the Christianization of the land.
This is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that the Byzantine side
supported the inheritance rights to the Kyivan throne of the children of
Volodimer and the porphyrogennëta Anna.90 The failure of this effort as a
result of the assassination of Boris and Glëb did not slow the continued conver-
sion of the country in the least, indicating that an authentic Christianization of
the dynasty and the elites that supported it had taken place during the reign of
Volodimer. An ability to distinguish between Christianity and its values, on the
one hand, and the political undertakings of Byzantium, on the other, had
likewise been fully attained.
What is more, once a curtain of total silence had fallen over the actual
reasons for the political murder of Boris and Glëb, the official version of the
violent deaths of these two sons of Volodimer found a sublimated interpreta-
tion in the cult of the two princes, who, by their example, offered a model of
Christian attitudes and moral behavior worthy of imitation. The far-reaching
effect of this dynastic political crisis was the entry of native martyr princes into
the ranks of the saints and the creation of a tradition that gave young Rus'
Christianity a unique profile of its own.91 The cult, originally directed at a
princely milieu, spread with astounding speed. In May 1115, the celebration of
the translation of the sarcophagi containing the relics of Saints Boris and Glëb
to a new walled church in Vyshhorod drew countless people of varying rank
from all over Rus': princes, bishops, boyars—all with their retinues—clergy,
monks, and common people, all come to pay homage, in continuous day and
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night processions, to their own martyrs in Christ and advocates for the land of
Rus'.
Similarly, in the decades of conflict between Iaroslav and his sons, on the
one hand, and the princes of Polatsk, on the other, the latter, though threatened
with the loss of their principality, did not appeal to heathenism, even though
soothsayers still enjoyed respect at the princely court in Polatsk. On the con-
trary, Vseslav of Polatsk, in his straggle with the sons of Iaroslav, opposed the
stone church of St. Sophia in Polatsk to the walled church of St. Sophia in
Kyiv. In 1067 he plundered St. Sophia of Novogrod to enrich his own church in
Polatsk. Giving four of his seven sons the names of Boris-Roman and Glëb-
David, Vseslav was among the.first to contribute to the development of the cult
of the martyr princes, in which he found a religious and moral justification for
the right of opposition and the rights of his line to the throne of Polatsk. This
political and ideological demonstration, incidentally, assured him the support
of the Church, especially that of the Kyivan Caves Monastery.92
The support of the ruling strata for the new religion was so ostentatious as to
create the appearance of a rapid Christianization of the whole land. The mis-
sionary archbishop Brano of Querfurt, a zealous advocate of the conversion of
all the remaining pagan peoples of Europe, when visiting Kyiv in 1008 consid-
ered Rus' already to be a Christian land, able to support his intention to convert
the Pechenegs—just twenty years after the baptism of Volodimer and the
Kyivans. The forest of cupolas and crosses towering over Kyiv must have
made a considerable impression on a visitor from Saxony, who in 1018 man-
aged to report on his visit to that city to the chronicler and bishop, Thietmar of
Merseburg. His reference to "more than 400 churches" has usually been ques-
tioned, despite the chronicle report of the destraction of 600 churches in Kyiv
in the great fire of 1124. In both cases here, small wooden structures were
mentioned. As is known from accounts from the thirteenth to fifteenth centu-
ries, small churches of this type could be erected in a dozen days or so, or even,
if prefabricated elements were used, in the course of a single day.
The capital city of Kyiv in 1018, with its 10-hectare princely fortress and
eight marketplaces, was, from the perspective of observers west of the Elbe and
the Salle, an exceptionally large and populous urban center.93 Its houses of
worship, however, with the exception of one stone palace church and about a
dozen or so largish wooden communal churches (publícete ecclesiae), including
the wooden metropolitan cathedral of St. Sophia (burned in 1017 and rebuilt in
less than a year), consisted of hundreds of private oratories and chapels
(ecclesiae privatae) belonging to the nobility of Kyiv. At the beginning of the
eleventh century there must have been several hundred boyars' residences in
Kyiv, considering that the city numbered no fewer than 15,000 inhabitants at
that time (and a hundred years later—some 40,000). The example of the prince,
and Byzantine (and probably even Western) custom as well, encouraged the
establishment of such "houses of God" in individual residences, originally, at
least, as an external expression of personal faith and loyalty to the ruler. Such
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churches bore witness at the same time to the position and prestige of boyar
families in the new Christian reality. Linked to the ecclesiatical foundations of
Volodimer himself, his nobles yearned to affirm in this way their role in the
confession and propagation of the new faith.
Half a century later, when the city—now encompassing a considerably
greater walled area, with a main city entrance called "the Golden Gate" (70
hectares)—had acquired a dozen stone churches along with the still impressive,
in its mass and beauty, St. Sophia cathedral (built 1037-1046), Adam of
Bremen saw Kyiv as an aemula, i.e., imitation, of Constantinople,94 no doubt,
in large part, because of its many churches. Despite the fact that the princely
stone church of the Virgin (Church of the Tithe)—abutting the stone palace—
built by Byzantine masters in the 990s, continued to be for half a century the
exception, the broad scale of Kyiv's wooden ecclesiastical architecture ensured
from the outset that the city impressed every visitor as an extremely Christian
one. Only under Iaroslav and his sons did the new fashion of ecclesiastical
building in stone and brick begin to effect changes in the landscape of the cities
of Rus', the impact of which gradually intensified in the twelfth and first
decades of the thirteenth century. Today one can identify slightly under 300
relatively well-preserved remains of stone churches from the pre-Mongol era,
just under a hundred of them in the middle Dnipro region, i.e., in Rus' proper.95
Throughout the Middle Ages, construction in wood would continue to domi-
nate the sacral architecture of Rus'.
The baptism of Rus' called into being a new group with a special social role,
endowed with the exclusive right to represent the new religious ideology and
possessing a significant unifying potential. Unlike the sacrificers, soothsayers,
and other representatives of the old pagan religion, the whole Christian clergy
was quite closely linked to the apparatus of political authority. That relation-
ship resulted in a growing prestige for this social group, whose special status
was underlined by distinctive dress and customs, outside as well as inside the
church. The clergy in eleventh-century Rus' consisted to a large extent of
persons of local origin. The clerics from Bulgaria, no doubt originally more
numerous, quickly integrated themselves into the local Slavic environment. A
less numerous, but significant element was the Greek clergy, who, among other
things, occupied the highest positions in the ecclesiatical hierarchy. The latter,
coming to Rus' with a strong sense of their own worth and a consciousness of
their sociopolitical as well as ecclesiastical usefulness, brought with them
ready-made models of relations between secular and ecclesiastical authority.
The formal ties linking the Rus' and Byzantine churches grew closer in the
decades following the baptism thanks to the ideological ties of Rus' monasti-
cism with the centers of monastic life in Byzantium.96 It was these links that
would ultimately decide the loyalty of the Rus' church to the principles of
Byzantine Orthodoxy. Rus' monasticism, with its religious zeal and political
sense, became, thanks to its intimate ties with the social elite of old Rus'
society, a crucial factor in the development of Christianity and the church in
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Rus'. The aristocratic Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv achieved a high degree
of religious and moral authority in the second half of the eleventh century,
becoming a center of particular influence on ecclesiastical, cultural, and politi-
cal life in Rus'. An exceptionally important contribution here was made by one
ascetic holy man produced by this monastery, Hegumen Theodosius [Feodosii]
(d. 1074), whose renown as a saint, local at first, acquired an all-Rus' character
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The primary activity of the clergy was concentrated in the religious field and
in related social matters. Its constant, gradually growing influence on the
mentality of society, and that of the upper strata in particular, led to a transfor-
mation of outlook that could not have been achieved at the moment of baptism
itself in 988, but which it would be wrong to assume took centuries to accom-
plish. The adoption by old Rus' culture of the Christian value system pro-
gressed with varying degrees of success on various fronts, but much had
already been accomplished in the course of the first century.98
The clergy as a whole, distinguished by its literacy, by its extensive reading,
and sometimes by its knowledge of languages, production of books, and liter-
ary activity, served as an intermediary in transmitting the values of Christian
culture to the Eastern Slavs. The beginnings of intellectual activity inspired by
Christianity must be dated to the tenth century, for the personality and activity
of Hilarión—such an outstanding example of a Byzantine education and the
Christian worldview—who was capable of independent historiosophic specula-
tion, could not have sprung out of a culturally virgin soil.99 The clergy, a kind
of medieval intelligentsia, likewise assisted in the diffusion of reading and
writing and other elements of education among the laity—not only the princes,
the boyars, and their retinues, but townspeople as well. In the generation after
baptism, an ability to read and write was shared by all the members of the
dynasty, women included, and traces of four princely libraries of the eleventh
century had been preserved.100
The clergy, and particularly erudite monks drawn from aristocratic families,
enriched the store of historical thought, which had hitherto developed as an oral
tradition, by giving it a written form, adapting various genres of historical
writing—the annalistic note, the relation, the narrative, and the tale—for this
purpose. This development of a historical method and combination of varied
forms into a single chronicle genre, produced, at the beginning of the second
century after baptism, the Primary Chronicle, which was the result of historical
thought spun out in monastic cells but driven by the ideas and political passions
of this world. The central theme of this work was the state and Christianity in
Rus', in which the creation and maintenance of princely authority were linked
directly to the propagation of the Christian faith.101
These new cultural values became an important ally in the transformation of
the local order and local ways of thinking. The very appearance of the
churches, in their upward rising profiles contrasting with the surrounding
wooden, earthen, and semi-earthen huts, had already begun to exercise an
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influence on the psyche of the still really half-pagan Rus' Christian. The church,
moreover, as an artistic composite, adorned with frescoes and icons, costly
vessels and objects, and serving as a place of divine service, of liturgical
activity and song, offered an unequalled setting for emotional, esthetic, and,
ultimately, religious experiences.
From the very beginning, the church ascribed sacral traits to princely author-
ity. Preachers and scholars propagated the conviction that the prince, like the
biblical David and the Byzantine emperor, was the Lord's anointed; that
princely authority was established by God; and that the prince, ruler of the land,
was an icon of Christ, an earthly reflection of the ruler of the heavens.102 To the
prince, the church ascribed the roles of guardian of the flock of Christ, defender
of Orthodoxy, and teacher and guide; it endowed him with the character of
shepherd and archpriest, and taught all of his subjects that "disrespect for
authority is disrespect for God himself." In the rich array of epithets added to
the princely title in Rus' ("beloved of God, Christ-loving and beloved of Christ,
Orthodox, most pious," etc.), expression was given to the charismatic character
of authority and of the person of the prince. The same character was assumed
by the ceremony of enthronement of the prince, which already in the eleventh
century had become an ecclesiastical rite.
Princely authority certainly contributed to the Christianization of the coun-
try, but the contribution of the church and Christianization to the transforma-
tion of princely authority into a genuine state organization was likewise crucial.
Christianization and the formation of the state were closely linked in the case of
every people emerging onto the historical stage, and the East Slavs were no
exception.
* *
*
We cannot exclude the possibility that the fifth diocese, with its cathedral of the
Archangel Michael at Pereiaslav, 85 kilometers southeast of Kyiv, was
founded under Volodimer, but there is more in favor of its having been erected
together with the bishopric of "St. George on the River Ros"' in Iuriev, and thus
during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise, after his victory over the Pechenegs in
1036. It is notable that both of these cathedrals were entrusted to the patronage
of holy warriors—the leader of the heavenly forces and the destroyer of the
dragon, patrons of Christian soldiers in their struggles against unbelievers.
Both dioceses were created, not in the interior of the land, but on its steppe
frontier. To be sure, after the disaster suffered by the Pechenegs before Kyiv in
1036, settlement in these regions intensified, as did the building of forts to
guard the settlers, but this was chiefly colonization of a military type, aiming to
create an effective barrier against the raids of the nomadic Pechenegs who
roamed the steppes. The creation of the two border bishoprics, however, was
not aimed merely at moral and religious reinforcement of the barrier shielding
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the country from the steppe. Both patron saints were revered as humblers of the
dragon—the symbol of the devil, of evil, of unbelief, of paganism—and the
creation of the two bishoprics likewise had as one of its goals missionary work
among the pagans, a program that was also in the interest of Byzantium,
pressed as it was by the Pechenegs in the Danubian territories of the empire.103
An attempt to Christianize these mobile and dangerous nomads was also the
aim of the mission of Bruno of Querfurt and his successor, the anonymous
bishop in partibus Pezenegorum. The subordination of the Pechenegs was an
exceptionally vital matter for Kyiv as well as Constantinople. The results
achieved by these missionary efforts were modest, but only with the appear-
ance of new nomads—the Polovtsians, who visited disaster upon the Rus'
princes at Pereiaslav in 1068—and with the crashing of the Byzantine army at
Manzikert in 1071, did the situation change so drastically as to make Byzan-
tine-Rus' efforts to draw closer together and establish secure communications
lines through newly Christianized regions of the Pontic and Danubian steppe
appear unrealistic.
Before Byzantium and Rus' were made aware of the insurmountability of the
steppe barriers that hindered contacts on either side, significant developments
on another front had threatened to divide the ecclesiastical province of Rus'. In
the 1060s and 1070s the bishops of Chernihiv and Pereiaslav were also granted
the title of metropolitan. They received the title for life, and the dioceses they
administered likewise achieved the status of titular metropolitanates for that
period.104 They differed from ordinary metropolitanates in that they did not
represent ecclesiastical provinces with suffragan subordinate bishoprics, but in
accordance with their new standing were directly subordinate to the patriarch.
In Byzantium one can clearly observe the efforts of titular metropolitans to
transform their sees into ecclesiastical provinces by setting up suffragan bish-
oprics on their territory. The strength of this tendency is suggested by the
compromise imperial novella of 1084, which stipulated that only those titular
metropolitanates that had enjoyed this status for more than thirty years could be
recognized as regular metropolitanates.
In practical terms, the erection of titular metropolitanates in Rus' resulted in
the temporary removal of two dioceses that together represented nearly half of
the territory of the state (almost all of the region east of the Dnipro) from the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kyiv. The elevation of the bishoprics of
Chernihiv and Pereiaslav to the rank of titular metropolitanates was purely
political in character, undoubtedly connected with the events of 1060, when the
Rus' princes Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod inflicted a crashing defeat on
the Uzes, who were threatening Byzantium. Since the Byzantine holdings in
the Crimea as well as on the Danube frontier were vulnerable to pressure from
the steppe dwellers, the Byzantine court was quick to recognize the value of
Rus' armies in the straggle against the nomads. The transformation of the two
bishoprics into titular metropolitanates should be ascribed to the initiative of
the imperial court, which was well informed about the political situation in
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Rus'. After the death of Iaroslav the Wise, rule over Rus' was assumed not only
by his eldest son Iziaslav, the senior in Kyiv, but by two other sons as well:
Sviatoslav, prince of Chemihiv, and Vsevolod, prince of Pereiaslav. Their joint
decisions on matters of war, law, and the assignment of other princely thrones
permit us to speak of a triarchy in this period.105 This balance of forces found
its counterpart in the realm of ecclesiastical organization as well, as the Byzan-
tine court needed to maintain direct, friendly contacts with all three rulers of
Rus'.
Through the intermediary of these titular metropolitans, acting as Byzantine
ambassadors sui generis in direct ecclesiastical contact with Constantinople,
the imperial court sought to strengthen the alliance and make it more effective.
It was encouraged in this approach by internal upheaval within the empire,
which limited its own ability to oppose the Pechenegs and Uzes. Although the
Byzantine side emphasized the ecclesiastical primacy of Kyiv by granting its
metropolitan, George (Iurii), the high court rank of synkellos (member of the
imperial senate), Kyiv was well aware of the danger threatened by the division,
as clearly indicated by points 31 and 32 of the canonical answers of Metropoli-
tan John (Ioann) II, dating from ca. 1083.106 And even though subsequent
political developments in Rus' removed the underlying causes, this temporary
ecclesiastical-political arrangement had a braking effect on the further develop-
ment of a diocesan structure.
The first and probably only titular metropolitan in Chemihiv was Neofit,
who already held his title before 1072. He no doubt died not long after 1080,
for in 1088 Bishop John had already been the incumbent in Chemihiv for some
time. One may thus infer that the metropolitanate of Maurokastron (i.e.,
Chemihiv), that is, Nea Rhösia, mentioned in one of the manuscripts of the
Notitiae, compiled around 1072, was created in the 1060s.107
The situation was different in the case of the diocese of Pereiaslav. Its first
titular metropolitan was the Greek Leo (Leontii), known for his polemical anti-
Latin treatise against azymes (unleavened Eucharistie host). His successor,
sometime before 1072, was Bishop Peter (Petr), who probably did not possess
the honorary metropolitan title. In any case, he appears as an ordinary bishop in
the account of the translation of the relics of Saints Boris and Glëb on 20 May
1072, in which Metropolitans George of Kyiv and Neofit of Chemihiv also
took part. The vacancy in the see of Pereiaslav must be dated somewhere from
1068 to 1071, when the unstable political situation in Rus' (as a result of
princely quarrels) and Byzantium (as a result of the defeat at Manzikert) would
have supported a reassertion of the Kyivan metropolitan's rights over the
diocese of Pereiaslav through the ordination of Peter as a regular suffragan
bishop. However, after the death of Peter and, shortly thereafter, Metropolitan
George, the situation changed, and probably in 1076-1077, or in any case prior
to October 1078, Ephrem (Efrem), a former monk of the Kyivan Caves Monas-
tery, returned from Byzantium with the title of titular metropolitan of
Pereiaslav. The appearance of this metropolitanate before 1080 is registered by
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three versions of the Notitiae episcopatuum.108 Despite the change in the
situation, when Vsevolod, the youngest member of the triarchy, became sole
ruler of Rus' after the death of his brothers, Ephrem retained his title until his
own death in the 1090s.
In the midst of these changing political and ecclesiastical circumstances, a
new diocese came into being in Rostov. Rostov at that time was the center of a
region in the northeast of Rus' that later was to be known as the Vladimir-
Suzdal land. In the eleventh century it belonged to the principality and diocese
of Pereiaslav. When Iziaslav was driven out of Kyiv on 22 March 1073, and his
two brothers divided Rus' between them, in the process establishing new
spheres of influence and authority, the Rostov region passed under the rule of
Sviatoslav—the new prince of Kyiv. Sometime later, this political decision was
followed by an ecclesiastical one: the Rostov land became an independent
diocese subordinate to the metropolitanate of Kyiv. The metropolitan at the
time, George, was conscious that by this measure he would not only immedi-
ately broaden the range of his jurisdiction, but would also circumvent, or at
least lessen, the threat that the titular metropolitanate of Pereiaslav might be
transformed into a regular ecclesiastical province. The decision was undoubt-
edly facilitated by the fact that the current bishop of Pereiaslav, Peter, did not
have the title of honorary metropolitan or, even more likely, that the see had
already been vacated by Peter's death. The first bishop of Rostov was Leo
(Leontii), a monk of the Kyivan Caves Monastery. Shortly after his arrival,
perhaps as early as 1074, the new bishop died a martyr's death during disorders
probably growing out of the crop failure of 1073 and the ensuing famine.109 In
Rostov, pagans still represented the majority. A similar uprising took place at
this time in Novgorod: here the cause was the apostasy of significant numbers
of the townspeople. The death of Bishop Leo bore witness to the fact that
Christianity had not yet been accepted in peripheral areas such as Rostov, and
indicated the degree of importance the continuing development of its diocesan
structure was for the Christianization of the domain.
Despite the violent death of Rostov's first bishop, the diocese was able to
maintain itself, being filled again by the new metropolitan of Kyiv, John II, in
1077-1078. The new bishop was Isaiah (Isaiia), hegümen of the Kyivan mon-
astery of St. Demetrius. After his death in 1095, however, Rostov did not
receive another pastor. As a result of changes on the Kyivan throne, the Rostov
land had again passed, in 1094, to the rule of the prince of Pereiaslav, and the
titular Metropolitan Ephrem succeeded in returning it to his jurisdiction. From
the point of view of the metropolitan of Kyiv, this represented an ongoing
vacancy in the see. Only around 1137 did Rostov regain its own bishop, when
Iurii Dolgorukii, the first independent prince of Rostov and Suzdal, abandoned
efforts to win the throne of Pereiaslav for himself. The restitution of the Rostov
bishopric is also supported by the list of its bishops: the next after Isaiah
(d. 1095) was Nestor, mentioned in the 1140s. The history of efforts to estab-
lish the diocese of Rostov shows how difficult the initiation and maintenance of
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a bishopric could be. The difficult inception of the bishopric of Rostov must
have provoked resentments, echoed in the later attempt of Prince Andrei
Bogoliubskii of Vladimir-Suzdal to break away from the Kyivan ecclesiastical
province and create a metropolitanate of his own in the 1160s.110 This initia-
tive, along with the plunder in 1169 of the churches and shrines of Kyi ν —
which this prince took as a model for the construction of his own capital—was
an initially unsuccessful attempt at translatio regni, but with time acquired
significance as a harbinger of things to come.
*
The Christianization and ecclesiastical administration of a broad territory, often
separated from the seat of the bishop by hundreds or even a thousand kilome-
ters, was nearly impossible. Where the creation of new dioceses was too
difficult, local units of episcopal administration, which could be characterized
as territorial vicariates, were set up to satisfy a constantly growing demand.
The bishop's representative, known as a namëstnik (vicar), exercised certain
defined rights over a given part of the diocesan territory. The Byzantine church,
with its dense network of dioceses, had no need of such subunits, and so could
not serve as an example here. The institution was created locally, and the name
given to these vicars was taken from terminology customarily applied to
princely officials.111 Some inspiration may also have been drawn from various
early Christian officers created to assist the bishop in his work, such as the
chorepiscopos, periodeutës, or archidiakonos. And while the likelihood of
actual borrowing is small, a comparison of the namëstnik in Rus' with the
archdeacon in Western Europe seems justified, given that both offices grew out
of a rationalization of episcopal administration in an effort to avoid division of
dioceses. The progressive Christianization of the country dictated the creation
of smaller units within the broader framework of the bishopric—the vicari-
ates—which were naturally suited to the administrative structure of the state.
For this reason, the bishop's vicars first appeared in the seats of the prince's
sons or of his governors (posadniki or namëstniki). The bishop's namëstnik, an
ecclesiastical personage charged with administration of a fixed portion of the
diocese, exercised his office with the aid of a collective organ similar in certain
respects to the bishop's kliros, a collégial administrative-judicial body corre-
sponding to the Greek presbyterion or Latin capitulum—chapter. Such vicari-
ates must have already begun to appear in certain centers in the eleventh
century. Under favorable circumstances, where a city was the center of a
principality, there was a possibility of the transformation of one of these
subunits into an independent diocese. This was encouraged by the functioning
of a kliros alongside the namëstnik, just as one did alongside a bishop. In such a
case, it would simply be transformed into an episcopal kliros. The legal and
property status of the kliros, it would appear from the foundation document of
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the bishopric of Smolensk (ca. 1136), was independent of that of the bishop. ' n
When and how an episcopal vicarship became an independent diocese de-
pended on many circumstances, and undoubtedly involved more than just
ecclesiastical circles in Rus'. A special need to create more dioceses emerged in
the second half of the eleventh century, despite, and, in a certain sense, because
of the appearance of the two titular metropolitanates. Kyivan Metropolitan
John II even had to address this matter in his canonical responses: a diocese
could be created, he explained, "particularly where there is a large population,
many people and towns," and where it was a question of "Christian protection
and pastoral care over them." This was to be done, however, "in a God-fearing
manner," and was only permissible "when the incumbent of the first see of Rus'
[i.e., the metropolitan] and the synod of the whole country give their permis-
sion."113
The metropolitan's reiteration of the general rales of the Church was obvi-
ously connected with specific events. At the beginning, he indicated that the
question at hand involved a division planned by the princely authority and
noted that while the prince naturally might propose the establishment of a new
diocese, the decision lay ultimately in the hands of the bishops of the Rus'
ecclesiastical province (i.e., the metropolitan and his suffragans). This com-
mentary may well be connected with the establishment of new bishoprics in
Volodymyr-in-Volhynia in 1078-1086 and Turau (Turov) in 1088.114 Despite
the absence of any direct evidence in the sources, we can basically assume that
both these centers were located within the boundaries of the metropolitan
diocese proper, so that the new bishoprics had to be carved out of its territory.
When Vsevolod became the sole ruler of Rus' in October 1078, he assumed
certain obligations vis-à-vis the sons of his older brother, Prince Iziaslav of
Kyiv, who had just fallen on the field of battle. According to the law of
seniority, the throne of Kyiv was to pass to the oldest son of Iziaslav, Iaropolk,
on the death of his uncle Vsevolod. Among Vsevolod's first decisions was to
grant Volhynia, with its seat at Volodymyr, and Polisia, with its center at Turau
on the Prypiat River, to Iaropolk. Iaropolk-Peter is the Rus' prince whose visage
is known to us from the miniatures of the Cividale Codex (the "Trier
Psalter").115 Thanks to his sojourns at the courts of European rulers as well as
at the papal court in Rome, he was one of the members of the Rurikid dynasty
more conversant with the world, who understood well the need for and the
value of ties between princely authority and the church. Moreover, in Rus' and
at the Caves Monastery in particular, Iaropolk was viewed as a model Christian
and a just Christian ruler. Suggestions, about the supposed "Roman Catholic
orientation" of Iaropolk and his parents Iziaslav and Gertrude are the result of
an exaggerated, anachronistic view of the year 1054 as a sharp dividing line in
ecclesiastical history. In Rome and Kyiv alike, Princes Iziaslav and Iaropolk
were considered proper Christians. Also, Iziaslav's Polish wife was already
active in Kyivan religious life in the 1050s and 1060s. She helped to admit the
mother of Theodosius to the convent of St. Nicholas, which she founded, and
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was held in high respect at the Kyivan Caves Monastery.116 Thus, what we
know of Iaropolk permits us to see him as the initiator of the founding of the
bishopric of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Vsevolod and John II responded favor-
ably to this wish, since it was a question of a country "with a great population"
requiring pastoral care. It is significant that the first bishop of Volodimer was
Stephen (Stefan), a former hegumen of the Caves Monastery. Volhynia at that
time was considerably more Christianized than the Rostov land. In the 1060s
there was and had been for some time past a "Holy Mountain" monastery near
Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, which, as its very name indicates, owed its establish-
ment to close contacts with the center of Byzantine monasticism, the Holy
Mount of Athos.117 Hence, while political considerations were decisive in the
establishment of this bishopric, circumstances of an ecclesiastical nature were
clearly at work here as well.
Political considerations are most obvious in the case of the founding of the
bishopric of Turau on the Prypiat. After the death of Prince Iaropolk of
Volodymyr-in-Volhynia (22 November 1086), the anticipated successor to the
throne of Kyiv became the second son of Iziaslav, Sviatopolk, who at that time
held Novgorod. Sviatopolk's uncle, Prince Vsevolod of Kyiv, clearly under-
stood the danger that would threaten his own heirs, should Sviatopolk follow
him on the Kyivan throne while still retaining Novgorod. In order to avoid this,
he persuaded his nephew, on the pretext of his impending succession, to move
to a nearer center, Turau, just about 200 kilometers from Kyiv. At the same
time, a bishopric was established there. Here, for the first time, it can be seen
clearly—although it was already detectable in the case of Volodymyr-in-
Volhynia—how important, for reasons of prestige, was the presence of a
bishop in a princely residence. Sviatopolk realized this fact, although he must
have viewed Turau as merely a temporary residence (in fact, he ended up ruling
as prince there from 1088 to 1093). Accustomed to the presence of a bishop in
Novgorod, he wanted one in Turau as well. This indicates not only that the
social elite had been Christianized, but that collaboration with the church had
become characteristic of princely authority. And even though the erection of
the bishopric of Turau was the result of a temporary situation, it became a
permanent feature of the country's diocesan organization.
* =
#
The names of the cathedral churches in the newly erected bishoprics in Rostov,
Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, and Turau on the Prypiat were identical: all were
dedicated to the Holy Assumption of the Mother of God (Uspenie, Koimësis—
i.e., "Dormition"). In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, still other cathedrals
were dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God. It is, in fact, no accident
that all seven cathedral churches established between 1073 and 1213 bear this
name. Indirect data permit us to trace the source of this custom to the Kyivan
356 POPPE
Caves Monastery, the main church of which was dedicated to the Dormition.
This pattern highlights the significant role that this monastery played in the
Christianization of the Eastern Slavs and in the Slavicization of the ecclesiasti-
cal hierarchy. Its significance in the history of the church in Rus' can be read
not only in the widespread occurrence of churches of the Dormition, but also in
the consecration of about 50 bishops from that single monastery during the
period prior to 1220.118 In both the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth
centuries, half of the dioceses were occupied by bishops who had formerly
been monks at the Kyivan Caves Monastery. And this is only one aspect of the
activity of the Caves Monastery in transforming Rus' into a Christian land. Its
contacts were not limited to the princely court in Kyiv: through its branches
and episcopal curiae, it reached the courts of the appanage princes as well.
The clergy of the Dnipro region and the monks from the Caves Monastery in
particular also played an important role in the religious life and ecclesiastical
structures of the rest of the East Slavic lands in the second half of the thirteenth
century—for example, in the intensive colonization and Christianization of the
Oka-Volga mesopotamia, a process underway since the twelfth century.
It is a telling circumstance that, from the second half of the eleventh century,
bishoprics were established on foundations prepared by namëstniks in vicari-
ates, where a main church dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God
already existed. With the erection of a bishopric, this church was elevated to
the rank of a cathedral. It is possible to infer from this that the organization of
diocesan vicariates was likewise closely connected with the Caves Monastery.
Undoubtedly, the questions posed to John II about the preconditions for creat-
ing a diocese were often discussed in this community, deepening the conviction
that further Christianization and the development of a diocesan structure were
inseparably linked with one another.
Indirect but eloquent testimony from Hegumen Daniel's (Daniil's) account
of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land suggests that the question of the establish-
ment of new bishoprics was very much alive at the beginning of the twelfth
century. On his road to the holy places in Palestine in 1106, Daniel visited
Cyprus, where he paid special attention to the diocesan structure, noting that
there were "fourteen bishoprics but only one metropolitanate" on that island. It
is interesting that it was precisely the church in Cyprus, and not the ecclesiasti-
cal organization in Palestine or any of the other lands or localities along the
route of his pilgrimage, that attracted Daniel's attention. Obviously, there must
have been something similar in the situation of the church in Cyprus to that in
Rus'. Daniel underlined such an analogy by referring to the Cypriot church as a
metropolitanate, rather than, in accordance with the Greek custom, as an
archbishopric.119
Daniel had set off on his pilgrimage a dozen or so years after the special
status of the two titular metropolitanates had died out. However, fears about a
possible division of the heretofore unified Rus' ecclesiastical province had not
yet disappeared. At the same time, the question of creating new dioceses had
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come to a head as a result of the successes in Christianizing the realm and the
need to continue the process, as well as a result of changes in the political
structure of Rus'. In various circles, including the court of the metropolitan of
Kyiv, the future must have seemed unsettling. The experience of the Greek
metropolitanates suggested that an increase in the number of suffragan bishop-
rics encouraged the more dynamic among them to seek the status of indepen-
dent metropolitanates. In Cyprus, Daniel observed something that made him
think about his own church. By this time there were nine bishoprics subordi-
nate to the metropolitan of Kyiv. By pointing to the fourteen bishoprics in
Cyprus, Daniel wanted to calm the doubts of those who feared an increase in
the number of dioceses in Rus', and by emphasizing the presence of "just one
metropolitanate" (mitropolia zhe edind), he expressed himself clearly in favor
of preserving the unity of the Rus' ecclesiastical province. Such was the posi-
tion of the majority of the Rus' clergy during the eleventh to thirteenth centu-
ries. Addressing himself to his readers—princes and bishops, boyars and
hugemens—for whom he had prayed in the Holy Land, Daniel sought to dispel
any fears about an increase in the number of bishoprics in Rus', by pointing out
that an even greater number of dioceses had not prevented the church in Cyprus
from continuing to be a single ecclesiastical province. He represented here a
position shared by the Kyivan Caves Monastery, which was, on the one hand, a
proponent of the unity of the ecclesiastical province and, on the other, an active
supporter of the further development of its diocesan structure.
There were, however, forces in the church in Rus' that, while they did not
basically question this view, nonetheless opposed the establishment of new
bishoprics in concrete instances. The history of the bishopric of Smolensk
provides a good example of these tendencies. As long as the Smolensk land
was part of the principality of Pereiaslav, it was under the jurisdiction of the
bishops of that latter town. Sometime in the second half of the eleventh
century, an episcopal vicariate was established in Smolensk to facilitate the
ecclesiastical administration of this region, located some 600 kilometers away
from Pereiaslav. After 1094, when the suzerainty of the princes and bishops of
Pereiaslav over the Smolensk and Rostov-Suzdal lands was restored after a
temporary hiatus, some thought was also given to the creation of a local
ecclesiastical organization. At about the same time, immediately after 1096, the
new prince of Pereiaslav, Volodimer Monomakh, and his bishop, the titular
Metropolitan Ephrem, built a stone church in Suzdal in honor of the Dormition
of the Mother of God. The building of the first stone church in the Rostov land
just after the lapse of the bishopric in Rostov was designed to emphasize that
decisions affecting the region were made in Pereiaslav, for with this action the
episcopal vicariate was transferred to Suzdal. In Suzdal, moreover, a branch of
the Kyivan Caves Monastery had already been in operation for some time. In
1101, probably after the completion of the edifice in Suzdal, Volodimer
Monomakh and Ephrem's successor, Bishop Simon (Symeon) of Pereiaslav,
began the construction of a stone church of the Dormition of the Mother of God
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in Smolensk. The case of Suzdal makes it clear that no far-reaching plans for
change in the structure of the metropolitanate were connected with the building
of these churches. It was only a matter of ensuring, from the point of view of
Pereiaslav, effective administration in the north. Only after 1113, when
Volodimer Monomakh was seated upon the Kyivan throne, and particularly
after 1117, when his political intentions and those of his heir Mstislav became
clearer, did the two princes want to establish a bishopric in Smolensk. When
Bishop Sylvester (Sil'vestr) of Pereiaslav died on 12 April 1123, the vacancy in
the see provided a suitable opportunity for a division of the diocese. But here
Volodimer ran up against the opposition of Metropolitan Nicetas (Nikëtas). In
revenge, the prince denied investure to the new candidate to the Pereiaslav see.
Only after the death of Monomakh (19 May 1125) did his son Iaropolk, the new
prince of Pereiaslav, accept Abbot Mark as bishop-elect, and finally on 4
November 1125, Metropolitan Nicetas consecrated him as bishop of
Pereiaslav. The Kyivan Prince Mstislav continued, however, to strive for the
establishment of a bishopric in Smolensk, the seat of his son Prince Rostislav.
The sudden death of Metropolitan Nicetas on 3 March 1126, and the ensuing
vacancy of several years in Kyiv contributed to further delay. The new metro-
politan, Michael (Mikhail), who came to Kyiv in 1130, was clearly prepared to
carry out the wish of the Kyivan ruler, as can deduced by the fact that he
brought with him, in his entourage, the candidate designated to serve as bishop
of that see, Manuel (Manuil). Nonetheless, Metropolitan Michael encountered
opposition from Pereiaslav to the erection of a bishopric in Smolensk. Only
after the death of Bishop Mark of Pereiaslav on 6 January 1135 was it possible
to return to the project, and Manuel, the as yet unconsecrated bishop-elect,
began administering his future diocese. The political situation—specifically,
quarrels among the princes and continual changes on the princely throne of
Pereiaslav—delayed a final decision, so that only in 1136-1137, was Manuel
consecrated by Metropolitan Michael as the first bishop of Smolensk.120 At the
same time, the. bishopric of Rostov was restored. The opposition of the
Pereiaslav hierarchy and of the cathedral kliros in particular must have been
quite stubborn, as the vacancy in the see of Pereiaslav lasted until 1141. With
the creation of the Smolensk bishopric and the restitution of the Rostov bishop-
ric, the jurisdictional area of the diocese of Pereiaslav had been reduced by
three-quarters, being limited now only to the Pereiaslav land proper in the
south.
The development of a diocesan structure was essential for further
Christianization. This did not, however, prevent political motives from playing
a part in the establishment of the new bishoprics. This was certainly true in the
case of the bishopric in Halych. That region, roughly encompassing the upper
and middle course of the Dnister and San rivers, took shape at the end of the
eleventh and the first decades of the twelfth centuries as the domain of the heirs
of Rostislav, grandson of Iaroslav the Wise. In characteristic fashion, the idea
of an indigenous bishopric was born, but encountered misgivings in Kyiv and
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stiff opposition from the princes and bishops of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Only
the interprincely struggles that broke out in 1146, particularly the clash over an
appointment to the metropolitan see connected with the elevation of Clement
Smoliatich in 1147, made it possible to establish a bishopric in Halych, which
only shortly earlier had become the capital of this principality. The efforts of
Prince Volodimer of Halych were eased by the fact that Metropolitan Clement
and the bishop of Volodymyr were supporters of Iziaslav Mstislavich, who was
both the Kyivan senior prince and the prince of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. In the
struggle for the Kyivan throne between Iziaslav Mstislavich and Iurii
Dolgorakii, Volodimer of Halych supported the latter. In addition, his alliance
with Byzantium against the Hungarians, who were Iziaslav's allies, assured
him the support of the empire in this ecclesiastical matter. Since Clement's
elevation to the metropolitanate was viewed as an illegal act in Constantinople,
the Halych church had the right not to recognize its earlier obedience. Only
after the return to a legal situation acceptable to the patriarch, with the arrival of
Metropolitan Constantine (Konstantin) in Kyiv in 1156, did it become possible
to consecrate bishop-elect Kosmas as bishop of Halych.121 In this way, the de
facto existing bishopric of Halych was carved de iure out of the diocese of
Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, to which it had heretofore belonged, territorially
partly as the vicariate of Peremyshl {Pol. Przemyśl) as well.
Considerably less troubled was the birth of the bishopric of Riazan on the
Oka. The Riazan-Murom principality had already split off from the principality
of Chernihiv at the beginning of the twelfth century, but continued to be part of
the diocese of Chernihiv. The princes of Riazan had no great interest in
ecclesiastical independence. In order to counter the pressures of the princes of
Vladimir-Suzdal, they were forced to seek the support of Chernihiv, and could
count on the intervention of its bishop on their behalf. The ecclesiastical
alienation of Riazan arose only when the princes of Riazan, as a result of their
defeat of 1186, fell into dependence on Prince Vsevolod of Vladimir-Suzdal.
Vsevolod was interested in breaking the ecclesiastical ties between Riazan and
Chernihiv. The creation of the bishopric should be ascribed to the diplomatic
skill of Metropolitan Nikephoros II, who managed to take advantage of the
favorable conditions and bring the princes of Chernihiv and Vladimir-Suzdal
into agreement in the 1190s, and was able to obtain their consent to the creation
of a Riazan bishopric' out of the diocese of Chernihiv. Despite the changing
fate of its principality and the destruction of the city in 1237, Riazan was to
remain permanently as a diocese of the Rus' ecclesiastical province.122
The division of the Rostov-Suzdal diocese and the creation of a second
bishopric alongside Rostov in Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma took place as a result
of the division of the domain of Vsevolod "Big Nest" among his eldest sons.
The bishops of Rostov had already resided for some time in Vladimir-on-the-
Kliazma, so the separation in fact returned its function of episcopal see to
Rostov while recognizing the ecclesiastical role that Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma
had played for nearly 50 years. The division of the diocese was also a result of
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the progress in the Christianization of northeast Rus'. In November 1213 and at
the beginning of 1214 bishops descended from the Caves community were
consecrated for the two sees.123
King Danylo and Metropolitan Cyril:
The Church in the Face of the Mongol Invasion
Shortly thereafter, a bishopric was established in the western borderlands of
Rus' at Peremyshl, where—one can presume—there had already been a vicari-
ate of the diocese of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia at the turn of the eleventh and
twelfth centuries. During that period a princely stone church dedicated to St.
John the Baptist, which later became a cathedral, was also built here. After
1130, Peremyshl lost its primacy in the western lands of the Dnister basin to
Halych.1 2 4 Peremyshl, as the center of a land already advanced in its
Christianization, was well suited to be the seat of a bishop, but in fact the city
owed this status to an accident. Political events in Novgorod, the bishop of
which had borne the honorary title of archbishop since 1165, resulted at the end
of 1219 in the return of Archbishop Mitrofan to his throne, from which he had
been removed on 23 January 1211. Because Mitrofan's successor since 121.1,
Archbishop Anthony (Antonii), was not inclined to withdraw, however, it was
decided to send both bishops to Kyiv to submit to the mediation of the metro-
politan. Metropolitan Matthew (Matfii) settled the problem by rehabilitating
Mitrofan, who had originally been consecrated in 1201, and sending him back
to Novgorod. The metropolitan also "honored" Anthony, giving him the bish-
opric of Peremyshl.125 This was possible on the strength of an understanding
between the metropolitan and Mstislav the Bold, who had become the ruler of
the Halych principality in 1219. The latter, as prince of Novgorod (1210—
1218), had become friends with Archbishop Anthony. Probably a vacancy in
the see of Halych permitted the separation of the diocese of Peremyshl from the
diocese of Halych without any great difficulties. And even though Bishop
Anthony returned to Novgorod in 1225, this change could not threaten the
existence of the newly created bishopric. Despite the passing circumstances
behind the erection of an episcopal see and the political complications into
which the town had fallen, there were also real justifications for such a step,
and so the bishopric of Peremyshl became a permanent component of the
ecclesiastical geography of mikra Rhosia or "little Rus'."
Not long after the division of the diocese of Halych, there was a further
partition of the diocese of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Before joining Halych and
Volhynia together under his rule (1238), Prince Danylo had already established
a bishopric in his residence at Uhrusk on the Buh, about 80 kilometers north-
west of Volodymyr, conceived, no doubt, as a bishop's see at the ruler's court.
Only when the princely court moved between 1240 and 1250 to Kholm (Pol.
Chełm), which now emerged as the new capital of a unified Halych-Volhynian
principality, was the office of court bishop transformed into a regular bishop-
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rie.126 At about the same time, probably before 1240 and in any case before
1250, a bishopric was established in Lutsk, one of the most important cities in
eastern Volhynia.127 That foundation mirrored the further development of
ecclesiastical-religious life; it must be viewed, however, like that of Kholm, in
the overall context of Danylo's political plans. As a ruler, he yearned to be a
"prince of princes," a crowned king surrounded by bishops. The coronation of
Danylo must be seen against the background of his political ambitions. As a
ruler connected with European courts, he understood quite well that he could
become a true king (rex coronatus) by receiving a crown from the pope.128 The
earlier foundation of a bishopric in Peremyshl furnished him with a good
example, and, furthermore, a comparison with his neighbors—Hungary,
Bohemia, and Poland—inclined him to further foundations. There are thus
good grounds to suggest that Danylo consciously set out to increase the number
of dioceses on the territory of his realm. There is no evidence, however, from
which to infer that he sought to join his five dioceses into a new ecclesiastical
province or to break up the metropolitanate of Kyiv. Nonetheless, his ecclesias-
tical administrative activity laid the basis for the future metropolitanate of
mikra Rhösia.
In the difficult years of the Mongol invasion, Danylo was a spokesman for
the unity of the Kyivan ecclesiastical province: in the years 1239-1243 and
1246-1249 it was he who bore the title of Grand Prince of Kyiv. He held Kyiv
the first time until 1243, when Khan В atu named Grand Prince Iaroslav
Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal the "eldest among all the princes of Rus'."
After the death of Iaroslav, Danylo probably became grand prince of Kyiv
again, being the only one to return to Rus' of all the princes who had traveled to
the court of the Great Khan to pay homage in 1246.129 Metropolitan Joseph
(Iosif), who had come to Kyiv from Nicaea in 1236, quickly disappeared from
the scene, either returning to his homeland or losing his life in Kyiv when it fell
to the Mongols on 6 December 1240. In 1241 or at the latest in 1242, in this
exceptional situation—further complicated by a vacancy on the patriarchal
throne in Nicaea (1240-1244)—Danylo, as the nominal Grand Prince of Kyiv,
entrusted the administration of the metropolitanate to metropolitan-elect
Cyril.130 The latter, however, could not have gone to Nicaea until after
Danylo's journey to pay homage to Khan Batu in the spring of 1246, which
resulted in the return of the title of Grand Prince of Kyiv to him. Only in 1247
was Cyril finally consecrated in Nicaea. Not long after his return to Kyiv in
1249, it was decided at the court of the Great Khan to entrust the title of Grand
Prince of Kyiv to Alexander Nevsky, who also became Grand Prince of
Vladimir-Suzdal in 1252. The new Grand Prince of Kyiv and the metropolitan
of Kyiv developed a close working relationship with one another. Nonetheless,
speculation about a supposed loosening of Cyril's ecclesiastical ties to Halych-
Volhynian Rus' is groundless. A change in the bearer of the grand princely title
was simply accompanied with the normal retention of Cyril as metropolitan of
Kyiv. From the very fact that the edition of the Nomokanon produced under the
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direction of Metropolitan Cyril was accepted in Volhynia in its earliest form
and copied there in 1286, it follows that mikra Rhösia continued to be as much
under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kyiv as were the other lands of
Rus'.131 Equally baseless is the assertion that Cyril transferred the seat of the
metropolitanate to the Vladimir in the Suzdal land. Kyiv and its metropolitan
see continued to function: synods took place there (e.g., in 1273 and 1284), and
bishops were consecrated there as late as the 1290s (e.g., Clement of Novgorod
and Theodore of Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma in 1276). The Kyivan St. Sophia
likewise continued to be the final resting place of Kyivan metropolitans: the
remains of Cyril, who died on 27 November 1281 in Pereiaslav Zaleskii during
a pastoral visit to the Suzdal land, were transported back to Kyiv and buried on
6 December in the St. Sophia Cathedral there.132
Under Cyril's administration, two more bishoprics were established. De-
spite the fact that the principality of Tver was established in the 1240s, the
advance of Tver to the rank of a bishopric can be confirmed only in connection
with the treaty (1255-1258) between Grand Prince Alexander Nevsky and his
brother Prince Iaroslav of Tver ,133
The year 1261 witnessed the consecration of Mitrofan, first bishop of Sarai,
which was the capital of the Golden Horde on the Volga. His successor,
Theognostos, was made bishop both of Pereiaslav (near Kyiv) and Sarai in
1269. Theognostos journeyed three times to meet with the emperor and the
patriarch in Constantinople at the behest of Metropolitan Cyril and Khan
Möngke Temür. He was there on 12 August 1276, as indicated by an act of the *
patriarchal synod.134 In literature on the subject, the bishop of Sarai has tended
to be viewed more as a diplomatic representative than a pastor, but these
synodal documents portray the involvement of Theognostos in matters of a
strictly pastoral nature, related to the special circumstances of his post. It is
known that the bishopric of Sarai had a precisely delineated area of jurisdic-
tion. This is demonstrated by a quarrel with the bishop of Riazan about the
boundary of the diocese. From the end of the thirteenth century, these two
episcopal sees, located 750 kilometers one from the other, argued over the
course of the boundary line running midway between them. One would have
expected in that period to find open steppe and an absence of settlement
between the rivers Don, Khopor, and Vorona. But even in the stormy thirteenth
century, not only settlements, but Christian communities and a functioning
ecclesiastical organization existed there. The settlers recognized the jurisdic-
tion of the bishop of Sarai, counting on his effective defense of the Christian
communities against abuses on the part of the Tatar-Mongol administration.135
* *
*
These events in political and ecclesiastical life lead us up to the hiatus associ-
ated with the Mongol invasion. While one certainly should not underestimate
the significance of the invasion itself, which began in 1223 and reached its
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peak of destruction and slaughter in the years 1237-1240, it is also true that the
catastrophe, no matter how vast its immediate proportions may have been,
proved truly fatal only in the long run, when it turned out to be irreversible. The
deep dividing line thus comes not so much with those few years of armed
conquest as with the continuing rale of the Mongols in the decades that fol-
lowed. It was not defeat on the field of battle, but the ensuing half century that
turned the course of history toward a permanent division of Europe.136 Eco-
nomic, political, and ecclesiastical life went on after 1240, despite the destruc-
tion of the many fortresses and towns that had put up resistance to the invaders.
There were, after all, many remaining centers and settlements that had surren-
dered without a fight. The destraction of Kyiv meant the decline of a European
city, but not the end of its existence.137 Resistance was not entirely quelled,
moreover, and continued to smolder in the decades that followed. Even the
trips of the Rus' princes to pay homage at the court of the khan, the recognition
of Mongol suzerainty, and the readiness to collaborate with the foreign con-
querors do not lend themselves to a one-sided interpretation, but rather need to
be evaluated within the context of the overall situation of the time. The tactic of
collaboration with the victors enjoyed increasingly strong support from the
upper strata and the church, as the conviction grew that resistance was hopeless
and could only lead to a demolition of what remained of the state and to the
total destraction of Christian society.138
From the political and religious points of view, the thirteenth century was a
very difficult but fruitful one for the Church. It was a period in which the
common experience of disaster, of the defeats and humiliations suffered, awak-
ened a common confessional consciousness and served to enrich spiritual life.
Despite the heavy human losses and the material destraction—the rain of many
churches and the loss of countless monuments of artistic and spiritual value—it
became forcefully apparent just how deeply Christianity had penetrated the
various strata of society. Christian consciousness, pitted against a godless, or,
rather, religiously indifferent, invader, came to life in a defense of indigenous
values expressed in a growing religious intolerance.
Ecclesiastical institutions were not only spared by the characteristically
tolerant conquerors but were even encouraged in their activity by a variety of
privileges (the oldest such charter/iarlyк dating from 1267). The Church and
ecclesiastical hierarchy achieved a greater independence from their own
princes in this period, but at the same time had to take greater responsibility
upon themselves. It is worth noting that Metropolitan Cyril in the course of his
long tenure (1242-1281), did not once appear at the khan's court. However,
there is no evidence to support the contention that, because of his ties with King
Danylo, Cyril did not enjoy the trust of the Horde.139 Cyril managed to obtain
privileges and benefits for the Church without involving himself in the excur-
sions to pay homage at the court of the khans, and from this stance, a certain
model of behavior for the bishops of the Rus' church took shape. Bishop
Ignatius (Ignatii) of Rostov was even required to justify his journey to the
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Golden Horde before a metropolitan tribunal in 1281.140 For the metropolitan,
who wanted to avoid such visits to the court of the khan, the maintenance of a
permanent representative in the person of the bishop of Sarai became a neces-
sary and valuable expedient. The permanent presence of a Rus' bishop at Sarai
was also valued by the Golden Horde, in view of its need for closer diplomatic
ties with the Byzantine Empire.
One cannot help noting that, as a result of the Mongol invasion, the young
Rus' church was confronted with tasks of exceptional difficulty well before
reaching maturity. But after more than thirty years of Mongol lordship over
Rus', a synod held in Kyiv in 1273 was able to come to a conclusion that, while
containing nothing new, did offer a decisive pastoral program of ecclesiastical
reform for coping with this difficult era of foreign rule.141 The need to collabo-
rate with the conqueror in the ecclesiastical-political sphere was not translated
into the language of pastoral care, and sermons were not embellished with
praise for the invaders. On the contrary, the pastoral letter of Metropolitan
Cyril from Kyiv in 1273 reminded the faithful of the dark and humiliating
realities: "Has not God scattered us throughout the whole land? Have not our
cities been captured? Have not our powerful princes been cut down by the
sword? Has not our youth been led away into captivity? Have not our houses of
divine worship been violated? Do not the godless and criminal pagans torment
us day after day?" Metropolitan Cyril's suffragan, Bishop Serapion of
Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, who had been until recently (1249-1273)
archimandrite of the still functioning Caves Monastery in Kyiv, struck a similar
chord in his admonition of 1274. Warning of extermination, he called for a
purification of souls and a moral renewal, and did not fear to say of the Mongol
yoke: "Has not our country fallen into slavery? Have not our strongholds been
captured? Was it so long ago that our fathers and brothers lay down in battle?
Have not our women and children been led away into captivity? Have not those
who survived been trapped in a bitter yoke by the foreigners? And it has lasted
nearly forty years, this torment and suffering, and heavy dues bear down upon
us without ceasing . . . . " Likewise, in another sermon, Serapion complains that
"our riches have been taken by the pagans, our country has become the posses-
sion of foreigners, our neighbors look upon us with scorn—we have become
the laughingstock of our enemies."142
Such was the Church of Rus' and such were its pastors in the first decades of
the Mongol yoke. They succeeded in obtaining privileges from the conquerors
and in strengthening their own position. They also stood guard, however, over
national and spiritual traditions. Recounting the defeat and suffering, urging
the preservation of values inherited from the past, they awakened a spirit of
resistance, an internal rejection of the imposed reality. It is true that the young
church as an institution and its pastors as individuals did not always act with
appropriate dignity, but the Church was not broken: it found the inner strength
and social support necessary to continue its mission.
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The devastated and depopulated cities and settlements, and the burned and
profaned churches, evoked horror in the accounts of those who survived. The
armed invasion of the Mongols in 1237-1240 was a heavy defeat and was
perceived by contemporaries as utter annhihilation, but in fact it did not result
in a total destruction. Despite everything, life continued; finding support in the
Church, the conquered remained unreconciled to their fate.
The Mongol invasion inaugurated a major break in the continuity of the
history of Rus', but the further course of events was not immediately apparent.
The fatal turning point was the result not of the invasion of the Mongols itself,
not of the plundering and mass slaughter of the population, not of the fall of
Kyiv or Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, but above all of the profound changes in the
internal life of the country that took place under the influence of these events
and the continuing presence of the Mongols in the life of Rus'. The increasingly
coercive course, so disastrous for the land, was influenced more by the Tatar
register of 1257-1259 than by the destruction of the years 1237-1240.143
These changes meant, among other things, an end of the Kyivan era in the
history of the Church in Rus', an era of a single Church common to all the East
Slavs. Metropolitan Cyril, probably of Halych-Volhynian origin, was the last
pastor to preside over such a unity. His successor, the Greek Maxim (Maksim)
who arrived in 1283, sought to uphold tradition, but, in 1299, in the face of a
difficult reality, he decided to transfer his court and the Sophia kliros to the
Vladimir in the Suzdal land.144
Four years later, in 1303, a decision was made by Constantinople to carve a
second ecclesiastical province—with the seat of the new metropolitan at
Halych and his five suffragans initially in Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, Peremyshl,
Lutsk, Turau, and Kholm—out of the metropolitanate of Kyiv with its twelve
bishoprics.145 In the official note of the Patriarchate of Constantinople con-
cerning the erection of the metropolitanate of Halych we find for the first time
the phrase "mikra Rhosia," paralleling the name "Megale Rhosia," which had
been used for the first time in the twelfth century in reference to the
metropolitanate of Kyiv. Both of these names, despite their subsequent roles as
ethnopolitical and geographical terms,146 function here exclusively as Byzan-
tine conceptions of ecclesiastical geography, serving, on the basis of the num-
ber of suffragans in each, to distinguish the smaller Rus' ecclesiastical province
from the larger.
In tenth- to twelfth-century Byzantium, it was known that the geographical
term "Rus"' (Rhosia) was employed in Rus' first and foremost in referring to the
territory on the middle Dnipro with its center in Kyiv, while the domain of the
Kyivan princes extended to a significantly broader territory. At the same time,
this geographical term was also used, for practical purposes, in referring to the
whole area of Kyivan rule just as it is, for that matter, in contemporary histori-
ography. However, sometimes the need for greater precision was felt. Hence,
Constantine VII Porphyrogennëtos localizes Novgorod in "outer Rhösia," hav-
ing in mind the extent of Kyivan rule beyond Rus' proper. Similarly, in the
366 POPPE
chancellery of the patriarch, use of the term "great Rhösia," served to empha-
size the congraency between the jurisdictional range of the metropolitanate of
Kyiv and the territorial domain of Rus' as a state.
Moreover, the identification of the metropolitanate of Kyiv as the
metropolitanate of "great Rus'," in the sense of all, or the whole, of Rus', may
already have begun in Byzantium at the end of the eleventh century in the face
of political and ecclesiastical centrifugal forces that challenged the unity of the
patriarchate's Rus' province. The counterpart of this "great" Rus' is the phrase
"pasës Rhôsias," or "vseia Rusi," employed by metropolitans and princes of
Kyiv alike. From the moment of the division into two metropolitanates, the
adjective "great" regained its basic semantic sense, serving, in a pairing with
"little" or "minor," to distinguish a larger structure.
As later history would show, it was no easy matter to translate this division,
deepening in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, into the language of defini-
tive ecclesiastical administrative decisions, but the course had been set. The
processes leading to these transformations had begun earlier, but the events of
the thirteenth century had accelerated them dramatically.
The metropolitanate of Halych was not a stable structure. Among the factors
responsible for this was the crucial one: the extinction of local branches of
Rurikids. When, toward the end of the twelfth century, the line of
Rostislaviches of Halych died out, it seemed that they would be successfully
replaced by the Volhynian line of the scions of Volodimir Monomakh: Prince
Roman (d. 1205) and his son King Danylo (d. 1264; he even competed success-
fully for Kyiv). Their successors, in the face of the persistent Mongol-Tatar
pressure, increasingly limited themselves to local matters and rivalries, and
then by the year 1322 came the extinction of the male line of the Halych-
Volhynian Rurikids. Claims to the throne and power in Halych on the part of
related neighbors—members of the dynatsies of the Piasts, Gediminids and
Arpads—had a negative impact on the history of these lands, though they
initially brought political order and economic prosperity. There is no doubt,
however, that in the longer perspective the loss of its own dynasty, whose roots
reached back to the Kyivan era, weighed heavily on the fate of Rus'-Ukraine
and found reflection in its religious life as well.
Warsaw 1990, Kyoto January-February 1998
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NOTES
This essay was originally conceived as an introduction to a collection of
essays on the history of religious life in Ukraine, which was not pub-
lished because of the landmarks of 1991. It was based largely on my
analytical studies, which I reference below, as well as on my critical
discussion of previous studies on this subject. Here I consider mainly
studies related to the Millennium of Christianity in Rus '/Ukraine.
1. "Photii epistolae," no. XIII, chap. 35, in Jacques-Paul Migne, ed.,
Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857- '
1866), vol. 102, pp. 735-38. Cf. Ihor Sevcenko, "Religious Missions
Seen from Byzantium," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 12/13 (1988/1989):
7-27 (reprinted as "Religious Missions Seen from Byzantium: The Impe-
rial Pattern and its local Variants," in his Ukraine Between East and
West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century
(Edmonton, 1996), pp. 27-45 ). The interchangeability of [ö] and [ü]
(graphemically, ω/Ω) in the Greek of the Byzantine era (until the thir-
teenth century?) permits us to hypothesize confidently that the name
"Rhös, Rhösia" was pronounced in Byzantium in a manner similar to the
Slavic "Rus"' and the Latin "Rusia." Compare Liudprand, Bishop of
Cremona's (ca. 960): "gens ... quam Graeci vocant... Rusios"
(Antapodosis b. V, с 15). Ω was pronounced as a long 0, as shown by the
Latin spelling of the Greek sound of the name, Theophanu (Theophanö in
Greek spelling). For literature on the Christianization before 988, see the
second Russian edition, with corrections and bibliographic additions, of
Gerhard Podskalsky [Podskal'skii], Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia
literatura ν Kievskoi Rusi 988-1237 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 17-
29.
2. Tadeusz Lewicki, Źródła arabskie do dziejów Słowiańszczyzny, vol. 1
(Wroclaw, 1956), pp. 76ff, and the commentary on pp. 126-38. See
Omeljan Pritsak, "An Arabic Text on the Trade Route of the Corporation
of Ar-Rüs in the Second Half of the Ninth Century, " Folia Orientalia 12
(1970): 242-59; cf. M. Hrushevsky [Hrushevsicyi], History ofUkraine-
Ruś, vol. 1 (Edmonton, 1997), pp. 217, 218, 316, and 388. On some
implications in reconstructing the original text and in enlarging the dat-
ing for the whole ninth century, see Thomas S. Noonan, "When Did Rus/
Rus' Merchants First Visit Khazaria and Baghdad?" Archivum Eurasiae
MediiAevi 7 (1987-1991): 213-19.
3. Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds. and trans.,
Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text (Cambridge, MA, 1953),
p. 77. Since the term sobornaia tserkvi has often been translated as
"cathedral church," which would assume the presence of a bishop in
Kyiv even prior to 944, it should be remembered that sobornaia repre-
sents an exact translation of the Greek katholiki, in this context, meaning
a common, public church; in other words, a church serving the congrega-
tion of believers [publica ecclesia] in contrast to an oratory or private
church [privata ecclesia].
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4. A. P. Motsia, Naselennia pivdenno-Rus'kykh zemel' IX-XIII st. za
materialamy nekropoliv (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 6-46 and 74-102; A.
Chernetsov, "Nachalo khristianstva na Rusi ν svete arkheologicheskikh
dannykh. Sostoianie izuchennosti voprosa," Slavia antiqua 38 (1997):
81-93. It seems that it is too early to evaluate the degree of
Christianization on the basis of findings of 2 to 9 percent of the graves
with Christian signs on them from the eleventh-thirteenth centuries, if
one considers that in the thirteenth century there was a decline in the
number of such graves, as compared with the twelfth century. There is no
clear proof to state that "by the end of the 12th century almost all urban
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1970], pp. 104 and 106) dating of the baptism of both Hungarian princes
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Voprosy istorii 1986 [6]: 41-52) dates Ol'ga's baptism in a similar way,
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46 (1992): 271-77.
9. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus [Porphyrogennëtos] De ceremoniis
aulae byzantinae, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1829), pp. 594-98 (hereafter, De
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pp. 214-15.
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263, 265-66.
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and Chersoń in the Tenth Century," pp. 108-13; in compatibility with
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22. Cf. A. A. Shakhmatov, Razyskaniia о drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh
svodakh (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 133-61; D. S. Likhachev, Izbrannye
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23. This traditional interpretation predominates in writings on the Millen-
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71; and, unskillfully, in the jubilee publication of W. Seibt, "Der
historische Hintergrund und die Chronologie der Taufe der Ruś (989)" in
A.-E. N. Tachiaos, ed., The Legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Kiev
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"The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," pp. 211-12; G.
Downey, "Earthquakes at Constantinople and Vicinity, A. D. 342-
1454," Speculum 30 (1955): 599-600; A. P. Kazhdan, ed., The Oxford
Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. 1 (New York and Oxford, 1991), pp. 669-
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Etymologicum Genuinum," in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine
Studies Presented to L. G. Westerink (New York, 1988), p. 168.
Ponomarbv's and Serikov's suggestion (ibid., pp. 178-80) to date this
earthquake as having taken place two years earlier (987) cannot be
accepted. The authors ignore or dismiss records that contradict their
thesis. Thus, they claim that Asoghik [Asolik] (Stephen of Tarön) made a
mistake when he wrote several dozens of years later about the event;
however, the earthquake took place in the lifetime of this Armenian
historian, who finished writing his history around the year 1003.
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tion of those treaties (Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism
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Obolensky's reservations—pertaining to the withdrawing of linguistic
amendments to the 944 treaty and to remain explicit— (see "Chersoń and
Conversion of Rus': An Anti-Revisionist view," pp. 247 and 254): "By
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48. And the unheard-of thing happened: a porphyrogennëta became the wife
of a barbarian ruler. Was she forced to go to Kyiv, as the traditional
historiography tells us, in order to save the imperial city from an attack
by Rus'? It could have been that way, but it was not. A twenty-six-year-
old young woman went to Kyiv; she was raised in a palace and well-
educated. She went there because she was flexible, knew methods of
ruling, and also because she felt responsible for her new domain and the
success of its conversion. It suffices to take a look at her mother
Theophano, her nieces who later became empresses—Theodora and
Zoe—as well as the German empress, the Greek Theophano, to realize
that Anna was an intellectually mature woman, and well aware of the role
she had to play: filia sancti imperil, married to the newly converted
Volodimer. As a Christian, she must have liked the idea of spreading the
new religion, which she did through building new churches, as we know
thanks to Yahya. She may have been afraid of the severe climate and
heathen customs, but at least she knew the language: as a girl, she was
frequently in the company of Bulgarian princes and princesses of her age,
who were related to her and who lived for a few years in the imperial
palace. Thus, the Slavic vernacular was not alien to her. It may have been
for this reason that she was called a Bulgarian in Kyiv. Political and
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sister and help her spread the new faith. For details on Anna and her
political role, see A. Poppe, "Der Kampf um die Kiever Thronfolge nach
dem 15. Juli 1015," Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 50
(1995): 275-95. Anna's recognized activities in Rus' have also been
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101-10.
49. According to Ponomarev and Serikov ("989 [6496] god—god
kreshcheniia Rusi," pp. 171, 181) it was not Halley's comet but an
ordinary one that was seen on 17 July 987, so there are grounds to
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Monety i pechati vizantiiskogo Khersona (Leningrad, 1983), pp. 52-63,
116-17.
51. The interpretation on dating of archaeological excavations leaves much
to be desired. In the 1980s (A. Romanchuk) a trend began toward the
revision of earlier results (A. L. Jakobson and his school) about the
decline of Kherson after 989. The traces of ruin and fire are no longer
adduced in connection with Volodimer's action. But it is out of the
question that "some parts of the city were destroyed and burned, but the
causes are unknown." The new proposition that "it happened sometime
in the eleventh century" lacks clear arguments. See N. M. Bogdanova,
"Kherson ν X-XV w . Problemy istorii vizantiiskogo goroda," in
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extensive an adaptability. Some could think that it is improper to portray
Kherson—a place of the baptism of Volodimer and his wedding with the
basilissa Anna—as a destroyed city.
52. Aleksandr Zimin, ed., "Pamiaf і pokhvala Iakova Mnikha i Zhitie kniazia
Vladimira po drevneishemu spisku," p. 72; The Hagiography of Kievan
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cluded. Ponomarev and Serikov ("989 [6496] god-god kreshcheniia
Rusi," pp. 163-65) made the right critical remarks about the interpreta-
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their suggestion that Kherson was taken by Volodimer before his baptism
(ibid., p. 182).
54. See M. Arranz, "Catecumenado y bautismo en tiempos de Volodymyr,"
Orientalia Christiana Periódica 54 (2) 1988: 277-308; and the Russian
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42-90, 284-302; 50 (1984): 43-64, 372-97; 51 (1985): 60-85; 52
(1986): 145-78; 53 (1987): 59-106. S. Senyk's doubts (Λ History of the
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conferment during the the baptism itself, which Senyk should have
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baptism and the close connection between Theophania and the theologi-
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baptism.
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us from a similar list. See Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae
Constantinopolitanae, pp. 124-25, 344, 350, 382.
105. Cf. M. HrushevsTcyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1905; reprint,
New York, 1954), pp. 51-60; A. Presniakov, Kniazhoe pravo ν Drevnei
Rusi (St. Petersburg, 1909; reprint, Moscow 1993), pp. 42^17; A. V.
Nazarenko, "Rodovoi siuzerenitet Riurikovichei nad Rus'iu," in
Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR (Moscow, 1986), pp. 146-
57.
106. Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava, pp. 31 and 32. On the
seal belonging to John, the metropolitan of pases Rhösias which has been
ascribed to John II (1077-1089), the addendum "all" could have been
caused by these concerns. See A. Soloviev, Byzance et la formation de
l'État russe (London, 1979) IXa and IXb, pp. 294, 317-19. But accord-
ing to V. L. Ianin this attribution is not certain; it could be dated almost a
hundred years later to John IV.
107. Maurokastron is mentioned in only one notitia (the manuscript
Coislinianus, 211), where this metropolitanate is listed after Basileion
(founded in 1059-1071) and before Nazianzos (founded in 1068-1071).
That means that the advance of Neofit to the rank of titular metropolitan
of Chernihiv must have happened in the 1060s. See n. 105 above. During
the ceremonies at Vyshhorod on 20 May 1072, the metropolitan of
Chernihiv, Neofit, is listed second, according to the hierarchy of ranks,
just after the metropolitan of Kyiv, George. Cf. The Hagiography of
Kievan Rus', pp. 122-23. This text from the Tale of the Miracles (about
the events of 20 May 1072) is original in relation to the Primary
Chronicle for the year 1072 (PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 181-82); cf. The
Hagiography of Kievan Rus', pp. 200-201.
108. Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae (Paris, 1981),
pp. 344, 350, 382 (Notitiae: 11; 12; 15 in the sequence of 78, 80 or 81
positions). Pereiaslav was mentioned as a metropolitanate in six manu-
scripts. See Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae,
p. 382. It is always listed between Rhusion and Lakedaimon—metropoli-
tan sees that had been founded closer to 1080. However, we know that
the titular metropolitanate of Pereiaslav had already existed in the 1060s.
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An ephemeral titular metropolitan see did not occupy a constant position
in the ordo thronorum, but was put on the list when a given bishop was
given this honorary title and was crossed out after his death. The notitia
which preserved the metropolitanate of Pereiaslav reflects the confer-
ment of this title on Ephrem, which took place between 1073 and 1078.
Because Attalea is mentioned last (founded 1084), the notitia must have
been edited around 1085, which would explain why Maurokastron-
Chernihiv is absent from the list. It was recorded after the titular metro-
politan. Neofit had died, and his successor was an ordinary bishop. That
is the reason why we know more precisely the time of the editing of the
list from the manuscript Coislinianus, 211: it was compiled after the
death of the metropolitan of Pereiaslav, Leo, but before the nomination
of Ephrem—that is, at a time when Peter was the bishop of Pereiaslav
(without the honorary title), around 1072.
109. The founding of this diocese took place in the early 1070s, according to
M. D. Priselkov, Ocherkipo tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi
X-XII vv. (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 135-40. Shchapov (State and
Church in Early Russia, pp. 46-48) proposes to ascribe the establishment
of the Rostov see to Metropolitan Ephrem of Pereislav, but he has not
taken into account that titular metropolitans had no right to found bishop-
rics and divide their dioceses. For the dating of disorders, see A.
Kuchkin, Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii Severo-Vostochnoi
Rusi ν X-XIV vv. (Moscow, 1984), p. 64. According to the Kyivan Caves
Paterikon, written in the 1220s, Leo "was the first to occupy the Rostov
see, and suffered many torments at the hands of unbelievers; he was the
third citizen of the land of Rus', together with the two Varangians, to be
crowned by Christ, for whose sake he suffered" (The Paterik of the
Kievan Caves Monastery, p. 118). But we must remember that since the
twelfth century to the begining of the twentieth, the foundation of the
Rostov see was generally connected with the baptism of Rus' at the turn
of the tenth century. For this reason Leo is named the "third martyr"
(after the two Varangians murdered in 986). Hence Saints Boris and Glëb
are not passed over in silence, as some thought, because they were not
recognized as martyrs "in Christo."
110. See P. Sokolov, Ruskii arkhierei iz Vizantii i pravo ego naznacheniia do
nachala XV veka (Kyiv, 1913), pp. 93-158 (still the basic text);
Podskalsky, Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 77-78; cf. also
Pelenski, "The Sack of Kiev of 1169: Its Significance for the Succession
to Kievan Rus'," and W. Vodoff, "Remarques sur la politique
ecclésiastique d'André de Bogoljubovo," Cahiers de civilisation
médiévale 17 (1974): 193-215.
111. In the colophon of a Greek psalter from the fourteenth century, a Greek
priest, the hieromonk Malakhias, who was the vicar of the Moscow
metropolitan in Vladimir-on-Kliazma calls himself "namestnikos tou
Volodimirou." Cf. Ε. Ε. Granstrem, "Chernets Malakhiia filosof," in
Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1962 g. (Moscow, 1963), pp. 69-70.
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112. The document pertaining to the founding of the bishopric in Smolensk
shows the legal and financial status of the kliros as independent from the
bishop. In this case we are not dealing with the constitution of a new
bishop's kliros, but with the transformation of a vicariate's kliros, under
the Pereiaslav bishop, into the kliros of the Smolensk diocese. See the
document edited by la. Shchapov in Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy,
XI-XVvv. (Moscow, 1976), pp. 141-46. It is noteworthy that the Greek
kleros, serving to define clergy in its entirety, when it became part of
colloquial speech in Rus', was exclusively associated with "chapter"
clergy; the meaning of this word became much more narrow and institu-
tional. For information on the institution of the kliros and the bishop's
namestnik, see E. E. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 2, part 1
(Moscow, 1901; reprint, 1969), pp. 376-88; A. Poppe, "Fundacja
biskupstwa smoleńskiego," Przegląd Historyczny 57 (1966): 552-55;
Shchapov, State and Church in Early Russia, pp. 124-31.
113. Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava, p. 32.
114. For a more detailed discussion, see Poppe, "Werdegang der
Diözesanstraktur," pp. 275, 277-78.
115. The prince is presented in them with his wife, Irene, and his mother,
Gertrude; see Kämpfer, Das Russische Herrscherbild von den Anfängen
bis zu Peter dem Grosse, ill. 64 and 67.
116. See the life of St. Theodosius in S. I. Kotkov et al., eds., Uspenskii
sbornik ХІІ-ХШ vv. (Moscow, 1971), pp. 84-85.
117. Ibid., p. 95. It was a monastery, on the land route to Constantinople and
Mount Athos, that was founded surely before 1066—probably, but not
necessarily, as a branch of the Kyivan Caves Monastery.
118. See The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery, pp. 118-19; Podskalsky,
Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 84—92.
119. See Abbot Daniel's Khozhdenie. Wallfahrtsbericht. Mit einer Einleitung
und bibliographischen Hinweisen von Klaus Dieter Seemann (Munich,
1970), p. 10. W. F. Ryan's English translation, "Journey to the Promised
Land" in John Wilkinson, ed., Jerusalem Pilgrimage, 1099-1185 (Lon-
don, 1988); A. Poppe, "Soobshchenie russkogo palomnika o tserkovnoi
organizatsii Kipra ν nachale XII veka," in Epetëris tou Kentrou
Epistemonikön Ereunön Kyprou 8 (Leukosia, 1978), pp. 53-72; cf.
Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae, pp. 157, 338;
Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 321-26.
120. PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 238, 293, 296; The reference by the founder to "the
prayers of the father and the grandfather" allows one to assume that
Volodimer Monomakh contemplated the foundation of the bishopric of
Smolensk; cf. Shchapov, Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy, XI-XV vv.,
pp. 141, 144. It is well worth analyzing in depth the remarks made by V.
L. Ianin, "Zametki o komplekse dokumentov Smolenskoi eparkhii XII
veka," Otechestvennaia istoriia 6 (1994): 104-20.1 accept his criticism
that the date of the consecration of Bishop Manuel as 26 April 1136 is
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based on the not very credible Nikonian chronicle and must be verified.
As for the date of the writing of the act of foundation, I lean toward the
view that the draft of this document preceded the ordination and hence
there are additions made at the moment of its formal issuing. However,
V. Ianin is of the opinion that the foundation document was written a few
years later (between 1138 and 1142). The fontologic problems are excep-
tionally complicated and even if not all of the proposed solutions seem
correct, they are important enough to make us reevaluate our own solu-
tion and encourage us to study the issue further.
121. M. Hrashevsliyi, Istoriia Ukratny-Rusi, vol. 2, pp. 150-54, 417-20.
Poppe, "Werdegang der Diözesanstruktur."
122. After 1237, the residence of the bishops of Riazan was Murom, and in the
second half of the fourteenth century the bishop moved to the new
political center of Pereislavl Riazanskii (called Riazan from the sixteenth
century, but officially only since the eighteenth).
123. See Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 697-98;
Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, p. 296; Kuchkin,
Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii, pp. 98-103; J. Fennell, The
Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304 (London, 1983), pp. 46-51.
124. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 698-99; M.
HrushevsTsyi, Istoriia Ukramy-Rusi, vol. 2, p. 418 ff. and index; I. P.
Kryp'iakevych, Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 30-32,
90-91; Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 457,
464, 467-68; Shchapov (State and Church in Early Russia, p. 50) sug-
gests moving the date of the founding of the bishopric in Halych back to
1139-1145, but he thinks that until that time the Dnister region was
directly a part of the metropolitan diocese and did not belong to the
bishopric of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia.
125. PSRL, vol. 1, p. 502; A. N. Nasonov, ed., Novgorodskaiapervaia letopis'
starshego і mladshego izvodov (Moscow, 1950), pp. 52, 60; Podskalsky,
Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, p. 464; Shchapov (State and
Church in Early Russia, pp. 40-42) is ready, with reference to
Tatishchev, to date the Peremyshl episcopal see to 1119-1128, because
Prince Volodar "founded there the church dedicated to John the Baptist
which later was a cathedral"; this is uncritically repeated by Senyk, A
History of the Church in Ukraine, pp. 141—42.
126. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 1, part 1, p. 699; M.
Hrashevsiiyi, Istoriia Ukrai'ny-Rusi, vol. 2, pp. 381—84; Podskalsky,
Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, p. 465; cf. Shchapov, State and
Church in Early Russia, pp. 52-54.
127. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 1, part 1, p. 700; M.
Hrashevslcyi, Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi, vol. 2, pp. 384-85 (but his view that
the bishopric of Lutsk was founded already in the twelfth century is not
plausible); Shchapov, State and Church in Early Russia, p. 54. In any
case, Lutsk became the capital of the diocese before 1237 but after
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Peremyshl (1220), which follows from the chronicle and notitia of dio-
ceses. (PSRL, vol. 2, p. 926; Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae
Constantinopolitanae, p. 403). Unfortunately, the order of the bishoprics
was compiled in this notitia after 1303.
128. Cf. the basic collection of data on Danylo (still to this day) by M.
HrushevsTcyi, Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi, vol. 3, pp. 17-91. A convincing
characterization of Danylo's policies is presented by G. Stökl in
Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 508-
26.
129. See PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 470, 472; vol. 2, pp. 782, 785-86, 806, 808-809.
130. Podskalsky, Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 427-29, 468-
71; concerning Cyril IPs first years, see also G. Stökl, "Kanzler und
Metropolit," in his Der Russische Staat im Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit
(Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 98-123. Various assumptions about the role that
a hegumen from Kyiv, Petro Akerovych, who had escaped the Tatars,
was supposed to have played in contacts with the Roman church, were
properly disproved by O. Tolochko ("Petro Akerovych—hadanyi
mytropolyt vseia Rusi," Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 1990 (6): 45-
54). One might say that a puzzling "quidam archiepiscopus de Russia
nomine Petrus . . . a Tartaris exterminatus" (Matthaeus of Paris,
Chronica maiora), who participated in the 1244 Council of Lyons, was a
usurper but perhaps he could have been an archimandrite (abbot) of a
monastery in Rus' because archbishops were also given that title in the
West, and so it could have been simply a mistake in reversible translation
(cf. Charles Du Cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis 1: 891;
Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch, vol. 1 [Berlin, 1967], p. 891). The sur-
prising and ephemeral title of protothronos for Rus' metropolitans, which
the Bulgarian despot Iakov-Svietoslav gives to Cyril II around 1261 (cf.
Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, p. 470nl5), would
most easily be explained by recalling the confusion in the Byzantine
church, which caused a temporary transfer of the patriarch's residence to
Nicaea in Bithynia (until 1261). At that time, Caesarea in Cappadocia,
where the metropolitan was the patriarch's protothronos, was destroyed
to such an extent, especially after being conquered by the Mongols in
1243, that it ceased to be the seat of the metropolitanate. In this situation
the patriarch could have come to the conclusion that rapid changes in
church geography and the need for improving contacts with the Mongols
justified such a promotion of the metropolitan of Rus'. If this patriarch
was Arsenios Autoreianos, then it becomes understandable that after
1265 the new solution was forgotten.
131. See la. Shchapov, Vizantiiskoe і iuzhnoslavianskoe pravovoe nasledie na
Rusi ν XI-XIII vv. (Moscow, 1978), pp. 146-57, 209-12, 240^6, 270-
72.
132. Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia literatura, p. 469nl4. The
first mentioned synod took place in Kyiv in 1273 (and not 1274), as
Shchapov rightly proved (ibid., pp. 181-85).
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133. V. Borzakovskii, Istoriia Tver'skogo kniazhestva (St. Petersburg, 1876;
reprint, 1993), pp. 68-83, 205-206. Kuchkin, Formirovanie
gosudarstvennoi territorii, pp. 111-21; J. Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval
Russia, 1200-1304, pp. 107-18, 127.
134. For the Greek and Rus' texts, see Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo
kanonicheskogo prava, part 1, pp. 129-40 (no. 12), supplement 1-12
(no. 1). Cf. PSRL, vol. 1, p. 476, and Golubinskii, Istoria russkoi tserkvi,
vol. 2, part 1, pp. 41, 60-61.
135. Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava, part 1 pp. 159-66
(nos. 18 and 19), supplement 1, paragraph 15. Cf. A. Nasonov, Mongoly і
Rus' (Moscow, 1940; reprint, 1969), pp. 4 5 ^ 7 .
136. Cf. Nasonov Mongoly i Rus'; В. Spuler, Die Goldene Horde. Die
Mongolen in Russland 1223-1502, 2nd edition (Wiesbaden, 1965);
Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde. The Mongol Impact
on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington, 1985). In the discussion
about the Mongolian influence on the history of Rus', an important place
belongs to J. Fennell. The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304. After
this and other studies on the Mongols in Rus' (see, for example,
Podskalsky, Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 142-45), Leo
de Hartog's clear yet simplistic book, Russia and the Mongol Yoke
(London, 1996), is disappointing. Eurasian studies are useful if we wish
to gain some distance from issues at hand. As far as new publications are
concerned, the books of the historiosophically oriented, talented writer
Lev N. Gumilev dominate the field. Gumilev, who prefers to cross
boundaries and refuses to be a professional historian or a medievalist,
easily exaggerates and, although he has a critical mind, at times falls into
the trap of becoming a visionary or, as he would say himself, of falling
prey to excessive passionarium. Gumilev's constructs are built on a
grand scale, but not without a nationalistic narrowing of the mind. Huge
colorful canvasses and panoramic pictures can either be accepted whole-
sale or rejected, but one can also enrich one's knowledge through a view
that goes beyond Eurocentric borders, in this case exceptionally so,
without differentiating between Western and Eastern Europe. See, for
example, L. N. Gumilev, Drevniaia Rus'i velikaia step'(Moscow, 1989).
Gumilev, who was persecuted earlier but has become very popular today,
is to be commended for always being true to himself and refusing to
guard himself with an academic shield.
137. See M. HrushevsTcyi, Istoriia Ukra'iny-Rusi, vol. 3, pp. 147-53. And his
Ocherk istorii kievskoi zemli (Kyiv, 1891; reprint, 1991), pp. 427^3,
506-509. This excellent historian's thesis about the survival of Kyiv is
also substantiated by new studies of G. Ivakin; see, for example, his Kiev
ν 13-15 vekakh (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 12-23, 57-65, 82-102.
138. An exaggerated idealization and perpetuation of a hagiographical-like
image of Alexander Nevsky in historiography had to trigger a reaction,
which, however, was usually ignored or relabelled (for example, the
earlier contrast between "Soviet historiography" and "bourgeois histori-
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ography" is now replaced by a new opposition: zarubezhnaia (foreign)-
otechestvennaia (native). But the crux of the matter is the scaling down
of Prince Alexander's image to the proportions that it had in the thir-
teenth century, although a certain amount of exaggeration in historicizing
his image cannot be avoided. See Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia,
1200-1304, pp. 97-124; cf. W. Leitsch, "Einige Beobachtungen zum
politischen Weltbild Aleksander Nevskijs," in Forschungen zur
osteuropäischen Geschichte 25 (1978): 202-16; cf. also my attempt in
Lexikon des Mittelalters 1 (1980): 370-71.
139. See Nasonov, Mongoly i Rus', pp. 40-49, 329n95. This interpretation
gave rise to the thesis about the founding of the bishopric in Sarai as a
result of Mongolian mistrast toward the metropolitan of Rus' and of a
need for closer diplomatic ties with Byzantium.
140. Cf. PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 525-26; a later report focuses on accusing the
bishop of removing the grave of Rostov's Prince Glëb, who died in 1278,
from the cathedral.
141. Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava, part 1, pp. 83-100
(no. 6), especially p. 86. Cyril's pastoral letter played a preparatory role
for resolutions made at the Kyivan Synod in 1273; cf. Podskalsky,
Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura, pp. 427-32. Extreme judgments
and accusations against the Rus' church of servility during the Mongol
Yoke have been replaced by more moderate assessments. See N. A.
Okhotina, "Ruskaia tserkov' i mongol'skoe zavoevanie," in Tserkov',
obshchestvo і gosudarstvo ν feodal'noi Rossii (Moscow, 1990), pp. 67-
83; A. L. Khoroshkevich and A. I. Pliguzov, "Russkaia tserkov' і
antiordinskaia borba ν XIII-XIV vv. Po materialam kratkogo sobraniia
khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitom," Tserkov', obshchestvo і
gosudarstvo ν feodal'noi Rossii, pp. 84—102. See also the original pan-
oramic view of the thirteenth century Rus' church and Christianity by V.
N. Toporov, Sviatosf і sviatye ν russkoi dukhovnoi kul'ture, vol. 2 (Mos-
cow, 1998), pp. 203-94.
142. The Five Sermons of Serapion are published in Pamiatniki literatury
drevnei Rusi: XIII vek (Moscow, 1981), pp. 440-55, especially pp. 444,
448; See also the English translation partly edited by S. A. Zenkovsky,
Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles and Tales, 2nd edition (New York,
1974), pp. 243-48; cf. Podskalsky, Khristianstvo і bogoslovskaia
literatura, pp. 179-83. On Serapion's conciousness, see W. Philipp,
Ansätze zum geschichtlichen und politischen Denken in Kiever Russland
(Darmstadt, 1967), pp. 60-64.
143. Cf. T. T. Alisen, "Mongol Census Taking in Rus', 1245-1275," Harvard
Ukrainian Studies 5(1) 1981: 32-53; D. Ostrowski, "The Mongol Ori-
gins of Muscovite Political Institutions," Slavic Review 49(4) Winter
1990: 525-42.
144. PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 485, 528; cf. D. Ostrowski, "Why Did the Metropolitan
Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?" California
Slavic Studies 16 (1993): 83-101.
392 POPPE
145. Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae, pp. 399, 403; M.
Hrushevsicyi, Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi, vol. 3, pp. 269-74, 543^4. The
attempt to date the foundation of the Lithuanian metropolitanate before
1303 (instead of around 1316) in light of the notitia is unfounded. Cf. M.
Giedroyć, "The Arrival of Christianity in Lithuania: Between Rome and
Byzantium (1281-1341)," Oxford Slavonic Papers 20 (1987): 15-19.
146. Cf. the article by M. Hrushevsiiyi, "Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus'," reprinted
in Ukräins'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 1991(2): 77-85.
The Postwar Fate of the Petliura Library and the
Records of the Ukrainian National Republic*
PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED
The 1996 commemoration in Kyiv of the 70th anni-
ι
 v e r s a r y o f symon Petliura's death marked a dramatic
• I E AI Mi I iff! break with the Soviet characterization of him as a
siMUni dangerous bourgeois nationalist, antisémite, and anti-
F E T L U R A popular dictator. Petliura, as the head of the short-
¿"»^f^.18 ' u v e d Ukrainian National Republic, had fought the
Bolsheviks in Ukraine. Then, as head of the Ukrainian
government in exile, he continued to be perceived as a major threat to the
Soviet regime until his assassination in Paris in 1926. The French trial (and
acquittal) of his assassin raised the question of Petliura's complicity in the 1919
pogroms in Ukraine—and polarized Western attitudes toward him. In Soviet
Ukraine, Petliura officially remained anathema, and "Petliurite" became syn-
onymous with "enemy of the people." Against this backdrop, the 1996 com-
memoration was remarkable: Petliura had finally been rehabilitated, and his
aspirations for an independent Ukraine, for which he had sacrificed his life,
were now recognized in his homeland. To perpetuate Petliura's memory, a
documentary collection of Petliura's political and family letters was issued in
Kyiv, in collaboration with the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris.
In the preface to the publication, Vasyl' Mykhal'chuk, a former director of
the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris, relates the sad wartime fate of the
archival materials deposited before World War II in that library: "Together
with the library holdings and all the archives, they were confiscated by the
Gestapo in 1940 and taken to Germany. Their fate is unknown."2 Thus, even in
1996, it was not public knowledge that many of those materials were in the
metropolises of Ukraine and Russia. Coincidentally, most of the archival mate-
rials from the Petliura Library that are now in Kyiv are actually located in the
same archive that houses the records of the UNR Foreign Ministry, on which
the first part of that same 1996 publication was based.
Among the documents published for the first time are political and diplo-
matic letters of Petliura drawn from the records of the UNR Foreign Ministry
now held in Kyiv. They were probably among those which the Nazis had
discovered in Tarnów and processed in Cracow during the war and which
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Soviet SMERSH counterintelligence agents had seized from Cracow in March
1945. This information was not known to the compilers of the publication, but
serves to illustrate the extent of the Odyssey of documents relating to the
national statesman who was forced into exile. It also testifies to the lack of
public disclosure about such documents held in Kyivan archives.
The letters of Petliura's wife, OFha, and his daughter, Lesia, came from
family correspondence in Paris and Prague, but the precise archival designa-
tions are also not provided. In fact, these documents came from the papers of
Oleksander Siropolko, a relative and close friend of the Petliura family in
Prague, and Stepan Siropolko from Paris, which were recently transferred to
Ukraine and presented to TsDAVO, the same Kyiv archive that houses the
major collections from the Petliura Library and UNR records in Kyiv. Another
published letter from О1Ъа Petliura to the librarian of the Petliura Libary in
Paris, Ivan Rudychiv (1881-1958), dated 7 June 1941 (corresponding to the
period he was in Berlin) is now also located in that same archive in Kyiv.3
In 1997, barely a year later, another collection of articles and conference
presentations was published in Kyiv also to commemorate the seventieth anni-
versary of Petliura's assassination, in the introduction of which the editors
allude to the history of the Petliura Library in Paris:
The prewar holdings of that library were completely lost, taken away to
Germany by the Fascist occupiers, although some suppose that now they
might be found in KGB cellars in Moscow, or perhaps were earlier transferred
to the Secret Section (spetskhrari) of the Russian State Library.4
Such speculations, however, can now be put to rest. At last we know more
about the Odyssey and the fate of that library. It can be confirmed, for example,
that many of its archival holdings have survived and are accessible to research-
ers in Moscow and Kyiv, if they know where and how to request them.
However, they are also so widely dispersed that researchers would be at a loss
to identify their provenance or original arrangement as collections from the
Paris library. In the late 1980s some remains of the library books that were
identified in Minsk were transferred to Ukraine, but the rest, unfortunately,
remain diffused, some to be sure in the former Secret Section mentioned.
In the companion piece to this article, I described the fate of the Petliura
Library during the war, after the Nazis had confiscated the holdings from the
sealed library building in January 1941.5 Rudychiv, the librarian of the Petliura
Library from the start, was sent by the Nazis to Berlin under the pretext of
assisting with the reopening of its holdings transferred there, but he never saw
the library again. While in Berlin, he left behind his diary from the period of the
Nazi seizure and transport of the library, together with an account of the
library, some of its treasured documents, certain of his own papers, and
momentos of Petliura and his family. These materials have now surfaced in
Kyiv. Under the auspices of the Special Command of Reichsleiter Alfred
Rosenberg—the infamous ERR (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg)—the
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Petliura Library was incorporated into the so-called Ostbücherei, the special
"Eastern Library" relating to Bolshevik and other Eastern European matters,
developed under the Rosenberg command for its anti-Bolshevik research cen-
ter in Berlin. The same fate befell the much richer Turgenev Library, which had
been confiscated in Paris at the same time as the Petliura Library.
Starting in the summer of 1943, major ERR research and library operations,
including the Ostbücherei, were transferred from Berlin to the relatively iso-
lated city of Ratibor (Pol. Racibórz), 80 kilometers southwest of Katowice on
the Oder (Pol. Odra) River in Silesia. The extensive ERR Ratibor operations
were scattered among many buildings within the city and its surroundings,
which together housed over a million books and a vast array of archival
materials looted from occupied countries of Western Europe and the Soviet
Union. The elegant castle of the Prince of Pless in the town of the same name
(Pol. Pszczyna), 60 kilometers to the east of Ratibor, housed the newspaper
division and the special unit working on the captured Communist Party archive
from Smolensk. Operations continued there until the end of 1944.
hi the face of the fast approaching Red Army during January of 1945, some
of the materials evacuated from Ratibor were abandoned en route back to
Germany, while major library holdings and most of the Communist Party
archives from Smolensk were abandoned in the railroad station near Pless.
According to the last ERR report from Ratibor, many of the most important
office records from Ratibor itself had already been evacuated by the end of
January 1945. The remaining Ratibor office files were being prepared for
destruction, but the ERR decided not to destroy the Ostbücherei, because they
still had plans to return to resume its use, if the war situation changed, or at
least to take the materials with them. Otherwise, they assumed (quite correctly,
as it turned out) that the abandoned materials would be "captured by the
Bolsheviks."6
Soviet Postwar Archival and Library Retrieval
The Paris Slavic Libraries to Minsk and Moscow
Documentation on the postwar Soviet archival retrieval and "trophy" cultural
seizure operations is still fragmentary and dispersed throughout a number of
different groups of records. Those materials that might be anticipated among
the records of military units and military intelligence (or counterintelligence
such as SMERSH) are still not publicly available. Recently, however, it has
been possible to examine some important files among other record groups that
have been declassified, including some containing reports of the Trophy Bri-
gade for Libraries, the Main Archival Administration under the NKVD (later,
the MVD), and some collections of reports that were forwarded to Communist
Party authorities. New facts are emerging about where, when, and why various
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Nazi-looted archival collections were seized by the Soviet authorities (and
often with them the surviving records of Nazi wartime operations).
It was Soviet archival practice to separate the foreign "trophy" archives that
the Nazis had captured from the Nazi agency records themselves. They also
divided up collections by establishing separate "fonds" for each subgroup of
files they could identify with a specific creating agency, thereby obscuring
integral collections and the working order of documents in Nazi hands. When
examined together, the documentation that survives in various Soviet ar-
chives—including both Soviet reports and Nazi records—as well as the "tro-
phy" archives, provide new clues about their provenance and migration. In
some cases, these amount to hard evidence of the Ukrainian collections the
Nazis had taken from Paris and other West European centers; the materials
Nazi authorities had succeeded in evacuating from Berlin to Silesia, and from
Silesia to the West; and of the more extensive materials that were recovered
and seized by Soviet authorities after the war.
Major portions of the archival materials confiscated by the Nazis from the
Petliura Library in Paris fell into Soviet hands after the war together with the
looted books. As noted earlier, it has not been possible to establish how many
of these were actually held by the ERR in Ratibor or in other nearby Nazi
centers in Silesia. It has also not been possible to determine where all of them
were recovered by Soviet forces. Apparently, they were not all recovered at the
same time, nor from the same place, which helps explain why the materials are
now dispersed in several different archives and libraries. Many of them were
found together with vast library collections from occupied Soviet lands that the
Nazis had plundered, a large portion of which had been taken to the Ratibor
area in Silesia.
In March 1945, at the railroad station of Pless (Pol. Pszczyna), the Red
Army found "approximately 100,000 books in 580 crates . . . predominantly
from Riga, Reval [Tallinn], Pskov, and Vilnius" and "about 80,000 volumes of
journals packed in 660 crates . . . from the libraries of the Belarusian Academy
of Sciences and the Lenin Library of the B S S R . . . , the transport of all of
which would require some ten to twelve railroad freight cars." These were
portions of the materials that the ERR had collected for the Ostbücherei, but
which the Nazis had abandoned. This shipment retrieved by the Red Army also
included four railroad wagons of records from the Communist Party Archive of
Smolensk Oblast—the ERR had succeeded in evacuating to the West only a
small portion (about 500 files) of it.7 The Red Army shipped everything they
found back to the USSR, but we do not know if there were any books of West
European origin among this transport of materials.
Another large cache of ERR library collections, constituting over one mil-
lion volumes (54 freight-car loads), was collected further north in the Katowice
area and transferred to Minsk in the fall of 1945, but precise documentation
about their recovery or contents is not yet available. This batch included many
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of the books from Belarusian libraries seized by the Nazis that had been
shipped to Ratibor for the Ostbücherei, but also consisted of books from West
European collections—the Turgenev and Petliura libraries, for example. Many
of these were later transferred to various libraries in the Belarusian SSR, and
many of the books were subsequently transferred to Moscow.8
According to a 1946 Soviet report, most of the holdings of the Turgenev
Library was identified in Masłowice (170 kilometers north of Ratibor), to-
gether with thousands of books that had been looted from Belarusian libraries.
Hence the shipment back to Minsk from there. Many books from the Turgenev
Library, however, were transferred to a Red Army officers' club in Legnica,
although some of the most valuable materials were taken directly to Moscow.
The Petliura Library was not mentioned in available Soviet reports, hence we
can only speculate as to how many of its books and Ukrainian archival materi-
als were together with the Turgenev Library during its travels from Berlin to
Ratibor, and from Masłowice (via Legnica) to Minsk and Moscow. We know
that the books were in Ratibor, and that some of the books and many of the
archival materials surfaced again in Moscow and Kyiv, as will be explained
below.
Tragically, many books with Turgenev Library markings were destroyed in
Minsk during Soviet-period "cleansing" campaigns, as confirmed by one li-
brarian in the Belarusian capital who risked censure by trying to save some of
the title pages with dedicatory autographs.10 Perhaps some books from the
Petliura Library met a similar fate there. More volumes originating in the
Turgenev Library—along with a few from collections at the International
Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, and others from West Euro-
pean collections—have recently been identified in Minsk.11
Approximately 240 books from the Petliura Library were found in Minsk in
the late 1980s, and in 1989 were "returned" to Kyiv.12 Found in what is now
the National Library of Belarus in Minsk (earlier the Lenin Library), 180 books
of predominantly Ukrainian provenance and another 60 books with foreign
imprints (mostly French and a few German) are now held in the Parliamentary
Library of Ukraine, partly among the former special (secret) collections and
partly in the "foreign" division.13 The Parliamentary Library reported the
purchase of another 10 books bearing stamps of the Petliura Library at an
auction in Kyiv in the early 1980s, and an additional volume came with a
collection they received from Prague.14 More books bearing stamps of the
Petliura Library have recently been found in the National Library in Minsk, but
further details await verification.15
Scattered UNR Records found in Poland
Several cartons of fragmentary UNR files were recovered by Polish specialists
in October 1945 in Silesia west of Wroclaw, along with other manuscripts and
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rare books from the University and Ossolineum Libraries in Lviv, the Polish
Library in Paris, and other Polish collections that were evacuated by the
Nazis.16 The Ukrainian segment of that shipment, most of which was presum-
ably evacuated earlier under Nazi auspices from Lviv to Cracow, has recently
been described in a survey by Lviv archivist Halyna Svarnyk.17 The shipment
had in part been gathered by the Nazis in Cracow, and there were no materials
known to have been in Ratibor. It is now difficult to tell whether the assorted
UNR military files were the same that had been earlier identified by Nazi
reports in Lviv. Since that shipment also included books from several different
Polish libraries, it is possible that some of the Ukrainian archival materials
included could have come from other sources. The existence of a major seg-
ment from the Polish Library in Paris in that shipment suggests that those
portions of that library came from Cracow rather than Ratibor.18 As far as can
be determined, there were no materials from the Petliura Library in Paris with
that shipment. The UNR materials that were found there are now held in the
Biblioteka Narodowa in Warsaw. It is possible that some of the scattered
military records had been brought to Lviv in 1925-1926 and housed with the
Sheptyts'kyi archive. As evident from a wartime report, the Nazis knew about
the files of the UNR General Staff and there were efforts to take them westward
in their final evacuations from Lviv.19
Moscow: The Former "Special Archive"—TsGOA/TsKhlDK (now part ofRGVA)
Development of TsGOA
The former top-secret "Special Archive"—TsGOA (Tsentral'nyi gosudar-
stvennyi osobyi arkhiv) in Moscow was founded in March 1946 specifically for
processing, "utilizing," and preserving the large quantity of captured or "tro-
phy" records of foreign provenance that had been seized by Soviet authorities
during or after the war and brought back to Moscow. Its existence was first
publicly revealed in a series of newspaper articles in February 1991 entitled,
"Five Days in the Special Archive."20 Those stories mentioned only the Nazi
records held there, but finally, in October 1991, the extent of holdings from
other foreign countries (most of which had previously been captured by the
Nazis) was revealed.21 Officially renamed and opened to public research in
June 1992, the archive, until March 1999, bore the name of the Center for
Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections—TsKhlDK (Tsentr
khraneniia istoriko-dokumental'nykh kollektsii). In March 1999 it was abol-
ished as a separate federal archive, and all of the former TsGOA/TsKhlDK
"trophy" holdings became part of the Russian State Military Archive—RGVA
(Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv).22 During the Soviet period,
TsGOA functioned for the purpose of processing the materials brought back
from the war for postwar "operational" purposes of Soviet security services and
other high-level government agencies.
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Most of the Ukrainian emigre archival materials brought to the Soviet Union
after the war went directly to Kyiv, and stayed there. But many that arrived in
Moscow intermixed with other collections—as they had been in Nazi hands—
remained in Moscow. The most extensive collection of materials from the
Petliura Library of any archive in the former USSR is now among the holdings
of the former Special Archive. Most of these materials arrived in Moscow via
Minsk. Presumably, they were retrieved from the Ratibor area by Soviet forces
as part of the library shipments from Silesia mentioned above. One batch of 55
file units of Petliura Library documentation—in Soviet parlance, "records of
Ukrainian nationalists"—were transferred to the Special Archive in Moscow
from the Central State Archive of the October Revolution of the Belarusian
SSR (TsGAOR BSSR) in December 1954, but documentation is not available
about the accession of the rest.23 The introductions to some of the inventories
(opisi) prepared for those fonds in TsGOA also affirm that they were acquired
from Minsk, and in many cases that same origin is also indicated in one of
TsGOA's working lists of fonds.24
A few of the Ukrainian emigre holdings may have been received with the
RSHA foreign archival materials from Wölfeisdorf (Pol. Wilkanów) near
Habelswerdt (Pol. Bystrzyca-Kłodzko). The Ukrainian officer serving as an
archival scout in one of the Red Army trophy brigades who first reported the
cache there had announced the existence of some Ukrainian émigré holdings.
Some of those Ukrainian files and emigre publications apparently first went to
Moscow, and others were later transferred to Moscow from Kyiv.
The collections of archival documentation from the Petliura Library now in
Moscow are barely recognizable in terms of their original arrangement. Fol-
lowing Soviet archival arrangement regulations, these materials have been
separated into a series of splinter fonds, based on Soviet conceptions of the
creating agencies from which the documents originated. Many of these appear
quite artificial, in some cases overlapping, and apparently some files have been
intermixed from other sources. Typical of Soviet postwar archival processing,
individual file units within fonds have not been grouped in rational categories,
nor chronologically in terms of their creation dates. In Paris, by contrast,
archival materials in the Petliura Library had never been broken down into
separate fonds according to the creating agencies, nor had they been fully
processed. Some were held as ongoing office records of the library or the
journal Tryzub (Trident), the editorial offices of which were situated in the
same building; others were kept as subject-oriented collections of documents.
Because many of these materials had not been fully cataloged in Paris, and
because not all of them bore library stamps or other markings, it is exceedingly
difficult to identify their provenance.
It is now even more difficult to determine how many printed volumes from
the Petliura Library are held among the former TsGOA holdings. According to
Soviet archival rales, printed books would normally have been differentiated
from other archival materials. However, in processing these and similar emigre
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materials, Soviet archivists often treated many of the press bulletins or newslet-
ters of emigre organizations as archival, rather than printed library materials.
Many of them were issued in a duplicated or mimeographed format, and often
were not officially registered as publications. Today, most libraries abroad, as
well as those in Eastern Europe, would treat them as individually unique library
materials for cataloging purposes. Soviet archivists, however, frequently ar-
ranged them as file units within archival fonds and did not assign separate
cataloging data under their title or issuing agency. Even more problematically,
in assigning unit numbers to such serials within fonds, archivists did not
respect serial grouping by keeping issues in chronological order or assigning
contingent file unit numbers to issues of the same or successor serial. Some-
times in these record groups, a single issue of a serial constitutes a separate file
unit, but often several issues have been grouped together as one. Accurate
titles, issuing agencies, issue numbers, and dates frequently do not appear in
the archival inventories (opisi), further complicating research access.
Many of the printed books and some serial issues from the Petliura Library
that were received by TsGOA were separated from the "archival" materials. To
the extent that they were not transferred to other libraries, they remain housed
separately among the printed library collections in the TsGOA building. How-
ever, these were only partially cataloged for those in Cyrillic (Russian and
Ukrainian) and for those in Latin alphabets. Today, because thousands of
volumes remain virtually inaccessible in cardboard boxes, and others from
many different sources mixed together on unmarked shelves, a thorough ex-
amination of the holdings has not been feasible. Because preliminary catalog
slips provide no indications of provenance, source of accession, or book mark-
ings, we really have no idea of how many books with Petliura Library stamps
might exist in library collections from the former TsGOA.
As was the case with other library materials received by the Special
Archive, some other books or journals may have been transferred to various
libraries. However, the specifics of such transfers are almost impossible to
trace at this point, because Soviet archivists rarely recorded details about
specific collections of books with distinguishing stamps or other markings they
transferred elsewhere. A prefatory note in the inventory (opis') for the main
fond with records of the Petliura Library ominously informs the reader that in
1982 an unspecified number of "duplicate printed editions were destroyed,"
following evaluation by the "Expert Appraisal Commission." Similar notices
appear in the opisi of two other related fonds.25 Although the Nazis have
always been blamed for the destruction of the Petliura Library, it accordingly
appears that Soviet archival authorities may also have played a role in that
process. Not surprisingly, many books from the Petliura Library remained in
Minsk, as was the case of many books from the Turgenev Library, especially
those that had been turned over to libraries—as opposed to state archives—
there.26
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With these generalities understood, we can now distinguish several discreet
fonds as presently organized in the archive that comprise materials known to
have come from the Petliura Library in Paris. These include parts of the records
of the Petliura Library itself, amalgamated in the same fond with scattered
materials from its serial holdings and a few materials from its archival collec-
tions. Another fond has been assigned for the editorial records of the UNR
journal Tryzub (Trident), which had its office in the library in Paris, and
another for materials relating to the trial of Petliura's assassin, Samuel (or
Sholem) Schwarzbard (the pro-anarchist Jewish émigré from the Russian Em-
pire, who first came to France in 1910 and died in South Africa in 1938), which
were collected by those associated with the foundation of the library. There are
three other adjacent fonds of Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris and two
for personal papers, all of which probably came from the Petliura Library,
although some materials may be of other origins. The name assigned to the
fond with miscellaneous materials from "Ukrainian Émigré Organizations in
Czechoslovakia" probably represents incoming materials to the library. Fi-
nally, there is one fond identified as being of Parisian Ukrainian provenance,
but which was among the French security records seized from a RSHA hide-
away in Czechoslovakia.
None of the Ukrainian emigre fonds described below (except the artificial
fond for Tymofii Kotenko) are unique to RGVA. In most cases the institutional
origin of the documents and publications encompassed is not clear and in many
cases the materials are intermixed. When publications are included with actual
archival materials, they do not necessarily represent those issued by the agency
named by the fond, and in most cases they appear to be those that had been
received by the Petliura Library as part of its serial holdings. Noticeably, in
every case the other archives in Moscow and Kyiv that received materials from
the Petliura Library have established parallel fonds, containing other fragments
of the same body of documentation and scattered issues of the same serial
bulletins or other journals from the same emigre groups. Interestingly enough,
the names of the fonds established are similar, but the breakdown of materials
is equally jumbled. Obviously, these materials were all processed in haste with
little regard for the creating agency or order in their originating office or
collection.
1. S. Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukrainskaia biblioteka im. S.
Petliury. ParizhlUkrdins'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Paryzh) (RGVA, fond
271K; 196 units; 1892-1942). Of special significance among the former
TsGOA holdings is this separate record group which is actually a somewhat
miscellaneous collection. It includes a group of folders from the administrative
records of the library with documents about its foundation and organization in
the late 1920s, correspondence with Ukrainian émigrés and emigre organiza-
tions in various countries, and some account registers and receipts of donations
from the 1930s (nos.
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The fond also contains numerous printed materials and unpublished docu^
ments that were collected by the Petliura Library (scattered among nos. 43-
195); namely, a few printed UNR legal materials and copies of limited-edition
Ukrainian emigre printed publications, including press surveys, bulletins, jour-
nals, and newspapers (undoubtedly part of the library's periodical holdings).
Among the miscellaneous memoir materials are manuscript or typescript
documents, which may well have been part of some of the library's prewar
collections, such as a folder pertaining to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi and
the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in 1938-1939 (no. 73) and a folder of
correspondence and materials relating to Transcarpathia (1926-1939), which
includes protests about the Hungarian occupation (no. 74). The collection also
contains the original manuscript and proofs of Petro Zlenko's bibliography of
publications about Petliura that was published by the library in 1939 (no. 183).
Newspaper and periodical clippings constitute a large group of file units within
the fond (nos. 75-134), interspersed with issues of a number of different
emigre publications mentioned above.
2. Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Weekly Tryzub, Paris (Redaktsiia
ezhenedel'nika Trizub [sic]. ΡarizhlRedaktsiia tyzhnevyka Tryzub. Paryzh)
(RGVAJond 270K; 106 units; 1925-1940). There is no doubt about the prov-
enance of remaining files from the UNR journal, the editorial offices of which
were in the Petliura Library. According to the preface to the inventory (opis'),
the fond was transferred in 1955 from TsGAOR BSSR. In addition to dupli-
cated printed matter, some additional materials, such as "resolutions and proto-
cols," had been singled out for destruction by the Appraisal Commission in
1982.
The fond contains editorial copies, draft articles, and proofs from the journal
(nos. 25-56, 59). It should be noted that additional similar materials have been
assigned to the main library fond (fond 27IK, nos. 47, 63-72). There is
correspondence with émigré organizations and individuals (nos. 69-78, 80-
90). There are also—as a further example—some conference materials (1928-
1934) (nos. 65-67). Scattered copies of printed press bulletins and serials from
Ukrainian organizations (nos. 79, 93-94, 96-100) now included as part of this
fond (similar to the preceding one), originally came from the main library
holdings, as many of them even bear its stamps.
3. Legal Commission of Ukrainian Emigrants, Paris (Sudebnaia komissiia
ukrainskykh èmigrantov. Parizh/Sudova komisiia Ukraïns'kykh emihrantiv)
(RGVAJond 268K; 83 units; 1917-1927). As explained in the Russian-lan-
guage opis', the Commission had been founded in connection with the trial of
Schwarzbard. Documentation about the trial is known to have been among the
collections held by the Petliura Library before 1940.
Files include the following: some biographical materials on Schwarzbard;
copies of reports of the investigations for the trial; hearings, and press clippings
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relating to the trial (in French and Ukrainian); copies of testimony at the trial
and commentaries; minutes of the meetings of the Commission; materials
collected by the procommunist attorney Henri Torres, who defended
Schwarzbard; and materials relating to pogroms in Ukraine. There are also
scattered copies of UNR limited-edition bulletins (1917-1919), again probably
from the Petliura Library holdings.
Quite by coincidence, among the materials probably received from the
RSHA archival center in Wölfeisdorf were some personal papers of Torres
from Paris. Appropriately, these had been arranged in a separate small fond in
TsGOA (fond 143; 2 opisi; 12 units; 1925-1953). The Torres papers were
returned to Paris in March 2000. Given the fact that none of the files relate to
the Schwarzbard trial, it is inconceivable that these scattered papers would
have been held by the Petliura Library.
4. Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris
(Obshchestvo byvshikh voennosluzhashchikh armii Ukrainskoi Narodnoi
Respubliki (UNR) vo Frantsii. Parizh/Tovarystvo buvshykh voiakiv armiï UNR
и Frantsii Paryzh) (RGVAJond 269K; 48 units; 1921-1940). According to the
introductory notes in the opis', the Society was founded in Paris in 1927 with
sixteen local branches in France. According to Society documents, it was
founded in Paris in 1923 by General Oleksander Udovychenko, one of the
founders of the Petliura Library. Documentation of the Society was among the
collections reported as held by the library before the war. Similar to the first
two fonds listed, the current opis' for this fond notes that "duplicate materials"
therein were destroyed on instructions from the Expert Appraisal Commission
in 1982.27
Files include regulations, questionnaires, and cards of members. There is
some correspondence with veterans' associations in Czechoslovakia and Bel-
gium among others. There are accounts of the Society (nos. 44 and 45) and
materials from meetings. There are several autograph letters of Petliura, 1921-
1923 (no. 36) and biographical data about General Udovychenko. There are
also copies of émigré bulletins, which probably came from the Petliura Library.
5. The Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations in Paris (Ukrainskaia
assotsiatsiia pri Lige Natsii. ParizhlUkraïns'ke tovarystvo dlia Lihy Natsii.
Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 273K; 86 units; 1918-1940). This Ukrainian emigre
organization in Paris was active during the interwar period, associated as it was
with other branches of the Society in Prague, Belgium, and other countries.28
While the materials here were all plundered by the Nazis from Paris, it is not
possible to ascertain if all of the materials that now comprise the fond came
from the Petliura Library itself. Files include protocols (officially approved
minutes) of meetings of the Society, letters and correspondence, reports, and a
manuscript article.
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6. Tymofii Kotenko—"Ukrainian Nationalist Writer" (RGVA, fond 267K;
3 units; 1922[?]-1939). Background data on Kotenko are lacking. This frag-
mentary fond contains only three manuscript poems, which probably were
either submitted to the UNR journal Tryzub or deposited with other collections
in the Petliura Library.
7. Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs'kyi (RGVA, fond 272K; 8 units; 1919-1926).
Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs'kyi (1860-1925) served as Minister of Finance in
the Central Rada and was later an official representative of the Ukrainian Trade
Mission in France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. His papers were deposited
in the Petliura Library before 1940.29
This fond contains only a few fragmentary papers of Chyzhevs'kyi, mostly
dating to the years before his arrival in Paris (1919-1923). These consist of
correspondence, papers relating to a legal project, and minutes (protocols) of
meetings.
8. Ukrainian Nationalist Organizations in Czechoslovakia (Ukraińskie
natsionalistichcheskie organizatsii ν Chekhoslovakii/Ukraïns'ki natsio-
nalistychni orhanizatsïi ν Chekhoslovachchyni) (RGVA, fond 274K; 16 units,
1922-1938). TsGOA archivists designated this a "consolidated archival fond,"
meaning it contains documents of miscellaneous provenance. They also estab-
lished Prague as its source. But it cannot be discounted that these documents
represent incoming receipts by the Petliura Library in Paris, which obviously
were received or collected from other Czech sources. The 16 files contain
fragmentary materials from six different Ukrainian organizations in Prague and
Podëbrady, including some reports of a committee to construct a monument to
Petliura (nos. 10-13), the Ukrainian Academic Committee, and the Ukrainian
Economic Academy in Podëbrady. At least some of the documents included
here may have been received in Kyiv from Prague and then were later for-
warded from Kyiv to Moscow, but conclusive identification of their origin and
acquisition is not possible at present.
9. Ukrainian National Union in France (Collection), Paris (Ukrainskii
narodnyi soiuz vo Frantsii. ParizhlUkraïns'kyi narodnyi soiuz ν Frantsn.
Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 65K; 26 units; 1933-1939). Prefatory notes in the RGVA
opis" do not indicate the provenance of this fond that actually groups together
miscellaneous files from several Ukrainian emigre organizations in Paris. It
was initially suspected that at least some of the files might also have come from
the Petliura Library. However, a November 1945 communication from the
chief of the Glavarkhiv Division of Utilization to his counterpart in Kyiv
explained that materials from this organization were found among the files of
the French security services. At that time he forwarded a survey of these
documents to Kyiv which, in his judgment, would be useful for "operational
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work" in the Ukrainian capital and "to establish a report on the Prosvita
Society."30 Given this communication, it is now apparent that these files in fact
came to TsGOA with the French security service records (Sûreté Nationale and
Police) that were captured by Soviet authorities in Czechoslovakia. They repre-
sent documents that had been seized by French security authorities from Ukrai-
nian emigre organizations in Paris and incorporated into their own records,
which were later seized by the Nazis.31 An introduction (added to the opis' in
1987), explains that the "Narodnyi Soiuz" was founded in 1932 as an organiza-
tion of Ukrainian fascists, based on the ideology of Dontsov, who earlier in
Prague had published its Vestnyk; its aim, according to the introduction, was
"to attract the working class and hide from the French." Unlike the previous
materials received from Minsk, these materials were obtained in 1945.32 De-
spite this prefatory note, the relationship of the files included in the "collec-
tion" to "Narodnyi Soiuz" is not clear.
Most of the files included are from two Ukrainian émigré groups in Paris:
"Prosvita" and the Taras Shevchenko Society (Hromada im. Taraşa
Shevchenka). The "Prosvita" files comprise protocols of meetings, 1938-1939
(no. 10), correspondence registers, 1937-1939 (nos. 24, 25), financial records
(nos. 12, 13), and files on members (nos. 7-9). The material pertaining to the
Shevchenko Society includes financial records (no. 11) in addition to files on
individual members, some with their personal correspondence (nos. 1-5). In
both cases, there are membership lists. There are also some miscellaneous
pamphlet publications (15,16,19-21) and files of poetry (nos. 17, 18).
Boris Lazarevskii Papers
A few letters from the Russian and Ukrainian writer Boris Aleksandrovich
Lazarevskii [Borys Oleksanderovych Lazarevs'kyi] and those of his brother,
Hlib {Rus. Gleb), ended up in Kyiv after the war and were requisitioned from
there by TsGOA in 1956, together with other UNR documents and Ukrainian
emigré publications from Paris and Warsaw. Then held in TsDAZhR URSR,
they were among the documents transferred to Moscow in 1957.33 Their fate in
Moscow has not been determined, but as yet they have not been located among
Ukrainian holdings in the former TsGOA.
Trophy archival materials of a literary orientation, according to Soviet
regulations in postwar decades, were transferred to the Central State Archive of
Literature and Art—TsGALI, which in 1992 was renamed the Russian State
Archive of Literature and Art—RGALI. RGALI maintains a fond for the
personal papers of Boris Lazarevskii (1871-1937), who is there identified as a
Russian writer. However, the Lazarevskii files held in RGALI date only
through 1925, that is, before Lazarevskii's emigration, and hence cannot be
considered of foreign "trophy" origin.34 There is no indication that the materi-
als forwarded to TsGOA from Kyiv, which were of West European prov-
enance, were added to the Lazarevskii fond in RGALI.
406 GRIMSTED
The son of the prominent Ukrainian historian Oleksander Lazarevs'kyi,
Lazarevskii had written for Vestnik Evropy, Russkoe bogatstvo, and other
journals before 1917, but then emigrated and died in Paris. His brother Hlib
(1877-19??) was active in the Ukrainian emigre movement as a journalist in
Poland and France. He returned to Ukraine in 1940 and presumably remained
in the USSR until his death, though his fate has not been determined.
According to emigre sources, Boris also occasionally wrote in the journal
Ukraina, which appeared in the immediate postrevolutionary period under the
Ukrainian form of his name (Borys Oleksandrovych Lazarevys'kyi). Once
abroad, and especially in the years immediately before his death in Paris, he
was associated with the UNR journal Tryzub, the editorial offices of which
were housed in the Petliura Library. Some of his correspondence and a few
other papers were reportedly housed with the Petliura Library in Paris before
the war and were seized by the Nazis with the Tryzub editorial records. These
may indeed be the materials that Soviet authorities brought to Kyiv after the
war, but were then sent to Moscow in 1957.
Moscow: The State Archive of the Russian Federation—GA RF
Ukrainian Holdings from Prague and the RZIA Division of GA RF
A second large concentration of materials from the Petliura Library in Paris is
now held on the other side of Moscow in a similar series of separate splintered
fonds in the State Archive of the Russian Federation—GA RF
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii). These fonds were all formerly
held by the pre-1992 Central State Archive of the October Revolution—
TsGAOR SSSR, as part of the formerly secret section designated for emigre
materials from the Russian Foreign Historical Archive (Russkii zagranichnyi
istoricheskii arkhiv) in Prague—RZIA.35 Although that division was estab-
lished soon after the receipt of the nine freight-car loads of RZIA materials that
arrived in Moscow just after New Year's Day in 1946, its holdings actually are
from a myriad of émigré sources in many different countries, as well as those
from Prague. As far as can be determined, no materials from the Petliura
Library were transferred to RZIA in Prague before 1940. Further confusion
arises, however, because many of the RZIA materials arriving from Prague had
never been thoroughly processed there. What is more, archivists working with
the émigré materials in Moscow and Kyiv in the postwar period were princi-
pally oriented towards "operational" goals, and had no time to spare for deter-
mining provenance or migration data. Little did they understand the sources of
the materials and little did they care.
After the foundation of the parallel Ukrainian Historical Cabinet
(UkrainsTcyi istorychnyi kabinet—UIK) in Prague in 1929, Ukrainian or Ukrai-
nian-related archival materials were principally deposited there. In October
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1945 the entire contents of the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet in Prague were
shipped to Kyiv "as a gift to the Ukrainian people." With it came some
scattered UNR documentation that had been deposited in UIK. Almost all of
the UIK and related holdings shipped from Prague in October 1945 have
remained in Kyiv. One of the most notable exceptions were the files of the
Party of Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries from Prague, which were requisi-
tioned by Moscow in 1956.36 To further add to the confusion, many UNR
materials came to Kyiv from other sources, including a large body of UNR
records from Cracow that the Nazis had brought there from Tarnów. And, as
will be explained further below, some materials from the Petliura Library that
Soviet authorities retrieved elsewhere in Prague went to Kyiv, and there be-
came intermixed with the UIK materials.37
Despite the general Soviet policy that Ukrainian emigre materials were to be
concentrated in Kyiv, some UNR documentation came to Moscow from RZIA
and has remained there. Prior to 1929, a number of important groups of
Ukrainian materials, including fragmentary UNR diplomatic files, had been
deposited in RZIA and were never transferred to UIK. Similarly, during the
subsequent decade, a number of UNR files came to RZIA rather than UIK as
part of larger collections received from Russian or Russian-Ukrainian emigre
sources. The Ukrainian materials were never separated from RZIA in Prague
and accordingly were shipped to Moscow. In the 1960s a number of splinter
RZIA fonds with UNR military documentation were sent to Kyiv from Mos-
cow. However, there is no explanation why the UNR diplomatic and other
government files, most of which also came from RZIA, have remained in
Moscow (See the fonds which I have numbered 7—11, listed on pp. 413-16).
Because the TsGAOR division for émigré fonds long bore the RZIA desig-
nation, many archivists there were not aware until very recently of the multi-
faceted provenance of those holdings. This fact and the fact that the fonds of
materials from the Petliura Library all bore RZIA designations for the fonds to
which they were assigned in TsGAOR SSSR, have been the cause for consider-
able confusion and misconception about their true origin. Most of these Ukrai-
nian émigré fonds are listed in the sixth volume of the GA RF guide, but not all
of them with correct attributions of provenance.38
The process of preparing the 1999 inter-repository guide to the RZIA collec-
tions has led to a better understanding of this problem. Particularly since some
of the GA RF archivists engaged in that research were consulting this author
about the fonds to be covered for the present article, further clarification has
been possible.39 Initially, most of the Ukrainian fonds described here were
slated to be included in the RZIA guide, which embraces all of the materials
that came to Moscow from RZIA in 1946, among them those that were later
dispersed in over thirty other repositories throughout the former USSR. This
author's own research in cooperation with archivists in G A RF uncovered the
fact that most of these Ukrainian materials had not come from Prague, but
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rather had been received from other sources. Spot checks of files in these
current Paris fonds revealed stamps of the Petliura Library and other dedicatory
inscriptions. At the same time, the inspection of UNR materials together with
RZIA records yielded RZIA stamps, and hence that attribution of provenance
must be respected. However, not all the questions about the provenance of
these materials have been resolved.40
Transfer of Ukrainian Emigre Materials to TsGAOR SSSR from the
Lenin Library
Those materials that can convincingly be identified as having come from the
Petliura Library and related Ukrainian emigre organizations in Paris (which I
have numbered nos. 1-6 below, pp. 410-13) were in fact received by the
GA RF's predecessor, TsGAOR SSSR, in November 1948 among the 170
crates of archival materials transferred from the Lenin Library in Moscow. The
official transfer document from the Lenin Library does not mention the Petliura
Library, but it does specify files of the Ukrainian National Committee and the
Orthodox Church in Paris, records of the Turgenev Library, and materials of
"Ukrainian emigre organizations in Paris, among others." The act of transfer
notes that the materials were directed to the RZIA division in TsGAOR, having
been received by the Lenin Library from Berlin in 1946-1947.41 It is safe to
assume, for the most part, that the "materials of Ukrainian emigre organizations
in Paris" transferred from the Lenin Library would have included those of the
Petliura Library, since there were and still are no others of Parisian Ukrainian
provenance in TsGAOR/GA RF.
There was also a transfer of two large fonds of Ukrainian emigre organiza-
tions received from the Lenin Library (GBL) in 1949, which are likewise held
in GARF and might initially have been thought to have originated in the
Petliura Library. This was especially true of the records of the Ukrainian Press
Bureau in Lausanne, since other Ukrainian press bureau records were in fact
received by the Petliura Library on the eve of World War II. Earlier listed in
TsGAOR with an attribution of provenance to RZIA, both of them (see the
fonds numbered 12-13 listed on p. 416) had been received by the Lenin Library
from Geneva, together with the papers of the bibliographer, writer, and
bookman Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rybakin ( 1862-1946).42
As is apparent in the 1948 act of transfer, the Ukrainian materials involved
were undoubtedly intermingled with those from the Turgenev Library that were
found in Silesia in 1945-1946, quite possibly constituting part of the materials
that the ERR was trying to evacuate from Ratibor. As mentioned above, the
Turgenev Library materials were sorted by the Soviet Library Brigade in
Silesia before dispatch to Moscow and Minsk. The Lenin Library transfer
document noted that the administrative records of the Turgenev Library came
to TsGAOR from the Lenin Library as part of that same 1948 transfer. The
fragmentary Turgenev Library records received were assigned to a separate
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fond in the RZIA Division of TsGAOR, and for a long time archivists also
assumed those materials were from Prague, although clearly they were taken
by the Nazis in Paris at the same time they seized the Petliura Library.43
GA RF also has a separate fond with a "Collection of Letters from Russian
Soldiers on the French Front Gathered by the Turgenev Library in Paris,"
which undoubtedly was received at the same time. In this case the fond desig-
nation is misleading, since the files involved are letters from soldiers regarding
the loan of books from the Turgenev Library and are clearly part of the
administrative records of the library.44 The fact of the seizure of its administra-
tive records was confirmed in Paris, along with paintings and portraits that
decorated the library. Fortunately, the Nazis apparently did not seize all of the
"Russian Literary Archive," which had been established as an autonomous
entity within the Turgenev Library at the beginning of 1938.45 But in the case
of the smaller Petliura Library, nothing was left behind.
The fact of the transfer of archival materials from the Lenin Library—now
the Russian State Library (RGB)—raises the strong possibility that some books
from the Petliura Library may now be held there. We know from other sources
that the Lenin Library kept many books that had come its way from the
Turgenev Library in its classified Secret Section, although some were distrib-
uted to other divisions, and others were used for exchange with foreign librar-
ies.46 Recently, some books bearing stamps of the Turgenev Library have been
identified in Moscow in the library of the former Institute of Marxism-
Leninism (IML pri TsK KPSS), which has been redesignated the State Socio-
political Library—GOPB (Gosudarstvennaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaia
biblioteka). Other Turgenev Library books have been identified in the library
of Voronezh State University.47 At the time of writing, however, no books
bearing stamps from the Petliura Library have been discovered in any of those
libraries, although a thorough search has not been undertaken.48 Vasyl'
Mykhal'chuk, in his 1999 historical memoir account of the Petliura Library,
mentioned a fragmentary second-hand report of a box of books marked "Ukrai-
nian Library—Paris" found in the basement of the former Lenin Library (now
the Russian State Library) in the early 1990s.49 Colleagues in that library deny
this possibility, since, according to their records, all trophy books it received
were processed in the immediate postwar decade.
Given what we already know about the prewar archival holdings of the
Petliura Library and the fragments of those archival materials held elsewhere in
Moscow and Kyiv, we can now identify a number of separate fonds in GA RF
that retain its materials. There are a number of related Ukrainian émigré fonds
now organized in GA RF that were of Parisian provenance, but that had been
merged with the materials from the Petliura Library while they were in Nazi
hands. We also can designate several Ukrainian emigre fonds in GA RF with
scattered files from UNR records, most of which undoubtedly came from RZIA
in Prague, although questions remain about parts of some of the fonds.
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Files in some of the Ukrainian emigre archival fonds from Paris described
below possibly were added to those fonds from other sources. A number of
files in some of the fonds may have been misarranged. Certain of those fonds
have stray file units and stray documents of alternate provenance, including
some that may well have been received with the Prague RZIA shipment. That
shipment itself included materials from other emigre institutions in Czechoslo-
vakia in addition to RZIA. Further research and verification are still necessary
for a number of reasons: the effects of the multiple archival transfers in the
postwar decades; the fact that all of the incoming miscellaneous collections
were broken down into unduly specific fonds without regard to the archive
where they were last held or the collection with which they were received; and
because of the lack of precise provenance attributions. Nevertheless, the gen-
eral outline of the situation is clear for a start. In the list below, the Russian
name of the fond that follows the English translation is the form currently used
in GA RF. The Ukrainian names have been added.
GA RF Fonds from the Petliura Library
1.5. Petliura Ukrainian Library, Paris {Ukrainskaia biblioteka im. S. Petliury.
ParizhlUkraïns'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Paryzh) (GA RF,fondR-7008; 1
opis'; 141 units; 1909,1914-1917,1919-1920,1922,1924-1939). There is no
doubt about the Parisian provenance of the fond designated for the Petliura
Library itself, which originally contained only 64 file units, but was later
augmented by 77 more "from unsorted bundles of miscellaneous fragments."
TsGAOR/GA RF archivists had earlier been attributing provenance to RZIA,
but clearly that is not the case for most of the files.50 The vast majority of the
files were in fact looted by the Nazis from the library in Paris, and most of the
documentation had never been in Prague. Some of the documents even bear
stamps of the Petliura Library, dedicatory inscriptions, or other indications of
their Parisian source.
The Petliura Library fond in GA RF is not arranged in an orderly manner,
and its contents are similar to the parallel fond in RGVA. Scattered throughout
the fond are the following: folders with administrative records of the library,
such as the library statutes in French and Ukrainian (no. I l l ) ; incoming
correspondence from all over the world (many of the letters had enclosed
monetary contributions) relating to the opening of the library in 1929 (no. 32);
an account register from 1927-1931 (no. 93); and an acquisition register of
book receipts in 1929 (no. 87).
Of particular importance to the Petliura Library, and something not found in
the parallel fond from TsGOA, are various volumes of the library's own book
catalogs, some typewritten but many in manuscript notebooks, covering differ-
ent subjects: "Ukraine—History, Geography, Ethnography" (1908-1940), with
an inserted loose notebook labeled "Duplicates" (no. 65); "Scientific Subjects"
(1939-1940) (no. 66); "Religion and Philosophy" (no. 67); "Ukrainian Litera-
THE POSTWAR FATE OF THE PETLIURA LIBRARY 411
ture" (October 1940) (no. 68); "Music" (1911-1931) (no. 76); "Military Af-
fairs" (no. 82); "Ukrainian journals" (1921-1938) (nos. 90-92); and so forth.
There are also catalogs of the branch libraries in Vésines-Chalette (no. 85) and
Audun-le-Tiche (no. 39), the one for the latter having an inserted list of books
for the branch in Grenoble.
In addition to the library records, many files contain archival materials
donated to the library collections. There are scattered manuscript materials,
some of them with the original letters or inscriptions of donation to the Petliura
Library, such as a large collection of articles, speeches, and notes about
Petliura presented to the library during the 1930s (no. 11), and another with
memoirs on the Civil War inscribed as a donation to the Petliura Museum in
Paris (no. 12). A large part of the fond consists of printed (or hectographed)
laws and regulations of the UNR or other Ukrainian organizations;
hectographed or typewritten lectures on various subjects; and press clippings
regarding Ukrainian politics, the Schwarzbard trial, and memorial events at the
library.
Among printed materials from the library are scattered issues of Ukrainian
press bulletins, student journals, and newsletters of Ukrainian émigré organiza-
tions in different countries. Many of them bear the stamp of the Petliura Library
and would have been classified among its book and serial collections rather
than as archival materials. Hence they should be considered among the "miss-
ing" publications held by the library.
2. Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Journal Tryzub, Paris (Redaktsiia
zhurnala Trizub [sic]. ΡarizhlRedaktsiia zhurnalu Tryzub, Paryzh) (GA RF,
fond 7498 [earlier 3882s]; 93 units; 1918-1944). The opis' of this fond also
bears the designation "RZIA," although the provenance is now correctly identi-
fied as Paris.51 As we now know, the Tryzub records had never been acquired
by RZIA and remained in the Petliura Library in Paris until they were seized by
the Nazis. Complementing the other Tryzub records in RGVA, this fond con-
tains fragmentary correspondence files (e.g., nos. 85, 91, and 92) and proofs of
articles for the journal (e.g., nos. 88, 90), including a manuscript article by
Volodymyr Leontovych (no. 93), which was added to the fond in 1973.
The bulk of the files, however, contain scattered issues of Ukrainian press
bulletins and periodicals, undoubtedly from the main library's periodical hold-
ings. There are also press clippings from different newspapers, including, for
example, several files of clippings and press surveys relating to Schwarzbard
(nos. 5-8, 78). Many of these belong among the holdings of the Petliura
Library itself, rather than to the editorial records of Tryzub.
3. Committee to Honor the Memory of Petliura, Paris (Komitet po
chestvovaniiu pamiati S. V. Petliury, Ρ arizhl Komitet dlia vshanuvannia
pam'iati S. V. Petliury, Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-7437; 5 units; 1926-
1929).52 Some of these files that now form a separate fond most probably came
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from the records of the library itself, since the Committee in question was in
fact organizing the library as a monument to Petliura during that period. GA RF
archivists indicate that the materials were acquired by RZIA in 1926 and 1928,
but further verification is needed because these acquisitions may comprise only
the few posters in one file with RZIA stamps.53 None of the remaining docu-
ments bear RZIA stamps, and there is no indication that all of the other
documents were acquired by RZIA, especially those addressed to Paris. There
was a parallel committee operating in Czechoslovakia, and an extensive cam-
paign was waged there to raise money for the library. Rudychiv, who was then
still in Prague, was active in the Czechoslovak capital until he moved to Paris.
The fact that this fond has intermixed documents from Paris and Prague makes
it impossible to assign definitive provenance at this point.
In the collection are protocols of meetings in Paris involving the library
founders, including General Oleksander Udovychenko and Oleksander
ShulÎyn (no. 1). The correspondence (1926-1928) comprises incoming letters
from Prague (no. 2), some of them containing money sent to Paris for the
library (with receipts for donations from Tryzub). That file, however, also
contains a few receipts and letters sent to the Czechoslovak committee in
Prague and Podëbrady, including a few addressed to Rudychiv in Prague. Only
a few of the documents (most of them, small posters or billboard notices) in
that large file bear RZIA stamps, as noted above. Contingent files contain more
receipts from the Commission (nos. 3 and 5), along with communications from
the Commission (no. 4) and a duplicated "Komunikat" of the S. Petliura
Society.
Other GA RF Fonds from Ukrainian Émigré Organizations in France
4. Union of the Ukrainian Community in France, Paris (Ob"edinennaia
ukrainskaia obshchina vo Frantsii. ParizhlOb' iednana ukräins'ka hromada и
Frantsiï. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-9107; 1 opis'; 14 units; 1924-1936). These
files, which have been established as a separate fond, may have come from the
materials of the library itself, although quite possibly the Nazis acquired them
from other Ukrainian émigré sources in Paris. This is a good example of an
artificial fond created from intermixed documents, and further analysis is
required to verify their provenance.
The fond contains protocols of meetings, resolutions, and account registers.
There are also some printed brochures and serial publications.
5. Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris
(Obshchestvo byvshikh voennosluzhashchikh armii Ukrainskoi Narodnoi
Respubliki vo Frantsii. ParizhlTovarystvo buvshykh voiakiv armiï Ukraïns'koï
Narodnói Respubliky и Frantsiï. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-6406; 667 units;
1918-1940)}* This Society was established in Paris in 1923 and headed by
General Udovychenko, one of the founders of the Petliura Library. We cannot
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be sure that all of the materials in this collection were held by the Petliura
Library itself, but documentation from the Society was reported among the
prewar library holdings. Similar to the counterpart fond in RGVA (no. 4), it
would appear that the materials came from Paris and not Prague. Nor is there
any indication that they would have been transferred to Prague, since the
Society itself remained active in France until the Nazi invasion. Although
G A RF archivists still attribute provenance to RZIA in Prague (on the grounds
that the materials were received with RZIA no. 4412 in 1946), further analysis
of the fond's provenance is necessary. Further confusion arises owing to some
labels suggesting that the fond was originally devoted to "Constituent Mem-
bers of Russia in Paris." The opis' lists 630 file units that were first verified in
1952 and another 37 that were added later.
The files contain, among other documentation, correspondence, correspon-
dence journals, and protocols of meetings. There are also printed brochures and
scattered serial publications.
6. Supreme Church Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in France,
Paris (Vysshii tserlcovnyi sovet Ukrainskikh pravoslavnikh prikhodov vo
Frantsii. ParizhlVyshcha rada Ukraïns'koï pravoslavnykh tserkov и Frantsiï.
Paryzh) (GA RFJondR-9106; 1 opis'; 14 units; 1925-1936). These few files
that now form a separate fond may have come from the Petliura Library itself,
although the Nazis may have picked them up from other sources in Paris. The
TsGAOR 1948 act of transfer mentions materials from the Orthodox Church in
Paris, and it is quite possible that while the materials were in Nazi hands,
Ukrainian Orthodox Church files were combined with Russian ones. No
stamps have been found on the files examined that would indicate their prov-
enance.
The files contain protocols of meetings (no. 1), correspondence, books of
members (1930-1935) (no. 2), document registers (1926-1927—no. 8; and
1931-1938—nos. 9-11), and accounting records (1931-1932—nos. 12 and
13).
UNR Government and Diplomatic Documentation from Paris and Prague
(RZIA)
7. Chancellery of the UNR Rada [Poland] (Kantseliariia Soveta Ukrainskoi
Narodnoi RespublikilKantseliariia Rady Ukraïns'koï Narodnoï Respubliky)
(GA RF, fond R'7526; 1 opis'; 16 units; 1920-1930). This fragmentary fond
appears to be of heterogeneous provenance. Documents in the first part of the
opis' (nos. 1-11, first prepared in 1954) bear no stamps, but some documents in
one of the files among the later additions (nos. 12-16, added in September
1960) bear RZIA stamps. Hence, these files may have been acquired by RZIA
with other UNR documents, but no confirmation has been found.55
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The first file contains a fragmentary UNR law. Subsequent files contain
drafts or copies of protocols of meetings of the UNR Rada in Poland (June-
August 1921) (nos/2-8), a report on the Rada's legal work (February-June
1921) (no. 9), a report on financial work in Poland (January-April 1921)
(no. 10), and a list of deputies to different commissions (1921) (no. 11).
Among the files added later, no. 12 contains printed UNR handbills and decla-
rations bearing RZIA stamps.56 Remaining files contain a copy of the treaty of
peace between the UNR and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey (n.d.); a
regulation issued by the Rada (3. March 1921); a secret letter from the
Volhynian and Podilian Committee (7 April 1921) to the UNR (no. 15); and a
letter from the Head of the Rada to V. P. Lystovnych in Tarnów (31 December
1922).
8. UNR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Tarnów, Poland] (Ministerstvo
inostrannykh del Ukrainskoi Narodnoi RespublikilMinisterstvo zakordonnykh
sprav Ukraïns'koï Narodnoi Respubliky), 1918-11921] (GA RF, fond R-6087;
1 opis'; 17 units; 1918-1923).51 A separate fond was established in TsGAOR
SSSR for scattered files from the UNR Foreign Ministry, which in fact came to
GA RF with the RZIA collections. The earlier erroneous TsGAOR/GA RF
attribution of its provenance to Tärnovo, Bulgaria, has recently been cor-
rected.58 The first batch of documents came to RZIA in 1924, a second install-
ment arrived in 1926 from Sergei P. Postnikov, and others were received from
S. Elachich in 1935. According to the TsGAOR opis' (first copy) and adminis-
trative record of the fond (delo fonda), eleven units and three kilograms of
fragmentary papers (rospysi) were destroyed in 1956 as being of "no scientific
value." Six items were added to the fond in May 1960.
The initial file contains regulations issued by the UNR Directorate (1919—
1921) and a later one bears excerpts of regulations (no. 6). Intervening files
have annual journals of meetings of the UNR Council of Ministers (nos. 2-5—
1918-1921). Several others appear to be consular files, mostly concerning
relations with Poland and efforts of the International Red Cross to help Ukrai-
nians in Poland (no. 9) and Germany (no. 11).
9. UNR Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (Delegatsiia Ukrainskoi
Narodnoi Respubliki na mirnoi konferentşii ν ParizhelDelehatsiia Ukrains'koï
Narodnoi Respubliky na myrnii konferentsiï ν Paryzhi), 1919-1920 (GA RF,
fondR-7027; 1 opis'; 40 units; 1918-1921 ) . 5 9 A separate fond was established
in TsGAOR for the UNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919-
1920), which did not have official diplomatic recognition. It was headed by
Count Mykhailo T. Tyshkevych. Files of the UNR Delegation in Paris would
probably have originally been merged with files from the UNR Diplomatic
Mission in Paris (no. 10), under which name the same delegation functioned.
RZIA accession numbers suggest the overlap and confirm that these files also
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came from Prague.60 RZIA reports from the late 1920s and/or 1931 affirm the
acquisition of 500 pages of documents of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris
(1919-1922), but the fate of the remainder of the documents is not known. The
two GA RF fonds hardly total that number.61 Two folders of these files were
noted in a 1960 list of Ukrainian émigré fonds held in TsDIAK in Kyiv, but
have not been located there.62
10. UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris (Chrezvychainaia diplomaticheskaia
missiia Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki [UNR] ν ParizhelNadzvychaina
dyplomatychna misiia UNR ν Paryzhi), 1920-1921(GA RF, fond R-6275; 1
opis'; 27 units; 1917-1921, 1926, 1928).6Ъ A separate fond was formed in
TsGAOR for the UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris, which, like the UNR
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, lacked official diplomatic recogni-
tion. In point of fact, however, these files were undoubtedly originally consoli-
dated with files from the UNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (no. 9),
because their dates overlapped and the same individuals were involved. The
delegation was first headed by Count Tyshkevych; in 1921 Oleksander
ShulTiyn was named ambassador.
GA RF now correctly attributes this fond as having been received from
RZIA, as all of the files with publications examined bear RZIA stamps with
RZIA acquisition numbers added. Judging by the numbers involved, the docu-
ments came to RZIA intermixed with those assigned to the separate fond 7027
(no. 9).M Initially, 22 items were assigned to the fond in 1951 and 6 more were
added later.
Some confusion has arisen because other records of the UNR Diplomatic
Mission in Paris were acquired by the Petliura Library in 1939. Most of them
(6,809 documents) remain in the Petliura Library in Paris having escaped
confiscation by the Nazis.65
The collection comprises several official documents about the establishment
of the Mission, other communications sent from the UNR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Mission in Paris (nos. 5 and 24), and memoranda on the question
of accepting Ukraine into the League of Nations. A 1920 printed brochure
requests Ukrainian admission to the League of Nations (no. 11). There is also a
copy of a letter from Petliura to Tyshkevych about preparations for a new
Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks (December 1920), and documenta-
tion concerning assistance to Ukrainian émigrés in France. There are several
printed bulletins and brochures.
11. Embassy of the Ukrainian National Republic in Germany, Berlin
(Posol'stvo Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ν GermaniilPosol'stvo
Ukraïns'koï Narodnoi Respubliky ν Nimechchyni) (GA RF, fond R-5889; 1
opis'; 36 units; 1918-1926).66 Some of the fragmentary files that were grouped
together in TsGAOR SSSR as what is now a fond designated for the UNR
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Embassy in Berlin bear a RZIA Prague inventory number.67 The files were
acquired by RZIA in the late 1920s or early 1931, and an additional part was
obtained in 1934.68 The first 28 units that initially comprised the TsGAOR
fond were acquired by RZIA as part of a collection that included documenta-
tion from the UNR delegation in France, UNR missions in England, Turkey,
Italy, Vienna, and other countries; and a large packet from the UNR Ministry of
Finance (1919-1920).69 These other materials may have been among the UNR
papers that were transferred from the TsGAOR SSSR to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in 1947.70
Many of the files in the present fond in GA RF are of relatively minor
interest, being reports of the mission's press bureau, rather than actual diplo-
matic correspondence. This corroborates the German assessment during World
War II that the UNR documentation in Prague was fragmentary and not essen-
tial for removal. The same decision apparently was made by Soviet authorities.
Although the UNR Berlin Embassy files were on the list of RZIA documenta-
tion to have been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR at
the end of 1946, they do not appear on the official acts of transfer. All the initial
28 files that then comprised the fond remained in TsGAOR in 1948.71
Of more interest in the present GA RF fond 5889 are some folders that were
added later (as per an endorsement on the opis'), including a letter by Volo-
dymyr Vynnychenko and another from 1919 regarding UNR funds in the
Berlin Reichsbank. Most notable among these later additions is the personal
correspondence of Petliura and the UNR ambassador in Berlin, Viktor Porsh.
That latter folder (no. 34) includes a letter of presentation to RZIA (1934) and a
note about the Petliura letter that was sold to RZIA.72
Ukrainian Émigré Fonds from Lausanne
12. Ukrainian Press Bureau, Lausanne (Ukrainskoe press-biuro ν Lozannę/
Ukraïns'ke press-biuro ν Lozanni) (GA RFJond R-7050; 2 opisi; 2,011 units;
1902-1944). Earlier listed in TsGAOR with an attribution of provenance to
RZIA, this group of materials was in fact received from the Lenin Library in
1949 from Geneva, together with the papers of the bibliographer, writer, and
bookman Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rybakin. Other records of the Ukrainian
Press Bureau had been acquired by the Petliura Library before the war, but it is
not clear if any of these might be interspersed in the present fond.
13. Editorial records of the journal Ukraina, Lausanne (Redaktsiia zhurnala
Vkx&vnaJRedaktsiia zhurnalu Ukraïnaj (GA RF,fondR-7063; 257 units; 1911-
1924). Acquired from the Lenin Library in 1949 with the preceding fond from
Geneva.
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Materials from the Petliura Library and Other UNR Records in Kyiv
Ukrainian Emigre Holdings from Prague to TsDIAK and TsDAZhR
Even before the nine wagon loads of RZIA materials had arrived in Moscow in
early January 1946, a railroad freight car of collections from the Ukrainian
Historical Cabinet was transferred directly from Prague to Kyiv in October
1945. Coming "as a gift of the Czechoslovak government to the Ukrainian
people," along with the Czechoslovak opisi and copies of the relevant adminis-
trative archive of UIK in Prague, it also included extensive archival materials
from other Ukrainian emigré institutions in Prague, only part of which had
been formally accessioned to UIK.73 According to the official top-secret Ar-
chival Administration report to Nikita Khrushchev in Kyiv and Lavrentii Beria
in Moscow, "the so-called Ukrainian Archive, formed on the basis of the
Ukrainian University in Podëbrady (Czechoslovakia)," comprised documen-
tary materials of the ministries of the Ukrainian "bourgeois-nationalist 'gov-
ernments' of Skoropads'kyi, the Central Rada, Petliura, and others. The archive
also holds a large quantity of personal fonds of known individuals in the
Ukrainian national movement."74 That description was inaccurate, since UIK
was in fact formed under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in
Prague, not the University in Podëbrady, although some collections from
Ukrainian institutions in Podëbrady had been accessioned.75
Immediately after the war, all of the many emigre materials brought to Kyiv
from various points abroad, and most notably from Prague, were initially
placed in the Special Division of Secret Fonds—OOSF (Osobyi otdel
sekretnykh fondov) of the Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv—TsDIA
URSR (later TsDIAK). According to Moscow instructions, that section was
organized as one of the main centers for "operational" analysis in the search of
wartime collaborators and "anti-Soviet" emigres. The emigre materials were
broken down into over 300 often fragmentary fonds according to the archivists'
determination of their alleged creating agencies, which, in fact, frequently
obscures their true provenance.76 By 1948, the section had prepared reports on
19,298 predominantly "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist émigrés," and sent the
MGB detailed reports on several organizations of Ukrainian nationalists
abroad.77
Some UNR files, together with related records from the period of struggle
for Ukrainian independence during 1917-1921, went to the Central State
Archive of the October Revolution of the Ukrainian SSR (TsDAZhR URSR),
which was still located in Kharkiv. Before World War II, that archive had
brought together all possible records from the UNR period remaining in the
USSR, as well as a few emigre and military records. In the 1960s parts of the
TsDIAK émigré holdings were transferred to TsDAZhR. After construction of
the new building for the Ukrainian Central State Archives in Kyiv in 1972, all
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of the emigre holdings were consolidated in what became the Special Division
of Secret Fonds of TsDAZhR. These postwar developments and transfers,
together with the pressure for immediate "operational" analysis, explain the
further fragmentation of the materials today and complicate assigning prov-
enance to many files and determining the history of individual fonds.
Unfortunately, no comprehensive list of fonds covering the former Secret
Division is currently available to researchers. It is accordingly very difficult, if
not impossible, for researchers to identify all of the UNR records and related
fonds now held in the successor to the TsDAZhR—now known as the Central
State Archive of Highest Organs of State Power and Administration of
Ukraine, TsDAVO Ukrainy (Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh
orhaniv derzhavnoi vlady і upravlinnia Ukraïny). A brief survey of records in
TsDAVO from the UNR period appeared in 1996, but the archivist who wrote
that first overview of the holdings does not mention the Parisian collection.78
While noting that there are now some 400 fonds from the period of the UNR,
she only mentions a few of those specifically relating to Petliura and the UNR
itself.
Petliura Library Materials from Paris
It has not yet been possible to establish where Soviet authorities found the
fragmentary archival materials from the Petliura Library in Paris that are now
in Kyiv, and details about their source of acquisition by the archive have not
surfaced. Recently, lists of postwar holdings of the Special Division of
TsDIAK have been found confirming acquisition in January 1946 of several
groups of emigre papers from Paris that are now held in TsDAVO in Kyiv.79
But details of where they came from or of the Soviet agency that held them
before transfer to the archive are lacking.80 A letter to the chief of the Ukrai-
nian Archival Administration, Panteleimon P. Gudzenko, dated 4 June 1947,
mentions "half a carload of documents . . . which arrived from Germany in a
wagon amidst library books and among which are some documents from Paris
in French."81 But those are most likely later additions, and not necessarily
Ukrainian émigré ones, because later lists of fonds in the Special Secret Divi-
sion of TsDIAK show no new Ukrainian émigré fonds from Paris that did not
appear on earlier lists.
The existence of the Parisian materials in Kyiv has hitherto not been widely
known because there is no publicly available list of holdings in the formerly
Secret Division of TsDAZhR URSR. Some preliminary descriptive words
about these materials therefore are in order here, although a more professional
survey and comprehensive list of fonds is still among the high priority archival
reference needs in Kyiv. Given the extent and complexity of the UNR holdings
from Prague that are now in Kyiv, as well as the UNR holdings that were
already held in Kyiv and Kharkiv before World War II, no attempt will be
made here to survey them.
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It could have been suspected that the materials from Paris in Kyiv would
have come with the records of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR),
which were received in Kyiv in TsDIA from Dresden in December of 1945. We
already know that the Petliura Library was in Ratibor, and that the ERR
succeeded in evacuating some of their records as the Red Army was approach-
ing (January 1945). However, there is no mention of the fonds from Paris in
any of the appraisals of the ERR materials after their receipt in Kyiv.82 Possi-
bly, they were among those not evacuated, but that were retrieved by Soviet
authorities in Silesia in the spring of 1946 and first shipped to Minsk. Some of
the Parisian materials in Kyiv mesh exactly with the additional files from the
same Paris sources that are now held in Moscow, and which we now know
were received in 1955 from Minsk. However, no transfer documents from
Minsk to Kyiv involving these materials have been found.83 Some of the
Ukrainian emigre materials from Paris conceivably came via these two chan-
nels, but, given the chaotic situation in the Kyiv archive in 1945 and 1946, the
details of such transfers apparently were never recorded.
Another more likely explanation for the acquisition of at least some of the
materials from the Petliura Library in TsDAVO has recently emerged with the
availability of a report by Rudychiv, the aforementioned long-time librarian of
the Petliura Library, who was present when the Nazis confiscated the library
and its archival holdings in Paris in January 1941. Rudychiv, it will be recalled,
was subsequently summoned to Berlin in May 1941, purportedly to work with
the library. Although he stayed in Berlin until the fall of 1942, he never did see
the library before he was permitted to return to Paris. Following his return,
Rudychiv prepared a report for the Petliura Library Council in France in
December 1942.84
According to that report, Rudychiv gave the memoir account he had written
in Berlin about the Nazi seizure of the library, "Iak tse bulo," to his old friend
Ievhen Vyrovyi (or Jevhen Vyrovyj) from Prague, whom he met in Berlin.
Indeed, that autographed memoir account ("Iak tse bulo") is now among the
Petliura Library documents in Kyiv. Rudychiv also mentions having given
Vyrovyi some other documentation relating to the library for the Museum of
the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine in Prague before he left Berlin.85 If
Vyrovyi succeeded in taking Rudychiv's papers and the other documentation
that Rudychiv had saved from the Petliura Library to Prague, then these materi-
als probably came to Kyiv with the holdings that Soviet authorities seized from
Prague after the war.86 Significant amounts of documents held by the interwar
Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine (sometimes translated as
the Museum of Ukraine's Struggle for Independence) in Prague were seized by
Soviet authorities and transferred to Kyiv. However, those transfers took place
only in 1958 and 1962.87 Furthermore, although some of the materials went to
TsDIAK at that time, many of those later Soviet seizures from Prague went
directly to the KGB or MVD in Kyiv rather than to the state archives.
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It is unlikely that Vyrovyi would have transferred that documentation to the
Museum in Prague during the war. Vyrovyi, just as NKVD agents were coming
to arrest him, committed suicide in Prague in May 1945. If Rudychiv's papers
and other documents remained with Vyrovyi himself, then perhaps they were
confiscated at that time or soon afterwards, which would explain their acces-
sion in the Kyiv archive in January 1946.88
In addition to the Rudychiv papers now in TsDAVO, there are several other
fragmentary fonds comprising additional materials that presumably came from
the Petliura Library in Paris. Paralleling materials from the same sources in
Moscow, it is not immediately apparent from their dates and contents that these
materials would have been with Rudychiv in Berlin. However, all of them, as
noted in the immediate postwar lists of fonds in the Special Division of
TsDIAK where they were originally housed, were apparently received at the
same time as the Rudychiv papers.
There quite possibly are other similarly fragmentary fonds in TsDAVO
today that have been assigned for materials originating from the Petliura Li-
brary or related Ukrainian organizations in Paris, including fonds of personal
papers. And perhaps, too, files from the Petliura Library were dispersed among
other fonds. Because no comprehensive list of fonds covering the former Secret
Division is currently available to researchers, it is impossible to identify other
materials from Paris assigned to separate fonds that might now in fact be held
in TsDAVO. However, all those that were identified in the 1947-1949 lists of
holdings in the Special Secret Division of TsDIAK are now accounted for in
TsDAVO, and are described in the list below.
Still other fragmentary materials from the Petliura Library and other files
from the UNR are today held across the city of Kyiv by the former Communist
Party Archive, now the Central State Archive of Public Organizations—
TsDAHO. In 1988, a considerable group of archival materials that had been
held by the KGB and/or MVD in Kyiv was transferred by the MVD to the
former Communist Party Archive. This group comprises most of the materials
from the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine that were seized
in 1958 and 1962 in Prague, and then separated from the other materials that
went to TsDIA or TsDAZhR. They also include other Ukrainian emigre materi-
als collected by secret service agents from disparate sources in Prague and
other cities, along with some fragmentary materials brought to Kyiv earlier that
had been turned over to the MVD/KGB at various times for specific investiga-
tions. They came to the former Party Archive in unsorted packages; by the
spring of 2000 they had not been fully processed.89 A folder of letters that
Rudychiv received in Berlin and other documentation about the Petliura Li-
brary can be found among these materials.
The Ukrainian emigre archival holdings from Paris now in Kyiv are exceed-
ingly fragmentary, and in almost all cases they represent files contingent to
those already described among the former TsGOA/TsKhlDK holdings in
RGVA and those in GA RF in Moscow. Their distribution into multiple frag-
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mentary fonds is also similar to the arrangement of the contingent records in
Moscow, although with a few notable exceptions. Their division between two
different archives in Kyiv is unfortunate, but given the problems in Kyivan
archives today, it is unlikely that the separation can be corrected.
UNR Records from Cracow/Tarnów in Kyiv
Much more politically significant than the fragmentary files from the Petliura
Library and Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris were the records of the
UNR government itself that the Soviet authorities also transferred to Kyiv after
the war. As was described earlier, during the war Nazi archival authorities from
the Reichsarchiv had overseen the processing of a major body of records of the
UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Discovered in Tarnów, these
materials had been brought to Cracow where German inventories were pre-
pared between 1942 and 1944.90
Soviet SMERSH agents removed these records from the State Archive in
Cracow in March 1945.91 Confirmation of the Soviet removal of these UNR
materials has been found in Soviet sources in the recently declassified files of
the Soviet archival administrations in both Moscow and Kyiv. On 12 March
1945 the head of the Lviv Oblast Archival Administration informed NKVD
archival authorities in Kyiv that a SMERSH unit of the Fourth Ukrainian Front
in Cracow "was in the possession of Petliura documents in the Ukrainian
language from the years 1918-1922."92 So important was this "find" to Soviet
authorities that the news was forwarded to Moscow ten days later with the
request for orders to transfer the materials to Kyiv.93
According to a later report, "a freight-train wagon load of documentary
materials of the former Petliura Directorate and its ministries, under the juris-
diction of counterintelligence 'SMERSH' of the Fourth Ukrainian Front trans-
ported from Vienna," arrived in Lviv at the end of May 1945. However, the fact
that the shipment also included "six freight-train wagons of documentary mate-
rials removed by the German-Fascist occupiers from the Lviv Archive of Early
Acts," which had been recovered near Cracow, and other such references,
confirms that the shipment included the Cracow Petliura materials and makes it
unlikely that the shipment came from Vienna (although the Cracow wagons
could have been added to a train originating in Vienna). Valentyn Riasnyi, the
Ukrainian Commissar of Internal Affairs, ordered the transfer of the Petliura
materials to the Archive of the October Revolution (TsDAZhR) in Kyiv.94
Gudzenko, the Ukrainian Archival Administration Chief, subsequently con-
firmed that the six wagons had returned from Cracow to Lviv, and that "docu-
mentary materials of the Ukrainian counterrevolutionary government from the
1917-1927 period consisting of eighteen fonds (6,234 units) . . . found by
SMERSH in Cracow" were transferred to TsDAZhR in Kyiv.95
No further reports have been detected on what specific materials (if any)
may have been transported from Vienna in that same shipment. Some files
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relating to the Petliura government were brought to Kyiv from Vienna at the
end of the war, along with some other emigré Ukrainian fonds of Viennese
provenance. A few are listed among the postwar holdings in TsDIAK, although
details about their recovery, transfer, and date of acquisition are not avail-
able.96
From Polish and Nazi sources we already know that among the materials
SMERSH removed from Cracow were the most important extant records of the
UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, for which German summary
inventories are available. In TsDAVO today, there is a fond for the UNR
Foreign Ministry and several other splinter fonds into which the materials may
have been divided. However, details of their migration from Cracow have been
suppressed, and a history or administrative record of the main Foreign Ministry
fond is not available. It is impossible to reconstruct the "eighteen fonds (6,234
units)" initially projected, nor is it possible to confirm that all the materials in
question remain in TsDAVO.
Approximately 30 letters and telegrams from the UNR Foreign Ministry
records in Kyiv (fond 3696, ору s 2) were published in the aforementioned 1996
volume of documents honoring the 70th anniversary of Petliura's assassina-
tion.97 The compiler did not, however, present any more details he might have
gleaned about the files themselves or their provenance. Most probably these
documents all came to Kyiv with the Tarnów materials, but further analysis is
needed to arrive at a more definitive conclusion.
Printed Books from the Petliura Library in Kyiv
As yet, the most significant collection of printed materials from the Petliura
Library identified in Kyiv are the 240 books "returned" to Kyiv from Minsk in
the late 1980s that are now held in the Parliamentary Library. It has recently
been confirmed that some books from the Petliura Library were among one of
the shipments of "trophy" books to Kyiv which arrived from Leningrad in
1946-1947. They were deposited in the State Historical Library in Kyiv,
together with others with stamps of the Turgenev Library. A librarian working
there in the early 1980s recently related that she encountered some books (in
English and French) with those stamps in the foreign-language department,
where she worked in 1983, when the library was ordered to remove books that
were so identified. She lost her job when she wrote a letter to the Ukrainian
Communist Party Central Committee in an effort to preserve the books from
destruction. The few books that the library may have managed to preserve from
the "cleansing operations" were shorn of their library stamps, which today
would make their identification impossible. Other books may have been de-
stroyed in earlier "cleansing" operations, much like those from the Turgenev
Library which met a similar fate in Minsk.98
Some books from the Petliura Library are quite possibly held in the Central
Library under the State Committee on Archives (DKAU) in Kyiv, which would
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have been transferred there in the process of arranging the various fonds
containing materials from the Petliura Library now stored in TsDAVO." Inad-
equate data in acquisition registers, along with the lack of provenance data on
library cards, would make it a labor-intensive task to check for Petliura Library
books in that library, and we cannot rule out the possibility that Petliura Library
stamps or book markings would have been expunged.
In June 1947, the head of the Ukrainian Archival Administration received an
unspecified number of "published brochures of the League of Ukrainians in
France" (1939) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Moscow.
According to the accompanying memorandum, these "could be good reference
tools for identifying fellow-countrymen by operational organs and your Divi-
sion of Utilization."100 We do not know the disposition of these materials after
their arrival in Kyiv.
Similar to the fonds from the Petliura Library deposited in Moscow, many
scattered issues of emigre journals and press information bulletins have been
incorporated as file units in several of the Ukrainian émigré fonds in TsDAVO,
which otherwise would have been part of the original library holdings. Appro-
priate cataloging data or records of serial holdings are not currently available.
According to archival regulations, books that might have come to the archives
with archival materials in Kyiv should have been either deposited in the archi-
val library (as was the case of many of the receipts from Prague) or transferred
to other libraries. Transfers to other libraries were less likely in many cases,
because restricted émigré materials were involved. Because of minimal library
transfer and acquisition records—and because current catalogs do not indicate
previous library markings on books—it would be a difficult task to try to find
them.
Ominously, "brochures and information bulletins of Ukrainian emigre orga-
nizations in France" are specifically mentioned in connection with a shipment
of 6,661 printed books requisitioned from Kyiv (TsDIAK) to Moscow
(TsGOA) in 1956. The TsDIAK copy of the 1956 act of transfer is preserved,
but a copy of the list that was to have been attached has not been found in the
Kyiv file.101 No incoming copy has surfaced in Moscow. Given the current lack
of cataloging in the former TsGOA library in Moscow, it has not been possible
to determine what books were involved, and no record of the incoming ship-
ment has been found. Hence it is not possible to determine how many Petliura
Library books might have been part of that shipment.102
In the former Communist Party Archive (now TsDAHO), where cataloging
efforts are underway for the Ukrainian emigre documents from Prague trans-
ferred to that archive from MVD sources, a collection of Ukrainian émigré
publications has been identified. But again, these are being designated as part
of an archival fond. Item-level cataloging has not been undertaken, and there
has as yet been no possibility of examining the volumes for book stamps, ex
libris, or other markings.
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Kyiv: Petliura Library and Seized UNR Records in TsDAVO
Distinguishing Documentation from the Petliura Library and other UNR
Records
Given what we already know about the prewar archival holdings of the Petliura
Library and the fragments of those archival materials held in Moscow, we can
now identify a number of separate fonds in TsDAVO that retain materials from
the Petliura Library (nos. 1-4). And there are a number of related Ukrainian
émigré fonds of provenance in Paris (nos. 5-8). In some cases, they may have
been intermixed with the materials from the Petliura Library while they were in
Nazi hands, or after their arrival in Kyiv. Certain files in some of those fonds
appear to be misarranged. Several fonds have stray file units, or even stray
documents of alternate provenance, including some that may well have been
received with the Prague UIK shipment.
Unlike the situation in GA RF, but like RGVA in Moscow, there are no
current lists of fonds in the archive available to researchers in TsDAVO. Hence
we can only rely on recently declassified typescript lists from the immediate
postwar period, which in most cases do not even reflect current TsDAVO fond
numbers. Because of the multiple archival transfers in the postwar decades—
and because of the lack of precise provenance attributions and the fact that all
of the incoming miscellaneous collections were broken down into fragmentary
fonds without regard to the archive where they were last held or the collection
with which they were received—further research and verification are still
needed. Nevertheless, a preliminary outline of the fonds in question can be
presented.
It is virtually impossible at this point to identify even the principal fonds that
contain documentation from the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Fi-
nance that were shipped to Kyiv from Cracow in 1945. Given the potential
importance of these materials and the lack of previous attribution of their
provenance, some conjectures are appropriate. A separate analysis is needed to
identify other UNR documentation in TsDAVO.
Fonds from the Petliura Library
1. Symon Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukraińska biblioteka im.
Symona Petliury ν Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-4362; 31 units; 1929-1941).
The fragmentary 31 files in TsDAVO that have been assigned to this fond are
not the same type of administrative records of the Petliura Library as those
found in either of the two Moscow archives described above (RGVA, no. 1 and
GA RF, no. 1). Undoubtedly, these documents are what remained of the per-
sonal papers that Rudychiv had with him in Berlin in 1941 and 1942. Accord-
ing to Rudychiv's report of 1942, materials relating to the library were handed
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over to "his friend from Prague for the Museum of the Straggle for the Libera-
tion of Ukraine."103 Although some of these documents may have come from
the library in Paris, Rudychiv undoubtedly had brought them with him to
Berlin. Others he received or prepared there. Thus, it is most likely that the 31
files forming fond R-4363 all went from Berlin to Prague (via Vyrovyi) and
thence went to Kyiv from Prague. A few other Rudychiv papers have recently
surfaced in TsDAHO amidst the documentation received from MVD sources,
but none were cited in earlier descriptions of the archival materials that had
been held by the Museum of the Straggle for the Liberation of Ukraine. That
would be understandable if they only reached Prague in 1942, and it is unlikely
that Vyrovyi would have immediately turned them over to the Museum. Closer
examination of the files in this fond supports this hypothesis.
Of particular interest among these files are the following: two different
versions of a handwritten history and description of the library Rudychiv
prepared in Berlin (nos. 4 and 5), presumably by order of his Nazi "hosts"; a
typewritten version (in several copies) of "Iak tse bulo"—Rudychiv's account
of the Nazi arrival and confiscation of the library in Paris (1940-1941) and his
subsequent transfer to Berlin in June 1941, which he prepared at Nazi request
in July 1941 (no. 3); and his brief handwritten diary entries, spanning the
period of fall 1940-1941 (no. 29). There are fragments of Rudychiv's personal
correspondence with Ukrainian emigres and emigre organizations, mostly from
the period he was in Berlin. There are also some clippings and notes from the
Ukrainian press, which Rudychiv prepared in Berlin (1941-1942), possibly at
Nazi request.
A packet of letters, clippings, photographs, and notes of sympathy pertain-
ing to the death in 1941 of Petliura's daughter, Lesia (no. 24), were undoubt-
edly collected by Rudychiv after the Nazis closed the library. One file (no. 31)
contains many of Rudychiv's personal identification documents—a student
lecture card from his period at Kamianets-Podilskyi State University in 1918
and registration cards in various cities following his emigration—Berlin,
Vienna, and Prague.
The only substantial records of the library are 9 files containing annual
reports and clippings about the library, mostly from Tryzub (nos. 6-14; 1929—
1940). There is also a file with draft budgets for the library (no. 17; 1930-
1940), a list of books and periodical publications presented to the library in
1940 (no. 18), a register of negative and positive photographs held by the
library (no. 26), and statistics on subscribers (no. 27; 1929-1940). One file
contains various announcements and clippings about Petliura's funeral
(no. 19), another concerns memorial celebrations honoring Petliura in subse-
quent years, and still one more holds illustrated printed booklets describing the
library and museum (no. 2; 1936-1940), which were probably prepared by
Rudychiv.
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2. Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Journal Tryzub, Paris, {Redaktsiia
zhurnalu Tryzub ν Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-3537; 6 units; 1933-1934).
There are only 6 files in Kyiv from the editorial correspondence for the journal
published at the Petliura Library, and then only some fragments from a few
years. The more extensive files remain in Moscow. The 6 files comprise
correspondence (1933-1934), lists of subscribers (1933-1934), and a copy of
an article. There is also a printed bulletin of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Paris
(no. 4).
Of particular interest is a file added later that contains correspondence of
Boris Lazarevskii (1930-1936; 50 fols.), which dates from the period he was
working with the journal, but which does not necessarily belong to Tryzub
records. Earlier, there had been more correspondence of Lazarevskii held in
TsDIAK and TsDAZhR, but transfer documents were found, whereby corre-
spondence between Lazarevskii and his brother Hlib and others in Poland was
requisitioned from TsGAOR UkrSSR and sent to the former Special (Osobyi)
Archive (TsGOA SSSR) in Moscow in March 1957.104
3. Commission for the Conduct of the Trial on the Case of the Assassination of
S. Petliura, Head of the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the
UNR (Komisiia dlia vedennia sudovoho protsesu ν spravi vbyvstva Holovy
Dyrektoriï i Holovnoho otamana viis'k UNR S. Petliury) (1926-1928). These
files come from the commission established in connection with the trial of
Schwarzbard after his assassination of Petliura in Paris and, according to
available accounts, were most probably held by the Petliura Library before the
Nazi invasion. The Commission included the same people involved in estab-
lishing the library, and its documentation remained in the library.
This fond includes appraisals of Petliura's conduct during the Jewish po-
groms in Ukraine 1917-1919 with a number of press clippings (including a
series of articles from the journal Ukraina in 1919 and Tryzub articles about the
trial—no. 23). It also contains descriptions of the preparation of witnesses and
inquiries for the trial in Paris (nos. 1, 2), published acts and articles about the
judicial inquiry, copies of letters to and about Petliura that were presented at the
trial (nos. 3-8, 13), and additional materials about the Jewish pogroms in
Ukraine (nos. 9-11, 14).
4. Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs'kyi (TsDAVO, fond R-3534; 23 units; 1919-
1926). This fond has fragmentary personal papers of Pavlo Ivanovych
Chyzhevs'kyi (1860-1926), the Minister of Finance in the Central Rada, who
subsequently served as an official representative of the Ukrainian Trade Mis-
sion in France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. ChyzhevsTtyi's papers were
held by the Petliura Library before the war as affirmed in several sources.105
Another few files of his papers are held in Moscow (RGVA, no. 7).
The files comprise the following: biographical documents (no. 1); business
papers (nos. 7-13), including those relating to the League of Nations, 1919-
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1925 (no. 8); correspondence (1919-1927) (nos. 14-22); published articles
(nos. 2, 3); a manuscript for a geographic journal (no. 5); and proofs of an
article on Ukraine and France (in French) (no. 23). One file contains printed (or
duplicated) Ukrainian Press Bureau reports (no. 4).
Other Fonds from the Ukrainian Emigre Community in France
5. Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris (Uprava
tov-va buvshykh voiakiv armii UNR u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (TsDAVO,fond 4176;
1 unit; 1933-1936). The fond parallels similarly entitled fonds in RGVA and
G A RF. Only a single folder is now held in this separate fond, although a 1949
TsDIAK list indicated that at the time it had comprised 18 units (1930-1939).
The fate of the additional units has not been determined.
The 10-page folder has documents relating to assistance for Ukrainian
emigres in France (1933-1936).
6. Directorate of the [Ukrainian] Emigration Council in Paris (Holovna
emihratsiina rada ν Paryzhi) (TsDAVO,fond 3534 [earlier 247]; Opys 1—10
units; 1924-1935; Opys 2—6 units; 1926—1936). The first opys was prepared
in 1949 with 8 units; 2 more were added in 1951. A second opys was prepared
in TsDIAK in 1961 with 6 additional units. None of the predominantly printed
or duplicated publications bear stamps or markings.
The first file contains mimeographic and proof copies of the protocols of the
Council's First Conferences in Prague (published in Paris, 1929) (duplicate
copies are in no. 9 and opys 2, no. 6) and the statute of the Council. It also has
mimeographed copies of the Protocols of the Third Conference (1934) (nos. 3
and 10; and opys 2, no. 3). Other files contain letters (no. 4), newspaper
clippings (no. 7), a printed brochure and a bulletin of the Ukrainian telegraph
agency (1930-1935) (no. 6), and two articles in French on Ukraine (nos. 7 and
8). The second opys contains more duplicated communications of the Council
from Paris (1934-1935) (no. 1), protocols of meetings (1926) (no. 2) and
(1936) (no. 4), and other émigré bulletins.
7. Ukrainian Community in France (Paris) (Ukraińska hromada и Frantsiï)
(TsDAVO, fond 3901; 12 units; 1928-1938). This fond contains fragmentary
files and publications of the Paris Hromada with indications of several differ-
ent addresses in the French capital. One issue of the Society's Vistnyk (1931)
(file no. 4) bears the stamp of the Association (with the address: 22, rue
Barrault, Paris 13è). There are no other stamps or markings to suggest the
materials had been acquired by the Petliura Library. A few related materials
regarding this organization were sent from TsDIAK to the Special Archive in
Moscow (TsGOA SSSR) in 1957: namely, a brochure about its first conference
and an information bulletin of Ukrainian émigré organizations in France.106
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Fragmentary files of this Ukrainian émigré organization include information
for the membership (no. 1), protocols of meetings of the directors (1930—
no. 2; and 1934-1935—nos. 7, 8), and correspondence (no. 3). There are
copies of the organization's publication, Vistnyk (1931-1937) (nos. 4-6, 9, 10),
and Biuleten' (1937, nos. 1-3) (file no. 12).
8. Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations in Paris (Ukraïns'ke tovarystvo
prykhyl'nykiv Liny Natsii ν Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-3535; 5 units; 1923-
1940). This fond was originally arranged in TsDAZhR in March 1951 with 4
units; a fifth was added later. The Society was founded in 1921 in Prague,
under the presidency of Professor Andrii Yakovliv. Also active in Prague was
Professor Oleksander Shul'hyn (Alexandre Choulguine), who was simulta-
neously the president of the Supreme Council of Ukrainian Émigrés. The social
seat of the Society was in Paris, its secretary being M. B. Boiko (2, rue Denfort-
Rochereau, Paris 5è). There were branches in Poland, Belgium, and Romania.
The contents of the fond are highly miscellaneous with a number of differ-
ent printed or duplicated bulletins and other documents from various emigre
organizations. One of the duplicated bulletins of the Society (in no. 2) bears a
red stamp of the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet in Prague, but no other markings
have been found.
File units of the fond contain copies of correspondence (1929-1930) (no. 1),
with some letters addressed to the President of the Society in Prague. There are
two copies of the Society's bulletin and a separate appeal of the League of
Nations (no. 2). The third file consists of bulletins of the Press Bureau of the
UNR Diplomatic Mission to Romania (1923)—one issued by the Society itself
in Paris, a resolution of the Commission on Minorities, and a report on the
financial situation of the Society, among other miscellaneous documents. A
fourth folder contains a typescript essay on the international situation (1940),
an annual report of the Society (1931), and copies of the Society's bulletin
(1923-1936).
Petliura Papers from Other Sources
9. Petliura, Symon Vasyl'ovych (TsDAVO, fond3809; 2 opysy; 17 units; 1907-
1923: opys 1, 6 units [1907-1919]; opys 2,11 units [1920-1923]. TsDAVO
also has a small separate fond with personal papers of Petliura himself, all of
them dating to the period before Petliura's arrival in Paris. These files were
apparently acquired before World War II from sources other than Paris, and
there is no indication that any of these files came from Paris with the other
Petliura materials described above. Most of the files in the first opys, which
predate Petliura's exile, apparently came to Kyiv from TsDAZhR in Kharkiv,
having been acquired early on from sources within Ukraine.
The provenance of the files now grouped in a second opys (established in
1954) has not been determined, and they pertain to the years that Petliura was
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based in Poland. The documents in the second opys may have come to Kyiv
with the UNR Tarnów materials (see below), or with the materials from the
Ukrainian Historical Cabinet (UIK), or with other collections in Prague that
had been earlier held by security services. Recently, some additional files have
apparently been added to the second opys, with a few extending into 1924. It is
conceivable that these came from the materials turned over to the archive from
private sources in Prague, but provenance data is not presently available.
A few Petliura letters from this fond were published in a 1997 collection
commemorating the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's assassination. The
editor could not furnish exact archival citations, because, as he explained, the
materials were still being processed. He was unable to glean provenance data,
but suggested the materials may have come from the MVD and may have been
among those seized from the collections of the Museum of the Struggle for the
Liberation of Ukraine in Prague.107
Records of the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic (Ministerstvo
zakordonnykh sprav UNR) (TsDAVO, fond no. 3696; 3 opysy; 189, 703, and 51
units). Archivists in TsDAVO have been unable to furnish details of the
provenance and history of this fond. It is impossible at present to determine the
provenance of its various parts because of the inadequate nature of inventories
of the UNR records in TsDAVO, the unsystematic arrangement of files, and the
lack of data about the history of the fond. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible
to coordinate the opysy of this fond with the German-language inventory of the
UNR Foreign Ministry records that the Nazis prepared in Cracow, or to deter-
mine if all the materials seized from the Cracow inventory are now held in
Kyiv.108 In contrast to the careful arrangement imposed in Cracow, which
appeared to follow the office of origin for the records involved, the Kyiv
arrangement is much more random.
The Foreign Ministry files in the first opys obviously came to the archive
earlier from other sources. The first opys (189 units) itself had initially been
prepared in January and August 1943, apparently when those parts of
TsDAZhR had been evacuated to the east by Soviet authorities.
From cursory examination, it would appear that the second opys (703 [ear-
lier 694] units) and the third opys (51 [earlier 46] units; 1918-1924), both
arranged in the early 1950s with later additions, do contain some files of
probable Tarnów provenance, but not the quantity nor the content indicated in
the German Cracow inventory.109 Nor has it been possible to identify the
"eighteen fonds (6,234 units) from the 1917-1927 period" in the full "freight-
train wagon," that was specified in the Soviet shipping reports for the Cracow
shipment. Given the dates of the documents involved, many of the files de-
scribed in the German inventory from Cracow could not be identified in that
group of records in Kyiv. Those may well have been among the other splinter
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fonds into which the Cracow files were divided in Kyiv, but a study to confirm
this remains to be done.
As determined by postwar archival reports, apparently the materials re-
ceived from Cracow were first accessioned by the Historical Archive TsDIA
URSR (later TsDIAK), which was then housed in Kyiv rather than TsDAZhR
(which was then operating in Kharkiv). TsDIA reported in 1948 that the
Special Division of Secret Fonds had finished processing the UNR Foreign
Ministry fond that year. Their top-secret list of fonds in 1949 indicates a UNR
Foreign Ministry fond covering the years 1918-1923 with 858 file units. The
fond number (346s) corresponds to the old fond number indicated on the
present opysy, but the number of file units and dates on the present opysy does
not correspond to that information. Today there are two other fonds containing
documentation from the UNR Foreign Ministry, but both of those predate the
UNR regime in exile.110
Part of the problem comes from the fact that after their arrival in Kyiv, the
Cracow UNR records were broken down into many different fragmentary
fonds. This may explain the earlier reference to materials from Cracow "com-
prising eighteen fonds." Postwar TsDIA URSR lists of fonds from 1947 and
1948 also contain contingent fonds for UNR diplomatic missions in several
different countries, which suggests that those fonds were broken out separately.
According to the German inventory, the records involved were incoming or
copies of outgoing records from Tarnów relating to UNR missions in the
different countries.111 For example, a separate fond was established in Kyiv for
the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin (probably material extracted from the
UNR Foreign Ministry records transferred from Cracow), while in the German
inventory an entire separate section is devoted to the Press Division of the UNR
Foreign Ministry.112 Other examples of the additional splinter fonds created
from the Cracow shipment need further investigation. The fact that the archival
arrangement of the records was completely revised in TsDIA explains the lack
of concordance with the German inventory.
At some point during the 1950s, fond numbers were changed, and some of
the fonds themselves were reorganized. At least some of the fonds, including
UNR Foreign Ministry records, were transferred to TsDAZhR URSR in Octo-
ber 1954.113 A 1962 list of émigré fonds in TsDIAK, however, still mentions
one fond of the UNR Foreign Ministry (fond no. 3696; 17 units). Some of the
additional fonds for UNR diplomatic missions in other countries were still
housed in TsDIAK.114 The materials were all consolidated in TsDAZhR URSR
when it was moved from Kharkiv to Kyiv in 1972.
Only since approximately 1990 have researchers had open access to the
UNR Foreign Ministry records in Kyiv (fond 3696), but there still is no
analysis or published survey of the fond and its varied provenance. As noted
above, approximately 30 letters and telegrams from the second opys of the
fond, including some original Petliura letters, were published in part of the
1996 volume of documents honoring the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's
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assassination, but with no details of their provenance.115 Most probably these
documents all came to Kyiv with the Tarnów materials, but it cannot be said for
certain.116
It has already been noted that another 17 file units of the UNR Foreign
Ministry (1918-1923) are today held in GA RF in Moscow, which also prob-
ably came from Tarnów via RZIA in Prague.117 No information has as yet been
found about the possible transfer of sensitive UNR Foreign Ministry files from
Kyiv to Moscow. Had they been transferred, they most probably would have
gone to the Archive of the Foreign Ministry, rather than to TsGAOR SSSR.
Also noted above, some fragmentary files in GA RF were assigned to a sepa-
rate fond of the UNR Mission in Berlin, but those files all clearly came from
RZIA.
Ministry of Finance of the Ukrainian National Republic (Ministerstvo finansiv
UNR) (TsDAVOJond no. 1509; 6 opysy; 357, 39, 83,16,1,004, and 16 units;
1918-1925). Some records of the UNR Ministry of Finance were reportedly
also received in Kyiv with the UNR Foreign Ministry records from Cracow. A
brief German handwritten summary of an inventory for those records, presum-
ably from Cracow, was found in Moscow among the scattered records of the
Reichsarchiv (Potsdam).118 However, it has also not yet been possible to verify
the fate of the 58 packets from the Ministry of Finance that were included in
that Nazi inventory, or to even determine how many of them are now held in
TsDAVO. Similar types of problems and questions apply to the Foreign Minis-
try records. For example, in the 1961 list of fonds of Ukrainian émigré organi-
zations in TsDIAK, only 8 files are listed in a fond for the UNR Ministry of
Finance in Tarnów (fond 1509), 4 files for agents of the Ministry of Finance in
Berlin, and 1 file in a separate fond for the State Bank of Ukraine in Tarnów.119
A corresponding list of fonds in TsDAZhR in that period has not been located,
so it is not possible to determine if other related files had been assigned to that
archive. Further study of the history and provenance of this fond is obviously
needed.
Kyiv: Petliura Library and Related Ukrainian Emigré Materials in TsDAHO
Considerable progress has been made in the last few years to process the
Ukrainian emigre documentation that was acquired by the former Party
Archive in Kyiv from MVD (and KGB) sources in 1988. As of the fall of 1999,
when a relatively final draft of the new guide for TsDAHO was completed, a
30-page section was devoted to the 1,644 file units now grouped in fond
no. 269, under the fond name of the Ukrainian Museum in Prague (Ukraïns'kyi
muzei ν Prazi, to which the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of
Ukraine was renamed after November 1945). It is a misnomer to group all of
the documentation in this collection under the name of the Ukrainian Museum,
because clearly the materials come from a number of different Ukrainian
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emigre sources in Prague, Berlin, Paris, and other places. The collection had
been haphazardly gathered at different times by the MVD (and undoubtedly
also the KGB) in Kyiv. Certainly, many of the materials had never been
formally acquired by the Ukrainian Museum in Prague.
It would be a safer and more professional archival designation to call it a
"Consolidated (or Amalgamated) Collection of Ukrainian Emigré Documenta-
tion from Different Sources," as is even clearly stated in the draft introduction
that provides an administrative history for the fond:
To the fond 269 "Ukrainian Museum in Prague," in addition to materials from
MVBU, came also various documents from other archival collections of the
Ukrainian emigration (the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris, the Society of
Former Combatants in the UNR Army in France, and others). Although it has
not been determined in which year they came to the archive, they were
identified in the process of scientific-technical processing of the fond in
1997-1999. Most of the documents and materials in fond 269 are of a frag-
mentary character and other small parts of their fonds or collections remain in
other archival repositories in Ukraine, or even abroad in the Czech Repub-
lic.120
Unfortunately, because these materials were officially transferred to the
Party Archive, it has not been possible to consolidate the collection with the
contingent documentation in TsDAVO or other archives in Ukraine to which
receipts from Prague (including the Museum in question) were dispersed.
Some of the documents probably were taken by the NKVD/MVD (and/or
KGB) from files that were received by TsDIAK or TsDAZhR earlier, including
those that came from UIK as well as other émigré sources. But on the other
hand, at this point an attempt to unite these files in TsDAVO might serve
further to obscure and complicate attributions of provenance to documentation
now in TsDAVO. At least researchers should bear in mind that many of the
documents now dispersed between the two archives originally came from the
same agencies, organizations, or individuals, as is apparent even in the names
of the subdivisions established for the collection in TsDAHO.
A third opys of the fond comprises printed emigre editions, many of which
are rare among holdings in Kyiv and deserve to be cataloged on an item-level,
according to accepted library practice. These publications have not yet been
examined for library stamps, ex libris, and other dedicatory markings, which
may be helpful in assigning their provenance. Thus, it is not possible to
determine if any of them might have come from the Petliura Library in Paris.
Because the documentation in question is still being processed in TsDAHO,
it has not been possible to examine or even sample most of the relevant files de
visu. The following list of relevant subdivisions is therefore extracted from the
forthcoming guide. Annotations have been added by the author. The files
mentioned and the different headings correspond to fonds in other archives
described earlier in this report:
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Ору s 1: Documentation and Materials of Ukrainian Organizations,
Associations, and Societies in the Emigration
Governmental, Diplomatic, Military,
and Legal Agencies of the UNR and ZUNR
Foreign Files of the Credit Chancellory of the UNR Ministry of Finance
(Zakordonna ekspozitura kredytovoi kantseliarii Ministerstva finansiv UNR)
(1919-1923). Although no immediate indication is apparent, this group may
contain some of the missing materials from the UNR Ministry of Finance
received from Cracow.
Some of the other groups of materials from UNR diplomatic missions listed in
this section may also hold missing materials from the UNR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs received from Cracow. They obviously complement those that came
from RZIA to Moscow, some of which were forwarded to the Foreign Ministry
Archive.
Political Parties and Organizations
Foreign (Prague) Group of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party
(USDRP) (Zakordonna [Praz'ka] hrupa Ukraïns'koï sotsial-demokratychnoï
robitnychoï partiï [USDRP]) (1911-1936). These materials supplement those
that were requisitioned by Moscow from Kyiv and are now held in GA RF (see
n. 36), having regrettably been transferred there in 1956 from the UIK collec-
tions in Kyiv. (Not from the Petliura Library or other UNR sources.)
Community Organizations
Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations (Ukrains'ke tovarystvo
[prykhyl'nykiv] Lihy Natsii) (1917-1924). From the available description, it
would appear that these files all came from Prague, complementing those in
TsDAVO and RGVA.
Committee for the Foundation of a Monument Honoring S. Petliura, Head of
the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the UNR, Podëbrady
(Komitet dlia vshanuvannia pam'iati Holovy Dyrektoriî i Holovnoho otamana
viis'k UNR S. Petliury ν Podebrodakh) (ChSR) (1926-1929). The files involved
appear to complement those in TsDAVO relating to the fund-raising drive for
the foundation of a monument to Petliura and the library in Paris.
Commission for the Conduct of the Trial on the Case of the Assassination ofS.
Petliura, Head of the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the
UNR (Komisiia dlia vedennia sudovoho protsesu ν spravi vbyvstva Holovy
Dyrektori'ii Holovnoho otamana viis'k UNR S. Petliury) (1926-1928). Includes
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letters and telegrams to the Commissions in Paris and Warsaw and other
Ukrainian emigre groups relating to the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919, all
in connection with the trial in Paris. The materials are related to files in
TsDAVO and RGVA.
Military Societies and Organizations
Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France (Tovarystvo
buvshykh voiakiv Armiï UNR и Frantsiï) (1921-1938). Files include statutes of
the Society, proclamations, correspondence with members and commanders of
the UNR; Polish record books of the Third Sharpshooters' Division of the UNR
Army for 1920 under Oleksander Udovychenko; copies of Army reports (Octo-
ber 1921), among others. They appear to contain contingent files to other files
from this organization in GA RF and TsDAVO.
Cultural-Enlightenment Organs
Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury ν
Paryzhi) (1927-1941). Files include copies of the Library Council reports
(1933-1941), the accession register of books and other printed matter pertain-
ing to the library (1927-1929), and a catalog of the library collection in
religion, philosophy, history, archaeology, ethnography, geography, language
and literature, and belles-lettres (1939), complementing those in GA RF. Also
included are copies of printed publicity-information bulletins about the Petliura
Library's activities (1927-1929).
Religious Organizations
Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous) Committee in Paris (Ukrdins'kyi
pravoslavnyi [avtokefal'nyi] komitet ν Paryzhi) (1925—1930). Files comprise
lists of members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Committee in Paris, and appeals
for financial aid and registration books for the Ukrainian Orthodox Parish in
Paris, thereby complementing files in GA RF.
Publishing and Editorial Agencies
Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Socio-Political and Literary-Artistic Peri-
odical Tryzub (Paris) (Redaktsiia hromads'ko-politychnoho і literaturno-
mystets'koho tyzhnevyka Tryzub [Paryzh]) (1925-1926, 1933-1934, 1938).
Files include letters to the editorial office relating to the Ukraïns'ka zahal'na
entsyklopediia (Lviv) and the monthly Ridna mova, among them those penned
by V'iacheslav Prokopovych, Stepan Siropolko, Oleksander Shul'hyn, and
Mykola LevytsTcyi regarding organizational and business matters; typewritten
and manuscript editorial materials; political and economic reviews of the So-
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viet press (for issues of 1929-1930); and proof copies of Tryzub from 1927.
The files complement those in RGVA, GA RF, and TsDAVO.
Opysl: Documentation and Materials of Ukrainian State, Military, Socio-
political Figures, and those Representing Science, Culture, and Enlighten-
ment, and Other Persons
levhen Vyrovyi (1920-^1941). Personal papers of Vyrovyi include correspon-
dence with Rudychiv.
Ivan Rudychiv (1936-1942). Among Rudychiv's personal papers is correspon-
dence with various Ukrainian emigre friends and colleagues, including Dmytro
Doroshenko, Andrii Levyts'kyi, Ol'ha Petliura, V'iacheslav Prokopovych,
Stepan Siropolko, Stepan Skrypnyk, Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi,
Oleksander Udovychenko, and Panas Fedenko. Incoming letters to Rudychiv
primarily date from 1941 and early 1942, when he was in Berlin. Presumably,
these letters came from the same source as those in the Petliura Library fond in
TsDAVO, having been separated from the main group of the Rudychiv papers
in Kyiv at some point, or simply removed by the secret police for their own
direct examination.
Petliura Letters. Although there is no special separate group designated for
Symon Petliura himself, there are a few letters by Petliura among the holdings
in this fond in TsDAHO, most of which came to Kyiv from Prague. One
important group of Petliura letters is found in the group for the Kost'
Matsiievych papers, representing Petliura's correspondence with him from
Prague (1920,1924-1925).
Conclusions: Return to Paris?
Almost all of the agreed upon archival restitution from Russia to France was
completed with the 26 October 2000 transfer in Moscow of the latest group of
records of French provenance held in RGVA. However, none of the archival
materials from the Petliura Library or others of French Ukrainian émigré
provenance described here were returned. All of the Petliura Library holdings
and other Ukrainian émigré materials from Paris in the former "Special
Archive" (now part of RGVA) were included in the official list of French
holdings designated for restitution to Paris appended to a French-Russian
diplomatic agreement in 1992.121 The official French-Russian restitution list
covers only materials from the former "Special Archive" (now part of RGVA,
before March 1999, TsKhlDK). But archivists there were not aware that most
of the Ukrainian archival materials listed came from the Petliura Library in
Paris, or that the library still existed. They had no idea about their provenance
or the facts of their migration from Paris.
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Unfortunately, the official 1992 list does not include any of those materials
held across the city in GA RF. Before the research for this article was under-
way, archivists in GA RF were convinced that the Petliura Library holdings,
like the UNR ones described here, came from RZIA in Prague. They believed
that, accordingly, there should be no pretensions for restitution, because the
materials were part of the 1945 Czechoslovak "gift" of RZIA to the Soviet
Union. Besides, Russian archivists were not inclined to include "emigré"
records, such as those in GA RF, as candidates for prospective restitution along
with the acknowledged "trophy" records held in the former "Special Archive."
The French-Russian diplomatic agreement of 1992 called for restitution by
the end of 1994. In Moscow, archival restitution to France was in motion
during the winter of 1994, with the blessing of Russian archivists, who had
prepared the French materials in TsKhlDK for return. But in the spring of
1994, restitution to France was dramatically halted by the Russian Duma,
pending passage of the Russian law nationalizing the cultural treasures dis-
placed by the war that ended up in the Soviet Union.122 After the law was
finally signed by President Yeltsin in April of 1998, a new act of the Russian
Parliament provided for the completion of the archival restitution to France,
although officially it was called an "exchange" for Russian-related archival
materials in France, and the term "restitution" was not used.123
As late as the fall of 1997, however, officials handling restitution negotia-
tions at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay did not
know that the Petliura Library still existed in Paris. At the same time, the
administration of the Petliura Library in Paris was still not aware of the official
archival restitution list, nor had they filed an official claim. When this author
visited with the older directors of the Petliura Library at that time, they had a
vague notion that some of their library materials might be in Moscow, but they
had not investigated the matter.124 After those November 1997 meetings,
representatives of the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris were in contact with
the Quai d'Orsay to verify the situation.
Then in 1999, just as articles by this author were going to press in Cam-
bridge, MA, the new director of the Petliura Library, Jaroslava Josypyszyn, on
the basis of preliminary drafts of these articles, prepared a brief summary of the
findings—showing where the archival materials from the library were distrib-
uted in Moscow and Kyiv—which would assist in establishing a claim. Noting
that only the seven fonds from TsKhlDK (now part of RGVA) had been on the
official list for restitution, she concluded with some optimism: "We place our
hopes in the negotiations between France and Russia so that what belongs to us
may be returned."125 Since that summary was prepared, more details about the
provenance of these materials have come to light. Ukrainian specialists in Paris
may place hope in negotiations, but no one connected with the Petliura Library
has tried to verify the holdings in Moscow, or to search any of the pertinent
libraries for possible Petliura Library book stamps. Why has it taken half a
century, or even a decade since most of the holdings in the former RZIA
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Division of GA RF were declassified? Why, almost a decade since holdings in
the former "Special Archive" were revealed, were researchers in Paris still
unaware of these Ukrainian emigre materials in Moscow?
Part of the problem lies with the lack of openly available information in
Moscow and Kyiv about captured or "trophy" (as they are called in Russian)
archives and their provenance. In the case of these Ukrainian emigre materials
from Paris, Prague, and Tarnów, before this article was first prepared, there has
been no published list that specifies the origins, content, or location of the
Ukrainian "trophy" materials from the Petliura Library and other UNR records.
As this article was in preparation, a monograph appeared in 1998 on Russia
abroad and archives, which listed in an appendix the fonds of Ukrainian émigré
archival materials from Paris in GA RF. Although constituting the first men-
tion of any of them in print, the author did not distinguish them as Ukrainian,
nor did he list any of the Ukrainian émigré fonds among the former TsGOA
holdings now part of RGVA.126 A preliminary English-language list of fonds in
TsKhlDK was posted on the Internet during 1998, having been prepared by a
Russian commercial group working on a guide and anxious to sell copies of
documents from that archive. The Ukrainian fonds were mentioned, but the
records of the Petliura Library and other Parisian Ukrainian emigre organiza-
tions were erroneously stated to have their provenance in Ukraine. It was thus
little wonder that, during the French-Russian archival restitution negotiations
in October 1999 and still after, Russian archivists were not willing to consider
restitution of the émigré Ukrainian materials from Paris to French authori-
ties.127
Now for the first time we know more precisely which materials from the
Petliura Library in Paris are currently held in Kyiv and Moscow, even if we do
not know all of the details about their wartime and postwar Odyssey. Among
the problems that remain are lingering questions about the provenance of some
of their files from Paris, or contingent emigre files from Prague. We still do not
know the fate of all of the library books that the Nazis seized from the Petliura
Library, nor can it be determined how many of them survived the purges in
Minsk, Moscow, and Kyiv. The Petliura Library in Paris today has replaced
only a few of the 20,000 looted books, but the dedicatory inscriptions are gone.
In terms of archives, special collections in the Petliura Library in Paris today
are devoted to such subjects as: "Symon Petliura: His Collaborators and His
Times," "The Ukrainian War of Independence, 1917-1940," "The Ukrainian
Periodical Tryzub, 1925-1940," and "Documents of the UNR Diplomatic Mis-
sion in Paris and to the Peace Conference, 1918-1936," along with the postwar
records of the library. But researchers who are interested in these subjects
today would be well advised to journey to Kyiv and especially to Moscow—at
least until restitution and/or until full microform copying arrangements can be
negotiated with Russian and Ukrainian archival authorities on behalf of the
Petliura Library in Paris.
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There is no question that the Petliura Library's own records, its related
collections, and those of the journal Tryzub it fostered, should be reunited in
their Parisian home and remain there as long as the library continues to operate.
The foundation act for the library clearly affirms its Paris location and no other.
Other archival materials associated with the library before the war and those of
the Ukrainian community that patronized it also deserve preservation in Paris,
where they were created, as long as there is an active Ukrainian emigre com-
munity and research center to support them. Some may prefer today to see their
personal archival legacy in exile reunited in archives in the home country, now
that Ukraine has achieved independence. Such should be the choice of those
advocating this preference. Yet as long as there is an émigré community, its
strength can be important to the newly independent Ukrainian nation in many
ways. Petliura himself believed that a strong library and cultural center is
essential to an emigre community, as he pronounced not long before his
assassination in Paris. Poland understood that, too, when it returned all that was
found of the Polish Library from Paris—part of it immediately after the war
and the rest in 1992.128
By way of comparison, only one of the 100,000 books seized by the Nazis
from the Turgenev Library has thus far come home from the war to Paris (as of
fall 2000), and that one by sheer accident. A Dutch-language volume bearing
the Turgenev Library stamp was returned in 1992 to Amsterdam with a ship-
ment of Dutch books from the Library of Foreign Literature (VGBIL) in
Moscow, and Dutch librarians duly returned it to Paris.129 Other books from
that library have recently been located in Voronezh, Minsk, Kyiv, as well as in
Moscow.
Even more politically important than the archival materials from the Petliura
Library are the UNR Foreign Ministry records that the Nazis brought from
Tarnów to Cracow and that the Soviets brought from Cracow to Kyiv. The
stray contingent UNR files in Moscow deserve to be consolidated with those
now divided between two archives in Kyiv. As they are reunited in Kyiv with
any other files that remain of the Ukrainian regimes that failed in their bid for
Ukrainian independence, their provenance should be revealed and known facts
of their migration openly explained. Their future in Kyiv, where they undoubt-
edly belong, however, is contingent on the new Ukrainian government's com-
mitment to support a strong national archival system with professional finding
aids—the likes of which do not exist in Kyiv today.
The archives in Kyiv do not now have money for light bulbs and paper clips,
let alone for the professional staff they need. That may explain why they have
been unable to produce even a list of fonds as presently arranged for the UNR
and other materials brought to "the home country" from Prague and Cracow a
half century ago. The predecessor Soviet regime had interest in the records
only for "operational" or counter-intelligence purposes against the Ukrainian
emigration abroad. Today they need to be professionally arranged and de-
scribed, so that they can be open for public research. We still cannot tell if the
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UNR Foreign Ministry files from Tarnów are all in Kyiv or how they were
reprocessed there. We have found 17 others in one fond and some additional
fragments in another in Moscow, but it is now clear that these arrived via RZIA
in Prague.
The terrible fragmentation and dispersal of archival and library collections
wrought by postrevolutionary emigration, the Nazi regime during the war, and
the Soviet regime thereafter remains a serious detriment to national culture,
emigre communities, and scholarship in both East and West. Our story here of
the Petliura Library is a microcosm of that larger tragedy. The dispersal of
documentation from the Ukrainian straggle for independence, and especially
the Petliura regime, throughout the world resulted from the larger political
expediencies that dispersal served. If today there is a real spirit of political
renewal, as one would expect, we should also hope that restitution could
reunite the archival collections of the Petliura Library and the UNR regime.
Even if some of them can only be brought together in library microform, we
still need a thorough publicly available inventory of their contents, their present
whereabouts, and the known facts of their migration.
It is doubtful that the remnants of the Petliura Library or other UNR archival
materials that have now surfaced in Moscow and Kyiv will resolve the contro-
versies that still surround the life and death of Symon Petliura or the brief
regime he led in the straggle for an independent Ukraine. But the survival of
that documentation, and our knowledge about it, may help promote more open
research on those issues than has been possible in the past. Many of the French
intelligence and security service records (Deuxième Bureau and Sûreté
Nationale) are now returned to Paris from Moscow, following their parallel
odyssey at the hands of the Nazi and Soviet regimes.130 We do not know how
many of their files have been dispersed along the way or if they may also hold
further clues, because not all of them are as yet arranged and open to the public.
Other much more important clues about Petliura and his assassin undoubtedly
remain hidden in the inner sanctum of diplomatic and intelligence archives in
Paris, Warsaw, and Kyiv, and, especially, Moscow. When they will come to
light, or to what extent, remains an even more perplexing question.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT AND NOTES
AVPRI Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperil (Archive of
the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire), Moscow
BAB Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives), Berlin-Lichterfelde
DKAU Derzhavnyi komitet arkhiviv Ukrainy (State Committee
on Archives of Ukraine). Before December 1999, HAU
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ERR
GARF
Glavarkhiv
GPIB
HAU
IISH/IISG
MID
MVD
NKVD
RGALI
RGASPI
RGVA
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Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (Special Command
of Reichsleiter Rosenberg)
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State
Archive of the Russian Federation), Moscow. Formerly,
TsGAOR SSSR and TsGA RSFSR
Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie (Main Archival Adminis-
tration). Alternatively, and earlier usually, GAU (Ukr.,
HAU)
Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka
Rossii (State Public Historical Library of Russia), Mos-
cow
Holovne arkhivne upravlinnia (Main Archival Adminis-
tration). Rus., GAU, Glavarkhiv
International Institute of Social History (Internationaal
Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis), Amsterdam
(Dutch, IISG)
Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs)
Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del (Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs). Before 1946, NKVD
Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (People's Com-
missariat of Internal Affairs). After 1946, MVD
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva
(Russian State Archive of Literature and Art), Moscow.
Formerly, TsGALI SSSR
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-
politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-
Political History), Moscow. Formerly, Central Party
Archive (TsPA) and RTsKhlDNI
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (Russian
State Military Archive), Moscow. Formerly, TsGASA
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Rosarkhiv
RTsKhlDNI
RZIA
SMERSH
TsDAHO
TsDAVO
TsDAZhR URSR
SSSR, and now includes holdings from TsKhlDK (for-
merly, TsGOA)
Federal'naia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii (Federal Archi-
val Service of Russia). Before August 1996, Gosu-
darstvennaia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii (State Archival
Service of Russia)
Rossiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov
noveishei istorii (Russian Center for the Preservation
and Study of Documents of Modern History), Moscow
(1991-1999). Formerly, Central Party Archive (TsPA),
and now RGASPI
Russkii zagranichnyi istoricheskii arkhiv (Russian For-
eign Historical Archive), Prague
"Smert' shpionam" (literally, "death to spies")—military
counter-espionage units under GRU [Glavnoe
razvedyvatel'noe upravlenie] (Chief Intelligence Direc-
torate)
Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh
ob'iednan' Ukrainy (Central State Archive of Public Or-
ganizations of Ukraine), Kyiv. Formerly, Arkhiv KPU
(Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Ukraine).
Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv
derzhavnoi vlady i upravlinnia Ukrainy (Central State
Archive of Highest Organs of State Power and Adminis-
tration of Ukraine), Kyiv. Formerly, TsDAZhR URSR
Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhovtnevoï Revoliutsiï
URSR (Central State Archive of the October Revolu-
tion—official full name varied), Kyiv (Rus., TsGAOR),
now TsDAVO
TsDIAK (TsDIA-K) Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy,
Kyiv (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine; ear-
lier, of the Ukrainian SSR) after 1958: TsDIA URSR u
m. Kyievi (often, TsDIA-K) (Rus., TsGIA UkrSSR, or
TsGIAK)
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TsGAOR
TsGIAK
TsGOA SSSR
TsKhlDK
UIK
UNR
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Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi
Revoliutsii [i vysshikh organov sotsialisticheskogo
stroitel'stva]—official full name varied (Central State
Archive of the October Revolution [and Socialist Con-
struction])
—SSSR (of the USSR), Moscow (now part of GA RF)
—UkrSSR (of the UkrSSR), Kyiv (now TsDAVO)
{Ukr. TsDAZhR)
Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv
UkrSSR, Kyiv (Central State Historical Archive [of the
UkrSSR] in Kyiv). After 1958, often TsGIA-K (Ukr.,
TsDIA)
Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi osobyi arkhiv SSSR (Cen-
tral State Special Archive of the USSR), Moscow
(1992-1999, TsKhlDK). Now part of RGVA
Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental'nykh kollektsii
(Center for the Preservation of Historico-Documentary
Collections), Moscow. Formerly, TsGOA SSSR, and
now part of RGVA
Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi kabinet (Ukrainian Historical
Cabinet), Prague
Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika (Ukrainian National
Republic)
Technical Note: The archival term "fond" has been anglicized, since there is
no exact translation. The term came to the Soviet Union from the French fonds,
but not without some change of usage. In Russian a "fond" is an integral group
of records from a single office or source. American archivists might prefer the
more technical term "record group," which in British usage would normally be
"archive group," but the Russian usage of the term is much more extensive, as a
"fond" can designate personal papers and/or collections as well as groups of
institutional records.
In citations from former Soviet-area archives, numbers are given sequen-
tially for fond (record group, etc.)/opis' ([Ukr. opys], a series or separate
numbered file list or inventory within a fond)/ and delo ([Ukr. sprava], file or
unit) numbers.
Some commonly used geographic terms, such as "oblast"' and "krai" have
also been anglicized, and hence do not appear in italics—and in the former
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case, without the final soft sign. A few personal and geographic names such as
Yeltsin, and Cracow {Pol. Krakow) have been retained in the form most
generally known in the West, but most others have been rendered in a more
strict LC transliterated form. Family names have usually been rendered here as
they appear in the sources, unless another preferred spelling is known.
For historical references to localities then officially part of the Reich during
the war, such as Silesia, official (and usually more familiar) German forms are
used with the present Polish versions in parentheses on first reference—Ratibor
(Pol. Racibórz), Danzig (Pol. Gdańsk), etc., unless there is a common accepted
English variant, such as Silesia. Variant forms are repeated as necessary to add
clarity to references in the text.
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* The first part of this study was published as "The Odyssey of the Petliura
Library and the Records of the Ukrainian National Republic during
World War II," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 22(1-4) 1998: 181-208.
1. Vasyl' Mykhal'chuk, ed., Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna: Do 70-richchia
ioho trahichnoïzahybeli: Dokumenty i materiały (Kyiv, 1996).
2. Mykhal'chuk, "Peredmova," in Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna, p. 11.
3. Only vague remarks about the source of the documents appear in the
preface by Vasyl' Mykhal'chuk. See ibid., p. 11.1 have since been able to
identify them, thanks to Serhii Kot and archivists in TsDAVO. The
recently acquired Siropolko family papers in TsDAVO have been pro-
cessed as a second opys (276 units) of fond 4433. That fond for Siropolko
(undoubtedly from Prague) already existed with 10 units in Opys 1.
4. Vasyl' Mykhal'chuk and Dmytro Stepovyk, eds., U VO-richchia paryz'koï
trahediï, 1926-1996: Zbirnyk pam'iati Symona Petliury (Kyiv, 1997),
p. 132. Reference is to the former Lenin Library in Moscow.
5. See Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library," pp. 181-208.
6. ERR Stabsführer Gerhard Utikal to Rosenberg, "Aktenvermerk für den
Reichsleiter—"Dienstgut in Oberschlesien" (25 January 1945), BAB,
NS 8/261 (cc in NS 30/7); the text is published in Ulrike Härtung,
Verschleppt und verschollen: Eine Dokumentation deutscher,
sowjetischer und amerikanischer Akten zum NS-Kunstraub in der
Sowjetunion (1941-1948) (Bremen, 2000), pp. 204-205 (Doc. I/87).
Regarding U.S. Army recovery of ERR materials there after the suicide
of Kurt von Berg and his wife, see Grimsted, The Odyssey of the "Smo-
lensk Archive" : Communist Records in the Service of Anti-Communism
(Pittsburg, 1995), pp. 52-53.
7. A report by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army
intelligence service (RKKA), I. V. Shikin (1 March 1945) to G. M.
Malenkov, TsK VKP(b) (1 March 1945), RGASPI, 17/125/308, fols. 11-
12; G. F. Aleksandrov and I. V. Shikin to G. M. Malenkov, TsK VKP(b)
(1 March 1945), RGASPI, 17/125/308, fols. 14-17. The reports were
published by Valerii Shepelev, "Sud'ba 'Smolenskogo arkhiva,'"
Izvestiia TsKKPSS 1991 (5): 135-36. See also V. N. Shepelev, "Novye
fakty o sud'be dokumentov 'Smolenskogo arkhiva' (po materialam
RTsKhlDNI)," in Problemy zarubezhnoi arkhivnoi rossiki: Sbornik
statei (Moscow, 1997), pp. 124-33.
8. A report on the Minsk developments was kindly furnished me by Frits
Hoogewoud on the basis of a letter (dated 25 June 1993) he received
from H. N. Oleinik, Director of the National Library of Belarus
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{Natsyianal'naia Bibliiatieka Belarusi). In that letter, Oleinik dated the
transfers to Moscow to the late 1970s and early 1980s, but we have
indications that other shipments occurred earlier.
9. The report on the Turgenev Library is no. 31 "Turgenevskaia biblioteka ν
Lignitse (Pol'sha)," in "Spisok bibliotek, obsledovannykh pred-
staviteliami Komiteta kul'tury ν Germanii za period 1-go ianvaria-1
maia 1946 goda," GA RF (earlier, TsGA RSFSR), A-534/2/1, fol. 182-
182v (original ribbon copy; cc in A-534/2/10, fol. 137-137v); published
in a German translation by Ingo Kolasa and Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, eds.,
Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten Armee: Eine
Dokumentensammlung zur Verschleppung von Büchern aus deutschen
Bibliotheken (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1996), p. 141. The date of the ship-
ment to Belarus is not specified, but apparently there was a shipment in
the fall of 1945 (noted above) which contained some books from the
Turgenev Library. For confirmation of the Legnica location, see also the
telegram from Morozov addressed to Aleksei D. Manevskii and
Margarita Rudomino (22 January 1946), GA RF, A-534/2/8, fol. 187.
There is a handwritten resolution on the telegram addressed to Rudomino
(24 January 1946) to check if the materials could be removed from
Poland. Subsequently, in March 1946, the "cream" of the Turgenev
Library in terms of "manuscripts, first editions, autographed books by
well-known authors" was personally delivered to the Lenin Library by
Soviet Major Shaporovich.
10. Regarding the fate of the Turgenev Library in the Soviet Union, see a
lengthy footnote by Nikolai V. Kotrelev, "Piach o pogibeli russkoi
biblioteki," in Redkie knigi i rukopisi: Izuchenie i opisanie (Materiały
Vsesoiuznogo nauchno-metodicheskogo soveshchaniia zaveduiushchikh
otdelami redkikh knig i rukopisei bibliotek vuzov. Leningrad, 24—26
ianvaria 1989 g.) (Leningrad, 1991), pp. 107-109; or the English ver-
sion: "Lamentation on the Ruin of the Russian Library," KuYturologiia:
The Petersburg Journal of Cultural Studies 1(3) 1993: 147-50. In a
footnote on the fate of "trophy books" (that deserves expansion as a
separate study), Kotrelev documents the rescue of several title pages with
dedicatory autographs by important Russian writers from several vol-
umes with stamps of the Turgenev Library that were designated for
destruction "in an outlying Soviet library." Kotrelev (in conversation
with this author) has since identified that library as being in Minsk, and
has further evidence that subsequently most of it was destroyed during an
"ideological purification" campaign.
11. See my forthcoming article on the fate of the Turgenev Library in Paris.
It was reported to Hélène Kaplan that Minsk librarians have recently
identified more books with Turgenev Library markings. A list of books
with IISH prepared by Belarasian librarians is available at IISH in
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Amsterdam, but none of them is of a value meriting restitution efforts.
Regarding other West European books in Minsk, see the report by
Vladimir Makarov, "Involuntary Journey of Books from Paris to Minsk,"
Spoils of War: International Newsletter 6 (February 1999): 25-27.
12. Adam Mal'dzis, who heads the National Commission on Restitution in
Belarus, cites the "return to Kyiv" (with no details) in his 1995 New
York conference presentation, "The Tragic Fate of Belarusian Museum
and Library Collections during the Second World War," in Elizabeth
Simpson, ed., The Spoils of War: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery
of Cultural Property (New York, 1997), p. 80. It is also mentioned
appreciatively by Olena Aleksandrova in her report at the 1997 confer-
ence in Minsk. See her "Poten bibliotek Ukrainy: Problemy vyiavleniia i
poiska," in Restytutsyia kul'turnykh kashtounastsei: Problemy viartannia
i sumesnaha vykarystannia (Minsk, 1997), p. 95 [=Viartanne, 4].
13. This author initially received confirmation of the transfer in a letter from
. Adam Mal'dzis, who dated the transfer as having taken place in 1993-
1994. The receipt was kindly verified for me by Olena Aleksandrova,
Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Library in Kyiv, who established,
however, that the books were received earlier, in 1989, although the
exact date was not immediately known.
14. That purchase was also reported by Olena Aleksandrova, Deputy Direc-
tor of the Parliamentary Library in Kyiv.
15. The identification of more books from the Petliura Library in Minsk is
mentioned in a personal letter to this author by Adam Mal'dzis.
16. The shipment of about five freight cars, found in a shed on an estate in
Kswary Świerkowski, near Złotoryja (Ger. Goldberg) and Adelina (Ger.
Adelsdorf), 80 kilometers west of Wrocław—was described in a 25
October 1945 report by Dr. Bohdan Horodyski of the Biblioteka
Narodowa (Warsaw). The head of the Manuscript Division of the
Biblioteka Narodowa kindly showed me a copy of the report and inven-
tory. The shipment, which had been abandoned by Nazi authorities in
February 1945, also included books from the Polish Library in Paris,
which was taken by the Nazis at the same time as the Petliura Library. It
moreover comprised manuscripts and rare books from several libraries in
Lviv, including the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh). It is now
difficult to tell whether the scattered and badly mixed up Petliura military
files found there came from Lviv, or whether they were part of the UNR
military files that had earlier been taken by the Nazis to Vienna or
Danzig-Oliva. Possibly, some of the other fragmentary UNR records
may have come from Polish sources, or may have been separated from
those the Nazis had removed from Tarnów during the war.
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17. Halyna Svarnyk, "Arkhiv Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka ν
Natsional'nii bibliotetsi u Varshavi," in Z istoriï Naukovoho tovarystva
imeni Shevchenka (Lviv, 1998), pp. 232-41.
18. No mention has been found in Nazi reports that any books from the
Polish Library were in Ratibor. Indeed, as explained in documents cited
by Michael Burleigh, the ERR was forced to turn the library over to
another Nazi agency for use of the Institut für Ostarbeiten in Cracow,
which may explain why it was found in Silesia with other books evacu-
ated from Cracow at the end of the war. See Burleigh, Germany Turns
Eastward: Ostforschungen under the Third Reich (Cambridge and New
York, 1988), pp. 228-30. Another 747 crates of books from the Polish
Library were found by Soviet authorities after the war in a brick factory
in the German town of Neugersdorf (Saxony) near the Czech border.
There are no clues as to where this portion of the books had been earlier.
See the report "Pol'sko-frantsuzskaia biblioteka," in "Spisok bibliotek,
oblsedovannykh," GA RF, A-534/2/1, fol. 133v, and 10, fol. 178v; pub-
lished in German translation in Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten
Armee, p. 133. According to another Soviet report, 742 crates were
shipped to Moscow for the Historical Library in Moscow (GPIB) (16
May 1946), GA RF, A-534/2/8; or, as published in German translation in
Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten Armee, p. 171. According to the
present director of GPIB, Mikhail D. Afanas 'ev, who has been research-
ing these matters, all of the Polish books were removed from GPIB under
instructions from the security services in the 1960s for shipment to
Poland. He and his staff have not encountered any books with stamps and
dedications from the Petliura Library in GPIB.
19. ERR report (March 1942-March 1943), TsDAVO, 3206/5/26, fols. 4-5.
20. Ella Maksimova, "Piat' dnei ν Osobom arkhive," Izvestiia 7-21 February
1991.
21. The first published mention of the massive fonds of French intelligence
archives, for example, came in the interview with P. K. Grimsted by
Evgenii Kuz'min, "Vyvezti. . . unichtozhit'. . . spriatat' . . ., Sud'by
trofeinykh arkhivov," Literaturnaia gazeta 2 October 1991: 13; publica-
tion of that interview was delayed for almost a year and it was permitted
in print only after August 1991. In a follow-up interview with Ella
Maksimova a week later, the former director of the Special Archive,
A. S. Prokopenko, confirmed and expanded on the holdings in the Spe-
cial Archive—"Arkhivy Frantsuzskoi razvedki skryvali na
Leningradskom shosse," Izvestiia 9 October 1991. The story broke in
Paris later in November—for example, Thierry Wolton, "L'histoire de
France dormait à Moscou" (interview with Anatolu Prokopenko),
U Express 21 November 1991.
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22. Since the merger, former TsGOA/TsKhlDK fond numbers continue to be
the same, but with the addition of a "K" following the number, as
apparent in the citations that follow.
23. Deputy Director of RGVA Vladimir I. Korotaev kindly verified for me
"the receipt of a total of fifty-five units of records of Ukrainian national-
ists in fonds nos. 267-73 from TsGAOR BSSR, according to
'Rasporiazhenie GAU,' no. 21/3/09053 (29 December 1954)." There are
now a total of 530 units in those 7 fonds, which leaves open the question
about the acquisition of the remaining file units. Unfortunately, the ad-
ministrative files for those fonds {delà fondy) are not available to re-
searchers, so it is not possible to try to clarify the history of their forma-
tion. According to Soviet archival practice, the obligatory files kept for
every fond would necessarily record details of any transfers in or out of
the fond and more details about any destruction of materials from the
fond as authorized by the "Expert Appraisal Commission." So far, access
has also been denied to the TsGOA accession registers and to incoming
correspondence files that might well contain more detailed inventories of
materials transferred from other archives.
24. Details about the receipt of the fonds from Minsk are found in marginal
notes in the typescript list of fonds for what was earlier known as the
"French" Division of former TsGOA (typescript with manuscript notes
and annotations), which this author was first permitted to see in 1996.
When I first found a description of these TsKhlDK fonds in the list of
fonds for the "French Division" of TsGOA, the words "Ukrainian nation-
alist" were part of their official titles, as recorded in the opisi as well.
These descriptions, however, have recently been dropped.
25. For example, RGVA, fond 271K, opis', preface, fol. 2; destruction notes
also appear in the prefatory remarks for fond 269K and fond 270K. No
numbers are given in any case, and as yet it has not been possible to
locate other corroborating data or reports of the Appraisal Commission.
Since permission has not been granted to see the delo fonda, any con-
firming data recorded there cannot be reported.
26. See notes 11 and 15.
27. Again, the delo fonda (administrative file) for this fond has not been
available for examination. As noted in the opis', this fond earlier com-
prised 45 units; 3 more units were brought from TsGAOR SSSR in
November 1989. However, as explained below, GARF (the successor
archive to TsGAOR SSSR) still holds a much larger fond from this
organization (GA RF, R-6406).
28. In Ukrainian, this organization was alternately known as Ukraïns'ke
tovarystvo dlia Lihy Natsii and Ukrains'ke tovarystvo prykhyl'nykiv
Lihy Natsii. See the subsequent discussion elsewhere in this study on
related materials in GA RF and in TsDAVO in Kyiv.
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29. These papers were mentioned by Rudychiv in his account of the Petliura
Library (signed 1 October 1941), TsDAVO, 4362/1/5, fol. 14v. They are
also mentioned in the recently published prewar account by Symon
Narizhnyi, "Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury ν Paryzhi," Ukraïns'ka
emigratsiia: Kul'turna pratsia ukraïns'koï emigratsiï mizh dvoma
svitovymy viinamy, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1999), p. 39. See also the Chyzhevs'kyi
papers in RGVA (no. 7).
30. Captain GAU NKVD SSSR Gur'ianov to Lieutenant Andrii Iaroshenko,
Chief of the Division of Utilization AU NKVD UkrSSR (17 November
1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1423, fol. 93.
31. The Soviet archival practice with trophy records of removing "incorpo-
rated documents" from the agency records with which they were found,
explains why these were established as a fragmentary separate record
group. The fact that this fond has a lower number than, and is not in
sequence with, the other Ukrainian emigre fonds from TsGOA described
above, confirms this analysis (the French security records were among
the first to be processed in TsGOA).
32. The opis' in this case was signed as having been completed in August
1946. The preface to the opis' says there is a survey available—"obzor
fonda," no. 75/1, but I have not been able to examine it.
33. See the letter from Lt. Col. V. I. Sheludchenko to the director of TsGIA
UkrSSR (14 March 1956) requesting the transfer of archives relating to
"Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist organizations in Poland (1920-1927)"
and specifying "letters to B. A. Lazarevskii in Paris from his brother Gleb
[Hlib] and others in Poland." TsDAVO, 4703/2/35, fols. 3 ^ . In response
to the Moscow request, eight letters of that description were found in
TsDAZhR URSR, and were noted in a transfer document specifying
"sixteen files in Polish and other languages relating to 'Ukrainian bour-
geois-nationalists'" from TsDIA URSR to TsDAZhR URSR (29 Febru-
ary 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 31. Specific mention of publica-
tions transferred is found in a letter from TsDIAK to TsGOA SSSR (29
March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 43. Note that often the brothers
are identified differently: Boris as a Russian, because he published exten-
sively in Russian before emigration, and Hlib as a Ukrainian. This ex-
plains the divergent primary forms of their names.
34. Lazarevskii's papers now constitute fond 278 in RGALI (82 units, 1900-
1925). They are briefly described in the first volume of the guide to
RGALFs predecessor TsGALI: Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv
literatury i isskustva: Putevoditel', ed. N. F. Bel'chikov and A. A.
Volkov et al. (Moscow, 1963), pp. 257-58. Post-1991 guides or other
finding aids to RGALI give no indication that any later papers were
added to the fond, and archivists have not been able to identify any
emigré components.
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35. See Tatiana F. Pavlova, "Russkii zagranichnyi istoricheskii arkhiv ν
Präge," Voprosy istorii 1990 (11): 19-30, the first scholarly account
about RZIA to appear in the USSR in the period of glasnost. The most
detailed study of RZIA is Pavlova's unpublished dissertation—I am
grateful to her for making the typescript available to me. See also the
1990 interview by Natal'ia Davydova with MGIAI specialist Valerii
Sedel'nikov, "Arkhiv, o kotorom dolgo molchali," Moskovskie novosti
15 April 1990: 16.
36. These materials now constitute fond R-7744, Kolektsiia materialov
zagranichnykh organizatsii Ukrainskoi partii sotsialistov-
revoliutsionerov, Prague, 1919-1938. As currently listed in GA RF, the
fond is supposed to have 10 opisi, although elsewhere it is listed with
only one. Within the first opis' (unit no. 3) is one of the original Kyiv
opisi from TsDIAK—(оруs 3, prepared on 10 July 1946), indicating 122
units (1928-1938) under the Ukrainian title "Holovnyi politychnyi
komitet Ukr.P.SR (za kordonom) ν Prazi." Documents regarding the
transfers to Moscow are found in the TsDIAK correspondence file for
1954 (TsDAVO, 4703/2/31), where there are references to transfers on
20 February 1954 (fol. 5) and on 10 March 1954 (fol. 6) to TsGAOR
SSSR, which encompassed 444 folders of Ukrainian SR fonds (and some
files of Jewish committees) from Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland,
and another on 18 October 1954, referencing 381 folders of Ukrainian
SR files.
37. Regarding the transfers of RZIA and UIK from Prague and the Ukrainian
materials affected, see chap. 9 of Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire:
The Archival Heritage of Ukraine; World War II; and the International
Politics of Restitution (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
38. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Putevoditel', vol. 6:
Perechen' fondov Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Rossiiskoi Federatsii і
nauchno-spravochnyi apparat к dokumentam arkhiva, ed. S. V.
Mironenko et al. (Moscow, 1998). More detailed fond-level descriptions
will be included in a subsequent volume of the GA RF guide series
covering "Fonds for the History of the White Movement and Emigration
(1917-1946)."
39. Fondy Russkogo Zagranichnogo istoricheskogo arkhiva ν Präge:
Mezharkhivnyi putevoditel', сотр. О. N. Kopyleva et al., ed. T. F.
Pavlova et al. (Moscow, 1999). Publication subsidy was provided by a
consortium of European research institutions—IISH (Amsterdam),
BDIC (Paris-Nanterre), and the Feltrinelli Foundation (Milan). The guide
appeared just as this study was going to press, but archivists in GA RF
had discussed the production with me from the outset and kindly showed
me proof copies of appropriate sections.
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40. Limited staff assistance and the restriction on the number of files that can
be shown to a researcher in one day (usually no more than ten) made it
impossible to complete the checking process within a reasonable time.
41. The official receipt in the records of TsGAOR SSSR was signed by
Mikhail Il'ich Rubinskii, chief of the RZIA Division of TsGAOR SSSR
(9 November 1948), GA RF, 5142/1/423, fols. 140-41. GA RF archivist
Ol'ga Kopylova found this document among TsGAOR SSSR records and
kindly showed it to me after I had questioned the accuracy of the attribu-
tion of the provenance of the Petliura Library files to RZIA or other
Prague sources.
42. See the official act of transfer to TsGAOR SSSR (16 July 1949), GA RF,
5142/1/449, fol. 72. Other Rybakin papers are held in the archive of the
All-Russian Book Chamber (VKP).
43. Scattered administrative records of the Turgenev Library now held in
GA RF (fond 6846, 141 files) are described briefly in the 1994 guide,
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossisskoi Federatsii: Putevoditel', vol. 1:
Fondy GA RF po istorii Rossii XlX-nachala XX vv, ed. S. V. Mironenko
and Gregory Freeze (Moscow, 1994), p. 214. This author was permitted
to examine those records in the spring of 1991, at which time TsGAOR
archivists were still under the impression that the materials had come
from RZIA. I showed them the Paris stamp of the Turgenev Library and
other markings on many of the files, although at that time I had not
discovered the other documentation presented in this article.
44. This collection bears a separate designation (fond R-6162, 1 opis'; 13
units, 1919). Many of the files were personally examined in the spring of
2000.
45. A separate article on the fate of the Turgenev Library is forthcoming in
Paris. Regarding the Nazi seizure and the sense of loss suffered among
the Russian emigration in Paris, see the symposium memorial volume,
Russkaia obshchestvennaia biblioteka imeni I. S. Turgeneva. Sotrudniki-
Druzia—Pochitateli: Sbornik statei (Paris, 1987). Regarding the Russian
Literary Archive, see the 1938 announcement (p. 107). On the 1940
seizure by the Nazis, see the article by Mikhail Osorgin, "Gore ν Parizhe:
Unichtozhena Turgenevskaia Biblioteka" (pp. 111-13) and N. N.
Knorring, "Gibel' 'Turgenevskoi biblioteki' ν Parizhe" (pp. 115-19).
46. This author has personally seen books with Turgenev Library stamps,
and in some cases dedicatory inscriptions, in the former "Special Collec-
tion" (spetskhrari) of the former Lenin Library, now the Russian State
Library (RGB). Russian colleagues have reported many more sightings
and some have shown me books in their personal libraries that bear
Turgenev Library stamps, which they purchased from second-hand book
dealers in Moscow (with appropriate stamps to that effect).
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47. A report on the findings in Voronezh was presented at an international
conference at the All-Russian State Library of Foreign Literature
(VGBIL) in Moscow in April 2000. Among the leaflets issued by the
Zonal'naia nauchnaia biblioteka of the Voronezh State University in
2000 that describe trophy books recently discovered in the region, is one
listing twenty-six books from the Turgenev Library and another listing
fifteen books from the Polish Library in Paris (see the series of leaflets
Universitetskaia biblioteka ν litsakh, sobytiiakh, knigakh, no. 3: "Knigi iz
Russkoi Turgenevskoi biblioteki ν Parizhe, khraniashchiesia ν ΝΒ
VGU," and no. 5: "Iz kataloga knig 'Pol'skaia biblioteka ν Parizhe'").
48. Book stamps are normally not indicated on library catalog cards, and
because of the volume of trophy book receipts after the war, precise
records of their provenance were not prepared.
49. Vasyl' Mykhal'chuk, Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. Symona Petliury ν
Paryzhi: Zasnuvannia, rozvytok, diial'nist' (1926-1998) (Kyiv, 1999),
p. 103.
50. A draft annotation prepared for the GA RF catalog of archival materials
received from RZIA, which was shown for review to this author in 1997,
notes that "Information about the acquisition of these files in RZIA has
not been established. Presumably, the basic part of the fond was received
in exchange for printed editions."
51. Archivists had initially intended to include this fond in the RZIA guide,
although they had not found proof of its acquisition. Like the preceding
fond, it was dropped when the Parisian source became apparent.
52. See a more detailed description in Fondy RZIA, p. 153.
53. A few documents in file no. 2 (mostly posters) bear RZIA stamps: fols.
6-7 bear the RZIA no. 6407; fol. 9 from the parallel committee in Prague
bears RZIA no. 6430; fol. 10—no. 7390; and fol. 11—no. 6464. The fond
was apparently first established in 1965.
54. See a more detailed description in Fondy RZIA, pp. 148-50.
55. The fond is not listed as of RZIA provenance and hence is not described
in Fondy RZIA.
56. A number of the handbills and printed declarations bear RZIA stamps:
fol. 1—no. 1863; fols. 15, 16, and 23—no. 7233; fol. 21—no. 6850; and
fol. 25—no. 7554. A few bear the stamps of Lukasevych.
57. See a more detailed description in Fondy RZIA, pp. 99-100.
58. A typescript list of fonds of émigré institutions and organizations pre-
pared by GA RF in preparation for the forthcoming fourth volume of its
guide, listed this fond under Diplomatic Missions in Tärnovo, Bulgaria,
and it is also so listed in the 1998 GA RF Perecherífondov.
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59. See a more detailed description in Fondy RZIA, pp. 125-26.
60. All five files examined in fond 7027 bear the RZIA no. 7486 (the same
number as for three files in fond 6275 above).
61. The RZIA annual report for 1928 lists 500 pages of documents of the
Ukrainian delegation in Paris (1919-1922) among receipts. GARF,
7030/1/114, p. 7. Clearly, only a fraction of these remain in the present
fond. UNR diplomatic documentation from Paris is specifically men-
tioned in an undated letter among RZIA acquisition correspondence in a
descriptive list of a UNR collection received by RZIA, GA RF, 7030/1/
91, fols. 7-8.
62. TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 41. The problem of determining the present
location of these files in Kyiv has not been resolved.
63. See the more detailed description in Fondy RZIA, pp. 126-27.
64. RZIA no. 7486 (the same one as for all 5 files examined in fond 7027
below) was found on 3 files. Two other files bore nos. 8262 and 8598.
The fond bears an acquisition no. of 4412. See more details about acqui-
sition notes below.
65. The brief historical report on the history of the Petliura Library in Paris
published in 1977 notes that these materials had been moved out of the
main library building before the Nazis sealed it. Pavlo Shumovs'kyi,
"Korotkyi narys istorii і rozvytok Biblioteky im. S. Petliury,"
Bibliothèque Ukrainienne Symon Petlura à ParislUkraïns'ka Biblioteka
imeny S. Petliury ν Paryzhi, Informatsiinyi Biuleten' 38 (1977): 2. A
typescript inventory is available in Paris.
66. See the more detailed description of contents in Fondy RZIA, pp. 54-55.
67. RZIA no. 8306 (Petliura Embassy in Berlin) covers the first 28 items in
the fond.
68. The RZIA report printed in 1931 mentions that some files of the UNR
Embassy in Berlin were received that year. GARF, 7030/114, 1931
report, p. 7. The RZIA accession register also lists receipts in 1934.
69. Several other RZIA annual reports in the same folder (1928-1931) also
mention the receipt of UNR diplomatic documentation. Several other
RZIA annual reports (1928-1931) mention the receipt of UNR documen-
tation (GARF, 7030/114). Note that other parts of the records of the
UNR Ministry of Finance were found in Tarnów during the war and
transferred to Cracow and then, after the war, to Kyiv.
70. The 1946-1947'transfer to the Foreign Ministry, however, did include
diplomatic documents of the Petliura government and Ukrainian repre-
sentatives in West Europe, which are apparently now held as part of a
Collection of Documents from the League of Nations. These are listed as
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AVPRI, fond 415, opis' 1 (1914—1937), including Prague inventory nos.
1840-1859.
71. An official request for transfer addressed to I. I. Nikitinskii from
V. Khvostov of MID (24 December 1946) is accompanied by a seven-
page list of the files involved—GA RF, 5325/2/1705a. The original
typescript list with a covering letter from Madik to Kruglov (dated 24
June 1947) remains in another file, GA RF, 5325/2/2286a. The UNR
Berlin Embassy was included in the initial list. However, the Prague
inventory number 8306 (Petliura Embassy in Berlin) does not appear in
the official acts of transfer dated in September 1947. GARF, 5142/1/
407, fol. 22. I appreciate the assistance of GA RF archivist Ol'ga
Kopulova in acquainting me with the transfer documents and the admin-
istrative record (delo fonda) for fond 5889.
72. GA RF, 5889/1/34. The Vynnychenko letter is in file unit no. 26, and the
letter of 1919 about UNR funds, in unit 29a. The Petliura letter (auto-
graph), sold to RZIA by V. L. Forna with a receipt for 600 korunas, is
referred to along with the RZIA inventory no. 8827.
73. Copies of the official act of transfer (30 August 1945) in Ukrainian,
Czech, and Russian, are found in the recently opened secret opys of the
administrative archive (AA) of TsDIAK, which is now officially cited as
TsDAVO, 4703/2/2, fols. 13 and 14. An English translation appears as
Appendix VIII in Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire.
74. This text follows the official announcements with description of the
"gift" by Valentyn Riasnyi to Nikita S. Khrushchev (25 September
1945), TsDAVO, 4703/2/2, fols. 28-30, and to Beria, fols. 31-33, and
also appears in Moscow copies. For example, Nikitinskii to S. N.
Kruglov, "Spetsial'noe soobshchenie о sostave 'Ukrainskogo arkhiva'"
(September 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 88-88v.
75. Regarding the transfer of UIK to Kyiv and the related Ukrainian materi-
als from RZIA from Prague in Moscow, see more details in Grimsted,
Trophies of War and Empire, chap. 9.
76. When the often artificial fonds were established in Kyiv, no reference nor
correlation was made to the earlier archival disposition, numeration, or
existing finding aids for the materials in Prague or other sources.
77. "Otchet o rabote Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov za 1948 god,"
TsDAVO, 4703/2/13, fol. 35.
78. Nataliia Rubl'ova, "Dokumenty TsDAVOV Ukrainy periodu UNR," in
U 70-richchia paryz'koï trahediï, pp. 147-50. Although providing no
descriptive details about the contents of individual fonds, this is nonethe-
less the first such information published in Kyiv. Rubl'ova no longer
works in TsDAVO.
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79. These lists were found in the recently opened files from the administra-
tive records of TsDIAK. Those of Parisian provenance appear as fond
nos. 245-^8, 250, 251, and 253—TsDAVO, 4703/2/6, fol. 35; it is noted
there that they were received on 10 January 1946. Later, in the 1949 list,
they appear as fonds nos. 243, 246-48, 250, and 256—"Spisok fondov
Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov TsGIA UkrSSR, podlezhashchikh
uporiadocheniiu ν 1949 g." (25 January 1949), TsDAVO, 4703/2/16,
fols. 10-18. They were also listed among the 100 fonds that the TsDIA
Special Division had processed in a report to Glavarkhiv in Moscow (30
December 1946), GARF, 5325/2/2253, fols. 13-18. It was thanks to
these lists and the names of fonds there provided, that it was possible to
survey the fonds in TsDAVO today, because otherwise there are no
public lists that include holdings from that former Special Secret Divi-
sion. Further research is needed to confirm migratory details for these
materials and to determine from which agency they were received by
TsDIAK.
80. Reference is to the 1947 list—TsDAVO, 4703/2/6, fol. 35.
81. Iaropenko to Panteleimon Gudzenko (Lviv, 4 June 1947), TsDAVO,
4703/2/11, fol. 8. Specific mention was made of a Kerensky journal
published in French.
82. "Kharakteristika dokumental'nykh materialov Shtaba reikhsliaitera
Rozenberga" (11 October 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/12, fols. 3-13. See
also A. V. Bondarevskii to Gudzenko (11 July 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/
10, fols. 19-20; with the separate list—"Spisok і kratkoe soderzhanie
fondov і grupp dokumentov na frantsuzskom iazyke, vyiavlerinykh ν
fonde 'Ainzatsshtaba Rozenberga'" (Kyiv, 26 November 1947),
TsDAVO, 4703/2/10, fols. 33^0, 51-52 (cc. fols. 41-50). See more
details about the ERR materials in Kyiv in Grimsted, Trophies of War
and Empire, chap. 9.
83. Notice of other transfers from Minsk to Kyiv has surfaced, including
portions of the Dnipropetrovsk Party Archive that the Nazis had taken to
Ratibor. TsDAVO still denies access to their acquisition registers and has
not opened any files from the postwar secret section of the administrative
records of their predecessor archive (TsDAZhR UkrSSR), if such files
still exist. The administrative records of TsDAZhR UkrSSR now avail-
able to researchers in Kyiv do not contain any of the secret opysy from
the postwar period (TsDAVO, fond 4665).
84. Ivan Rudychiv, "Prymushenyi vy'izd bibliotekaria Ivana Rudycheva і
ioho perebuvannia ν Berlini (Dopovid' na zasidaniiu Rady Biblioteky 3-
ho hradnia 1942 roku)," typescript, pp. 65-66. Professor Arkady
Joukovsky kindly furnished me a copy of the report, which is retained in
the Petliura Library in Paris. Although much less detailed and interesting
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than Rudychiv's diary and the reports he prepared while he was in Berlin,
all of which are now located in Kyiv (TsDAVO, fond 4362), a few details
presented there are of significance in explaining the migration of the
archival materials from the Petliura Library now held in Kyiv.
85. "Prymushenyi vyizd bibliotekaria," pp. 65-66. For further elaboration on
the Rudychiv story, see the first part of this article, "The Odyssey of the
Petliura Library," p. 182.
86. Regarding the postwar seizures of Ukrainian emigré archives in Prague,
including those from the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of
Ukraine, see Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire, chap. 9.
87. See Pil'kevich to TsDIAK Chief Mykhailo Teslenko (18 December
1958), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 2 and fol. 8. A list of 25 fonds follows
(fols. 3-7). The 1958 and 1962 Prague receipts (fols. 58-62, and fol. 79),
together with the lists of other fonds received from Prague earlier (fols.
65-78 and 85-98), are bound together in a recently declassified folder.
Regarding the Museum, see Mykola Mushynka, Muzei vyzvol'noi
borofby Ukrainy ta dolia iohofondiv (Melbourne, 1996).
88. If we believe the January 1946 acquisition date, the Rudychiv papers and
other archival materials from the Petliura Library in TsDAVO came to
Kyiv before other materials from that museum that arrived much later.
89. The first announcement to this effect was circulated on electronic mail by
TsDAHO in February 1994. TsDAHO director Ruslan la. Pyrih showed
. these materials to this author in 1994. Their transfer from Prague is
mentioned in the article by Larysa Iakovlieva, "Praz'ki fondy ν Kyievi,"
Pam'iatky Ukrainy 1994 (3-6 [26]): 121.
90. See the account of the wartime transfer of these records from Tarnów to
Cracow and the Nazi processing of them there in Grimsted, "The Odys-
sey of the Petliura Library," pp. 193-95.
91. As documented in Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library,"
p. 194.
92. Report of Hryhorii P. Neklesa (Lviv, 12 March 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/
56, fol. 2-2v.
93. Communications from the deputy commissar of the NKVD UkrSSR to
his Moscow counterpart and from Gudzenko to the Chief of Glavarkhiv
SSSR, 1.1. Nikitinskii, dating from 27 March 1945. Diatlov to Kraglov
(Kyiv, 21 March 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fols. 3-4. Gudzenko to
Nikitinskii (Kyiv, 27 March 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 17;
TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fol. 11. Although there are two days difference in the
dates recorded in Cracow and Kyiv, this communication would appear to
confirm the pencilled note on the report in the Archiwum Państwowe w
Krakowie in my earlier account (Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura
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Library," p. 207n64). Gudzenko requested that "you resolve the question
of the transfer of these documents to archival organs of the NKVD
UkrSSR through the Main Administration of Counterintelligence
(Glavnoe upravlenie kontrrazvedki) 'SMERSH' NKO SSSR."
94. Gudzenko and Abram Grinberg to Nikitinskii (Kyiv, 30 May 1945),
GARF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 39; and (31 May 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/56,
fol. 13. He concluded, "Once we have sorted these materials, we will
report more precise details about the fonds involved." A subsequent
report has not surfaced.
95. Gudzenko report (25 July 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1326, fol. 116; the same
is reported at the end of the year (fol. 229). As the report was in Russian,
it used the form "TsGAOR."
96. These are listed in several different postwar lists of fonds in TsDIAK,
now held among the administrative records of TsDIAK in TsDAVO,
4703/2.
97. Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna.
98. I am grateful to Serhii Kot, of the Institute of History of the Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine, for arranging my interview with Mariia Evgraf evna
Samoilova, now a department head in the Parliamentary Library of
Ukraine, who recounted her story of the fate of the "trophy" books from
the Petliura and Turgenev Libraries that had been acquired by the State
Historical Library in Kyiv after the war. Regarding the 240 books from
the Petliura Library transferred from Minsk and now held by the Parlia-
mentary Library, see above and nn. 12-13.
99. In a special search, librarians in the current Archival Administration of
the Central Library in Kyiv have recently identified 533 Ukrainian and
129 foreign-language books from the Ukrainian University in Prague.
They did not recall seeing any from the Petliura Library from Paris nor
had they seen the stamp of the library before I showed it to them. They
only sighed at the difficulty of a thorough search.
100. MID SSSR to Gudzenko (4 June 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/11, fol. 7.
101. TsDIAK to TsGOA SSSR (29 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193,
fol. 43.
102. The act of transfer to the TsGOA (4 January 1956) notes an attached list,
but a copy has not been retained in the TsDIAK records, TsDAVO, 4703/
2/33, fol. 1. See also the act of transfer dated 8 December 1955,
TsDAVO, 4703/1/192, fol. 77. So far, an incoming copy of the list has
not been available in TsGOA records. Archivists at RGVA insist that the
records of the archive have not been processed adequately to be submit-
ted for declassification proceedings. A spot check of the catalog slips that
are available for the library books in TsGVA today reveals only a handful
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that might conceivably have come from the Petliura Library; this author
is still waiting for a response to her inquiry about these volumes.
103. This is explained in Rudychiv's report, "Prymushenyi vy'izd bib-
liotekaria," pp. 65-66.
104. In this case, Borys is cited in Ukrainian, although he has often been
recognized in Russia as a Russian writer. See above, nn. 33 and 34. The
letter from the TsGAO SSSR director to the TsDIA UkrSSR director,
V. I. Sheludchenko (14 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/2/35, fol. 5, re-
quests the transfer. A letter of transfer for 16 files regarding Ukrainian
"bourgeois-nationalists" in Polish and other languages, which included
"eight letters of B. A. Lazarevskii to his brother and others in Warsaw,"
was dated earlier (29 February 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 31.
105. Seen. 29.
106. TsDIAK to TsGAOR SSSR (29 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193,
fol. 43. Also included at the same time in the five crates with 77 file units
were many French and German materials that had been acquired and held
with the ERR records in Kyiv, and some scattered files of Ukrainian
emigre organizations in Poland.
107. Mykola Shudria, "Lysty Petliury ζ Pol'shchi," in U Ю-гкһсЫаparyz'koï
trahediï, pp. 200-201. See the prefatory remarks, p. 201. The article
surveying UNR materials in TsDAVO cited above, prepared by an archi-
vist there, however, does not mention this. She writes, as this author also
found when she last examined the opysy, that there are only 17 files in the
fond. Note below that most of the Prague Museum collections was
deposited in the former Communist Party Archive in Kyiv, now
TsDAHO.
108. "Verzeichnis des Archivs des Aussen-Ministeriums der Ukrainischen-
Volks-Republik, 1918-1926" (dated 1943), BAB, R 146/ 73. When this
author first found that inventory among the records of the Nazi State
Archival Administration (Reichsarchivverwaltung), it was still located in
Koblenz, but the entire record group has since been moved to the
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde.
109. The second opys contains 703 [earlier 694] file units (prepared in 1951).
The third opys currently contains 51 [earlier 46] files; an earlier version
ofthat opys (now no. 47) was apparently prepared in 1954. An additional
4 files received from the Lithuanian SSR were added to that opys in
1969. Many of the files included predate the UNR move to Tarnów, and
again dates do not correspond with those in the German inventory.
110. Fond 2592 (earlier 344s/259s) came from TsDIA as the fond of the
Secretariat of National Questions of the Ukrainian Central Rada, but its
Opys 1 (4 opysy; 121 units) has one group of files of the National
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UNR (Narodne ministerstvo sprav
zakordonnykh UNR) (1917-1918). Fond 3766 (3 opysy) has predomi-
nantly earlier materials labeled from "Ukrains'ka derzhava
(Hetmanstvo)." Different opysy were prepared at different times and the
transfers among different fonds complicate their identification.
111. "Spisok fondov Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov TsGIA UkrSSR"
(April 1949), TsDAVO, 4703/2/18, fol. 51. It has not been possible to
verify these data with the TsDIA URSR accession registers.
112. The German inventory of the UNR Foreign Ministry records prepared in
Cracow has a large section for the press division of the Ministry
(C. Presse-Abteilung, 1919-1922, nos. 74-111). There are also contin-
gent files of Press Bureau records, as noted above, in the UNR Berlin
Embassy fond held in GA RF in Moscow, which had been acquired via
RZIA in Prague.
113. The transfer protocol listed 18 émigré fonds, including UNR MID
records (26 October 1954), TsDAVO, 4703/2/31, fol. 38.
114. "Spysok fondiv orhanizatsii, ustanov ta osobystykh fondiv ukraïns'kykh
emihrantiv viddilu fondiv respublikans'kykh ustanov TsDIA URSR" (6
January 1962), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 96. Coincidentally, the number
of units in this fond corresponds to the 17 units listed for a fond by that
name in GA RF (no. 8), but those came from RZIA.
115. Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna.
116. The administrative record of the fond {delà fonda) has not been available
for examination, and there was no historical data presented in the very
rough handwritten opys.
117. See nn. 54-55.
118. RGVA, 1255K/2/13. The first 5 fols, give an administrative history of the
Ukrainian government; fols. 6-9 constitute a draft opis' of sections of the
records of the Ministry of Finance (1918-1921).
119. See the 1961 list, "Spysok fondiv orhanizatsii, ustanov ta osobystykh
fondiv ukraïns'kykh emihrantiv viddilu fondiv respublikans'kykh
ustanov TsDIA URSR" (6 January 1962), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, passim.
120. Colleagues in DKAU kindly provided me with a typescript review copy
of this section of the new TsDAHO guide in May 2000, from which the
present appraisal is prepared. See also the survey article by the TsDAHO
archivist who has been processing this collection—Anatolu V. Kentii,
"Fond 'Ukrams'kyi muzei u Prazi' TsDAHO Ukrainy iak skladova
'Praz'koho arkhivu' (za rezul'tatamy vporiadkuvannia)," Arkhivy
Ukrainy 2000 (1-3): 4 3 ^ 9 . I am very grateful to Kentii for making
available to me his preliminary card file and consulting with me about
these materials (as authorized by Ruslan Pyrih).
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121. I was shown these listings from the official French-Russian agreement at
the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. As of my visit in November 1997, the Quai
d'Orsay authorities did not even know the coordinates of the Petliura
Library in Paris, although they explained to me that the Petliura Library
would have to file a claim for their wartime losses and verify the fonds on
the official list. The library subsequently did so.
122. See Grimsted, "'Trophy' Archives and Non-Restitution: Russia's Cul-
tural 'Cold War' with the European Community," Problems of Post-
Communism 45(3) May/June 1998: 3-16, and the earlier, more detailed
coverage in Grimsted, "Displaced Archives and Restitution Problems on
the Eastern Front in the Aftermath of World War II," Contemporary
European History 6(1) 1997: 27-74.
123. "Ob obmene arkhivnykh dokumentov Frantsuzskoi Respubliki,
peremeshchennykh na territoriiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii ν rezul'tate Vtoroi
mirovoi voiny, na arkhivnye dokumenty rossiiskogo proiskhozhdeniia,
nakhodiashchiesia na territorii Frantsuzskoi Respubliki": Postanovlenie
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo sobraniia RF ot 22 maia 1998 g.,
no. 2504-11GD, Sobranie zakonodatel'stva RF, 1998, no. 24, st. 2662.
124. I am grateful to Professor Joukovsky for meeting with me at the Petliura
Library at that time. I appreciate the assistance of my friend and col-
league, Hélène Kaplan, President of the Turgenev Library Association,
for arranging my visit to the Quai d'Orsay, where Madame de Nomazy
kindly received us, briefed us about the French negotiations, and showed
us the proposed restitution list.
125. Jaroslava Josypyszyn, "Les archives de la Bibliothèque ukrainienne de
Paris retrouvées," Bulletin de Γ Association française des études
ukrainiennes 3(13) Novembre 1999: 3-6.
126. Andrei V. Popov, Russkoe zarubezh'e i arkhivy: Dokumenty rossiiskoi
emigratsii ν arkhivakh Moskvy. Problemy vyiavleniia, komplektovaniia,
opisaniia, ispol'zovaniia (Moscow, 1998), p. 301.
127. As reported to this author by colleagues in Rosarkhiv and RGVA.
128. Documentation regarding the Odyssey of the Polish Library is being
prepared for a separate essay.
129. This incident was reported to the author by Frits Hoogewoud, Deputy
Curator, Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, Amsterdam University Library. See
Hoogewoud's published conference report about the migration and fate
of the returned collections, "Russia's Only Restitution of Books to the
West: Dutch Books from Moscow (1992)," in The Return of Looted
Collections (1946-1996): An Unfinished Chapter: Proceedings of the
International Symposium to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Return of
Dutch Book Collections from Germany in 1946, Amsterdam, 15 and 16
April 1996 (Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 72-74.
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130. Claire Sibille, "Les Archives du ministère de la Guerre récupérées de
Russie," Gazette des Archives 176 (1997): 64-77; Dominique Devaus,
"Les Archives de la direction de la Sûreté rapatriées de Russie," ibid.,
pp. 78-86.
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A Recent Contribution to the Corpus Editionum
of Medieval Slavonic Texts
THOMAS ROSEN
PANDEKTY NIKONA CHERNOGORTSA V DREVNERUSSKOM
PEREVODE XII VEKA (IURIDICHESKIE TEKSTY). By Kirili A.
Maksimovich. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury (Studia Philologica),
1998. 574 pp. ISBN 5-7859-0069-6.
The comparatively intense research to which the Old Church Slavonic Canon
has been subjected sets it apart from the majority of medieval Slavonic texts,
many of which have still barely been studied. A new contribution to the study
of an insufficiently known text—Dr. Kirili A. Maksimovich's edition of the
Pandectae of Nikon of the Black Mount—is therefore to be welcomed by the
international community of Slavists.
Although Maksimovich's edition does not include the entire text of the
Pandectae, his is the first and largest of its kind. Several editions were pub-
lished in the late nineteenth century, but none of them covers more than small
fragments of the text. It would thus be appropriate here to say a few words
about the original author of the Pandectae, Nikon of the Black Mount (or
Nikon of the Black Mountain), and the text in its original language, Greek,
before evaluating Maksimovich's edition and the state of research on the
Slavonic translation of the Pandectae.
The work known as the Έρμηνεΐαι των εντολών του κυρίου, or
Pandectae, of Nikon of the Black Mount, is a compilation of texts from some
three hundred different sources, including resolutions of ecumenical and local
councils of the Church, extracts from secular law, hagiography, and patristic
writings. The Pandectae, traditionally viewed as a guide to various aspects of
monastic life, crosses over many borders of genre set up by modern scholars. In
fact, since it is of such a heterogenous nature, the Pandectae could be placed in
either one of the traditional genres of liturgy, canon law, or theology.1
The entry on Nikon in the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium2 tells us that he
was born into a family of archontes in Constantinople, probably sometime
around 1025. He later served in the army of Constantine IX, subsequently
withdrew from secular society, and took up residence in the Monastery of the
Black Mount near Antioch, where he was tonsured by its founder, Luke, the
former metropolitan of Anazarbos. Nikon, apparently a man of considerable
religious zeal, was later compelled to leave the Black Mount following a clash
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with members of his monastic community when he pressed the issue of intro-
ducing stricter discipline. The date of Nikon's death is not known with cer-
tainty, though it is probable that he died sometime between the years ca. 1100
and 1110. The place of his death is also a matter of some debate. Possible sites
are the monastery of St. Symeon the Stylite the Younger, not far from
Antioch—to which he moved after having tried to found his own monastery—
or the monastery of the Virgin of the Pomegranate.
Nikon's literary production or, rather, whatever fragments have survived to
modern times, consists of two large compilations, the Pandectae and the
Tacticon. The latter, which was compiled after the Pandectae, contains valu-
able personal information about the author.3 Whereas the text of one of the
Greek manuscripts containing the Tacticon was edited in prerevolutionary
Russia,4 no similar edition of the Pandectae exists.
At the time of the compilation of the Pandectae, around the year 1060, the
Seljuk Turks began to make their presence known in Syria. A plausible aim of
the compilation might therefore have been to secure the future existence of a
large number of texts that might otherwise have become casualties of war.5
The existing literature on the Greek tradition of Nikon's work is not exten-
sive, comprising articles by Nasrallah, Graf, Solignac and de Clercq.6 Minor
parts of the Greek manuscript tradition are to be found, in edited form, in
Migne's Patrología Graeca?
Maksimovich's recent contribution is an edition of the "juridical" parts of
the Pandectae. The sources represent a vast number of works on Orthodox
canon law.
In the table of contents, one finds that Maksimovich's book consists of a
Preface ("Predislovie," pp. vii-xiv), an Edition ("Teksty," pp. 1-470), and
three Appendices: "Prilozhenie I. Iuridicheskie terminy 'Pandektov' Nikona
Chernogortsa. Grechesko-slavianskii slovoukazatel'," pp. 471-524;
"Prilozhenie II, Iuridicheskie terminy 'Pandektov' Nikona Chernogortsa.
Slaviano-grecheskii slovoukazatel'," pp. 525-57; "Prilozhenie III. Index juridi-
cus," pp. 559-72. The third appendix, the "Index juridicus," is a list of the
sources of the approximately 300 canonical and secular rules and regulations
that make up the Pandectae. The book ends with a short bibliography (pp. 573-
74).
In the Preface, Maksimovich presents his work as the first critical edition of
the earliest known Slavonic translation of the juridical texts of the Pandectae of
Nikon of the Black Mount. Originally composed in Greek in the eleventh
century, the Pandectae were translated into Church Slavonic in the second half
of the twelfth century. Maksimovich characterizes this first translation as
"russkii," thus implying that it may have been made in the East Slavic area
(p. vii).
In the fourteenth century, Maksimovich asserts, the first translation was
followed by a second one, this time South Slavic. This second translation is the
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one most frequently encountered in the manuscript material, and it has been
edited twice, the first time in Vilnius in 1591 and the second time in Pochaiv in
1795 (the Pochaiv edition was later re-edited in Moscow in 1889).8 ·
Having briefly presented the two translations, Maksimovich goes on to
discuss a couple of his predecessors in the investigation of the oldest translation
of the Pandectae, mentioning the works of Sreznevskii9 and Tikhvinskii.10
Sreznevskii's edition of parts of the Pandectae is flawed by an excessive
number of misprints and the lack of a parallel Greek text. This—as
Maksimovich correctly points out—makes it unsuitable for scientific purposes
(p. viii).11 Having provided the reader with this characterization of the work of
one of his predecessors, Maksimovich refrains from elaborating on the existing
research on the Slavonic translations of the Pandectae.
Maksimovich's edition of the text is designed according to the rales of so-
called "lingvisticheskie izdaniia" of early East Slavic literary monuments
(p. viii).12 The edition consists of the text of the oldest known "russkii" manu-
script (i.e., the so-called Iaroslavskii spisok, "Я," dated to the beginning of the
thirteenth century), supported by a critical apparatus comprising ten additional
witnesses, ranging from fragments to complete texts (labelled: "Г," "Син,"
"У," "M," "Ч," "П," "Яр," "С," "Пн" and "A").13 The Iaroslavskii spisok is
used only for the first half of the edition, while the second half is made up of a
text taken from the manuscripts of the apparatus. The Iaroslavskii spisok was
chosen as the base text by Maksimovich by virtue of its seniority: it is more
than 150 years older than any of the other witnesses. In view of the fact that the
Iaroslavskii spisok presents many errors and lacunae, though, Maksimovich
briefly discusses the possibility of choosing another manuscript as his base text
(p. xi).
The "drevnerusskii" text is accompanied by a parallel text in Greek taken
from one "osnovnoi spisok,"1^ called " L " by the editor, and two
"vspomogatel'nye spiski," "С" and "P." 1 5
Maksimovich's editorial principles are clearly stated and the edition does
not cause any significant problems as far as interpretability is concerned.
To date, there exists no textological investigation of East Slavic manuscripts
containing the Pandectae, and Maksimovich's contribution does not change
this fact. The author states that a large number of witnesses remained beyond
his reach for the duration of his work, and he therefore chooses to refrain from
constructing a stemma codicum (p. x). He does, however, provide the reader
with some comments about the relationships of the various manuscripts. First,
he writes, the situation is complicated by the fact that many of the witnesses are
in a fragmentary state of preservation. Second, the majority of witnesses con-
tain only the first half of the Pandectae.16 The second half is poorly attested in
the material (p. xi).
According to Maksimovich, the Iaroslavskii spisok is textologically most
closely related to the Chudovskii copy, " 4 . " They appear to have a common
protograph, although "prikhoditsia predpolozhit' nalichie po krainei mere
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dvukh posredstvuyushchikh zven'ev" (p. xii). Besides this, the author identifies
two other groups among the witnesses: "Син," "M," "Пн," and "Π," "Яр,"
"С." Another one of the witnesses, labelled T " (short for "Gosudarstvennaia
Publichnaia Biblioteka"), represents a state intermediate between the three
identified groups (p. xii). Maksimovich does not attempt to classify two frag-
mentary witnesses, "У" and "A," which are mentioned on p. ixff. The author
never states whether he has had access to the manuscripts themselves or to
microfilm copies of them. In a single case, that of fragment "A," he declares
that the readings are taken from a secondary source (p. x).17
* *
*
On the whole, Maksimovich deserves to be congratulated for having made a
valuable contribution to the corpus editionum of early Slavic texts. On the one
hand, the fact that he has restricted himself to the "juridical" parts of the
Pandectae might be deplored by some, but Maksimovich's decision to do so
may clearly be defended when one considers the sheer size of the text. An
edition of the entire text, in all of its sixty-three chapters, would have produced
a very bulky edition that might then have had to be divided into two volumes.
Moreover, from the point of view of content, Maksimovich has "streamlined"
the text by leaving aside "extraneous" elements (for example, those of theology
and hagiography).
On the other hand, there are grounds for objection to Maksimovich's man-
ner of selecting his material, since the result gives a somewhat distorted picture
of what kind of text the Pandectae really is. By choosing to eliminate from his
edition everything that is not purely "juridical," in his understanding of the
word, Maksimovich excludes one of the most important authors, the ubiquitous
St. John Chrysostom. In the words of de Clercq: "[...] Saint Jean Chrysostome
surtout, qui est l'auteur le plus cité dans les Pandectes: son commentaire sur
l'évangile de Saint Mathieu forme dans de nombreux chapitres comme le fil
conducteur, le cordon tressé d'or sur lequel s'enfilent d'autres textes."18
As far as its usefulness to other scholars is concerned, Maksimovich's
edition prompts mixed impressions. To scholars interested in Slavonic render-
ings of canon law it is, of course, exceptionally useful. For others, its utility is
less obvious, due to a number of drawbacks—some of them of a serious nature.
Before addressing these concerns, however, it should be noted that the
author clearly states in the preface that the present edition is not accompanied
by a textological investigation of the manuscript tradition. This is, in general,
quite acceptable. Indeed, if it were required that all editions of early Slavic
texts should necessarily come with beautifully drawn stemmata, explaining the
relationships within manuscript traditions in all their minute details, there
would be significantly fewer medieval texts for Slavists with which to work.
Maksimovich has not attempted to come up with such a stemma, and he is to be
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commended for not having done so; clearly, the research on the Slavonic
Pandectae is still in its infancy, and any self-assured comments regarding
filiation, based on incomplete evidence, would have been premature.
Maksimovich's edition will certainly be useful to whoever decides to solve the
question of the textological relationships of this particular manuscript tradition.
That having been said, the problematic aspects of Maksimovich's edition must
still be addressed.
The first and foremost concern has to do with Maksimovich's complete
avoidance of the question of the provenance of the first Slavonic translation of
the Pandectae. In his preface, as already noted, Maksimovich mentions a pair
of Russian nineteenth-century scholars: Sreznevskii, who worked with three
East Slavic manuscripts, the Iaroslavskii, Sinodal'nyi and Chudovskii copies
(Maksimovich's sigla: "Я," "Син" and "Ч") and was also one of the earliest
editors of parts of the Pandectae; and Tikhvinskii, who described the paléo-
graphie and morphological features of the oldest East Slavic manuscript, the
Iaroslavskii spisok. But beyond these two scholars, Maksimovich remains
silent concerning the state of research on the earliest translation of the
Pandectae. This silence begs the questions: is Maksimovich aware of the
existence of any of the work that has been published on the subject during the
last century? Is he familiar with the articles by Likhachev,19 Franko,20 Isakin,21
Ivanova-Konstantinova,22 Pavlova,23 Thomson,24 and Bogdanova?25 Judging
from what he writes in his preface, one is inclined to believe that he is not.
Thus, before taking the discussion any further, it seems germane here to
review the existing evidence concerning the provenance of the oldest Slavonic
translation of the Pandectae.
Quite independently of his learned predecessors, and without references of
any kind to other relevant works, Maksimovich affirms, already in the second
sentence of his preface, that "ètot trad [...] byl pereveden vo vtoroi polovine
XII v. na tserkovnoslavianskii (drevnerusskii) iazyk i okazał znachitel'noe
vliianie na dukhovnoe prosveshchenie drevnerusskogo chitatelia" (p. vii). The
wording of this sentence is highly problematic in more ways than one.
First, it seems to declare that the dating of the translation has been decided
once and for all. This seems odd, since all we know for certain is that the date
of translation must fall somewhere between the original compilation of the
material in Greek (1060s at the very earliest) and the oldest surviving Slavonic
manuscript ("Я," beginning of the thirteenth century). Maksimovich's date,
"vtoraia polovina XII v." [second half of the twelfth century], may be an
educated guess, but it remains exactly that: guesswork.
Second, this sentence gives the impression that Maksimovich either consid-
ers Church Slavonic and "Old Russian" (i.e., early East Slavic) to be com-
pletely identical, or that the Pandectae were translated into the RusYearly East
Slavic recension of Church Slavonic. What he actually means remains unclear.
It would appear, however, that Maksimovich is in favor of the first alternative,
since he occasionally refers to the text simply as "russkii perevod" (p. ix).
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Third, this sentence gives the impression that someone has studied the
reception of this translation of the Pandectae in the East Slavic area. In fact, as
far as could be determined by this reviewer, no such study exists.
By including this sentence in his text, Maksimovich manages to circumvent
the entire discussion about the provenance of the translation. However, this
issue is far from solved and needs to be examined in a serious way. Since a
review is hardly the appropriate place for such a serious scrutiny of the evi-
dence, I will restrict myself to merely drawing the contours of the debate.
In essence, there exist three hypotheses:
(1) The Pandectae were translated by a team of South and East Slavs.
(2) The Pandectae were translated in the East Slavic area.
(3) The Pandectae were translated in the South Slavic area.
The first hypothesis is the oldest. It was presented by Sreznevskii as early as
1872.26 The evidence presented in favor of this theory builds on two facts
which were true at the time of Sreznevskii's publication: namely that all known
manuscripts were of East Slavic origin and that they contained many East
Slavisms in the vocabulary.27
The second hypothesis, pertaining to the East Slavic theory, is really a
variation of the first, uses the same kind of evidence, but excludes the idea of a
South Slavic translator working together with a colleague from the East Slavic
area. This theory is found in articles by Franko28 and Ivanova-Konstantinova.29
It should be noted that neither Franko nor Ivanova-Konstantinova nor, indeed,
Maksimovich, present any evidence in favor of the exclusively East Slavic
hypothesis.
The third hypothesis, found, for example, in an article by Emil
Kałużniacki,3 0 characterizes the translation as "slaviano-bolgarskii."
Kaluzniacki's contribution fails, however, to offer evidence in support of this
characterization. More recent proponents of this theory are Pavlova31 and
Thomson.32 According to these scholars, the existence of a South Slavic manu-
script, HilandarSMS 175 (1290s), containing chapters 2-32 of the Pandectae,
speaks in favor of the idea that the translation was originally made in the South
Slavonic area.
A preliminary study of Hilandar SMS 175 by this reviewer, shows that the
manuscript lacks many of the alleged East Slavisms. Before anything definite
can be said about it, though, the manuscript needs to be studied in greater
depth, and to be compared both with other Slavonic representatives of the
tradition and with possible Greek candidates for the title of being the "original
of the Slavonic translation."
As should be quite clear from the presentation of the problems surrounding
the location of the earliest translation of the Pandectae, the whole matter is far
from being insignificant. It is therefore puzzling not to find a single word about
this issue in Maksimovich's book. One might conclude, given the circum-
stances, that Maksimovich did not have access to all the information needed to
address these very important questions.
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If Maksimovich had indeed read the articles by Pavlova and Thomson, he
would have learned about the intriguing facts offered by the single known
South Slavic copy of the oldest translation of the Pandectae. Surely he would
have found it difficult to ignore this important witness.
The second concern with Maksimovich's edition touches on the question of
which Greek version of the Pandectae should be considered to be the original
of the Slavic translation. Maksimovich uses three Greek manuscripts: one from
the twelfth century, "L," and two from the thirteenth, "C" and "P." In his
preface (p. ix), he refers to these manuscripts collectively as "original" and
goes on to say that those parts of this "original" that cannot be found in the
Slavonic translation will be surrounded by brackets in the edition. In doing this,
Maksimovich follows a venerable tradition in the research on the earliest
Slavonic translation of the Pandectae: he considers the translation to be an
abridged version of the Greek text. This idea goes back to the very beginning of
research on the Pandectae.33 Here, however, as in the question of the
translation's provenance, there exists manuscript material that might prove
otherwise. In 1088 Nikon himself prepared a shorter version of the Pandectae,
known as the Liber Parvus. So far, only one copy of this text is known, Codex
Sinaiticus graecus 441 (ff. 264r-335v).34 No investigation exists of this manu-
script, but this reviewer intends to prepare such a study in conjunction with a
more detailed analysis of the Hilandar manuscript.
A third concern, linked to the second, is that Maksimovich appears not to be
familiar with the work done by Carlo de Clercq in the 1940s.35 Similar to
Maksimovich's Index juridicus, but much more detailed, de Clercq's book
traces and analyzes the sources of the entries in the Pandectae.
Maksimovich's failure to deal with the difficult problems of location and his
completely inadequate introduction to the problems concerning the history of
the Slavonic translations of the Pandectae of Nikon of the Black Mount, are
serious drawbacks in his otherwise tidy and well-organized edition. By thor-
oughly ignoring the views of those scholars who do not agree with him about
the East Slavic provenance of the earliest translation, Maksimovich has per-
petuated these problems rather than offered an acceptable solution to them.
To date, there exists no definitive treatment of the question of the origins
and development of the Slavonic translations of the Pandectae. The interested
reader will find useful information, however, in the articles by Pavlova and
Thomson, which also give a brief introduction to the work done at the turn of
the twentieth century.
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RELIGION AND NATIONALITY IN WESTERN UKRAINE:
THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE RUTHENIAN
NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN GALICIA, 1867-1900. By John-
Paul Himka. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999.
236 pp. ISBN (cloth) 0-7735-1812-6 $70.00.
In 1867, the Habsburg monarchy was reorganized according to the constitu-
tional arrangements of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Galicia found itself
in the Austrian half of the monarchy, sometimes known as Cis-Leithania, and
the conservative Polish nobles of Galicia, guided by Agenor Goluchowski,
found themselves well positioned to negotiate a secondary compromise with
Vienna, permitting very significant Galician autonomy within Cis-Leithania.
The consequent autonomy was structured to favor the prerogatives of Polish
language, culture, and nationality, although Poles barely constituted a plurality
of the population vis-à-vis the people who were called, and generally called
themselves, Ruthenians (rusyny), sometimes Galician Ruthenians (halyts'ki
rusyny), still on their way to becoming nationally Ukrainians. In 1867, the year
of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Vatican approved the canonization
of Iosafat Kuntsevych, the Uníate or Greek Catholic bishop who was martyred
at the hands of Orthodox murderers in Vitsebsk in 1623. The Ruthenians of
Galicia were overwhelmingly Greek Catholic in 1867, and so the canonization
of St. Iosafat was of most immediate interest to them. John-Paul Himka takes
this occasion as the paradoxical point of departure for his important new study
of religion and nationality in eastern Galicia, or, as his title affirms, in western
Ukraine.
"It would seem on the face of it that the Greek Catholic Ruthenians should
have been elated to have one of their number solemnly declared a saint by Pope
Pius IX," remarks Himka. "Yet the exact opposite was the case: Galician
Ruthenian public opinion greeted the news of Iosafat's canonization with
hostility" (p. 29). The reason for such antipathy to a saint who might well have
been regarded as one of their own, to a canonization that could have been seen
as an occasion of national pride, was that Iosafat's martyrdom was being
rehashed, so to speak, at a moment of peculiar delicacy in the development of
Greek Catholic religious identity and Ruthenian national identity. The intersec-
tion of those identity crises forms the central subject of Himka's study, as he
attempts to sort out the interrelated impacts of religious and political forces in
the making of modern Ukrainians in Galicia. Reticence toward the Greek
Catholic saint was a function of ambivalence toward his Orthodox murderers at
a moment, 250 years after his martyrdom, when Ruthenian Greek Catholics in
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Galicia, faced with the political predomination of Roman Catholic Poles in the
province, had to consider a favorable revaluation of the Orthodox component
in their hybrid religious rite.
"The hostility to the canonization of Iosafat Kuntsevych in Greek Catholic
Galicia," Himka explains, "makes sense within the context of the Russophile
hegemony in Ruthenian public opinion" (p. 31). Exceptionally sensitive to the
weight of national names in an age of evolving national consciousness, Himka
describes a "Russophile" orientation, displacing an older "Ruthenian" identity,
as part of a dialectical evolution that would eventually, though not inevitably,
bring this population around to becoming Ukrainian. Russophilism plays a
particularly important part in this study inasmuch as its manifestations were
clearly both religious and political, reflecting Galician Ruthenian interest in the
Orthodox religion and the Russian state, as well as a sense of common cultural
destiny with the Orthodox population of Ukraine within the Russian Empire.
Himka has worked in several major archives to produce this study, including
Lviv, Vienna, and the Vatican, and the archival results are fascinating. Equally
impressive, though, is the research that he has pursued in representing "public
opinion" among Galician Ruthenians at a moment of maximal ambivalence
and cultural controversy. Himka attends to the divergent journalistic perspec-
tives of the province, with particular attention to Ruthenian publications in the
provincial capital Lviv. He notices not only what was said, but what was passed
over in silence, like the canonization of St. Iosafat which was most notable for
being hardly mentioned in those publications. Himka's research permits us to
witness in concrete detail the elusive process of the construction of nationality
in the public sphere of Ruthenian Galicia.
Himka discusses the Russophile role of the Galician clergy who were also
active outside Galicia, in the Greek Catholic diocese of Chełm (Kholm), the
only remaining one within the Russian Empire; the irresistible combination of
Russian imperial power and a Russophile clergy brought the Greek Catholics
of Chełm over to Orthodoxy in 1875, envisioning a dual return "to the bosom
of the Russian church and Russian nationality" (p. 59). The case of the intently
Russophile Father Ioann Naumovych is treated in detail, including his role in
the scandal surrounding the village of Hnylychky where 129 Greek Catholic
Ruthenians wanted to convert to Orthodoxy in 1882. As well, Naumovych is
discussed for his role in the making of Galician public opinion, his trial for
treason by the Habsburg government, and his eventual embrace of Orthodoxy
and emigration to the Russian Empire. Himka also addresses the efforts to
shape Roman Catholic public opinion in the Sion circle in the 1870s, and the
Roman-Polish perspective of the Jesuits who were supposed to reform the
Greek Catholic Church in the 1880s, earning Russophile excoriation as "the
most difficult historical enemy of the Ruthenians, responsible for rivers of
blood and blazing fires" (p. 84). The variant details of religious practice are
considered in their implications for ultimate allegiance, with organs and rosa-
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ries pointing toward Rome, and three-barred crosses, Julian calendars, and
priestly beards denoting Russophile Orthodox leanings. The bearded
Naumovych was said to look just like an Orthodox priest even before he
actually became one, while the journal Sion made the case for a clean-shaven
Catholic clergy, suggesting, according to Himka, that nothing less than "the
march of civilization" dictated smooth cheeks over shaggy beards (p. 50).
Thus, even the cultural politics of bringing "civilization" to "Eastern Europe"
entered into the public debate about Greek Catholic practice.
The fascination of ecclesiastical history is often in the details, and Himka
clearly recognizes that no detail of ritual or prerogative seemed too small to
provoke the passions of nineteenth-century churchmen. One of the most inter-
esting sections of the book focuses on the exacerbating debates and numerous
draft resolutions concerning the sensitive issue of clerical celibacy at the Lviv
Provincial Synod of 1891. Uniates largely preserved clerical marriage at the
time of the Union of Brest in 1596, and three hundred years later Greek
Catholic priests faced Vatican pressure to recognize the spiritual priority of
celibacy in the Catholic world. While a succession of resolutions sought to
specify different degrees of recommendation on behalf of celibacy, the debate
addressed the crucial national issue of the origins of the small Ruthenian
intelligentsia, often the sons of married priests. One of the points that Himka
emphasizes is the Vatican's general distrust of national sentiment, and reluc-
tance to countenance the national deployment of religious issues, let alone
encourage a national perspective that took priority over religious concerns.
Himka sharply characterizes the Vatican delegate at the synod, Monsignor
Agostino Ciasca, chosen as an Orientalist expert to go east to Lviv, though his
expertise did not involve Slavic languages or culture. He appears in these pages
petulantly throwing his snuffbox down on the floor, making tasteless jokes
about the sexual impropriety of the Greek Catholic clergy, and finally altering
the text of the accepted resolution after the synod ended. Perhaps from his
perspective the Greek Catholics did indeed seem to practice an exotic Oriental
rite, perceived by him according to the demi-Orientalism that helped to define
the backwardness of Eastern Europe for so many foreign visitors to the region.
Starting the chronology of his study with the year 1867, Himka concludes it
with the year 1900, which was not just the turn of the century, but also the year
in which Andrei SheptytsTcyi became the Greek Catholic metropolitan, inaugu-
rating a new era of church leadership in the guidance of Ukrainian national
development. Himka sketches the remaking of SheptytsTcyi from a Polish noble
to a Basilian monk to a Ruthenian leader, and points out his ancestral legacy of
involvement in the Ruthenian sphere; at SheptytsTcyi's ordination his father
appeared in the costume of a Ruthenian boyar. This family history, like the
account of the canonization of St. Iosafat, connects Himka's history of national
issues in the modern Greek Catholic Church to the early modern emergence of
the Union. Historiographically, this important study may be read alongside
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such recent landmarks in early modern Uniate history as Boris Gudziak's
Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of
Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest (1998) and David
Frick's Meletij Smotryc'kyj (1995).
Himka's work, profoundly engaged with the all-important modern issue of
national identity, makes a brilliant contribution not just to the history of Ukrai-
nian nationality, but also to the general theoretical understanding of modern
nationalism. Taken together with his recent article on "The Construction of
Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions" (in
Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, eds. Michael Kennedy and
Ronald Suny, 1999), Himka's research makes the case for a contingent and
evolutionary perspective on nationality in which several different forms and
inflections of national identity jostle one another in cultural competition, en-
hanced or diminished by various historical forces, including religion, without
any predetermined outcome. In the case of Ukrainian national history, the
ultimate outcome was, tautologically, Ukrainian national identity. Himka's
study of the late nineteenth century in "Western Ukraine," however, demon-
strates the range of competing alternative identity formations still seemingly
viable at the turn of the century. The issue of nationality has drawn many
stimulating theoretical treatments over the last generation, and one of Himka's
achievements in this book is to offer an empirical study the subtlety, sophistica-
tion, and insight of which meet the intellectual challenges posed by this excep-
tionally important and profoundly complex historical problem.
Larry Wolff
Boston College
OLD BELIEVERS IN MODERN RUSSIA. By Roy R. Robson.
DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995. XIII,
188 pp. + 18 illus., bibliography, index. ISBN (cloth)
0-87580-205-2 $30.00.
This book addresses the history of Old Belief, a topic that has been sorely
neglected by English-language historians of the Russian Empire. While a
plethora of studies exist in Russian and there are some relevant publications in
Polish (Iwaniec), French (Pascal; Niqueux), and German (Hauptmann; Pleyer;
Hildermeier), English-language scholarship has been almost exclusively de-
voted to the seventeenth-century genesis of Old Belief (Cherniavsky;
Crummey; Michels). Robson's study makes an important contribution by fo-
cusing on Old Believers between the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. The 1905
Revolution led to the legalization of Old Belief after more than two hundred
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years of persecution, giving Old Believers the opportunity to discuss their
internal affairs for the first time in a public forum. Robson organizes the five
principal chapters of his book around the topics raised in these discussions:
liturgy and prayer, church architecture, iconography, ritual prohibitions, and
the notion of "community." These chapters are preceded by two rather general
chapters providing the uninitiated reader with basic facts about Old Beliefs
religious history.
Robson draws the bulk of his information from post-1905 Old Believer
publications, including liturgical books, prayer manuals, conference proceed-
ings, and, in particular, articles published in eleven Old Believer journals and
magazines. These sources provide some fascinating glimpses into the intellec-
tual and moral dilemmas of faithful Old Believers facing modernity: Did Old
Belief's religious ideals permit the use of kerosene lamps, iron plows,
gramophones, or photographs? Should Old Believers have their children vacci-
nated or seek medical care in hospitals? Should Old Believers residing in cities
eat together with non-Old Believers at one table? Should they be allowed to
drink tea, or alcohol, and what about smoking tobacco? Clearly, the traditional
boundaries of the Old Belief community were coming under attack and Old
Believers were struggling with how to maintain their distinctiveness and inner
cohesion.
Robson presents Old Believers' own views while downplaying critical com-
mentary by outside observers as "problematic" and "hav[ing] their limitations."
He rarely refers to archival sources such as reports by agents of the Holy Synod
or by government officials, and seems to imply that Old Believers discussed
their affairs openly without internal censorship or concerns about public repu-
tation. This optimistic reading of Old Believer sources underscores Robson's
desire to take Old Beliefs own statements seriously.
Throughout his study Robson postulates that the religious ideals of Old
Belief were stronger than the forces of modernization. "The way an Old
Believer interacted with the world" was informed by "separatist traditions,"
developed during the seventeenth century and expressed in ritual,"prohibitions
serv[ing] to set Old Believers apart from the rest of Russian society." Even
those "liberal" Old Believers who made concessions to modernity—and the
book illustrates that there were many such Old Believers—accepted traditional
ideals and tried to give them new vitality by appropriating the tools of technol-
ogy and scientific analysis (e.g., using photographs to disseminate old icono-
graphie motives or describing the health hazards of smoking and drinking).
The common language of symbols (Robson speaks of an "iconic principle")
also transcended inner divisive factors such as economic status, power hierar-
chy, social position, and geographic separation. According to Robson, all Old
Believers participated in the same "system of communication" and were con-
nected with each other by "shared sets of assumptions and [mutual] trust."
Rank-and-file Old Believers had deeply internalized ancient religious tradition
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("the piety of Old Rus"') as the only viable "conduit of grace through which one
could become deified," and thus, very much afraid of the Antichrist, did not
even think of questioning the ritual proscriptions of their superiors.
However, Robson's book contains some data—mentioned only in passing
and not fully analyzed—that contradict his basic premise and indicate that Old
Believer peasants and merchants frequently disregarded the exhortations of
their religious leaders: many drank alcohol and smoked tobacco (though "pre-
sumably no Old Believers . . . would ever smoke in church"); many used white
sugar (a commodity that "had not been known in old Russia") and a growing
number drank tea (denounced by "the most creative Old Believers" as "part of
Chinese idolatry and therefore inappropriate for Christian consumption"); oth-
ers visited the bathhouse (bania) together with their Orthodox neighbors ("with
the heterodox" as Robson puts it); or they visited shrines of the Orthodox
church, and bought cheap machine-made icons (not following injunctions to
buy only expensive handmade icons); finally, Old Belief entrepreneurs had no
qualms about selling Old Believer icons to the general public and mass produc-
ing icons of the Russian Orthodox Church in order to turn a profit (at least one
Old Believer firm made icons for the imperial family). These developments
suggest a community in conflict and crisis rather than an "ideological
communitas" held together by shared beliefs.
Robson glosses over this internal crisis, creating an impression of unity and
cohesion. Did the pronouncements of an educated Old Belief elite—writers,
journalists, conference speakers, and community elders—really give expres-
sion to widely shared community values? One might note here that even Old
Belief leaders of earlier periods had to overcome great obstacles when trying to
impose their learned notions of religion and culture on community members
(cf. studies on the Vyg Community). Was the chasm between post-1905 Old
Belief leaders and their flock any less pronounced? We simply do not know.
The archival records that would allow historians to reconstruct the aspirations
and behavior of the vast majority of ordinary Old Believers have yet to be
studied.
This book is of great interest to scholars of modern Russian religion, but
readers should bear in mind the following two caveats: first, the author tends to
idealize modern Old Believers' community spirit and to assume that ordinary
and elite members lived in harmony; second, in the opinion of this reviewer
Robson overestimates the power of religious tradition to immunize Old Believ-
ers against the rapid changes of the modern world.
Georg В. Michels
University of California, Riverside
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A LONG WALK TO CHURCH: A CONTEMPORARY HIS-
TORY OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY. By Nathaniel Davis. Boul-
der, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. 381 pp. ISBN
(cloth) 0-8133-2276-6; ISBN (paper) 0-8133-2277-4 $32.00.
This book is the result of a project undertaken by Nathaniel Davis more than
forty years ago. The project began in 1954 when he submitted a paper on
"Religious Collaboration and Resistance in the Communist World" to Profes-
sor Philip E. Mosely of the Russian Institute at Columbia University. What
followed was a dissertation on "Religion and Communist Government in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," completed at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy in 1960, and a distinguished career as an American diplomat
that lasted more than thirty years. The "delay" in completing the project
certainly added to the value of the book, since it allowed Davis not only to
enhance his understanding of the Soviet state apparatus and its policies as a
result of his diplomatic missions in Moscow, but also to take advantage of the
recently opened Soviet archives.
It is Davis' familiarity with the literature of the subject and his first-hand
knowledge of the Soviet system that has enabled him to present a well-bal-
anced history of Russian Orthodoxy since the end of World War II. But it is his
access to the formerly closed Soviet archives that makes his contribution truly
unique. Davis appears to be one of the first Western scholars to have gained
access to the records of the USSR Council for Religious Affairs (now housed in
G A RF, the State Archives of the Russian Federation). These documents shed
new light not only on the history of Soviet policy toward Russian Orthodoxy
during the last fifty years of the existence of the USSR, but also on the inner
workings of the Russian Orthodox Church, including changes in its structure,
finances, education, and parish life.
Although this documentary material comes from the archives of the highly
centralized ail-Union body, it has enabled Davis to depart from the traditional
Moscow-centric point of view that prevailed for decades in the study of Rus-
sian Orthodoxy. As a result, his work is not limited to the analysis of events in
Moscow, but also follows developments in those areas of the USSR where the
majority of churches and Orthodox believers were located. Ukrainian Ortho-
doxy clearly emerges as one of the major beneficiaries of this approach. Davis
notes that after World War II, "The Russian Orthodox Church had become a
predominantly Ukrainian institution, as almost two-thirds of its parishes were
in Ukraine" (p. 24).
It can be deduced from Davis' study that the predominance of Ukrainian
parishes over Russian ones remained a salient feature of the Russian Orthodox
Church throughout the post-war period. In 1958, for example, before the start
of Nikita Khrushchev's antireligious campaign, the Kyiv eparchy had 582
active churches, compared with 212 in the Moscow eparchy, and the Lviv
eparchy accounted for 2,071 churches, almost ten times as many as in the
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Moscow eparchy. According to statistics compiled by Davis, even in 1994,
after the Moscow Patriarchate had lost thousands of its former parishes to the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox churches, it still had more
parishes in Ukraine than in Russia (5,700 compared with 5,200).
Why did Russian Orthodoxy become an essentially Ukrainian phenomenon
and remain so for many decades? Davis seeks the answers to this puzzle in the
history of the Sovietization of the western borderlands of the USSR, acquired
by Moscow in the course of World War II. He rightly states that it was the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that "rescued the institution of the Russian Orthodox
Church" (p. 16). As Davis shows in the book, Stalin used the church as an
instrument of sovietization and russification of the Baltics, western Belarus,
western Ukraine, and Bessarabia. In Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church
was also an instrument to combat the Vatican and the Greek Catholic faithful,
who were forcibly "converted" to Orthodoxy between 1946 and 1950.
Statistical data acquired by Davis from the Council for Religious Affairs
support this conclusion, showing that the authorities in the western Ukrainian
oblasts apparently kept in mind the main objectives of their anti-Vatican policy
when they tried to spare Orthodox parishes from deregistration during the
antireligion drives of the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, Galicia accounted for
roughly 2 percent of the all-Union population and 25 percent of all the Orthodox
churches in the USSR. Only half of those churches had an assigned Orthodox
priest, but were kept open by the authorities, contrary to the usual practice in the
rest of the country. It would appear that eastern Ukraine had to pay the price for
the government's religious "tolerance" in the regions of western Ukraine so that
the all-Ukrainian number of deregistered churches would meet all-Union "stan-
dards." In the late 1940s, Ukraine met that "standard" by closing approximately 7
percent of all active churches in the republic, but it was the oblasts of eastern
Ukraine that suffered the most, with the closing of as many as 20 percent of the
Orthodox churches in Poltava Oblast in eastern Ukraine.
In the 1950s, during the beginning of Khrushchev's antireligion campaign,
western Ukraine lost 3.5 percent of its parishes, while eastern Ukraine lost 14
percent. By the end of Khrushchev's rale, the Lviv eparchy had lost 42 percent
of its parishes—close to the USSR average of 40 percent, but the
Dnipropetrovsk eparchy in eastern Ukraine lost 86 percent, the highest percent-
age in the USSR. The Mukachevo eparchy in Transcarpathia lost only 16
percent of its churches. Of 167 priests active in Dnipropetrovsk oblast at the
start of the campaign, only 30 continued to serve their parishes at the end of the
drive. In 1996, in neighboring Zaporizhzhia oblast, there remained only 9 of
the 92 clerics who were registered there in 1958. As a result, by the mid-1980s
there was a population of 170,000 for every Orthodox parish in the
Dnipropetrovsk eparchy (including Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts)
and 3,500 for every parish in Transcarpathia.
The closing of churches in individual oblasts often depended on the atheistic
and bureaucratic zeal of local officials, the resistance of the population to
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forceful closures, and especially on the general tendency of Party officials to
"shelter" the Orthodox communities in the western regions of Ukraine, using
them to combat the continuing loyalty of the local population to the suppressed
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. As Davis shows, that was the case not only
with the closing of churches in the USSR, but also with the registration of new
Orthodox communities. In 1988, after the dramatic change of religious policy
under Mikhail Gorbachev, more than half of the 800 or so new Orthodox
parishes registered in the Soviet Union were located in Ukraine, most of them
in the former Greek Catholic eparchies in the western regions.
Davis is well acquainted not only with the sources and literature on the
history of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but also with recent developments
in church politics in the former USSR. In fact, he offers one of the most accurate
descriptions to date of the current confessional strife in Ukraine and of Ukrainian
Orthodoxy's struggle for autocephaly. At the same time, the book's coverage of
Ukrainian events is not completely free of occasional errors and omissions.
Contrary to what Davis writes in the book, at the time of the Union of Brest
(1596) it was not only western Ukraine (p. 132) but all of Ukraine that was under
Polish rule. The leader of trie Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stepan
Bandera, was never a Greek Catholic priest (p. 28). There are also some other
omissions in Davis' account of Ukrainian topics, but they are not significant.
Davis adopts a "flexible" policy on transliteration, using Ukrainian forms of
personal and geographic names when his sources are Ukrainian, and Russian
forms when they are Russian. This creates some confusion. A case in point is
the transliteration of the first name of Mariika Kazyn, a girl from Hrushiv who
claimed to have witnessed the appearance of the Mother of God in April 1987:
Davis identifies her as Marina Kazin (pp. 254-55). Nor does Davis make a
clear distinction between the terms "Russia" and "Rus'," identifying the Nestor
Chronicle as the "Russian Primary Chronicle," and Rus' lands as "Russian"
(p. 237). Sometimes he uses the term "Orthodox" as an antonym of "Auto-
cephalists" (p. 84), even though the latter designation refers to Orthodox be-
lievers seeking independence for their church.
In general, it should be noted that Davis' work is virtually free of errors
concerning the history and current status of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which gives
him a rare distinction among scholars who specialize in the history of Russian
Orthodoxy. For Davis, Ukraine is far from terra incognita, and that fact greatly
enhances the quality of his book. Davis concludes with a number of reflections
on the prospects for Russian Orthodoxy. According to his scenario, sooner or
later the Russian Orthodox Church will be confined within the borders of the
Russian Federation, and the Ukrainian and even the Belarusian Orthodox
churches will follow their separate paths. Given the history of Orthodoxy in
Eastern and Southern Europe, it is difficult not to agree with that prediction.
Serhii Plokhy
University of Alberta
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THE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE
SOVIET STATE (1939-1950). By Bohdan R. Bociurkiw.
Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
Press, 1996. 310 pp. ISBN (cloth) 1895-5711-2 $39.95.
This book is the product of a lifelong study of the history of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church under Soviet rule by one of the most eminent scholars in the
field. Its main focus is on the forcible suppression of the Greek Catholic
Church by the Soviet authorities in 1945-1950, a topic that has generated an
impressive literature, including both memoirs and research.
What are the new elements in the book's contribution to the subject? The list
of archival sources includes an impressive amount of material from the for-
merly inaccessible Soviet depositories. Bociurkiw gained access to documents
from the archives of the Greek Catholic Church that were confiscated by the
Soviet authorities, the former KGB archive in Kyiv, and Communist Party and
state archives in Moscow, Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil, as well
as materials pertaining to republican and oblast officials in charge of religious
affairs. These and other materials, quoted abundantly in the book, have made it
possible for Bociurkiw to produce the most authoritative study of the Soviet
destruction of the Greek Catholic Church that has appeared to date.
The book provides an impressive amount of information on the preparation,
logistics, and actual execution of the plan to destroy the church. It also docu-
ments the process of intimidation of the clergy, as well as the arrest and exile of
Greek Catholic bishops, priests, monks, and nuns. Bociurkiw's archival find-
ings present a unique opportunity to check the validity of studies of Soviet
religious policy written in the West before 1991. The newly acquired KGB,
party, and state documents prove "beyond reasonable doubt" what Bociurkiw
and some of his colleagues claimed long ago: the "reunion" of the Greek
Catholics with the Moscow Patriarchate was not voluntary, but was orches-
trated by the state and conducted in a most brutal way by Stalin's secret police.
Bociurkiw's study persuasively links the actual process of the suppression
of the Greek Catholic Church with two successive leaders of the USSR—
Joseph Stalin, who signed the directive to suppress the church, and Nikita
Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who
carried out the assignment. For the first time in the study of church-state
relations in the USSR, Bociurkiw presents the reader with portraits of those
Soviet secret police officials who were behind the scenes in the drama of the
persecution and forcible suppression of organized religion in the USSR. One of
them, whose career is detailed in the book, was Colonel Serhii Danylenko
(Karin), mentioned in the memoirs of Metropolitan Vasyl' LypkivsTtyi of the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Danylenko was responsible for
overseeing the destruction both of the Autocephalous Church in the 1920s and
of the Greek Catholic Church in the 1940s.
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Apart from this new and detailed information on the crucial role of the state
in the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church, Bociurkiw's study sheds new
light on a number of the most controversial aspects of the history of the
suppression of the church. These include the church's relations with the Ukrai-
nian Insurgent Army (UPA), the motives and role of the Initiative Group of the
Greek Catholic Church for Reunion with the Orthodox Church led by Fr.
Havryïl Kostel'nyk, and, finally, the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in the
suppression of the Greek Catholic Church.
Bociurkiw shows that although the church was closely linked with the
Ukrainian political and cultural movement through its episcopate, clergy, and
faithful, Soviet claims that the church leadership had closely cooperated with
the anti-Soviet underground were little more than a propaganda slogan put
forward as a pretext to destroy it. The directive signed by Stalin in March 1945
makes it clear that the plan to suppress the Greek Catholic Church was part of a
larger Soviet assault on the Vatican and on Catholicism in general on the
territory of the USSR, and not a campaign aimed specifically against the
Ukrainian underground. Quite symptomatically, that is also the way in which
the assault was interpreted by the anonymous author of the 1946 letter to the
leaders of the underground—a document that Bociurkiw attributes to
Kostel'nyk.
Bociurkiw draws attention to the fact that after the Red Army took Lviv in
the summer of 1944, the church leadership actively sought a modus vivendi
with the Soviet authorities and did nothing to provoke its forcible suppression.
He quotes a pastoral letter by the bishop of Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk),
Hryhorii Khomyshyn, and two pastoral letters of the head of the church,
Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, issued between October 1944 and March 1945. All
three letters called on the underground to desist from "arbitrary killings," and
Slipyj also helped to organize a secret meeting between the Soviet military
command and the leadership of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. None of this
helped the church's cause or prevented the Soviet propaganda machine from
accusing the church leadership of collaboration with the anti-Soviet under-
ground. Bociurkiw concludes that "there is nothing the Greek Catholic Church
could have done to avert its suppression by the Kremlin" (p. 235).
The church's attempts to establish a working relationship with the state
contributed, at least in part, to the fact that there was no immediate reaction on
the part of the underground to the arrests of church hierarchs in April 1945.
Only in mid-1946 did the underground take a clearly negative stand against the
suppression of the church and the "reunification" of its faithful with the Mos-
cow Patriarchate. Soviet secret police reports show that initially some leaders
of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army even welcomed these developments, planning
to install their men in positions of influence in the Orthodox Church in eastern
Ukraine. Such reasoning was made possible by strained relations between the
underground and the leadership of the church in early 1945, as well as by
nationalist ideology, which was skeptical in its attitude toward religion and
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postulated as its goal the creation of an independent "united" Ukrainian state
(with an inevitable majority of Orthodox believers). That factor also enabled
Kostel'nyk to claim at the "reunification" Sobor of March 1946 that the "forest
men" were all in favor of Orthodoxy. Characteristically, the underground never
retaliated against the organizers of the "reunion" and refused to take responsi-
bility for the assassinations of Kostel'nyk in 1948 and the anti-Catholic publi-
cist Iaroslav Halan in 1950.
What were the motives of Kostel'nyk and other members of the Initiative
Group? Bociurkiw comes to the conclusion that all of them, including
Kostel'nyk, who was the leader of the pro-eastern faction in the church, were
intimidated by the secret police and forced to join the group. He also points out
that the death in November 1944 of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytslcyi, who was
truly respected by Kostel'nyk, and his replacement as the head of the church by
Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, Kostel'nyk's old foe, may have contributed to the
latter's decision to join the group. The rationale for the "reunion" that
Kostel'nyk put forward in his private talks with priests and was presented in the
anonymous letter to the underground, consisted of the following points: the
Soviets had decided to suppress the church and would do so in any event; under
such circumstances it was wrong for the clergy to abandon their flock, hence it
was better to "reunite" with the Orthodox Church and thus prevent the influx of
"Muscovite" priests into Galicia.
Bociurkiw's archival findings (Kostel'nyk's letters, as well as reports sub-
mitted by government and secret police officials) show that those were indeed
among the true goals of Kostel'nyk's "conversion." To achieve them,
Kostel'nyk insisted on the convocation of a special Sobor instead of oblast
conferences, as had been suggested by the Moscow Patriarch, and on the
consecration of new Orthodox bishops from among former Greek Catholics.
Students of church-state relations in the USSR will be interested to learn that
the Sobor of 8-10 March 1946, which concluded on the Sunday of Orthodoxy,
was in fact arranged by government officials to take place between elections to
the USSR Supreme Soviet and the start of spring sowing.
The Sobor was labelled an "operetta" by its participants and proclaimed
uncanonical by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops in the West. But for Kostel'nyk
it had a special meaning and was probably intended to set the seal on his "deal"
with the authorities. That "deal" included the consecration of new bishops from
among former Greek Catholics, the reduction of liturgical changes to a mini-
mum, and the establishment of a theological seminary in Lviv. Kostel'nyk was
also naïve enough to think that he and his supporters would be allowed to
conduct a "modernization" of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Little of this was ever
realized, apparently contributing to Kostel'nyk's disillusionment with the "re-
union" at the end of his life. It would appear that he was assassinated on orders
of the Soviet secret police, which feared that the resistance movement would
spirit Kostel'nyk to the West.
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Bociurkiw analyzes the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church not only
in relation to Soviet religious policy, but also in the broader context of Russian
Orthodox attacks on Greek Catholics, starting with the partitions of Poland in
the late eighteenth century. He also draws a parallel between the Lviv Sobor of
1946 and the 1839 Sobor in Vitsebsk, which suppressed the Greek Catholic
(then Uniate) Church in central Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time,
Bociurkiw rightly remarks that "in contrast to the tsarist 'reunion' campaigns,
the Russian Orthodox Church played only a marginal role in the postwar
assault on Greek Catholicism" (p. 237). One must agree with Bociurkiw that
the Russian hierarchy generally had little choice but to follow Stalin's orders.
However, the absence of any condemnation of the 1946 Lviv Sobor on the part
of the Moscow Patriarchate after its liberation from the communist "yoke" is
striking.
Bociurkiw quotes a document according to which the Orthodox archbishop
of Lviv, Makarii (Oksiiuk), warned authorities back in 1945 that Kostel'nyk
wanted only a formal union of the Greek Catholic parishes with the Orthodox
church, and that if given a chance he would revive an autocephalist movement
in Ukraine. This was a prescient statement, as it was indeed the former Greek
Catholic parishes in Galicia that formed the core of the revived Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1989. The "time bomb" set by Kostel'nyk
actually went off.
Bociurkiw concludes his book with a paragraph on sources to which he did
not have access, remarking with irony that the Vatican archives remained
largely closed to him when those of the former Soviet secret police in Ukraine
were opened to researchers. There is little doubt that more revelations about the
history of the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church, based both on West-
ern and former Soviet archives, will come to light, but it is highly unlikely that
those new documents will challenge the principal conclusions of Bociurkiw's
study.
Serhii Plokhy
University of Alberta
NIHIL OBSTAT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA. By
Sabrina P. Ramet. Durham, NC and London: Duke University
Press, 1998. xi, 425 pp. Index. ISBN (cloth) 0-8223-2056-8
$74.95; ISBN (paper) 0-8223-2070-3 $23.95.
Religion and politics are wisely banned from polite conversation, for separately
they are dangerous enough, but together—potentially explosive. Even among
scholars, disinterested discussion of religion in relation to politics and soci-
ety—combined with the requisite empathy with the religious point of view—is
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rare. Sabrina P. Ramet's Nihil Obstat exemplifies that combination of profound
understanding and objective distance necessary for a scholarly treatment of this
much neglected subject.
The book is divided into five sections, beginning with a cross-regional
overview of communist religious policy and ending with a survey of
postcommunist trends and some general theoretical conclusions. The three
intermediate sections divide the subject geographically: the northern tier, the
Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. While the different countries are not all
treated chapter by chapter (Poland and Czechoslovakia each appears in two
chapters, while Bulgaria shares a chapter with Poland), all of communist East
and Central Europe is covered, except for the Baltic states (more properly
belonging to Northern Europe), Belarus, and Moldova (though the latter two
are to some degree covered by the chapter on the Russian Orthodox Church).
Chapters two through six, and chapter eight, have all been published before
(in some cases, in earlier versions) in journals, or in collections edited by the
author. The eight remaining chapters are entirely new. Thus, the book com-
bines the virtues of up-to-date scholarship with the convenience of collecting
some of the author's previous research in a single volume.
The clever title—its tongue-in-cheek reference to Roman Catholic terminol-
ogy is continued in such headings as "Imprimatur," "In Hoc Signo Vinces,"
and "Ego Te Absolvo," which the publishers have cutely set in a somber
Gothic typeface—sounds a principal theme of the work. With the collapse of
communism, "nothing stands in the way" of a proliferation of religions and
religious groups throughout the former Soviet Union and its satellite states.
This theme and its corollaries provide some conceptual unity to the tangled
history and current problems of religion in East-Central Europe and Russia.
In her preface, the author questions the common view that the fall of
communism has left a "spiritual vacuum" in its wake. As she points out,
communism never quite succeeded in eradicating religion, nor was the influ-
ence of the institutional churches that survived through the communist period
negligible. In fact, as Ramet remarks in her introductory chapter, "Communism
in its own brutal way ultimately protected the religions of which it approved,
crushing rival religious associations that failed to obtain its sanction" (p. 3). In
countries such as Poland, it served as an unwilling foil to the Church's im-
mense moral credibility. Thus, the new and revived religions now active in
postcommunist space do have serious traditional competitors. On the other
hand, there are sectors of society, particularly in such heavily Sovietized areas
as Ukraine's Donbas, where something approaching a spiritual vacuum can be
detected.
In a mostly historical study, chapter two stands out with its strictly political
science approach. Here the author analyzes communist religious policy in
Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, as well as in two countries beyond
the scope of the rest of this work: China and Cuba. Identifying several phases
and subphases in the development of policy, she is able to draw illuminating
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comparisons among these five regimes. She argues convincingly that religious
policy is usually not isolated, but tends to track political, economic, and other
government policy.
The next eight chapters examine religion, politics, and society in the former
East European communist states, Russia and Ukraine. The concise historical
summaries show, among other things, that close government supervision and
control of religious groups was hardly a twentieth-century innovation. The
reader is also reminded that the long-term deleterious effects of communist
policies on religious life are far from spent. It is revealing that the East German
Jugendweihe, long regarded as a lame government attempt to supplant reli-
gious confirmation of youth with state-imposed ceremonies, has experienced
an evidently genuine revival since 1989 (p. 87). Particularly noteworthy is the
chapter on Yugoslavia, with its lucid theoretical introduction, illuminating
historical summary, and delicately balanced account of the intricacies of a most
complex subject. The chapter on Romania concentrates on intolerance, defin-
ing and discussing it with a precision all too rare in treatments of this phenom-
enon. It is significant, incidentally, that the Romanian revolution of December
1989 was sparked by government removal of a Reformed parish priest in
Timişoara. Albania, characterized by a religious complexity inversely propor-
tional to its size, deserves its separate chapter. Ukrainianists may be struck by
the parallels between the government-sponsored autocephaly of the Albanian
Orthodox Church in 1922 and that of Ukraine in 1919-1920 (pp. 207-209).
Chapter nine, on "The Russian Orthodox Church in Transition," contains a
most enlightening discussion of "system collapse, civil strife, and religious
revival" (pp. 235-38), drawn in part from a 1992 article. Sounding a leading
motif of her work, the author notes that because churches "are committed to
systems of values that they ideally would like to become dominant is society,"
"religious organizations . . . are naturally political" (p. 238), and that "religion,
concerned with the values of society, is intrinsically political" (p. 240). There is
hope in Ramet's suggestions that "within the ideological corpus of Russian
Orthodoxy may be found not merely 'reactionary-romantic authoritarianism,'
but other proclivities, potentialities, and possibilities" (p. 245).
In a chapter aptly entitled "A House Divided," Ramet ably summarizes the
complex church history of Ukraine since the 1596 Union of Brest, concentrat-
ing, however, on the emergence of the Greek Catholic Church and three rival
Orthodox Churches since 1989. Even with reliance on the most trustworthy
sources, however, a few errors or inconsistencies inevitably creep in. Thus, she
states that Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev at-
tended Metropolitan Sheptytsicyi's funeral in November 1944 (p. 249). This is
apparently inconsistent, however, with the statement by Bohdan Bociurkiw in
his cited monograph that a letter to Pope Pius XII by Metropolitan Josef Slipyj
describing the funeral "should lay to rest the still current rumours about
Khrushchev's participation in the funeral bearing a wreath from Stalin"
(Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State [1939-
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1950], p. 81n56). The statement that Greek Catholics "routinely said Mass in
'padlocked churches'" (page 250) would be better phrased "routinely cel-
ebrated the liturgy outside 'padlocked churches.'" On page 252 Ramet says
that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church "regained its legal registration in
December 1989." More precisely, in December 1989 the Soviet government
agreed to register individual Greek Catholic parishes; registration of the
Church as a whole, however, was only accomplished in June 1991. Such details
aside, this account is thorough and accurate, and the characterization of the
overall situation rings true. Noteworthy is the author's concluding observation
that the emergence of a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with perhaps 55
million faithful, would constitute the second-largest Orthodox Church in the
world (p. 262).
The section on postcommunist trends begins with a survey of the "new
evangelism" in postcommunist Europe, which includes some startling statis-
tics. We learn, for example, that in 1994 Ukraine had approximately twice as
many "nonindigenous protestant missionaries" as Russia (table 11.1, p. 266).
When one corrects the misstatement of Ukraine's population in the table, one
finds that Ukraine's ratio of missionaries to population was about six times that
of Russia's. Ramet's analysis can be accordingly corrected to read that "Rela-
tive to population density, the most intense missionary activity has been cen-
tered in Estonia, [Ukraine] and Latvia, followed—at some distance—by Rus-
sia, Armenia and Georgia" (p. 266). Ukraine's more favorable religious legisla-
tion, and the absence of a single dominant church with the kind of political
influence wielded by the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia, make it amenable to
evangelization. At the same time, the evangelical challenge to the traditional
Churches may prove a modernizing stimulus, much as in the sixteenth century,
when competition from Protestantism and Counterreformation Catholicism
spurred the Kyivan Orthodox Metropolitanate to reform.
In the next chapter, Ramet contrasts the fate of two churches in
postcommunist societies: the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Catholic
Church in Poland. Using Bogdan Cywinski's concept of the "Julianie" and the
"Constantian" church as an analytical model, she passes from the recent history
of the weak, divided Bulgarian church to a detailed account of church-state
relations in Poland. There, the Catholic Church has mostly found itself in
"Julianie" opposition, first to the communist regime, then to postcommunist
liberal constituencies. Warning that a Julianie church given access to power
tends to turn theocratic, Ramet examines the controversies surrounding abor-
tion, broadcasting, the constitution, and the concordat. Here, she seems to
implicitly take current American notions of church-state relations as normative.
While common enough, attaching political labels like "liberal," "progressive,"
and "conservative" to religious views (e.g., p. 306) is of questionable utility.
With regard to the abortion controversy, for example, it is hardly self-evident
that those who would extend legal protection to what is in their view an
underrepresented class of persons should be termed "conservative," while
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those who would deny it are called "progressive" (p. 305). Nonetheless, Ramet
does illustrate how religious institutions sometimes seek to circumvent the
democratic process; one is reminded that legislation is no substitute for evange-
lization.
The most colorful chapter is surely the thirteenth, from which this volume
takes its title, and which is subtitled "The Rise of Nontraditional Religions."
Here the author exhibits a laudable and all-too-rare respect for even the most
bizarre religious notions that have appeared in postcommunist space. Regard-
ing the extraordinary claims of White Brotherhood leader Maria Tsvigun,
however, one can only concur (however reluctantly) with Ramet's question,
"Why would Christ want to be reincarnated specifically as a Ukrainian . . . ?"
(p. 315). Among the author's astute concluding observations are that nontradi-
tional religious associations mirror tendencies in both mainline religions and in
the West, that certain typically "American" features help evangelical groups
gain converts (p. 333), and that the fundamentalist religious personality in
some ways coincides with the authoritarian personality type (pp. 333-34). It is
no revelation, however, that "the desire to proselytize . . . is common to most, if
not all, Christian religions" (p. 334): one need only consult Matt. 28:19-20 to
see why it could hardly be otherwise.
Ramet's final chapter, on "The Nature of Religio-Political Interaction," is
the most interesting theoretically. Some of his assertions, to be sure, are prob-
lematic. The choice of "Ego te absolvo" for the chapter title leads to a discus-
sion in which absolution seems to be confused with a priori approval: that
"absolution is sometimes given in advance" (p. 335) is a contradiction in terms.
Nor is the story of Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 22), cited on the same page, an
example of absolution, for if to sacrifice one's son is to carry out God's will,
there is nothing for God to absolve. Ramet's assumption of an antithesis
between divine commands (e.g., that Abraham kill his son) and moral impera-
tives (e.g., against killing) (p. 337) is debatable: to the religious believer, God's
commands are not distinguishable from the moral good, for God is good by
definition, and the love of God is not distinguishable from the "love of the good
and of Reason." That God stayed Abraham's hand is thus not incidental, but
essential, to the point of the story. For the same reason the author's corollary,
that because religious claims regarding positive law are registered "on behalf of
obedience to divine authority" (as opposed to rationalistic notions of the good),
they may be seen as "tending toward theocracy" and intolerance (pp. 337-38),
is not convincing, except to the extent that all value systems tend to establish
themselves to the detriment of competing ones. Any consistent Christian ethic
must, in fact, tolerate "difference"; that its views on human conduct should
play a role in a society's determination of what is harmful to public health,
safety, or morals is natural, and far from theocracy.
Although Ramet's characterization of a morality based on divine command
as "moral relativism" is even less convincing, one can only agree that moral
relativism offers no sufficient basis for a secular state resistant to theocratic
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pressures (p. 338). On what, then, can the state base its morality? Ramet
suggests natural law or "right reason," but candidly points out that if positive
law is to follow natural law, the problem remains of who should oversee and
determine this correspondence—a legislative authority, an intellectual elite, or
a religious body (p. 337). Conceding the inability of human reason to achieve a
consensus in "gray areas" such as the abortion issue, she rightly points out that
nevertheless, admitting such moral ambiguities "does not prevent one from
asserting, at the same time, the absoluteness of moral dicta" (p. 338). The
problem of finding an agreed-upon code for a diverse society in a secular sate
thus remains unresolved. In any case, the author has amply demonstrated that
"One does not need to be religious to apprehend the centrality of moral con-
cerns in politics" (p. 339).
Although this book lacks a bibliography, the nearly sixty-seven pages of
endnotes practically serve the purpose. There are a few minor gaffes of the
editorial and typographic variety (e.g., information on Cuba on p. 30 is re-
peated on p. 43; the use of Polish diacritics is inconsistent and seems to have
fallen victim to the vagaries of "find-and-replace"). They hardly detract from
this volume's fitness as assigned reading in courses not only on East Europe or
on religious groups, but on modern politics and society in general.
Sabrina Ramet's survey illustrates at least three important connections be-
tween religion and politics. First, religious policy often tracks other state
policies. Second, religious issues are sometimes an important factor in political
events (e.g., the 1989 Romanian revolution). Finally and most importantly, by
offering alternative, competing visions of the social order, religious groups
challenge political regimes, whether of an authoritarian or a liberal democratic
stripe. Moreover, these social visions, linked as they are to the transcendent,
may prove more compelling than mere political ideologies.
Andrew Sorokowski
Cambridge, Massachusetts
THE UKRAINIAN RESURGENCE. By Bohdan Nahaylo.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. xix, 608 pp. + 5 maps,
40 illus., index, bibliography. ISBN (cloth) 0-8020-4132-9 $55.00;
ISBN (paper) 0-8020-7977-6 $24.95.
The emergence of independent Ukraine in 1991 has resulted in a steady stream
of works that attempt to understand the history and political development of a
nation that had previously been consigned to oblivion because of its subjuga-
tion to foreign powers. Independent Ukraine's importance as a key element of
the so-called new "European security architecture" has also attracted the atten-
tion of non-Ukrainian political scientists and policy analysts. Given the long
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ghettoization of Ukrainian studies, the broadening of interest is welcome.
Formerly with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich and currently a
senior adviser to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the countries
within the Commonwealth of Independent States, Bohdan Nahaylo initially
sought to sketch a brief outline of how Ukraine achieved independence. He
soon expanded his goals to produce "a surrogate concise political history of
modern Ukraine and offer a tentative picture of the new independent Ukrainian
state" (p. xvi). Of Ukrainian extraction, Nahaylo presents a moderate Ukrainian
national viewpoint as he sketches chronologically the resurgence of Ukrainian
nationalism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's declaration of inde-
pendence, and the political and foreign policy history of that new independent
state between 1991 and 1996.
Nahaylo's study is political in the narrowest sense of the word. Readers will
search in vain for an analytical framework as the author does not engage
theories of nationbuilding, nationalism, and identity construction. Neither does
he investigate the roles that Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians— below the level
of the intelligentsia and politicians—played (beyond noting their participation
in demonstrations and elections) in bringing about independence and sustain-
ing thereafter a unified state. While including some of the newer scholarly
studies of Ukraine's independence in his select bibliography, the author unfor-
tunately does not engage those studies' conclusions, preferring to rely on his
own interpretation of contemporary print and aural media accounts as well as
interviews with some key political and cultural players. In the end, Nahaylo
does not achieve his promise of "an acceptable balance between the descriptive
and the analytical," erring as he does on the side of the descriptive (p. xvii).
Indeed, at times the text is encyclopedic in nature.
The first chapter on the historical background of Ukraine is the weakest.
Reducing over a thousand years of history to a mere nineteen pages, Nahaylo
presents Ukraine solely as the victim of various powers, especially Russia.
Nuances of historical complexity are absent, leaving the uninitiated reader to
assume that everything that went wrong in Ukrainian history, including
antisemitism, was imposed from the outside. The author might well have
opened the book with a discussion limited to the immediate post-Stalin period
in Ukraine. He is on much surer footing with his balanced examination of the
Shelest years, although some readers may wince at his characterization of
Khrushchev's ouster from power in 1964 as the result of "a palace coup"
(p. 26).
In his nonthematic discussion of the developments that led to Ukrainian
independence, Nahaylo does an excellent job in contextualizing. He keeps
readers abreast of changing political directions in Gorbachev's Soviet Union as
well as national resurgences in other non-Russian republics, especially the
Baltic States. As a result, the lag in the Ukrainian national awakening of the
period becomes fully apparent. Nahaylo also recognizes that Rukh, the national
democratic movement, missed a valuable opportunity in 1989 to reach out to
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mainly Russian workers in industrialized southeast Ukraine. Unfortunately, too
many events on the road to independence become, for the author, turning points
or watersheds, leaving the reader's head spinning.
Ultimately, Nahaylo believes that Ukrainian independence is "something of
a miracle" (p. 549). He stresses the pragmatic nature of Ukraine's 1996 demo-
cratic constitution as recognizing a territorial rather than ethnic principle as the
foundation for citizenship; the strides that both the governments of Leonid
Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma made in foreign policy by reorienting Ukraine
toward Europe, while maintaining restraint with regard to relations with the
Russian Federation; and the peaceful transition of government in the aftermath
of the 1994 elections. Consequently, in his conclusion he remains optimistic
about Ukraine's future. His postscript, however, which briefly chronicles po-
litical and foreign policy events from the late spring of 1997 through the 1998
election, ends on a more pessimistic note. Here Nahaylo concedes that Ukraine
may not be "adequately prepared to face the challenges of the twenty-first
century" (p. 553). Obviously, predicting the future is very difficult and meeting
the challenges of publishing deadlines and delays can be frustrating. But
Nahaylo's change of mind in the postscript does underscore a fatal flaw in his
book, and that is his reluctance to examine Ukraine's economic challenges.
While mentioning miners' strikes, Kravchuk's exacerbation of Ukraine's inter-
nal problems, hyperinflation, Ukraine's continuing economic dependence on
Russia, and other economic realities, he concentrates on political victories and
progress in external affairs. Ironically—though with far less serious conse-
quences—Nahaylo follows in the footsteps of Mikhail Gorbachev, who also
concentrated on politics at the expense of economic reform. Other studies are
beginning to appear, however, that address the more neglected topics of eco-
nomic issues, regional differences, and the continuing legacy of a Soviet com-
mand economy, as well as the construction of new identities and a shared
historical memory in independent Ukraine.
Christine D. Worobec
Northern Illinois University
THE LEGEND OF THE NOVGORODIAN WHITE COWL: THE
STUDY OF ITS "PROLOGUE" AND "EPILOGUE." By
Miroslav Labunka. Munich: Ukrainische Freie Universität, 1998.
χ, 339 pp. ISBN (paper) 3928-6873-1 $30.00.
The Tale of the White Cowl is a composition that purports to show the origin of
the white mitre worn by the Novgorodian archbishops in the sixteenth century.
A great deal of work on textual relations of the manuscript copies was done by
N. N. Rozov, who identified five redactions of the Tale. He considered the
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earliest of these to be the First Long Redaction, which contains mention of Rus'
as the Third Rome, but N. Subbotin had proposed that the Short Redaction,
which does not mention Third Rome, was the earliest form of the text.
Subbotin's suggestion seems more likely since the First Long Redaction cor-
rects the chronology of the Short Redaction.
According to the Tale, Constantine the Great, in the early fourth century,
presents Pope Sylvester with the white cowl as a gift for curing him of an
illness. A subsequent pope (Formosus in the Short Redaction; unnamed in the
First Long Redaction) sends the white cowl to a Byzantine patriarch (named
Juvenal in the Short Redaction; Philotheus in the First Long Redaction), who
then sends it to Archbishop Vasilii of Novgorod.
The problem with the chronology of the Short Redaction is that Formosus
was pope in the late ninth century while Vasilii was archbishop in the early
fourteenth century and there was no patriarch named Juvenal. The author of the
First Long Redaction most likely realized the error of the Short Redactor in
naming a person who was pope four-and-a-half centuries too soon. And, al-
though Philotheus was not patriarch at the time Vasilii was archbishop, at least
the century was right, since Philotheus was patriarch in the middle and late
fourteenth century.
Attached to many copies of the Tale are two shorter works. The first is a
letter or prologue self-attributed to Mitia the Small (generally thought to be a
reference to Dmitrii Gerasimov) and addressed to Archbishop Gennadii of
Novgorod in which the author explains how he found the Tale. The second is a
"writing" or epilogue attributed to Gennadii Gonzov who was archbishop of
Novgorod from 1484 to 1504 in which the author acknowledges receipt of the
Tale. It is these two shorter works that Miroslav Labunka subjects to a thor-
ough scholarly examination. Although a number of investigators (including
this reviewer) question the self-declared attributions and corresponding early
datings of these compositions, Labunka concludes that Gerasimov wrote the
letter in the 1490s and that Archbishop Gennadii is indeed the author of the
epilogue. As part of his argument for dating the epilogue early, Labunka
compares its text to the "Short Vita of Maksim Grek," which has some similar
passages. He convincingly shows that the author of the Vita borrowed from the
epilogue of the Tale. Once we are able to establish the date of composition of
the Vita, we will then, as a result of Labunka's analysis, be in a better position
to establish a terminus post quern non for the writing of the epilogue.
Labunka's book is a work of the highest order of scholarship, not only
because of its long, erudite, and informative footnotes, but also because of the
nature of the questions Labunka raises about the texts at hand. He lays out with
precise fairness the evidence and arguments both for and against early dating
and traditional attribution. Then he provides his own reasoning for why he
accepts one and not the other. A hallmark of sound scholarship is when the
historian provides enough evidence for the reader to disagree. This means that
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historians have as their primary goal the advancement of our understanding of
the sources, and Labunka achieves that goal many times over.
The publication by the Ukrainische Freie Universität of Labunka's doctoral
dissertation, completed by him at Columbia University in 1978 under the
direction of Ihor Sevcenko, will make it far less likely that Labunka's impor-
tant contribution to scholarship will be overlooked by other scholars writing on
the subject. It also makes more accessible to students this model of genuine
scholarly method.
Donald Ostrowski
Harvard University
JEWISH-UKRAINIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY: A SELECTED BIB-
LIOGRAPHY OF RESOURCES IN ENGLISH. Second revised
edition. By Andrew Gregorovich. Toronto-Scranton, PA: Forum,
1999. 116 pp. $50.00. [Orders: A. Gregorovich, 620 Spadina Ave.,
Toronto, ON Canada M5S 2H4.]
Andrew Gregorovich, a retired librarian with a long history of distinguished
service at the University of Toronto, has provided the scholarly world with the
first significant bibliography of this nature, and as such his work belongs on the
shelves of every serious collection of Ukrainian studies. This bibliography lists
over one thousand entries, the majority of them scholarly volumes and articles,
which deal directly or indirectly with the historical encounter of Jews and
Ukrainians. One of the unique strengths of this work is Gregorovich's inclusion
of many relevant works of fiction as well as several pamphlets, published in
very small runs, which were circulated during the early years of post-Soviet
independence. Also included are a number of more idiosyncratic items, such as
an important newspaper advertisement (item 320) and a conference program
(item 84).
The bibliography has several limitations, however. Gregorovich's intent in
producing this work is clearly to aid Ukrainian apologetics, as he indicates in
his introduction:
The annotations in this bibliography are descriptive and also consist of criti-
cism and evaluation as well as interesting quotes with a positive purpose.
[T]he negative side [of Ukrainian-Jewish relations-HA] is so well represented
in much of the literature that I did not feel compelled to dwell excessively on
that tragic side of the history.
This caveat alone certainly does not disqualify the value of the bibliography,
and Gregorovich does a reasonable job in listing all perspectives, whether
hostile to Ukrainian interpretations or not. Nevertheless, this approach is espe-
cially unfortunate given that the bibliography is intended primarily for readers
of English (despite the subtitle, a few Ukrainian-language works are also
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included) and his rather loaded annotations limit its utility as a research tool for
undergraduates. Gregorovich also includes an appendix of addresses and con-
tacts for various Jewish and Ukrainian organizations—understandable in the
context of providing material for engaging in contemporary political debate—
as well as a list of "famous Jews who trace their ancestry to Ukraine," including
"entertainment moguls" and others. The text is further marred by a small
number of technical errors such as repetition of entries (e.g., items 13 and 16;
44 reprinted in 45) and the like, all of which could have been avoided with
more careful editing.
Despite these reservations, Gregorovich's extensive revision of his first
bibliography on this topic represents an almost ten-fold increase in size and
constitutes an important contribution to the scholarship on the history of the
Jews of Ukraine.
Henry Abramson
Florida Atlantic University

CORRECTIONS
Pliguzov, Andrei I. "Or флорентийской унии к автокефалии русской
церкви," HUS XIX (1995): 513-530. The following was received from the
author and represents a corrected conclusion to his article. This conclusion was
not used at the time due to an oversight in the original volume:
В Троицк. 177 находим и еще один перевод с греческого, который
примерно аналогичен тексту, опубликованному Ж . Минем в 160 томе
«Patrologiae Corpus Completas» как «Апология» Марка Евгеника.1
Сочинение, переписанное редактором-составителем Троицк. 177, не
принадлежит Марку Евгенику (например, его нет в исчерпывающем
каталоге Константина Н. Цирпанлиса).2 Автором этого текста, по-
видимому, являлся свидетель последних минут жизни Марка Евгеника
иеромнемон на погребении Марка (в тексте: ίερομνημονος, отсюда—
испорченное славянское чтение «иероним») Федор Агалианос (Луи Пети
предположил, что в создании текста принимал участие Георгий
Схоларий.
3
 Однако русскому читателю были важны не запутанные
проблемы атрибуции, а резко антиуниатское настроение сочинения (в
русском тексте оно похоже на устное завещание («словеса на кончине
живота своего»): Марк Евгеник был единственным греческим иерархом,
кто открыто не подчинился унии и до самой смерти (23 июня 1444 г. или
23 июня 1445 г.) яростно критиковал решения Ферраро-Флорентийского
собора. Славянским переводчикам был доступен греческий список,
близкий Vallicellanus Φ. 38, φ . 263-265 (издан Л. Пети, с разночтениями
по восьми другим спискам). Дополнения славянского переводчика
незначительны: прибавлена дата «м(е)с(я)ца априлА в лЪто 6951»4 и
заключительный раздел текста: «того же шствюи . . . аминь».
Теперь наш перечень московских списков документации, имеющей
отношение к рецепции решений Ферраро-Флорентийского собора,
можно считать исчерпывающим.
В приложении публикуем неизданные славянские тексты Послания
1443 года и сочинения Федора Агалианоса о последних днях жизни
Марка Евгеника. При передаче текста я придерживался следующих
принципов: все славянские буквы оригинала сохранены в публикации,
надстрочные знаки не воспроизведены, сокращения под титлами
раскрыты, необходимые для этого буквы поставлены в круглых скобках;
титла всюду раскрыты по новейшей орфографии, выносные буквы
внесены в строку и обозначены курсивом, опущенные перед ними или
после них буквы также внесены в текст и помещены в круглых скобках;
конъектуральные дополнения выделяются квадратными скобками (є);
киноварные буквы переданы полужирным шрифтом (bold).
Harvard Ukrainian Studies XXI (3/4) 1997: 497-98.
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1. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completas. Seriae Graeca, vol. 160 (Paris,
1866), cols. 536-37.
2. Tsirpanlis, Mark Eugenicus and the Council of Florence, pp. 109-18.
3. См.: Louis Petit, ed., "Documents relatives au Concile de Florence. II
Oeuvres anticonciliaries de Marc d'Éphese," in Patrología Orientalis,
vol. 17, f. 2 (Paris, 1923), p. 484, note а. Об Agalianus, см. С. J. G.
Turner, "Notes on the Works of Theodore Agalianos Contained in the
Codex Bodleianus Canonicus Graecus 49," Byzantinische Zeitschrift 61
(1968): 27-35.
4. На современное летосчисление эту дату можно перевести—если
считать календарь мартовским—как апрель 1444 г.
Bilaniuk, Laada. "Speaking of 'Surzhyk,'" HUS ХХІЦ/2) June 1997:100.
The following phrase was erroneously inserted into the section "Semantics"
from a reviewer's marks, and should have been removed before going to press.
It was not the author's statement: "In standard Ukrainian it means 'to do,' and
'to work' is pracjuvaty. However, under influence of Russian rabotât' 'to work'
there is a lexical shift among some surzhyk speakers for robyty to mean 'to
work.'" Prof. Bilaniuk notes the possibility of nonstandard dialect influence on
the semantic load of robyty, where Ukrainian dialects may utilize it as the
unmarked lexeme meaning 'to work,' just as is the case in some forms of Polish,
Slovak, and Czech.
HUS regrets these oversights.
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